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Preface
The research projects reported in this book were initiated because of the 
painful realization in 1992 that there was an enormous vacuum of solid empir 
ical knowledge about the reasons for the unexpected explosion in the size of 
the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) disability programs an explo 
sion that led the Trustees to project near-term insolvency for the Disability 
Insurance (DI) Trust Fund in the absence of corrective action. The policy 
response to that crisis included the short-term fix of reallocating Old Age and 
Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund contributions to the DI Fund, as well 
as the initiation of a set of studies that are reflected in this volume.
The bulk of the original work forming the basis of this book was carried 
out between 1992 and 1995, culminating in a conference in 1995. Some of 
the papers were slightly updated subsequent to the 1995 conference, but most 
of the empirical work and the discussion of policy issues reflect the authors' 
understanding of the subject matter as of 1995. Some do not completely 
reflect post-1995 developments, not due to ignorance on the part of the 
authors, but simply as a result of not having had a good-quality crystal ball at 
the time of the substantive completion of the various contributions! Some of 
the papers include discussions of policy changes being actively considered in 
1995 that have since been made and are currently being implemented.
Much changed between 1992 and the 1995 conference, and much more 
has changed since then. In particular, 1992 reflected a situation that we sus 
pected all along was near the peak of unusually strong growth in the size of 
both the DI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability program rolls, 
as a result of the previous recession and a host of other, primarily program 
matic, developments. Good economic times followed, with a period of sus 
tained growth, accompanied by both low inflation and low unemployment, 
lasting through the time that this book is going to press, in early 1998. There 
were other, more complex, programmatic and policy changes affecting the 
growth of SSA's disability program rolls, many of them taking effect after the
1995 conference. Many of these changes were in some sense policy responses 
to the previous explosion in the disability rolls, just as our research effort has 
been. They also, however, reflected continued and broader societal and politi 
cal concerns with the appropriate balance between a safety net for the truly 
needy, personal responsibility, and the financial interests of taxpayers.
A series of legislative developments culminated in the passage of the Per 
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. This act and separate
1996 legislation focusing on drug addicts and alcoholics have several impor-
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tant provisions directly affecting important segments of SSA's disability pro 
gram target populations, including children and noncitizens. This legislation 
also has potentially sweeping indirect effects on the disability programs as a 
result of the replacement of the sixty-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program with block grants for Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF). Many of the contributors to this volume, including 
the co-editors, are deeply involved in major policy evaluation efforts directly 
focusing on such post-1995 developments.
Early on in this effort we often joked about the possibility that policy 
research may be a lagging, rather than a leading, indicator of major program 
developments. Empirical trends since 1992 seem to confirm that the research 
program reflected in this volume is a lagging indicator of program change, 
just as a previous flurry of empirical research on disability caseload growth 
that began in 1975 followed a rapid caseload expansion in preceding years. In 
1992 and 1993 we often argued that, given this perhaps inherently lagging 
nature of policy evaluation, one of the key potential uses of quick-turnaround 
research studies lagging as they may be might be to help prevent policy- 
makers from overreacting to cyclical factors or other developments that might 
produce one-time shocks with either temporary or permanent effects on pro 
gram caseloads. But we also hoped that such research would demonstrate 
timely, empirically solid results and eventually result in a more proactive role 
of policy evaluation in the arsenal of policymakers. One focal area of the 
research appears to have been particularly timely given subsequent policy 
developments: the interactions of SSA's disability programs with other social 
safety net programs, such as AFDC/TANF, Medicaid, and General Assis 
tance. The subsequent passage of the historic welfare reform legislation 
makes our findings in this area more significant although there is much yet 
to learn.
The collaboration between the co-editors of this volume goes back to the 
early stages of this research effort. One of us (Rupp) was assigned in 1992 at 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to design the research program 
reflected in this volume. ASPE and SSA collaborated in the planning and 
funding of these studies, and Rupp was assigned to work with SSA officials 
and staff in creating this research effort. Many high-level DHHS and SSA offi 
cials were highly supportive of this effort at this critical early stage and in sub 
sequent stages of the expansion of our project. Richard Eisinger, Christy 
Schmidt-Bayne, Wendell Primus, Gil Fisher, Larry Thompson, and David Ell- 
wood were especially supportive. Much of the research reflected in this vol 
ume was carried out through task-order contracts between ASPE and Lewin- 
VHI (now The Lewin Group); Rupp was the ASPE Project Officer and Staple-
XII
ton was the Lewin Project Director for all of these contracts. In these capaci 
ties we have established a productive working relationship focusing on 
creating analytic designs that are truly responsive to major policy concerns 
and are implemented in a technically sound manner. Our frequent and sub 
stantive interactions produced numerous ideas that shaped the overall research 
program in fundamental ways.
We also had the privilege of collaborating with several colleagues who 
played substantial roles in designing and implementing these studies and in 
providing support in the dissemination of the results. Peggy Trout (now 
Fisher) and Mindy Upp were SSA's co-project officers on the various Lewin 
contracts. Peggy was extremely useful and efficient in representing SSA and 
in coordinating the work of SSA staff involved in providing input to study 
design, administrative data, and analytic feedback.
We have dedicated this volume to the memory of Mindy Upp, who worked 
with us from the early stages of this research effort through the conference and 
the subsequent dissemination of the research results in the policy community, 
virtually up until her death at the end of 1996. Mindy played an enormous role 
in advocating the importance of this research within both SSA and the broader 
policy community. In particular, we are heavily indebted to Mindy's ideas, 
enthusiasm, and advocacy of using a case-study approach to complement the 
quantitative analysis, and in initiating and planning a separate section on pol 
icy and programmatic perspectives on program growth at the 1995 conference. 
It was Mindy's idea to include "The View from the Trenches" (the phrase 
itself is vintage Mindy), the representation of local practitioners with hands- 
on field experience in addition to the usual "suspects" high-ranking officials 
and prominent policy experts on panels of this kind. Mindy also had the pri 
mary responsibility for writing the subsequent SSA report to Congress, and 
she displayed enormous enthusiasm and skill in advocating the use of empiri 
cal results in this important document that reflected the relevant findings from 
these studies.
On a more personal note, Mindy was the one member of our core team who 
struggled with serious disabilities throughout our work together. Her courage 
in facing severe health problems, and eventually the very real possibility of 
death, has been an inspiration to all of us who have had the privilege to know 
her. The combination of her commitment to the civil rights of people with dis 
abilities and her no-nonsense perspective on the dilemmas facing people with 
severe disabilities and those who care about them brought a very credible and 
fundamental human perspective to our research and shaped our thinking about 
the analytic and policy issues in subtle yet important ways. We hope that our 
association with Mindy made us more responsible human beings and 
researchers. Up to the final days of her life, Mindy took great pride in her
work; we hope that our collaboration with her contributed to her sense of pos 
itive accomplishment and perhaps may have eased the substantial pain she 
must have experienced throughout this period.
Steven Sandell has provided support in his various capacities as friend, 
wise colleague, and DHHS and SSA official. We are especially thankful to 
Steve for encouraging the early dissemination of research results through a 
January 1995 conference session of the Society of Government Economists 
(SGE), and the subsequent publication of a summary article by the co-edi 
tors of this volume in the Social Security Bulletin. Pete Wheeler, the Asso 
ciate Commissioner of the Office of Research, Evaluation and Statistics at 
SSA, has been very supportive of the early dissemination of the research 
results through the Social Security Bulletin and also contributed to this vol 
ume.
Among the many colleagues who played major roles in this effort, we 
would like to highlight the contribution of a few who were helpful in strate 
gic ways. Alan Shafer and Charlie Scott played the key role of assembling 
the SSA administrative records databases that formed the basis of analysis 
of applications and awards (Shafer) and duration on the disability rolls 
(Scott). Rick Foster, currently Chief Actuary of the Health Care Financing 
Administration, but at the time the Deputy Chief Actuary of SSA, provided 
substantial support and encouragement as a reviewer of several key design 
documents and as a reviewer of early output from our research including 
his role of helpful discussant (with Pamela Loprest of the Urban Institute) of 
several papers presented at the January 1995 SGE meeting. Lewin's Gina 
Livermore played a significant role in conducting all of the work performed 
under the contracts to Lewin and also helped significantly in the prepara 
tion of this volume. Among our many colleagues who contributed to the 
design of the studies reflected in this volume, we would like to express our 
special thanks to Burt Barnow of Lewin and The Johns Hopkins University 
and John Bound of the University of Michigan. Finally, but not least impor 
tant, we would like to express our thanks to those who made it possible to 
publish this volume as an Upjohn Institute book. Allan Hunt has been a vig 
orous and enthusiastic supporter of publishing this volume, and the editors 
are indebted to both him and two anonymous reviewers for numerous ideas. 
We are also indebted to Judy Gentry, our manuscript editor, for efficient 
expert assistance in the publication process, and for making this volume 
more readable in ways that are very real, but may be apparent only to those 
few who have seen both the draft we submitted to the Institute and this final 
product.
The views and opinions expressed in this volume do not necessarily repre 
sent the official positions of the Social Security Administration, The Lewin
xiv
Group, or any of the organizations that any of the authors, including the co- 
editors, are currently affiliated with, or any they have been affiliated with at 
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David C. Stapleton 
The Lewin Group
This book is about the growth in income entitlement benefits for dis 
ability in the United States provided under two federal programs 
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA): the Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) program under Title II of the Social 
Security Act, and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
(Title XVI). Both programs use the same definition of disability, but 
other eligibility criteria differ. DI is a social insurance program with 
disabled worker eligibility conditioned on sufficient employment in 
jobs covered by Social Security. SSI is means-tested, requiring benefi 
ciaries to satisfy income and asset criteria. DI beneficiaries whose 
incomes, including DI benefits, are below the SSI benefit level may 
concurrently receive SSI payments to make up the difference, and 
many low-income DI applicants receive SSI benefits during the five- 
month postemployment DI waiting period. DI benefits are converted to 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits at age 65. SSI dis 
ability recipients may continue to receive benefits past age 65, 
although SSI benefits are also available to the nondisabled elderly 
meeting the income and asset tests. Children with qualifying disabili 
ties are eligible for SSI payments in their own right subject to income 
and asset eligibility requirements.
SSA's disability programs have evolved into major pillars of the 
social safety net in the United States. While the basic design of DI has 
not changed since the program was created in 1956, changes in the def 
inition of the target population, program administration, eligibility cri 
teria, work incentives, and eligibility reviews have expanded the 
program. The SSI disability program replaced federal-state Aid to the 
Permanently and Totally Disabled and Aid to the Blind programs in
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1974, and since then has expanded at a faster pace than DI. In 1995, 
4.2 million DI disabled worker beneficiaries and their dependents 
received $40.9 billion in benefits, and 4.9 million disabled SSI benefi 
ciaries received $19.5 billion in federal payments. 1 The combined 
value of benefits from the programs in 1995, $60 billion, is more than 
2.5 times as large as combined federal and state spending on AFDC 
benefits in the same year. The importance of both DI and SSI has 
increased enormously during recent years as the real value of medical 
benefits that most recipients are entitled to Medicare (for DI recipi 
ents after a two-year waiting period) and Medicaid (for SSI recipi 
ents) increased tremendously. In 1995, Medicare paid $12.5 billion 
in benefits for DI beneficiaries, and Medicaid paid about $40 billion in 
benefits for SSi-disability recipients. 2
Much has changed in the broader environment of SSA's disability 
programs as well. The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990, and more recently, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, are major federal laws affect 
ing people with disabilities. Changes in family structure, population 
health trends, economic restructuring, and increases in female labor 
force participation all affect the nature and growth of SSA's disability 
programs.
A substantial amount of recent research and policy discussion has 
focused on various aspects of the disability programs and their interac 
tion with the broader environment of our economy and society. A 
recently published Upjohn Institute volume, Disability, Work and Cash 
Benefits, is a compendium of studies by leading experts in disability, 
income security, labor economics, and rehabilitation (Mashaw et al. 
1996) and represents the range of program design and institutional 
issues raised by the programs. Other recent work focuses on narrower, 
but fairly important aspects of program design, such as work incentives 
and vocational rehabilitation, as represented by a series of papers pub 
lished in the August 1996 issue of the Journal of Vocational Rehabili 
tation (Prero 1996). SSA's Disability Evaluation Study is a major 
ongoing data collection effort designed to develop a better understand 
ing of SSA's eligibility screening processes and the potential to 
improve this critically important aspect of the program.
This book focuses on the factors affecting the growth of the disabil 
ity programs both understanding the causes of growth and their pol-
Growth in Disability Benefits 3
icy implications. Changes in program design and in the environment of 
SSA's disability programs are both very important in explaining and 
understanding program growth. The patterns and causes of program 
growth point to critically important aspects of program design and the 
changing role of SSA's disability programs in the social safety net.
In the next section we discuss the motivation and objectives of this 
book in somewhat more detail. We then provide an overall conceptual 
framework underlying the studies in the book, an overview of the 
major issues, and a brief sketch of the organization of the volume.
MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES
The last time the growth of income entitlements to persons with 
severe disabilities was subject to intense scrutiny by economists was 
during the mid 1970s, following acceleration in the growth of DI 
awards (Exhibit 1.1) and deterioration in the balance of the DI Trust 
Fund. Researchers concluded that the 1975 recession was the primary 
cause of that situation and that the anticipated recovery would turn the 
trends around (Lando 1974; Hambor 1975; Thompson and Van de 
Water 1975). The DI program was viewed by many as a potential tool 
of countercyclical macroeconomic policy an automatic stabilizer 
that, like many other government programs, came to the aid of those 
most hurt by a recession while stimulating much needed demand for 
goods and services. An important policy implication was that Trust 
Fund balances needed to be built up when the economy was strong in 
order to compensate for higher benefit payments during recessions.
Once again, a major upsurge in income entitlements to persons with 
severe disabilities has resulted in intense scrutiny of the DI program; 
this time the scrutiny extends to SSI, which was in its infancy at the 
federal level during the earlier period. This upsurge also coincided with 
a major recession, in 1991, but analysts were skeptical that it was the 
primary cause, despite the earlier findings. The "double-dip" recession 
of 1980-1982 was not accompanied by acceleration in program 
growth, and there are competing explanations of the recent growth  
most notably changes in the program itself, the aging of the baby 
boomers, and declines in the value of and access to benefits from state
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SOURCE: Social Secunty Bulletin, 1996 Annual Statistical Supplement.
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and local programs. Other changes in the economy and society, such as 
the decline in manufacturing jobs, growth in female labor force partici 
pation, growth in health care costs, changes in the structure of families, 
immigration, and changes in the prevalence of disabling health condi 
tions, represent another layer of factors that could have a bearing on 
recent program growth.
Again, policymaker scrutiny of the programs has generated a sub 
stantial research effort. While some policymakers argued that growth 
would subside of its own accord once the economy turned around, and 
others saw no end to the rapid growth without a significant change in 
program policy, many believed that research on the causes of program 
growth was needed to inform the policy debate. Some of us thought the 
research was not only overdue, but perhaps a little too late; the research 
during the mid 1970s was initiated at the peak of growth and therefore 
was a lagging indicator rather than a proactive agent of change. Per 
haps, again, "the damage was already done," in part because of the lack 
of serious research attention to this topic during intervening years. 
Growth now appears to be subsiding, and it may be that, once again, 
the attention of policymakers will turn to other hot topics of the day.
Stanford Ross (Chapter 11) provides an intriguing perspective on 
the initiation of this research from the point of view of a public mem 
ber of the Board of Trustees for OASDI. As Ross explains, in April of 
1992 the Trustees were obligated to report to Congress, warning that 
reserves were projected to fall below 20 percent of annual disburse 
ments. This was the first time that this official "alarm bell," enacted in 
1983 as Section 709 of the Social Security Act, was set off.
In response to the Section 709 mandate and recognizing the impor 
tance of developing a better understanding of the factors affecting 
caseload growth, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
and SSA prepared a report (DHHS 1992) summarizing existing knowl 
edge about the growth of the DI program and providing a comprehen 
sive list of various demographic, economic, and programmatic factors 
that were hypothesized to affect caseload growth. This "709 Report" 
called for additional research to assess the causal role of various fac 
tors, and to quantify their effects.
A short-term fix to the impending insolvency was proposed in 1992: 
reallocation of a small portion of OASI Trust Fund contributions to the 
DI Fund. As Ross describes (Chapter 11), the Public Trustees refused
6 Rupp and Stapleton
to accept the proposal unless a research agenda was pledged by the Ex- 
officio Trustees. The Public Trustees argued that the short-term pallia 
tive of a reallocation should not take place without providing the Con 
gress and the public with information that would permit a more 
fundamental look at the program and could lead to appropriate 
reforms. Around this time, Congress mandated an examination of the 
reasons for the rise in the number of applications and awards and for 
the decreased rates of benefit terminations. SSA was to report the find 
ings from this examination to Congress by October 1995.
In response, SSA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Plan 
ning and Evaluation (ASPE) of DHHS initiated a series of projects. 
Two of the papers in this volume are summaries of research conducted 
by staff at Lewin-VHI, Inc., under contract to SSA and ASPE. Three 
other research papers were written by academics under subcontract to 
Lewin-VHI, and two were written by SSA staff. The papers focus on 
adult program participation, but some papers also address participation 
of children with disabilities in SSL
Concerned that lessons learned from the current round of research 
would be neglected by the policy community, SSA and ASPE spon 
sored a two-day conference in Washington, D.C. entitled The Social 
Security Administration's Disability Programs: Explanations of Recent 
Growth and Implications for Disability Policy on July 20-21, 1995. 
The purpose of the conference was to present and discuss findings of 
the research on caseload growth. The conference also featured panel 
discussions by regional and state program administrators on their first 
hand experience, adding a human dimension to the numbers, and by 
well-known experts in the field of disability policy on the policy impli 
cations of the research findings and potential future directions for the 
federal programs. This volume is based on the research findings, 
administrator observations, and policy discussions featured at the July 
1996 conference.
In the decade and a half between the two periods of rapid program 
growth there has been a marked shift in attitudes toward entitlement 
programs from the benign Great Society view that such programs 
assist the less fortunate in our society, especially during economic hard 
times, toward alarm over growth in program participation and spend 
ing. Many fear that such programs are undermining the nation's eco 
nomic strength. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
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Act of 1996 reflects concerns about both the economic effects of previ 
ous welfare legislation and the effects on the moral fabric of our soci 
ety.
Cash assistance for persons with severe disabilities has long enjoyed 
fundamental political support because the intended recipients were 
viewed as "deserving." Early recommendations for a radical restructur 
ing of welfare programs from entitlement to temporary support based 
on individual responsibility and the objective of encouraging work 
called for exemptions for those with severe disabilities (see, for 
instance, Ellwood 1988). The political backlash following the tighten 
ing of eligibility for the federal disability programs initiated during the 
early Reagan years confirmed the notion that disability programs were 
"different" from other cash assistance programs because they provided 
support for a group that should not be expected to work.
Much of the recent growth in program participation, however, has 
been among beneficiaries who might be seen as "not deserving." There 
is increasing concern about the ability of the program to identify those 
who truly "cannot work" in the face of strong economic incentives and 
procedural barriers working in the opposite direction. The critics argue 
that the federal programs create a class of long-term beneficiaries who 
could and would work were it not for the increasingly strong economic 
incentives to get and stay on the rolls. The especially rapid growth of 
young beneficiaries and of beneficiaries with certain mental disor 
ders especially addiction disorders and affective disorders are cited 
as prime examples. The now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program is usually held up as the prime example of a 
program dominated by the long-term dependence of a subset of benefi 
ciaries, but average duration on the disability program rolls is longer 
(Rupp and Scott 1995).
Critics have called for policies restricting entry to, and encouraging 
exit from, the disability rolls. Congress has responded, initially by 
mandating time-limited benefits for persons whose drug addiction and 
alcoholism (DA&A) contributed to their disability, and subsequently 
by requiring the removal of DA&A cases from the rolls and denial of 
disability benefits to future applicants for whom DA&A is judged to be 
material to the determination of disability. The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 also tightened eligibility for dis-
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abled children, ended SSI eligibility for aliens, and increased the 
resources devoted to Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs).
The extent to which changes in the nature of the disability programs 
contributed to accelerated growth has been a major challenge for the 
research reported in this volume. The policy discussions, in turn, 
reflect a range of views on the nature of the disability programs, and on 
the extent to which work options are feasible tools for containing 
undesired program growth and dependence.
The provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu 
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that are directed at benefits for poor 
families with children have opened a new source of potential growth in 
the disability programs. It is possible that replacement of the AFDC 
program by block grants to the states for Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) will become a new source of growth in the 
disability programs, as disabled individuals no longer eligible for 
AFDC, some with access to more restrictive TANF programs, seek 
new sources of support, assisted by state governments that have 
increased financial incentives to shift welfare spending to the federal 
government.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Caseload growth is affected by both economic and noneconomic 
factors. Demographic and epidemiological factors, as well as the crite 
ria for determining disability status and their implementation are, at 
least in a proximate sense, noneconomic factors that might affect case 
load growth, often substantially. Other factors, such as the value of 
potential cash benefits relative to wages, the value of complementary 
or substitute program benefits, and business conditions are clearly in 
the domain of economics. The economic perspective emphasizes the 
role of opportunity costs individuals making choices comparing vari 
ous alternatives and is particularly useful in understanding how eco 
nomic and noneconomic forces interact in shaping decisions such as 
applying for and being awarded disability benefits, as well as decisions 
concerning leaving the disability rolls.
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From the economic perspective, program participation is an out 
come of the interaction of the "demand" for program benefits by indi 
viduals and the "supply" of program benefits by the government. On 
the demand side, the number of applications (representing the demand 
for awards) in part depends on
  the relative benefits of working and not working;
  the availability of substitute forms of public assistance, such as 
General Assistance (GA), TANF, or AFDC;
  complementary benefits provided to those receiving disability 
benefits especially health insurance benefits (Medicare for DI 
and Medicaid for SSI beneficiaries); and
  various features of the DI and SSI programs the costs of apply 
ing for benefits, the probability of receiving an award, and how 
long benefits are expected to continue.
The supply side is influenced by legislative factors, as well as adminis 
trative procedures, judicial rulings, and the resources available for 
making award decisions.
Once persons with disabilities begin receiving DI and/or SSI bene 
fits, their continued "demand" for benefits is influenced by
  the duration of these benefits over time, a beneficiary's poten 
tial earnings decline as their human capital depreciates due to 
separation from the labor force;
  programmatic disincentives to work with limited exceptions, DI 
beneficiaries who engage in "substantial gainful activity" (i.e., 
earn over $500 per month) subsequent to a nine-month trial work 
period lose all their disability benefits, while, apart from certain 
disregards, SSI beneficiaries lose a dollar of benefits for every 
two dollars of earnings;
  changes in their health and disability status; and
  changes in the labor market. 
The "supply" of disability benefits for those on the rolls is affected by
  the number of CDRs i.e., determining if the beneficiary's medi 
cal condition has improved (with benefit termination for those 
with sufficient improvement). The number of CDRs conducted
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depends both on the availability of administrative resources and 
the political will to conduct these often unpopular reviews;
  changes in rules concerning the effects of work on program eligi 
bility and benefits, especially for the SSI program; and
  the availability of vocational rehabilitation services and incen 
tives and requirements to use them.
While as a first cut the factors affecting initial awards and length of 
stay can be seen as sequential, changes at the "back end" of the process 
have potential feedback effects as well. For example, anticipated 
reconsideration and administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions may 
affect initial eligibility determination decisions by the state Disability 
Determination Services, as well as applicant decisions to ask for the 
reconsideration of unfavorable decisions and to exercise appeal rights. 
The perceived strictness of the disability determination process might 
affect applications, too. Perceptions about SSA's termination and sus 
pension policies might affect work activities, and therefore continued 
eligibility, among beneficiaries.
Although the economic perspective focuses on choices made by dis 
abled individuals, other parties often have a significant interest in this 
choice and may actively try to influence it. An important example is 
state and local governments, which have an interest in shifting the costs 
of welfare and health expenditures to the federal government. Other 
interested parties include family members, employers, health care pro 
viders, and private insurers.
All of these factors are addressed to some degree in the studies and 
commentaries presented at the conference and contained in this vol 
ume. Below, we describe the major issues and the overall contribution 
of the papers in this book to addressing those issues.
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES
Growth in disability applications, awards, and program caseloads is 
affected by a host of complex factors. In this section we provide an 
overview of the major factors and how the contributions in this volume
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fit into the literature on these factors. The factors are grouped as fol 
lows:
  population characteristics,
  labor market factors,
  other programs and policies, and
  features of SSA's disability programs and related supply factors.
We conclude the section with an overview of major themes from the 
discussion of policy implications.
Population Characteristics
The role of demographics, particularly the aging of the baby boom 
generation, has long been understood as important in shaping program 
growth, and actuarial projections explicitly consider the role of these 
variables. What this volume adds is a systematic accounting of the 
effects of demographics on applications and awards (Stapleton et al., 
Chapter 2), and on duration (Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4) over various 
periods of interest, when considered in the context of a broader range 
of factors. The effects of population aging on applications and awards 
on the one hand, and on expected duration on the other hand, are oppo 
site. Rupp and Scott demonstrate that the net result of the contrasting 
effects of the aging of the baby boom generation on caseloads as 
measured by expected benefit years is positive, but smaller than 
could be expected based on the effects on awards alone, due to the 
moderating influence of reduced expected duration associated with 
increased age at entry.
While changes in the size and age-gender composition of the popu 
lation provide the simplest explanation of changes in DI and SSI appli 
cations and awards, they do not translate directly into changes in the 
target populations for the two disability programs; program eligibility 
requirements the presence of qualifying disabilities and economic 
eligibility form essential intervening links. The disability criteria are 
identical for DI and SSI, while economic eligibility is tied to disability- 
insured status satisfaction of past work requirements for DI and to 
a means test for SSI. All three of these criteria are influenced by factors
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external to the DI and SSI programs, as well as by legislative, adminis 
trative, and judicial variables.
Three target populations can be visualized as being determined by 
various combinations of disability-insured status, meeting the SSI 
means test, and having a qualifying disability. Persons with qualifying 
disabilities who are disability-insured but do not meet the means test 
are eligible for DI only, those who are disability-insured and meet the 
SSI means test qualify for both programs (concurrent eligibility), and 
those who meet the SSI means test but are not disability-insured are 
eligible for SSI only.
Unfortunately, available data do not permit the observation of time 
series for these three target populations; in fact, there are no cross-sec 
tional data available on a reasonable proxy of the population satisfying 
the disability criteria in any year. SSA's Disability Evaluation Study is 
expected to provide detailed cross-sectional information on the most 
important variables affecting the disability determination process, but 
it will be some time before results are available from this effort.
Some information on the prevalence of self-reported disabilities is 
available from various surveys, such as the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). While some of 
the surveys (such as the HRS) incorporate a panel design, and others 
(NHIS) incorporate repeated cross sections over several years, the 
validity of longitudinal comparisons are seriously hampered by a vari 
ety of difficulties. Measurement of the prevalence of mental disorders 
raises complex methodological issues, and the reliable estimation of 
the prevalence of a number of physical and nonphysical conditions 
related to important impairments in general surveys is hampered by the 
small number of disabled respondents to each survey. Finally, the mea 
surement of some impairments, most notably HIV-related conditions, 
has evolved through time, as these conditions became increasingly 
important sources of disability applications and awards, thereby mak 
ing precise measurement of time trends difficult or impossible.
Better data are available for the measurement of trends in the DI 
insured population, although when it comes to survey data, reliable 
individual-level indicators are often not available. The measurement of 
trends in the SSI financial eligibility variables is more problematic, pri 
marily because of the absence of good longitudinal data on assets.
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Ongoing work at the Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics of 
SSA is expected to produce substantial advances in data availability, 
primarily through the creation of SIPP data files matched to SSA 
administrative records (Lahiri, Vaughan, and Wixon 1995).
Due to these data limitations, the studies incorporated in this vol 
ume relied on a patchwork of data pieces for examining the evidence 
concerning the effect of trends in SSA's target populations on disabil 
ity applications, awards, and duration. Even with limited and imper 
fect data, some interesting analyses were feasible. Stapleton et al. 
(Chapter 2) incorporates quantitative analyses of the role of factors 
such as changes in the size of the Dl-insured population, the poverty 
rate, the percentage of children living in single-family homes, and 
AIDS/HIV incidence rate. Rupp and Scott (Chapter 4) demonstrate the 
profound effect of demographic trends and impairments in affecting 
duration, as well as the interaction of demographics, Dl-insured status, 
and SSI financial eligibility in affecting awards, and duration. They 
also calculate the net effects on expected benefit years. Daly (Chapter 
5) provides important insights into the dynamics of SSI and DI eligi 
bility by providing longitudinal information on the changing charac 
teristics of awardees during the five years prior to benefit receipt, 
based on information from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics.
Labor Market Factors
One of the key issues that motivated the initiation of the research 
studies presented in this book was the urgent need to clarify the role of 
the business cycle in affecting disability applications and awards dur 
ing the early 1990s. Some hoped that much of the unexpected upsurge 
in disability applications was the result of the recession, and therefore 
temporary in nature. Others were concerned that the upsurge was pri 
marily the result of other factors responsible for more permanent and 
lasting shifts in the nature of SSA's disability programs. The authors of 
the "709 Report" recognized that several factors probably made impor 
tant contributions. For many analysts, the real question about the busi 
ness cycles and other factors was not whether they had an effect, but 
how much. The answer to these questions had major implications both 
from a short-term budgetary perspective, especially as it relates to the 
allocation and management of funds for program administration, and
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from the point of view of the assessment of the long-run financial 
health and viability of the disability programs.
While there have been numerous previous econometric studies esti 
mating the effects of the business cycle on DI applications, awards, and 
caseloads, previous studies have suffered from various specification 
problems or low statistical power, or both. The aggregate time-series 
approach used in most previous studies has difficulty disentangling the 
effects of program changes, business cycles, and other factors, while 
the cross-sectional approach used in some studies had to rely on cross- 
state or county variation in labor market measures that is confounded 
with cross-state/county variation in many unmeasurable factors.
An important methodological contribution of the research effort 
reflected in this book is the use of state-level pooled cross-section/ 
time-series methods to address the seemingly intractable problem of 
business cycle effects. This approach, presented in detail by Stapleton 
et al. in Chapter 2, controls for permanent differences among the states 
endemic to cross-sectional analyses of state data and eliminates the 
confounding effect of national changes endemic to time-series studies. 
As a result, the findings are much stronger and more credible than 
those obtained previously. Because of the importance of this contribu 
tion, we compare the findings presented in Chapter 2 to those from the 
previous literature here (Exhibit 1.2).
The new results provide strong evidence to support the conclusions 
from those previous studies that found significant business cycle 
effects. The new estimates are, however, somewhat sensitive to the 
data, specification, and time period chosen for the analysis, as dis 
cussed in Chapter 2.
The importance of business cycles and economic restructuring is 
further supported by the qualitative evidence presented in Chapters 6 
(Muller and Wheeler) and Chapter 8 (Livermore, Stapleton, and 
Zeuschner), and by the first-hand observations of Massanari and of 
Hemingson (Chapter 10). An important conclusion from the five case 
studies conducted by Lewin researchers (Chapter 8) is that the regres 
sion estimates of the impact of the recession are probably conservative, 
because the models failed to capture important subtleties of the busi 
ness cycle that, according to interviewees, significantly influence appli 
cations and awards.
Exhibit 1.2 Estimates of the Effect of a 1 Percentage Point Rise in the Unemployment Rate on Disability Program 
Growth for Adults
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Other Programs and Policies
An important focus of this book is how interactions with other cash 
and in-kind programs affect the growth of SSA's disability programs. 
Economic theory suggests that the availability of benefits through other 
programs and their relative value should affect the decision to apply for 
disability benefits. This is an important topic, particularly in light of 
substantial secular changes in the relative value of public benefits such 
as general assistance the generic term for welfare programs funded 
entirely by state and local governments, TANF (and the previous 
AFDC program it replaced), Medicaid, and Medicare.
Other programs can be classified as either "substitutes" or "comple 
ments" for DI and/or SSI, in the economic sense of these terms. Substi 
tute programs are those for which an expansion in the value of benefits 
reduces applications and awards for the SSA programs; benefit expan 
sion for complementary programs increases applications and awards. 
GA and TANF/AFDC benefits are substitutes for SSI; they result in a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction of SSI benefits. Decreases in the relative 
value or availability of GA or TANF/AFDC benefits are expected to 
increase SSI applications and awards the extent depending on the 
prevalence of severe disabilities among GA or TANF/AFDC beneficia 
ries. Medicaid and Medicare are clearly complements of SSI and DI, 
respectively because the later programs are gateways for those with 
disabilities to the former. Increases in the value of Medicaid and Medi 
care benefits increase the relative attractiveness of SSA's disability pro 
grams, and hence the demand for their benefits. Expansion of Medicaid 
to persons with disabilities who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for 
SSI or some form of universal health insurance coverage would reduce 
or eliminate the complementarity between medical insurance and the 
disability programs.
This book includes econometric analyses of the effects of GA pro 
gram cuts and the relative value of AFDC benefits, Medicaid benefits, 
and SSI state supplements on applications and awards using pooled 
state data (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2), an econometric analysis of the 
impact of health care costs and Medicaid on SSI participation based on 
Current Population Survey data for 1987 to 1992 (Yelowitz, Chapter 
4), and an in-depth analysis of the impact of the termination of Michi 
gan's GA program on SSI application and award growth (Bound, Kos-
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soudji, and Ricart-Moes, Chapter 7). The pioneering quantitative 
analyses in these studies are supplemented by valuable qualitative 
information gained through SSA's field manager survey (Muller and 
Wheeler, Chapter 6), case studies conducted in five states (Livermore, 
Stapleton, and Zeuschner, Chapter 8), research conducted by the Gen 
eral Accounting Office (Bordelon's comments on Chapters 6-8), and 
the experiences of administrators (Chapter 10, Massanari, Hemingson, 
Jones) including Charles Jones, who was the director of the Michi 
gan Disability Determination Service when Michigan's GA program 
ended.
Overall, both the quantitative and qualitative evidence supports the 
notion that such program interactions are extremely important in 
understanding the growth of the SSA disability caseload. In some 
areas, most notably with respect to the effects of the GA program cuts, 
the quantitative estimates show a consistent pattern of strong effects. 
Point estimates of the effects of changes in Medicaid and AFDC bene 
fits are much more tentative, and the studies point to a wide range of 
complex data and methodological problems to be explored in subse 
quent work.
The recent passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor 
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 increases the importance of this line 
of work for the timely understanding and, potentially, the anticipation 
of the impact of welfare program changes on the disability programs. 
Some provisions of the legislation directly restrict eligibility for SSA 
disability benefits (among children and immigrants), and related legis 
lation limits the access of persons with drug addiction and alcoholism 
to disability benefits. These changes alone will reduce the number of 
beneficiaries, although the extent of their impact will depend on how 
many of the individuals affected are able to obtain benefits anyway 
(e.g., by becoming citizens in the case of immigrants, and by qualify 
ing under a different impairment category for others.)
Other provisions of the Act, however, will almost certainly contrib 
ute to DI and SSI program growth potentially more than offsetting 
the reductions caused by the provisions concerning the SSA disability 
programs. The replacement of the federal match of state AFDC fund 
ing by federal block grants to states for TANF greatly, and immedi 
ately, increases the financial incentives of the states for cost-shifting. 
The new emphasis on temporary assistance, the expectation that TANF
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recipients will become self-supporting or seek other sources of assis 
tance, eligibility restrictions, time limits, work requirements, benefit 
reductions, and other conditions states may impose will increase the 
incentives to apply for SSI and/or DI among those beneficiaries with 
disabilities. Because states are charged with the responsibility for 
designing their own TANF programs, substantial state-to-state varia 
tions are likely in these effects. Moreover, the full effects of the 
changes may not be realized for several years, due to the time needed 
to redesign state systems, the likely trial and error character of reform, 
the inherently dynamic nature of some policy tools (e.g., time limits), 
and lags in behavioral responses.
The studies included in this volume suggest that the empirical study 
of the effect of changes in non-SSA components of the social safety 
net on SSA caseloads, albeit difficult, is not impossible. Moreover, the 
one area where this research probably made the most headway toward 
solid empirical estimates, the effect of the elimination or reduction in 
GA programs, is probably the most instructive for the study of the indi 
rect effects of the welfare reform legislation, because the incentives 
related to GA cuts in many respects are analogous to the incentives that 
apply to TANF. Given the large magnitude of the estimated GA cut 
back effects, the GA experience points to the potential for large TANF 
effects, especially in states embarking on radical restrictions of TANF 
eligibility and substantial reductions in benefit levels. Although the 
incidence of severe disabilities is presumably much lower among 
TANF recipients than among GA recipients, the number of TANF 
recipients is much larger.
Features of SSA's Disability Programs and Related Supply Factors
Features of SSA's disability programs such as the real value of bene 
fits, legislative and administrative actions affecting eligibility determi 
nation, work incentive provisions, CDRs, and SSA outreach activities 
might substantially affect applications, awards, and duration on the 
rolls. Other supply factors, such as judicial rulings on appealed cases, 
also play a role. Research on the effects of these factors is, unfortu 
nately, extremely difficult to perform: first, because there is only lim 
ited variation in the data; second, because most changes that do occur 
tend to affect the whole program, so there are no natural comparison
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groups; and/or third, because it is extremely difficult to disentangle the 
effect of programmatic factors from potential confounding factors.
Supply factors can affect applications, awards, and duration on the 
rolls. This volume contains contributions in each of these areas. The 
most salient overall econometric evidence of the importance of the 
contribution of supply factors to recent growth is the fact that the 
demand factors in the application and award models estimated by Sta 
pleton et al. (Chapter 2) account for proportionately more application 
growth than award growth, but total award growth was proportionately 
greater than application growth; i.e., the demand factors predict an 
allowance rate decline, but in fact allowance rates increased. The pro 
portionately smaller effect of demand factors on awards implies that, in 
a broad sense, SSA's disability determination process screens out mar 
ginally qualified applicants. The only plausible explanation for the 
increase in allowance rates despite the decline implied by demand fac 
tors is an upward shift in supply. The fact that the largest increases in 
application and award growth occurred in impairment categories that 
would most likely be affected by some of the administrative changes 
that occurred over the period mental and musculoskeletal impair 
ments reinforces this interpretation.
A crucial piece of previous research highlighting the importance of 
supply factors was a study by Parsons (1991) estimating the effect of 
denial rates on subsequent applications. Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) 
confirm the importance of the perceived "tightness" of eligibility deter 
mination, albeit on a lesser scale than was indicated by Parsons' work.
The importance of supply factors in affecting applications and 
awards is further highlighted by the results of SSA's field manager sur 
vey reported by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6), case studies in five 
states (Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner, Chapter 8), and the obser 
vations of administrators (Chapter 10, Massanari, Hemingson, Jones). 
Field office managers display a high degree of awareness of supply 
factors, such as court cases, congressional mandates, outreach activi 
ties, and changes in medical standards. Changes that appear to have 
had an impact include the 1985 changes to the mental impariment list 
ings, increased emphasis on source evidence, increased consideration 
of pain and other symptoms, SSI outreach, the decline in CDRs, court 
decisions (especially Sullivan v. Zebley, for child SSI applicants), and
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changes in the adjudicative climate. The relative importance of these 
factors is unknown.
Several supply factors are relevant primarily through their actual or 
potential effects on duration on the rolls. The potential of policies 
designed to reduce duration on the rolls is highlighted by the analysis 
of Rupp and Scott (Chapter 4), who show that expected lifetime dura 
tion on the rolls is extremely long for both DI and SSI, and is increas 
ing as a result of the decline in the average age at first award for both 
programs. The results are particularly striking for SSI, where the 
means test provides a potentially important supply constraint; although 
a high proportion of SSI disability awardees leave the rolls as a result 
of the means test, many of them return, and overall total duration 
among working-age SSI awardees before age 65 is roughly comparable 
for SSL and DI.
Work incentives and vocational rehabilitation on the one hand, and 
CDRs on the other hand, represent two generic approaches to reducing 
duration. The first of these approaches are voluntary mechanisms, 
while the latter, as well as time-limited benefits briefly experimented 
with in the context of DA A cases, represents the mandatory removal of 
cases no longer deemed to qualify. Policymakers and analysts find that 
the experience with both strategies has been disappointing to date. 
While CDRs were successful in removing many people from the dis 
ability rolls during the Reagan years, many returned; a substantial 
political backlash, followed by a reversal of CDR policies, was the 
result. Whether the recent allocation of more resources for CDRs will 
result in substantial and marked reduction in the disability rolls 
remains to be seen. The evidence to date suggests that the liberalization 
of work incentives under SSA's disability programs during the 1980s, 
if anything, increased duration on the rolls. Vocational rehabilitation 
has affected only a small fraction of beneficiaries to date.
Rupp and Scott (Chapter 4) provide part of the explanation for the 
failure of past policies to reduce duration. The DI and SSI data reveal 
that a substantial share of both DI and SSI awardees face very high 
mortality risk. Data from other sources (e.g., the recently completed 
Project NetWork baseline survey of both disability beneficiaries who 
volunteer for vocational rehabilitation and those who do not) suggest 
that disability beneficiaries, as a group, face enormous health problems 
that limit the ability to work and daily functioning. Many respondents
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reported substantial bed-days during the previous year, and close to 
half scored depressed on the CES-D depression screener (Rupp, Wood, 
and Bell 1996). Thus, it appears, that the tightness of SSA's disability 
determination screen limits the potential for back-end interventions. 
Other explanations for the poor performance of past policies include 
the fact that program incentives to demonstrate inability to work at the 
front end of the process are extremely strong, and that the health and 
human capital of beneficiaries are likely to deteriorate as they continue 
on the rolls.
As Daly (Chapter 5) shows, SSI recipients tend to have an extremely 
weak attachment to the labor market to start with, a factor also reduc 
ing the potential for back-end labor market interventions. The contribu 
tion by Craig Thornton (in Chapter 12) based on the results of the 
Transitional Employment Training Demonstration shows some success 
with vocational rehabilitation strategies, but on a very limited scale. 
While the net impact results from the Project NetWork experiments are 
not available yet, the degree of participation has been modest (Rupp, 
Wood, and Bell 1996).
Policy Implications
The policy discussions cover a broad range of issues, but a number 
of clear themes emerge. These themes for the most part reflect recogni 
tion of the importance of economic factors in determining program 
participation and concern over growth in program participation espe 
cially among young adults. All of these themes first appear in the con 
tribution of SSA's Gil Fisher and Mindy Upp (Chapter 9), the first 
chapter in Part III.
There is a clear consensus among the diverse authors that the dis 
ability programs do not distinguish between those who are able to 
work and those who are not (as required by the Social Security Act), 
but rather between those who are expected to work and those who are 
not. Some point out that the "can/cannot work" dichotomy of the pro 
grams is fundamentally in conflict with the growing acceptance of the 
idea that people with disabilities can work and should be afforded the 
opportunity to work, as embodied in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (see Chapter 11, S. Ross, J. Ross, Weaver). Several authors discuss 
a "continuum" of ability to work and the need to "make work pay" for
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people with disabilities (Chapter 11, Batavia, Goldman, J. Ross, 
Weaver). In recognition of this continuum, some recommend consider 
ation of policies such as partial disability categories, subsidies for work 
(e.g., the Disabled Workers' Tax Credit), and improved access to health 
insurance for disabled workers (Chapter 11, J. Ross; Chapter 12, 
Daniels and West, Burkhauser).
A number of authors address the temporal dimension of disability 
(Chapter 11, Batavia, Goldman, J. Ross, Weaver; Burkhauser, Chapter 
13). The DI program was originally established as an "early retire 
ment" program, primarily for older workers whose physical disabilities 
forced them to leave the labor force prematurely and permanently. 
Although this scenario applies to some beneficiaries today, many who 
have entered beneficiary status more recently have been younger adults 
who are expected to remain beneficiaries for many years. These 
authors express great concern about growth in long-term dependency. 
Some conclude that many have been enticed into a lifetime of depen 
dency and poverty by the program's promise of income security a 
promise that is increasingly difficult to keep as program growth strains 
federal resources and taxpayers begin to question whether some bene 
ficiaries are deserving of support (Chapter 11, Batavia, Weaver; 
Burkhauser, Chapter 13).
Many young beneficiaries have chronic health conditions that, with 
proper treatment, may be controlled sufficiently to allow them to work. 
The most frequently cited examples of such conditions are affective 
and anxiety disorders. Two authors propose time-limited benefits for 
selected groups of beneficiaries to address this problem (Chapter 11, 
Batavia, Weaver), but another author argues that specific time limits 
would lead to untimely, harmful terminations for many and suggests, 
instead, more rigorous enforcement of current review policies, which 
would hold harmless those who have not recovered (Chapter 11, Gold 
man).
Substantial discussion focuses on employment strategies. Several 
authors call for more emphasis on front-end interventions, shortly after 
the onset of the disability, instead of on back-end interventions that are 
used only after an individual has had to demonstrate inability to work 
in order to obtain program benefits (Chapter 11, J. Ross, Weaver; 
Chapter 12, Daniels and West, Burkhauser; Burkhauser, Chapter 13). 
One author suggests following the prevention and early-intervention
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approaches of private disability insurers and disability management 
service providers (Chapter 12, Owens). Another suggests expansion of 
the role of the private sector in the provision of rehabilitation services 
(Chapter 11, J. Ross). Others emphasize the importance of customer 
choice in the purchase of rehabilitation and other services (Chapter 12, 
Daniels and West). The need for ongoing employment support for 
those with chronic conditions and strategies to improve employment 
outcomes for those with childhood disabilities are also discussed 
(Chapter 11, Goldman; Chapter 12, Thornton).
The abundance of sentiment for fundamental changes in federal dis 
ability policy is striking. Yet, while many of the authors express sup 
port for such changes, they also urge caution in moving ahead. The 
need for incremental change, even if radical, is most clearly expressed 
by Stan Ross (in Chapter 11), who points to the vulnerability of the 
population that the programs serve, the difficulties that large adminis 
trative agencies have in implementing change, and the resources 
needed to effect change as reasons to pursue a cautious, bipartisan 
approach. The international experience with disability programs is also 
a cautionary tale (Chapter 12, Burkhauser). Any changes must be con 
sidered in the broader context of conflicting political pressures to 
reduce budgets, devolve programs to states, expect personal responsi 
bility and enforce civil rights.
ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME
The book is organized into three parts. Part I contains empirical 
analyses of the national experience. The analyses in these chapters are 
primarily, though not exclusively, based on quantitative studies. Chap 
ter 2, the longest in the book, and the richest in empirical detail, sum 
marizes the results of the econometric analyses of application and 
award growth that have been conducted by the Lewin team. Chapter 3, 
by Aaron Yelowitz, provides an econometric analysis of the impact of 
health care costs and Medicaid on SSL In Chapter 4, Kalman Rupp and 
Charles Scott analyze trends in duration in SSA's disability programs 
based on the rich administrative data sources that have been created to 
track monthly payments in the DI and SSI programs over the years. In
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Chapter 5, Mary Daly looks at the experience of SSI and DI recipients 
during the five years prior to program participation, using data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Part II of the book provides a closer, more qualitative, look at state 
and local experiences. Chapter 6, by L. Scott Muller and Peter 
Wheeler, provides an in-depth analysis of the perceptions of SSA field 
office managers based on a detailed survey. Chapter 7, by John Bound, 
Sherrie Kossoudji, and Gema Ricart-Moes, is a detailed case study of 
the effects of the elimination of general assistance in Michigan on SSI, 
utilizing both qualitative and quantitative information including data 
obtained from a match of Michigan GA records to SSA records. 
Finally, Chapter 8, by Gina Livermore, David Stapleton, and Andrea 
Zeuschner, summarizes the results of case studies in five states con 
ducted by the Lewin research team.
Part III of the book provides perspectives on program growth and 
policy by various actors in the disability community. In Chapter 9, Gil 
bert Fisher and Melinda Upp provide a perspective from the central 
office of SSA. This is followed by Chapter 10, presenting the perspec 
tives of regional and state SSA and Disability Determination Services 
officials Larry Massanari, Celeste Hemingson, and Charles Jones. In 
Chapter 11, five opinion leaders in the national disability policy analy 
sis community Stanford Ross, Andrew Batavia, Howard Goldman, 
Jane Ross, and Carolyn Weaver discuss the implications of the 
research findings for disability policy. Four additional papers by policy 
experts Susan Daniels and Jane West, Richard Burkhauser, Patricia 
Owens, and Craig Thornton focus on employment policies in Chap 
ter 12. Richard Burkhauser's summation and reflections on the past 
and future of the disability programs concludes the volume.
Notes
1. The SSI beneficiary number does not include 0.2 million disabled beneficiaries 
who received state supplement payments only, and the expenditure figure does not 
include $0.2 billion in state supplements. (Social Security Bulletin, 1996 Annual 
Statistical Supplement.)
2. The Medicaid figure is an estimate because exact figures for Medicaid enrollees 
who are SSI-disability recipients are not reported. SSI-disability recipients are 
included in a larger class of "disabled" Medicaid enrollees, for whom Medicaid 
paid $49.4 billion in benefits in 1995. The $40 billion estimate assumes that the
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share of this spending that is for SSI-disability recipients equals the ratio of SSI- 
disability recipients (4.9 million) to disabled Medicaid enrollees (5.9 million). 
(Social Security Bulletin, 1996 Annual Statistical Supplement.)
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of the National Experience

2 Empirical Analyses







From 1988 to 1992, the number of adults applying for and receiving 
benefits from the Social Security Administration's two disability pro 
grams greatly exceeded expectations. There were 330,000 more Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) applications in 1992 than in 1988, 
an average annual growth rate of 8.9 percent. Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) applications increased by 430,000 over the same period, 
an annual growth rate of 10.5 percent. Awards grew even faster: an 
average of 10 percent per year for DI and 12 percent for SSI. One 
important feature of application and award growth during this period is 
that it was much higher in two major impairment categories mental 
and musculoskeletal impairments than in others.
In this chapter, we summarize findings from two related studies that 
analyze the determinants of the substantial growth experienced during 
the 1988 to 1992 period. We also summarize findings from a third 
study that examines program growth over the longer period from 1980 
to 1993. 1
We analyze the issue of growth in the disability programs from an 
economic perspective. As discussed in Chapter 1, this perspective 
emphasizes the importance of individual choices in determining indi 
vidual behaviors, such as applying for disability benefits. An individ 
ual's decision to apply for benefits will be influenced by a variety of 
factors, including the costs and benefits of working versus leaving the 
labor force to apply for disability benefits, the availability of potential 
sources of nonlabor income, the availability of health insurance and
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noncash benefits, and the costs associated with the application process. 
The analysis presented here, while not directly modeling the individ 
ual's decision to apply for benefits, examines factors hypothesized to 
affect that decision process and therefore affect application and award 
growth experienced by the federal disability programs.
The major economic factors hypothesized to have an impact on 
growth in disability applications and awards that we examine in this 
analysis include
  Business Cycles: During times of economic downturn, persons 
with disabling health conditions may lose, or find it especially 
difficult to find, employment. Income from other sources may 
also decline. Disability benefits may become more attractive as 
an alternative source of income.
  Economic Restructuring: Changes in the types of jobs available 
in the economy, such as a reduction in the number of manufactur 
ing jobs and an increase in service occupations, may affect dis 
ability applications if those who lose their jobs are unable to 
adapt to the market changes and to impairments that may qualify 
them for disability benefits.
  State and Local Program Interactions: State and local cash and 
noncash support programs offer an alternative source of income 
for some individuals who might otherwise qualify for disability 
benefits. As these programs face budget reductions or political 
pressure to reduce their caseloads, program administrators and 
beneficiaries may seek other sources of support more actively, 
including federal disability benefits.
  "Supply" Changes: In addition to demand factors, the "supply" 
of disability benefits will also impact program growth. The sup 
ply of benefits will be affected by changes in the eligibility crite 
ria, changes in the implementation of the criteria, outreach efforts 
by SSA, and changes in the political and adjudicative environ 
ment surrounding the disability programs.
In addition to the economic factors described above, we also exam 
ine health and demographic factors that may affect disability applica 
tions and awards. Population growth and aging, the increase in female 
labor force participation, and changes in the prevalence of disabling
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health conditions, such as AIDS/HIV, may have substantial impacts on 
disability application and award growth.
The analysis conducted uses a methodology that has not been previ 
ously applied to the analysis of disability program participation: 
"pooled" cross-section time-series analysis of state-level data. Past 
analyses have used either national time-series or cross-section data 
alone. The time-series analyses have been plagued by the difficulty of 
separating the effects of major program changes from the effects of 
other factors. The pooled methodology allows us to control for such 
changes to the extent that they affect all states equally, resulting in 
more definitive estimates for the effects of factors that vary by state. 
Analyses that rely on a single cross section are problematic because the 
effects of unmeasured determinants of program participation that vary 
across states (e.g., the prevalence of chronic health conditions and 
impairments) are confounded with the effects of measured determi 
nants. The pooled methodology allows us to control for unmeasured 
determinants that vary across states, but not over time, in a very simple 
way.
The possibility remains that the estimated effects of state variables 
included in our models are confounded with the effects of supply fac 
tors that vary across states and the effects of unmeasured state vari 
ables that vary across states and over time. Nonetheless, we believe 
that the estimates obtained using the pooled methodology provide a 
much more accurate picture of the importance of the state-level factors 
included in the models than has been obtained previously. Further, 
national growth not accounted for by the state-level variables in the 
model is a more accurate reflection of the impact of program changes 
than national growth alone.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next 
section, we describe the application and award data used in the analysis 
and discuss the trends in disability application and award growth that 
occurred over the 1980 to 1994 period. This is followed by a descrip 
tion of the methodology employed to analyze the aggregate application 
and award data and define the independent variables used in the analy 
sis. In the next four sections, we discuss the individual factors hypothe 
sized to affect disability application and award growth. In each of these 
sections, we provide a description of the factor, discuss reasons why it 
is believed to have an impact on disability program growth, and sum-
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marize the findings for the specific factor. Subsequent sections are 
devoted to population changes, to business cycles and economic 
restructuring, to other income support programs, and to supply factors.
APPLICATION AND AWARD GROWTH
In this paper we focus on application and award growth from 1980 
to 1993, with a more detailed analysis of the period from 1988 to 1992. 
For the full period we analyzed the number of initial (medical) deter 
minations and allowances made by state Disability Determination Ser 
vices, and for the 1988-1992 period we examined applications filed 
and final awards. We describe significant features of these data below. 2
The 1980-94 Period
The Initial Determination Data
Initial determinations are the sum of initial allowances and denials 
made by state Disability Determination Services (DDS) for medical 
reasons. We use initial determinations and initial allowances when ana 
lyzing the full period because state-level application and final award 
data are not available in the early part of this period. Initial determina 
tions are lower than applications because denials for nonmedical rea 
sons made before the initial medical determination are not counted. 
Initial allowances are lower than final allowances because the latter 
include allowances made on appeal.
One important feature of the initial determination data used for this 
report is that they are broken down into three program groups: those 
made on claims filed for DI benefits only (Dl-only), those made on 
claims filed for both DI and SSI (concurrent), and those made on 
claims filed for SSI only (SSi-only). There are several reasons for ana 
lyzing these three groups, rather than analyzing total DI and total SSI 
initial determinations independently. First, the analysis of the three 
groups explicitly recognizes the overlap between the two programs. 
Second, concurrent initial determinations have grown at a substantially 
faster rate than either Dl-only or S Si-only initial determinations. Third, 
applicants in the three groups are from three distinct groups with
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respect to attachment to the labor force: Dl-only applicants usually 
have had a strong attachment to the labor force with relatively high 
earnings; concurrent applicants have had a sufficiently strong attach 
ment to the labor force to be covered by the DI program ("disability 
insured"), but relatively low earnings; and SSI-only applicants have 
had at most a limited attachment to the labor force. Finally, a large 
share of those receiving awards for both programs only receive SSI 
benefits until their five-month DI waiting period ends; once they 
receive DI benefits they no longer pass the SSI means test. Rupp and 
Scott (Chapter 4) estimate that 75 percent of concurrent awardees 
receive SSI benefits for less than twelve months.
There are two important limiting features of the initial determina 
tions data. First, they are not disaggregated by sex. As we discuss fur 
ther below, data are available by sex for 1988-1992, and we found very 
large differences in the results for men and women. Second, SSI-only 
initial determinations include initial determinations for children. For 
analysis purposes it would be much better to separate child and adult 
initial determinations, but separate data were not available. We know 
from the national data that child growth dominates the growth in this 
series from 1990 on, and that the causes of this growth are primarily 
the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Sullivan v. Zebley and 
1991 changes in the child listings for mental disorders (GAO 1994).
Initial Determination Growth
It is useful to divide the period from 1980 to 1994 into three distinct 
subperiods (Exhibit 2.1). From 1980 to 1984, initial determinations 
declined sharply, continuing a more gradual decline that began in 1977. 
The decline is usually attributed to aggressive legislative and adminis 
trative efforts to reduce the size of the beneficiary population, which 
presumably discouraged many from applying. One notable feature of 
this period is that the decline occurred in the midst of a slumping econ 
omy. There was a recession in 1980, and before the economy fully 
recovered there was a second recession in 1981-82. If these recessions 
had a positive impact on initial determinations, it was masked by the 
response to tightening of eligibility.
The 1984 amendments to the Social Security Act reversed efforts to 
reduce program caseloads, and in 1985 new impairment listings that 
made it much less difficult to obtain benefits for mental disorders were
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Exhibit 2.1 Initial Determinations for Applicants to SSA's Disability 
Programs, 1980-1994
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
SOURCE SSA, Office of Disability.
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implemented. Initial determinations grew sharply from 1985 to 1986, 
stayed at a high level in 1987, and then declined through 1989.
Since 1989, initial determinations have grown rapidly. While growth 
in initial determinations for children from 1991 was greater than for 
adults, initial determinations for adults also grew .extremely rapidly, 
especially in 1991 and 1992. The recession in 1990-1991 may explain 
some of this growth, but this is not clear from the national data because 
the recession of 1981-82, which was much stronger than the more 
recent recession, had no apparent impact.
Initial Allowance Rates
Initial allowance rates for the full period have an overall upward 
trend for all program groups (Exhibit 2.2). There are three notable 
deviations from the long-term trends: the sharp but temporary drop 
from 1980 to 1982, during the period of administrative tightening; the 
sharp increase from 1985 to 1986, after the new mental disorder list 
ings were implemented, again followed by a decline; and a second 
sharp increase from 1989 to 1992, followed by a decline in 1993 and 
1994.
With one exception, allowance rates for the three program groups 
move parallel to each other throughout the period. The exception is for 
the SSi-only allowance rate, which grew more rapidly than the other 
two allowance rates from 1989 to 1991 during the dramatic increase in 
initial determinations for children caused by Zebley and the new men 
tal impairment listings for children. As a general rule, it would seem 
that the dominant determinants of initial allowance rates are quite sim 
ilar for all three program groups.
The 1988-1992 Period
Disability Research File Data
SSA provided state-level tabulations of applications and awards for 
the 1988-92 period from its new Disability Research File (DRF), a 
micro database on all disability applications filed from 1988 on. The 
tabulations for both programs include application and award tables for 
each year and state, cross-classified by gender, age (five age groups), 
and impairment. All the DRF-based estimates in this report are for 
those age 18-64 only, including SSI-only estimates. The classification
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•Dl-only —- — -Concurrent • • - SSI-only •Total
SOURCE: SSA, Office of Disability
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of applications and awards into Dl-only, concurrent, and SSI-only 
groups is more difficult than the classification of initial determinations 
and allowances because applications for the two programs are not 
always filed at the same time or even in the same state. For this study, 
the state-level DI application and award data are classified by whether 
the DI applicant applied for SSI, regardless of where or when ("DI- 
concurrent" versus "Dl-only"). We did not obtain state-level SSI data 
disaggregated in a symmetric way (i.e., "SSi-concurrent" versus "SSI- 
only"). It appears likely, though, that analysis of analogously defined 
SSI-concurrent data would yield results similar to those reported here 
for Dl-concurrent applications and awards. National level SSI-concur 
rent and SSI-only data are available. We report national trends in SSI- 
only applications later in this section, but omit SSI-concurrent trends 
because they are very similar to those in the Dl-concurrent category. 3
The DRF award data include allowances made at all levels, not just 
initial allowances. They are dated by the year the application was filed, 
which is often earlier than the year that the allowance was actually 
made. Thus, "1992 awards" means awards for applications filed in 
1992.4 Many 1992 applications still had award decisions pending as of 
July, 1993, the closing date for the initial state tabulations. We subse 
quently analyzed updated state tabulations by gender and program, but 
not by age, gender, impairment, and program. Hence, we only report 
estimates of award models at the gender/program level, using the 
revised data.
Applications and awards in the DRF data are classified on the basis 
of the primary impairment listed in the administrative record for the 
highest level at which the application was considered. For the state- 
level analysis we used only four impairment groups in order to insure 
adequate numbers of cases in individual state/program/age/sex cells, 
but we report national trends in six categories: mental illness, mental 
retardation, musculoskeletal, circulatory, respiratory, and a combined 
category of all other impairments that includes neoplasms, nervous and 
sensory impairments, diseases of the endocrine system, genito-urinary 
conditions, diseases of the skin, blood, and digestive tract, infectious 
diseases, and a small number of unclassified cases. The categories used 
for the state-level analysis are: mental disorders (mental illness and 
mental retardation); musculoskeletal; infectious diseases and unclassi 
fied cases; and a residual category that we call "internal organ" disor-
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ders, in which circulatory impairments, respiratory impairments, and 
neoplasms are the dominant disorders.
Application Growth
Application growth for the 1988 to 1992 period was very rapid 
(Exhibit 2.3), essentially following the pattern of initial determination 
growth examined previously; changes in application growth rates occur 
somewhat earlier than changes in initial determination growth rates 
because of the processing time between the filing of an application and 
the initial determination.
While the distribution of applications by impairment changed only 
moderately from 1988 to 1992, these changes reflect much larger vari 
ation in rates of application growth across categories (Exhibit 2.3). 
Within each program category, the fastest growing application catego 
ries are mental illness, mental retardation, and musculoskeletal, while 
the slowest growing categories are circulatory and respiratory illnesses.
There is also substantial variation in growth rates across subcatego- 
ries of mental and musculoskeletal impairments (Exhibit 2.4). For 
mental disorders, growth in the addiction and affective disorder subcat- 
egories was much more rapid than in other subcategories for all pro 
gram groups; SSI-only applications in the addiction disorder category 
increased by 200 percent over the period. Growth in the anxiety disor 
ders subcategory was also high. Growth in the schizophrenia subcate- 
gory was remarkably low almost no change at all for the three 
categories combined. In the musculoskeletal category, growth in the 
back disorders subcategory, which accounts for over half of all applica 
tions in the category, was much higher than in all other subcategories.
Allowance Rates
As with initial allowance rates, final allowance rates increased sub 
stantially over this period (Exhibit 2.5). The increase is observed in all 
impairment group categories and for all program groups; patterns of 
change across program groups and impairments are much less evident 
than application patterns. Across program groups, the change ranges 
from 5.9 percentage points for SSI-only to 4.6 percentage points for 
Dl-concurrent. The increase in the allowance rate is greatest in the 
mental illness and circulatory impairment categories for all three pro-




















































































SOURCE- SSA, Disability Research File, and Lewm-VHI calculations.
NOTE: Dl-only and Dl-concurrent applications sum to total DI applications, but SSI-only and Dl-concurrent applications do not sum to total SSI applica 
tions All data are for adults age 18-64 See the text for further discussion.
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gram groups. For other impairment groups, the change varies consider 
ably across program groups.
While allowance rate increases were greatest in the mental illness 
category in general, increases varied substantially across subcategories 
(Exhibit 2.6). The largest increases by far were for addiction disor 
ders approximately 20 percentage points in each of the three program 
groups. The next highest increases were for anxiety disorders  
approximately 10 percentage points in each program group.
METHODOLOGY
The findings reported on here are primarily based on two sets of 
econometric models that were estimated with the state-level data 
described in the previous section. The first set uses 1980-1993 initial 
determination and allowance data, and the second set uses the 1988- 
1992 application and award data. The econometric methodology used is 
essentially the same for both sets. We describe this methodology below, 
discuss the main explanatory variables used in the analysis, and 
describe simulations conducted with the estimated models in order to 
interpret the findings. A more technical description of the econometric 
methodology appears in the appendix to this chapter, along with 
selected regression and simulation results.
The findings reported here also draw on several other activities we 
conducted in order to better design, interpret, and validate the econo 
metric analysis. These include
  a national-level actuarial analysis of the impact of growth and 
changes in the age/sex distribution of the disability insured popu 
lation on DI application and award growth
  a substantial review of relevant literature
  interviews with a series of government and academic experts on 
disability
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  case studies of application and award growth in California, Flor 
ida, New York, Texas, and Michigan
The findings of the case studies are reported more fully in Chapter 8. 
Econometric Model
For the 1980-1993 analysis we estimated a single initial determina 
tion and allowance rate equation for each of three program groups: DI- 
only, concurrent, and SSI-only. 5 The dependent variable in each equa 
tion is the logarithm of either initial determinations per capita or the 
initial allowance rate (initial allowances divided by initial determina 
tions). In assessing the findings from this analysis, it is important to 
keep in mind that children are included in the SSI-only category.
For the 1988-1992 analysis we estimated forty application equa 
tions for each program (DI and SSI). The dependent variable in each 
equation is the logarithm of either an application or incidence rate for a 
specific age/sex/impairment group (five age categories, two sex catego 
ries, and four impairment categories). For DI, we also estimated sepa 
rate Dl-only and Dl-concurrent equations. For the award analysis, we 
estimated male and female equations for each program group.
It is important to keep in mind differences in the dependent variable 
data when comparing the findings from the analyses of the two periods. 
Three critical differences are 1) the 1980-1993 data for SSI-only 
include children, while the SSI data for 1988-1992 do not; 2) the 
dynamics of the series are different in a systematic way because of the 
processing lag between the date of application filing and the date the 
initial determinations are made; and 3) awards for the 1988-1992 anal 
ysis include allowances made at all levels, whereas those for the 1980- 
1993 analysis refer to initial allowances only.
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables that appear in the final models include
  the expected application rate, based on 1990 national application 
rates by age group and the age-distribution of the state's popula 
tion in the current year to capture the effect of the aging of the 
population
  the unemployment rate to represent the business cycle
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• the labor force participation rate—to capture the negative, cycli 
cal effect of discouraged workers leaving the labor force during 
recessions. For DI, this variable may also capture the long-term 
positive effect of growth in the share of women who are disabil 
ity-insured
• the share of employment in manufacturing—to capture the effect 
of economic restructuring
• GA program cuts—to proxy for the effects of state and local 
shifting efforts (especially for SSI)
• the poverty rate—to capture changes in poverty that are not 
picked up by other variables in the model
• the mean AFDC payment for a two-person household relative to 
mean earnings—to capture the value of AFDC benefits
• the mean SSI payment, including state supplement payments, rel 
ative to mean earnings—to capture the value of SSI benefits
• AIDS/HIV incidence—to account for the effects of the AIDS epi 
demic on the incidence and prevalence of disability
• the number of immigrants granted legal alien status under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—unlike most other 
immigrants, those granted legal alien status under IRCA were 
immediately eligible to apply for SSI
• the percentage of children living in single-family homes—to 
proxy for the effects of the number of households headed by sin 
gle parents on applications and awards (particularly for SSI)
• a dummy variable for each year—to control for national factors
There are two important general differences between the explana 
tory variable specifications used for the two sets of analyses. First, for 
the 1988-1992 analysis, which was conducted first, we related current- 
year changes in explanatory variables to current-year changes in appli 
cation and incidence rates. For the 1980-1993 analysis we also exam 
ined the impact of prior year ("lagged") changes in the explanatory 
variables on current-year initial determinations and allowance rates 
and found substantial lagged impacts for two variables: the unemploy 
ment rate and the labor force participation rate. Second, the expected
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application rate was used only in the 1980-1993 analysis in order to 
capture effects of changes in the age distribution of the population. In 
the 1988-1992 analysis these effects were captured through disaggre- 
gation of the analysis by age (as well as sex and impairment).
Other differences in the explanatory variables for the two sets of 
analyses are due to data availability and statistical significance. We 
found that several explanatory variables that were significant for the 
longer period were not significant in the 1988-1992 analysis, appar 
ently because the variability of these variables was low during the 
shorter period.
Simulations
In order to interpret the findings from the econometric analyses, we 
used the estimated models to conduct a number of counterfactual simu 
lations. For the 1980-1993 analysis, we simulated the impact of all 
explanatory variables in the model on initial determinations and allow 
ance rates holding all "national factors" (the factors represented by the 
year variables) constant at their 1989 levels. Comparisons of the simu 
lated and actual series show how much of the historical variation in 
these series is accounted for by the state-level variables and how much 
is left unaccounted for—due to national factors as well as to state-level 
factors that were not fully captured in the analysis. For initial determi 
nations, we also compare the simulated and actual series to expected 
initial determinations; i.e., to the estimate of the number of applica 
tions expected based on national application rates by program and age 
for 1990 and the current year population in the state by age.
For the 1988-1992 analysis, we simulated the impact of the 1988- 
1992 change in each individual explanatory variable on application and 
award growth, holding all other variables constant at their 1988 levels. 
This was supplemented with the findings from the national-level actu 
arial analysis of the disability-insured population to get estimates of 
the marginal impact of the growth in the share of the working-age pop 
ulation (especially women) that is disability-insured.
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POPULATION CHANGES
Population growth
Changes in the size and age/gender composition of the population 
provide the simplest and most direct explanation of changes in the 
number of DI and SSI applications and awards. The size of the work 
ing-age "SSA area" population grew steadily from 1975 to 1992 and is 
expected to continue growing steadily in the near future. The baby 
boom generation, born between 1946 and 1964, was still entering the 
working-age population in 1975. As it did, the average age of the work 
ing-age population declined, but this decline was eventually reversed 
as the generation aged. Both the growth in the size of the working-age 
population and the aging of the baby boom generation have contributed 
substantially to recent growth in applications and awards for SSA's dis 
ability programs.
The SSA area population between the ages of 15 and 64 grew at an 
average annual rate of 1.1 percent from 1975 to 1992, but the growth in 
recent years has been much slower than in earlier years. From 1975 to 
1980 the average annual growth rate was 1.5 percent, while it was only 
0.6 percent from 1988 to 1992. During the later period, however, 
changes in the age distribution of the working-age population substan 
tially offset the effect of slowing population growth.
The expected initial determination variables used in the 1980-1993 
analysis are intended to capture the combined effects of growth and 
aging of the population on initial determinations. The contribution of 
these variables to the acceleration in application and award growth 
experienced from 1988 on can be seen by comparing their annual 
growth for the latter period to their annual growth in the 1980-1988 
period. For all three program groups, this variable grows at a faster 
annual rate from 1988 to 1993 than from 1980 to 1988. For Dl-only, 
the annual rate of growth increases from 0.8 percent to 1.3 percent; for 
concurrent, the increase is from 1.3 to 1.4 percent; and for SSI-only, 
the increase is from 0.6 to 1.2 percent. The very small increase for the 
concurrent category is apparently explained by the fact that a relatively 
large share of applicants in the concurrent category are young. Thus, 
these factors help explain the acceleration in growth in the Dl-only and
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SSI-only categories, but not in the concurrent category. It should also 
be noted that the acceleration in the growth rates of these variables 
themselves occurred before 1988, and thus does not coincide with the 
acceleration of applications that began in 1989.
Target populations
The number of DI and SSI applications and awards should be influ 
enced by changes in the size of the population eligible for either or 
both programs, i.e., each program's target population. The most impor 
tant eligibility factors are the presence of qualifying disabilities and 
economic eligibility. The disability criteria are identical for the two 
programs, while economic eligibility is tied to disability-insured status 
for DI and to a means test for SSI. For simplicity of discussion, those 
satisfying the SSI means test will be called "poor" below, although the 
official poverty population is an imperfect proxy for SSI eligibility. 
Our focus here is on exogenous changes in the size of the relevant tar 
get populations given program rules; we defer the discussion of supply 
factors affecting the size and composition of the eligible population 
until later.
The three program groups can be visualized as being determined by 
various combinations of the target populations defined by disability- 
insured status, meeting the SSI means test, and having a qualifying dis 
ability. To be eligible for DI, a person has to satisfy the insured status 
and disability requirements. SSI eligibility requires meeting the means 
test and the disability requirement. Persons with qualifying disabilities 
who are disability-insured but not poor are eligible for DI only, those 
who are poor qualify for both programs (concurrent eligibility), and 
those who are poor but not disability insured are eligible for SSI only.
Existing data do not permit observation of trends in the three main 
target populations directly, and indeed not even cross-sectional data are 
available on a reasonable proxy of the population satisfying the disabil 
ity criteria in the general population. Therefore we must rely on an 
item-by-item examination of evidence on trends in these three target 
populations.
Based on estimates from SSA's actuaries, the share of the population 
that is disability-insured grew at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent 
from 1975 to 1992. The rate of growth was much higher for women
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(2.6 percent) than for men (0.2 percent), reflecting growth of female 
labor force participation rates. The narrowing of gender differences 
also suggests that this source of growth is approaching exhaustion.
We performed an actuarial analysis of the contribution of growth 
and changes in the age and gender distribution of the disability insured 
population on DI applications from 1988 to 1992 and found an average 
annual contribution of 2.1 percentage points. This is almost 0.8 per 
centage points greater than the estimated impact of population growth 
and aging alone, with almost all of the added contribution due to 
changes in the disability-insured status of women. Results for awards 
were almost identical. It is important to note that the growth in the pro 
portion of the disability-insured population suggests an increase in the 
share of SSI eligibles concurrently qualifying for DI, thereby depress 
ing the growth of the SSI-only group, particularly for women.
Change in the age and gender composition of the disability-insured 
population will also have an impact on application growth in specific 
impairment categories. The large increase in the proportion of the pop 
ulation in their thirties and forties suggests a corresponding increase in 
disability applications based on impairments most likely to occur in 
middle age, and less growth for impairments that typically occur either 
earlier or later in life. Our actuarial analysis of DI application growth 
from 1988 to 1992 found that growth due to change in the disability- 
insured population was greatest in the musculoskeletal impairment cat 
egory, and smallest for the internal organ category. These findings are a 
result of the fact that applications based on musculoskeletal impair 
ment (most commonly back strains and injuries) represent a larger 
share of applications among younger and middle-aged applicants than 
among older applicants. Applications in internal organ categories 
(heart disease, respiratory disease, cancer, etc.) are a larger share of 
applications from older persons, which partially accounts for the rela 
tively slow growth rate in the internal organ category.
From 1979 to 1992 the poverty rate for the working-age population 
grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent. Growth was highest for 
persons age 18 to 24 and in the subperiods 1979-1983 and 1988-1992, 
both periods of slow economic growth or even decline; in the latter 
period, the average annual growth rate of the pretransfer poverty rate 
was 3.5 percent. If we assume that increases in the poverty rate directly 
translate into increases in SSI applications on top of the effects of pop-
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ulation growth and aging, these factors together account for 4.7 per 
centage points of the average annual growth in SSI applications over 
this period, or about 45 percent of the average annual growth of 10.5 
percent.
We included the poverty rate as an explanatory variable in our SSI 
regressions, but found in general that it did not have a statistically sig 
nificant effect on applications and awards; marginally significant, posi 
tive coefficients were obtained in analysis of initial determination data 
for the 1980-1987 subperiod alone. The weak findings might be attrib 
utable to substantial measurement errors in state-level poverty rate esti 
mates. Another explanation is that important determinants of the 
poverty rate, especially unemployment and the age distribution of the 
population, are included separately in all of the analyses, so only varia 
tion in the poverty rate that is not explained by other explanatory vari 
ables is being used to identify the impact of poverty.
One of the other determinants of poverty is the growth in the num 
ber of female-headed households. We included the percent of children 
living with only one parent to capture this factor. More generally, this 
variable serves as a proxy for changes in family structure that could 
have an impact on applications, especially declines in marriage rates 
that have left many individuals with limited family sources of financial, 
in-kind, and emotional support. In the 1988-1992 analysis this variable 
was very significant for the SSI and Dl-concurrent equations for both 
men and women. We found that this variable accounts for about 5 per 
cent of annual SSI application growth during the period. Effects were 
somewhat larger for women than for men, were larger for younger age 
groups than for older age groups, and were concentrated in the mental 
disorders category. We also found strong evidence of a positive impact 
on initial determinations in the SSI-only and concurrent categories. 6
These findings suggest that declines in the availability of financial, 
in-kind, and emotional support from spouses are making a substantial 
contribution to growth in applications and awards. They also help 
explain the rapid growth in the mental impairment category. A negative 
association between severe mental illness and marriage has been docu 
mented in the mental health literature; empirical evidence shows that 
individuals who are mentally ill are less likely to marry than others, 
and are more likely to get divorced if they do marry (see B artel and 
Taubman 1986). Thus, the prevalence of mental illness is relatively
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high in the population that is "on the margin" of marriage, so declines 
in marriage may result in more applications from this group. It could 
also be that expanded availability of disability benefits for those with a 
mental illness has contributed to the decline in marriage rates, by offer 
ing an alternative source of support to some who would otherwise be 
married.
The data available to study the prevalence of disabling health condi 
tions is limited, especially for analyzing trends. Long-term trends in 
the prevalence of disabling conditions may be influencing long-term 
growth in applications and awards (in some cases negatively), but with 
one exception (AIDS/HIV) we did not find convincing evidence of 
health trends explaining the recent acceleration of application and 
award growth. The incidence of AIDS/HIV grew at an annual rate of 
9.3 percent from 1988 to 1992. Our regression estimates for 1988- 
1992 along with counts of the number of applications in the AIDS/HIV 
impairment category suggest that AIDS/HIV accounts for between 0.6 
and 0.9 percentage points of both DI and SSI application growth over 
this period.
SSI applications from legal aliens and those living in the United 
States under the color of law grew much more rapidly than those from 
citizens from 1988 to 1992—at an average annual rate of 17.4 percent 
versus 9.8 percent for citizens—although the share of all applications 
that are from this group is still small (6.8 percent in 1992). We previ 
ously have hypothesized that the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (IRCA) explained the relatively rapid growth among applica 
tions from this population. National time-series of IRCA legalizations 
show a striking resemblance to national time-series for SSI applica 
tions from legal aliens (Lewin-VHI 1994). Because IRCA legalizations 
are concentrated in a relatively few states, we expected that any impact 
of IRCA legalizations would be clearly distinguished in the application 
and award analysis for 1988-1992. In fact, however, the findings were 
very weak. To verify the econometric findings, we asked SSA to tabu 
late the number of annual SSI awards to IRCA immigrants in a 10 per 
cent sample of all SSI applications for the period from 1989 (the first 
year of IRCA legalizations) to 1993. The number identified as IRCA 
immigrants turned out to be very small—peaking at an estimated 3,200 
of the 88,500 applications from all legal aliens in 1993. 7 Thus, the rapid 
growth in legal alien applications over this period appears to be primar-
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ily due to the same factors that are behind growth in applications from 
citizens. While applications from legal aliens grew at a somewhat 
faster rate than those from citizens, evidence from the case studies sug 
gests that this is because the recession had a larger impact on legal 
aliens than on citizens.
Thus, IRCA is apparently not responsible for the relatively rapid 
growth of applications from noncitizens. In the analysis of the 1980- 
1993 data we examined whether growth in the number of legalized 
immigrants who have satisfied the three-year waiting period could 
explain this phenomenon, but again found no significant results. Evi 
dence from the case studies (Chapter 9) suggests that the recession had 
a much larger impact on the immigrant population than on citizens, but 
we have not tested this hypothesis empirically. It is also known that 
middleman fraud has played a role in helping immigrants in some 
areas obtain awards, but the extent of the fraud is not known. 8
An important feature of our findings concerning population factors 
is that they explain why growth in concurrent applications and awards 
has been greater than growth in applications and awards for either pro 
gram alone, and especially why concurrent application and award 
growth has greatly exceeded that in the Dl-only category. Female and 
young DI applicants are more likely to meet the SSI means test than 
older male DI applicants, and growth in the disability insured popula 
tion has been greatest for women and for young to middle-age groups. 
The effects of poverty and changes in family structure have roughly 
equal impacts on concurrent and SSI-only applications and awards, but 
at most small impacts on Dl-only applications and awards. Finally, the 
effect of AIDS/HIV on concurrent applications and awards has been 
substantially greater than its effects on those in either the Dl-only or 
SSI-only categories.
BUSINESS CYCLES AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
Regression Estimates of Business Cycle Effects
There have been numerous previous econometric studies estimating 
the effect of the business cycle on DI applications, awards, and case-
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loads. Most of the previous studies used aggregate time-series meth 
ods, although some work has been conducted using state- or 
individual-level cross-sectional estimates (see Exhibit 1.2 in Chapter 1, 
pp. 15-16). The point estimates vary across individual studies, but no 
study finds substantial effects in a direction opposite from the predic 
tions of economic theory. Previous studies have suffered from various 
specification problems, low statistical power, or both.
One of the key results from our work using annual pooled cross-sec 
tion/time-series data for states relates to our estimates of business cycle 
effects. Our ability to control for permanent differences among the 
states and to eliminate the confounding effect of national changes 
endemic to time-series studies makes the results obtained from our 
analysis methodologically much stronger and more credible. Strong 
results were found in both the 1980-1993 analysis of initial determina 
tions and the 1988-1992 analysis of applications (see Exhibit 1.2 in 
Chapter 1). In general we found stronger effects for DI than for SSI 
and for initial determinations and applications than for initial allow 
ances and final awards. The estimated effects on allowance rates are 
negative.
In the 1980-1993 analysis of initial determinations we found that the 
impact of a change in unemployment begins in the year of the change, 
but is greatest two years after the change. Such "lagged" effects are pre 
sumably greater for initial determinations than for applications because 
of the substantial lag between filing and the initial determination, but 
nonetheless could be very significant. We did not examine lagged 
effects in the 1988-1992 application analysis, and this may explain the 
somewhat stronger findings in the 1980-1993 analysis.
We were also able to extend our DI initial determination analysis 
back to 1976, and found remarkably stable unemployment effects for 
DI in each of three subperiods: 1976-1979, 1980-1987, and 1988- 
1993 (see the appendix to this chapter). We also found that unemploy 
ment effects for SSi-only initial determinations were essentially as 
large as for Dl-only and concurrent initial determinations in the 1980- 
1987 period, whereas we found no unemployment effect for SSI-only 
initial determinations in the 1988-1993 period. The difference may be 
related to the fact that the SSI-only data include children, and growth 
in this category during the latter period is dominated by growth for 
children.
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In the initial determination analysis we also found evidence of a 
"discouraged worker" effect—holding the unemployment rate con 
stant, a decline in labor force participation as individuals give up their 
search for work during a recession is associated with a significant 
increase in initial determinations.
Simulated Business Cycle Effects
One especially notable finding in the simulations for the 1980-1993 
period is that the short recession of 1980 combined with the more 
severe recession of 1981-1982 had a large impact on initial determina 
tions during that period, even though initial determinations declined 
(Exhibit 2.7). 9
Tightening of eligibility standards during that period (see p. 63, The 
Supply of Benefits) evidently discouraged applications sufficiently to 
more than offset the impact of the recession. According to the simula 
tions, the effect of the 1981-1982 recession was much larger than the 
substantial simulated effect for the 1990-1991 recession.
Based on simulations using the 1988-1992 model estimates, 
changes in the unemployment rate over this period account for substan 
tial fractions of the total growth in applications, especially for DI. 
Changes in unemployment account for 1.7 percentage points of the 8.9 
percentage point annual growth in total DI applications, a 19 percent 
share. For SSI, changes in the unemployment rate account for 1.1 per 
centage points of the 10.5 percentage point annual growth rate, a 10 
percent share.
Changes in the unemployment rate account for much more of the 
growth in DI and SSI applications for men than for women from 1988 
to 1992. For example, the unemployment rate accounts for 2.2 percent 
age points of the 7.9 percentage point annual increase in total DI appli 
cations by men, a 28 percent share, but only 0.9 percentage points of 
the 10.5 percentage point annual increase in total DI applications by 
women, a 9 percent share. One reason changes in the unemployment 
rate account for a greater share of the total growth in DI applications 
by men is because the models do not take into account changes in the 
disability-insured population. It is likely that this omission results in an 
underestimate of the effect of the unemployment rate on DI applica 
tions by women.










1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Simulated3 Actual Actual (adults only)
SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations.
aThe simulated series is based on regression results reported in Exhibit IV.A 1, and shows the path initial determinations would have
followed had they been affected solely by state-level factors The actual and simulated series are normalized to equal one another in 1989
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In award simulations for 1988-1992, the unemployment rate 
accounts for 1.0 percentage points of the 10.0 percent annual growth of 
DI awards and 0.7 percentage points of the 12.0 percent annual growth 
of SSI awards, respectively; i.e., it accounts for 10 percent of DI award 
growth and 6 percent of SSI growth. These findings, and the findings 
from the 1980-1993 analysis of initial allowances, indicate that the 
marginal applicant who is induced to apply by a recession is less likely 
to obtain an award than the average applicant. Put another way, the 
recessions have a negative effect on allowance rates. This finding is 
especially important in view of the large increases in allowance rates 
that were observed during and shortly after the 1990-1991 recession. 
We return to this point later.
The findings from the five case studies add credibility to the econo 
metric findings about business cycles, suggesting, if anything, that they 
are conservative. It is clear from the case studies that subtleties of busi 
ness cycles not captured by the unemployment rate are relevant to a 
recession's impact—the industrial distribution of job losses, the per 
ceived permanence of layoffs, and key characteristics of workers who 
lose their jobs (age, sex, prior earnings, skills, etc.). In effect, the 
unemployment rate is a crude proxy for the business cycle. As is well 
known by statisticians, estimated effects that rely on proxy variables 
tend to understate the effect of the factor they are meant to capture.
We know relatively little about the mechanisms through which busi 
ness cycles have an impact on program growth. We cannot determine, 
for instance, the extent to which our results reflect the effects of state 
and local fiscal responses to recessions as opposed to job losses and 
pay reductions among workers with serious disabilities or spouses of 
persons with serious disabilities. The weaker findings for SSI-only 
applications and awards suggest, however, that much of the effect is 
due to job losses. Findings from the case studies support that interpre 
tation as well, but they also provide evidence of a significant role for 
state and local fiscal responses to revenue losses, a subject we will 
return to later.
The dynamic aspects of business cycle impacts are also poorly 
understood. The considerable lagged effects found in the initial deter 
mination analysis suggest that many individuals who are induced to 
apply by a recession only do so after an extensive search for other 
sources of support.
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Economic Restructuring
Many have hypothesized that economic restructuring—the replace 
ment of high-paying manufacturing jobs with relatively low-paying 
service sector jobs—has had an impact on application and award 
growth. The short-term effect of economic restructuring is thought to 
be positive, because disabled workers who lose their manufacturing 
jobs may choose to apply for disability benefits rather than find new 
work in the service sector. The long-term effect may be negative, how 
ever, because service sector workers are less susceptible to disabling 
injuries and illnesses (see Loprest, Rupp, and Sandell 1995). The long- 
term effect may vary by impairment group; for instance, some have 
suggested that it is negative for physical impairments but positive for 
mental impairments.
We have previously speculated that the large business cycle effects 
found in the 1988-1992 application analysis may partly reflect the 
short-term, positive impact of economic restructuring (Lewin-VHI 
1995b). In the 1980-1993 initial determination analysis we tried to 
capture this effect using the percent of employment in manufacturing 
as an additional explanatory variable. We did find the expected nega 
tive effect for the Dl-only category, but it was small and not replicated 
for other program categories. We also developed two indices of job- 
related injuries and illnesses to capture the longer-term impact of eco 
nomic restructuring, but found no significant results. While it may be 
that measurement and other specification errors account for the insig 
nificant findings, it would appear that business cycle effects overwhelm 
the effects of economic restructuring in the periods we have examined.
OTHER SUPPORT PROGRAMS
The Potential for Program Interactions
Just as economic theory suggests that the relative value of disability 
cash benefits to potential earnings affects the decision to apply, it is 
reasonable to expect that the availability and relative value of benefits 
through other programs should also affect the decision to apply. This is
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an important topic, particularly in light of substantial secular changes 
in the relative value of public benefits such as General Assistance 
(GA—the generic term for welfare programs funded entirely by state 
and local governments), Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC—a state/federal program that primarily provides support for 
low-income single-parent households), Medicaid, and Medicare.
Other programs can be classified as either "substitutes" or "comple 
ments" for DI and/or SSI, in the economic sense of these terms. Substi 
tute programs are those for which an expansion in the value of benefits 
reduces applications and awards for the SSA programs; benefit expan 
sion for complementary programs increases applications and awards. 
GA and AFDC are examples of substitute programs for SSI; individu 
als who receive SSI benefits are not eligible for GA or AFDC. Tighten 
ing of eligibility rules and reductions in benefits for GA or AFDC are 
expected to increase SSI participation. State supplements to SSI are 
clear complements to SSI; reductions in state supplements are 
expected to reduce SSI participation.
Medicaid and Medicare are also complements of SSI and DI, 
respectively; most SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medic- 
aid, while DI beneficiaries receive Medicare coverage after a two-year 
waiting period. Increases in the cash value of Medicaid and Medicare 
benefits increase the relative attractiveness of the disability programs, 
and hence the demand for their benefits. Changes in eligibility rules for 
other programs can change the degree to which they are substitutes or 
complements for the SSA disability programs. For example, expansion 
of Medicaid to individuals who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for 
SSI, or the introduction of universal health insurance coverage, would 
reduce or eliminate the complementarity between medical insurance 
and income support programs.
General Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
In our state-level analysis for the 1988 to 1992 period we found 
strong evidence of effects of cuts in state and local GA programs on 
both applications and awards. GA cuts in seven states and the District 
of Columbia had highly significant, positive effects on SSI applications 
and awards for both men and women, and for concurrent applications 
and awards among men. Estimated effects on applications and awards
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were nearly identical, and the elasticities were often large, particularly 
for younger men, and especially for applications and awards in the 
mental disorders category. We later found similar results for initial 
determinations in both the 1980-1987 and 1988-1993 periods. For the 
1980-1987 period we also found evidence that reductions in AFDC 
benefits increase SSI-only initial determinations, but these findings 
were not replicated in the 1988-1993 analysis. The lack of findings for 
the later period may simply reflect a lack of large changes in AFDC 
benefits, the dominance of growth in initial determinations for chil 
dren, and/or the confounding effects of Zebley and the new mental dis 
order listings for children.
These findings are the only direct econometric evidence we are 
aware of demonstrating that changes in other income and in-kind trans 
fer programs have an impact on SSI applications and awards, but the 
lack of evidence may simply reflect the difficulty of measuring such 
effects. The lack of evidence may also reflect a widely prevailing view 
that anyone who is eligible for SSI as well as either AFDC or GA 
would already have applied for SSI because SSI benefits are greater. As 
several welfare administrators and other welfare experts have told us, 
however, this reasoning neglects the fact that the SSI application and 
appeals process is prohibitively difficult for many who can much more 
readily qualify for GA or AFDC—especially those with mental disor 
ders.
A primary objective of the case studies was to learn more about the 
impact of changes in state and local welfare programs on SSI applica 
tions and awards. As described in detail in Chapter 8 of this volume, 
we found that cuts in GA benefits during the 1988-1992 period repre 
sent only a fraction of state and local efforts to shift welfare recipi 
ents—primarily GA recipients—onto SSI. It appears that the 
econometric models may substantially understate the impact of the 
combination of GA cuts and other state and local shifting efforts. The 
reason for this is methodologically the same as the reason that our 
business cycle estimates may understate the magnitude of business 
cycle effects: the GA cuts variable used for the analysis is a crude 
proxy for general state and local efforts; its estimated coefficient prob 
ably understates the impacts of these changes because it fails to capture 
the effects of shifting efforts that don't involve cuts in GA benefits.
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While the findings from the case studies and econometric analysis 
provide much less support for the impact of AFDC benefit changes on 
SSI, the AFDC findings for 1980-1987 along with the long-term 
decline in the value of AFDC benefits relative to SSI benefits (from 
1975 to 1992 the level of median AFDC benefits for a family of four 
declined by 37 percent relative to the value of federal SSI benefits for 
couples), and evidence that a substantial share of AFDC mothers have 
disabilities (see Adler 1993), suggest that AFDC program changes 
have contributed to long-term SSI application and award growth. Pro 
posed future reforms to both AFDC and GA programs could have a 
substantial positive impact on SSI caseloads.
As stated above, the econometric analysis for the 1988-1992 period 
shows that GA cuts had an especially strong impact on applications 
and awards in the mental impairment category. Evidence from our 
interviews of DDS administrators and the case studies supports this 
finding and suggests that, in general, state and local shifting efforts 
over this period can help explain the exceptionally rapid application 
and award growth in the mental impairment categories. Several people 
we interviewed argued that the success of state and local shifting 
efforts would not have been possible were it not for the changes in eli 
gibility requirements for mental disorders.
State SSI Supplements
Many states supplement federal SSI benefits with a state payment. 
We expect increases in total benefits (state plus federal) relative to 
earnings to increase applications. In the 1980-1993 analysis of initial 
determinations, we used the sum of the federal payment and state sup 
plements to individuals living independently divided by earnings per 
worker in the state as an explanatory variable in the S Si-only and con 
current initial determination equations.
The findings were quite strong. We estimate that the elasticity of 
SSI-only initial determinations with respect to the sum of the state and 
federal benefit is 0.8. This estimate is very significant statistically and 
is robust to the subperiod used. 10 For concurrent initial determinations 
the point estimate of the elasticity is smaller (0.4) and is less robust to 
the choice of subperiod, but is still significant. 11
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Medicaid
We also attempted to estimate the impact of the rising value of Med 
icaid benefits on SSI applications and awards, but were not successful 
in identifying an impact. It seems likely, however, that the absence of a 
positive finding reflects the difficulty of measuring the value of the 
benefits. Welfare administrators and other experts generally attest to 
the importance of Medicaid benefits to SSI applicants, and recent 
research on the related topics of "continuation of coverage" mandates 
(Gruber and Madrian 1993), and the effects of Medicaid on AFDC 
caseloads (Moffit and Wolfe 1992; Congressional Budget Office 1993; 
Yelowitz 1994) confirm the importance of medical benefits to labor 
force and program participation decisions. In addition, as discussed 
further in Chapter 9, the growing burden of health care costs for indi 
gent patients on state and local governments and health care providers 
is an important factor behind state and local shifting efforts.
Medicaid reform or general health care reform could have a signifi 
cant impact on SSI caseloads. Medicaid block grants, which would 
result in federal payments to states that are not tied directly to Medic- 
aid enrollment, would significantly reduce the incentives to shift state 
and local welfare recipients onto SSI. Cutbacks in Medicaid benefits 
could also have a negative effect. Making Medicaid benefits available 
to disabled persons independently of SSI, or otherwise increasing their 
access to health insurance, would also be likely to reduce SSI caseload 
growth.
THE SUPPLY OF BENEFITS
Features of SSA's disability programs such as the real value of bene 
fits, legislative and administrative actions affecting eligibility determi 
nation, work incentive provisions, and SSA outreach activities might 
substantially affect applications and awards. Other supply factors, such 
as court decisions on appealed cases, also play a role. Research on the 
effects of these factors is extremely difficult to perform for three rea 
sons: there is only limited variation in the data; most changes that do 
occur tend to affect the whole program, precluding natural comparison
64 Stapleton, Coleman, Dietrich, and Livermore
groups; and it is extremely difficult to disentangle the effect of pro 
grammatic factors from potential confounding factors.
In this section we first briefly discuss the contributions of our work 
to existing literature on the impact of increases in the value of benefits 
and on exogenous shifts in denial rates. We then turn to a more in- 
depth discussion of supply changes that occurred from 1980 to 1993 
and evidence from our simulations concerning their collective impact.
The Value of Benefits
Previous econometric work has addressed some programmatic fac 
tors. Most important, there is a considerable body of econometric work 
since the pioneering work of Parsons (1980) and Leonard (1984) 
focusing on the effect of wage replacement rates on labor force and 
disability program participation. This body of econometric work has 
been plagued by serious identification problems, and has produced a 
wide range of estimates. An alternative quasi-experimental approach 
using rejected applicants as a comparison group (Bound 1989) raised 
fundamental questions about the validity of these estimates, but relies 
on somewhat questionable assumptions as well.
With one exception, we did not analyze the impact of changes in the 
value of benefits because benefits only change at the federal level, i.e., 
the value of federal benefits is a national factor that does not vary at the 
state level. The exception is the estimated positive effect on SSI initial 
determinations of the sum of federal and state SSI benefits relative to 
earnings, discussed in the previous section. The effect estimated is 
identified only through variation in the value of the state benefit and 
variation in earnings. Hence, caution should be exercised in using it to 
infer the effect of a change in the federal benefit on initial determina 
tions.
Denial Rates
Economic theory suggests that the expected probability of award 
and future benefit streams should affect applications, and therefore 
changed eligibility rules and their enforcement might be important in 
determining the number of applicants. Two pioneering studies on this 
issue used state-level analysis for the 1970s that is similar methodolog-
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ically to our own analysis for later years. These studies focused on the 
impact of changes in initial denial rates on DI applications and labor 
force participation, taking advantage of what appears to have been 
exogenous changes in state denial rates from 1978 to 1979. Parsons 
(1991) estimated that a 10 percent administrative increase in denial 
rates reduces applications by 4.5 percent. One limitation of Parson's 
work is that he did not control for changes in unemployment or demo 
graphics at the state level during this period. Gruber and Kubik (1995) 
use data from the same period to estimate the impact of denial rate 
changes on labor force participation of individuals with chronic health 
conditions. They did control for demographic change and the unem 
ployment rate, and also found significant effects. We were able to repli 
cate Parsons' findings exactly, and to test the robustness of his results 
in models in which we also controlled for demographic and business 
cycle effects. We found that taking these factors into account reduces 
the estimated effect of denial rate increases by 50 percent, but the esti 
mated effects were still very significant. We also assessed the validity 
of Parsons' assumption that reductions in the denial rate from 1977 to 
1978 reflected state DDS tightening of eligibility standards; if reduc 
tions in denial rates were due to other factors, then it is not clear that 
potential applicants and advocates would regard them to be indicators 
of changes in eligibility standards. We found that lagged denial rates 
had only very weak, insignificant coefficients in DI initial determina 
tion models estimated for later years, which is consistent with Parsons' 
assumption about the reasons for denial rate changes- from 1977 to 
1978.
Our econometric analysis of state data did not provide other direct 
evidence of program supply effects, by design. Despite this, it is possi 
ble to make some inferences concerning the effects of supply changes 
indirectly. In the remainder of this section we develop such inferences 
about supply changes that have occurred since 1980.
Analysis of Supply Changes, 1980-89
Description of the Changes
The 1980 and 1981 Amendments to the Social Security Act reduced 
DI benefits for some workers, introduced new work incentive provi 
sions for DI and SSI, and required SSA to tighten adjudications. 12 In
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some ways these changes codified or extended earlier administrative 
changes aimed at slowing the growth of the programs. The amend 
ments set the stage for substantial administrative tightening of the eli 
gibility standards for claims filed in the next two years, as well as for 
aggressive efforts to remove persons who did not meet the tightened 
interpretation of the eligibility standards from the roles through con 
tinuing disability reviews (CDRs). This was followed by widespread 
criticism of the loss of eligibility for many, particularly those with 
mental impairments who were disproportionately affected by the 
changes. This criticism eventually resulted in a moratorium on CDRs 
in 1984 and the 1984 amendments to the Act.
The 1984 amendments called for new mental impairment criteria 
that reduced the weight given to diagnostic or medical factors and put a 
greater weight on functional factors, such as the degree to which the 
applicant is limited with respect to activities of daily living, social rela 
tions, concentration, persistence and pace, and ability to function in 
work or work-like settings. In 1985, SSA published revised listings of 
mental impairments for adults in order to comply with the amend 
ments.
The 1984 amendments also required that "source evidence"—evi 
dence provided by an applicant's own physician or other health care 
provider (e.g., psychologist)—be considered first, prior to the results of 
an SSA consultative examination. This had the effect of substantially 
increasing the weight given to source evidence. The amendments also 
required that due consideration be given to pain and other symptoms. 
Pain had previously been an important factor in many decisions, but 
concerns raised by litigation, advocates, and even SSA led Congress to 
codify and reaffirm SSA's existing policy. Litigation over specific 
guidelines for the consideration of pain continued after 1984. SSA has 
now promulgated detailed regulations spelling out how symptoms are 
to be evaluated. The new regulations also have special significance for 
mental illnesses because consideration of mental symptoms, such as 
anxiety and depression, is important in many cases.
Another change required by the 1984 amendments is often men 
tioned along with changes in the treatment of source evidence and pain 
and other symptoms: a change in the treatment of multiple nonsevere 
impairments. Prior to the amendments, applicants were automatically 
denied awards in the initial determination if all impairments were
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judged to be nonsevere, even if there were several; unlike in cases of 
impairments that are severe, but do not meet or exceed the listings, 
assessments of the effects of multiple "not severe" impairments were 
not individualized. The change in the law stopped these automatic 
denials. A final change brought about by the 1984 amendments was the 
establishment of a medical improvement standard. Benefits could no 
longer be terminated without substantial evidence of medical improve 
ment in the beneficiary's condition.
The legislative and administrative changes that surrounded the 1984 
amendments were in part instigated by, and accompanied by, court 
decisions that required SSA to be less restrictive in making eligibility 
determinations. In Mental Health Association of Minnesota v. Sch- 
weiker, a 1982 class action suit on behalf of persons with severe mental 
illness in SSA's Chicago region whose benefits had been denied or ter 
minated because of alleged administrative changes in the evaluation of 
mental impairments, the plaintiffs charged that the Chicago region 
DDS offices were not applying the decision-making process called for 
in the regulations. Claimants with mental impairments who did not 
meet the listings were presumed to be able to engage in unskilled work. 
The judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring SSA's policy to be 
"arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and an abuse of discretion" (National 
Academy of Social Insurance 1994). A similar suit was brought by the 
City of New York against SSA in 1983, ending in a decision favoring 
the plaintiff and declaring that such a policy was illegal.
The Effects of the Supply Changes
The 15.4 percent decline in total initial determinations that occurred 
from 1980 to 1982 is usually attributed to the supply tightening that 
occurred during this period. That is, potential applicants were discour 
aged from applying by reductions in benefits and the tightening of eli 
gibility. The 10.7 percent increase in initial determinations from 1984 
to 1986 is attributed to the changes surrounding the 1984 amendments, 
while the 4.9 percent decline in initial determinations from 1987 to 
1989 is attributed to the ending of their initial impact; i.e., the "pool" of 
potential applicants who were affected by the changes was presumably 
depleted.
The initial determination simulations provide strong evidence that 
the effects of the supply changes on application growth during this
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period were even greater than the large swings in initial determination 
growth indicate because the state-level factors in our models had large, 
countervailing effects on initial determination growth (Exhibit 2.7). In 
particular, if it were not for the short recession of 1980 and the more 
substantial recession of 1981-1982, the swings in initial determination 
growth would have been even larger. The simulations imply that total 
initial determinations would have dropped by 28.8 percent from 1980 
to 1982, instead of the actual 15.4 percent drop, if the unemployment 
rate and other explanatory variables in the model had remained at their 
1980 values. Analogously, the increase in initial determinations from 
1984 to 1986 would have been 16.8 percent instead of 10.7 percent. 
Further, the 4.9 percent decline from 1987 to 1989 that is usually 
attributed to the ending of the initial impact of the changes surrounding 
the 1984 amendments is entirely explained by the recovery from the 
recession; had there been no recovery, the model predicts that initial 
determinations would have grown by 0.1 percent.
While the initial determination simulations show that the effects of 
this period's supply changes on initial determinations were much 
greater than previously thought, the initial allowance rate simulations 
show that the impacts of the supply changes on allowances, given 
applications, were not as large as swings in the actual allowance rate 
suggest. The simulations show that changes in other variables during 
this period, especially the unemployment rate, contributed to the 
decline in allowance rates from 1980 to 1982 and also contributed to 
their growth from 1984 to 1986. For instance, the Dl-only simulations 
imply that the initial allowance rate would have fallen by 2.3 percent 
age points from 1980 to 1982 had the state-level explanatory variables 
remained constant over this period, rather than by the actual decline of 
3.7 percentage points; the same rate would have increased by 1.5 per 
centage points from 1984 to 1986 instead of by the actual increase of 
4.1 percentage points. Very similar results were found for the other 
program categories.
To summarize, the findings from our analysis of this period indicate 
that the impacts of historical supply changes on initial determination 
and allowance growth were even greater than previously thought. Fur 
ther, the "indirect" effects of the supply changes on initial allowances 
(i.e., through effects on the number of initial determinations) are much 
more important relative to "direct" effects (i.e., through effects on the
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share of initial determinations that result in initial allowances) than the 
actual initial determination and allowance rate series suggest.
Analysis of Supply Changes, 1989-93
Description of the Changes
Several additional policy changes in the DI and SSI programs 
occurred during the 1989-1993 period that may have affected the sup 
ply of disability benefits. As discussed previously, the 1984 amend 
ments required that source evidence be considered first in the disability 
determination process. In 1991, further regulations regarding source 
evidence were adopted as a result of court challenges to SSA's treat 
ment of source evidence. These regulations stipulated that deference 
must be given to source evidence because of the value of long-standing 
relationships between the patient and the health professional, and more 
weight must be given to source evidence the longer the relationship 
between the health professional and patient, or if the professional is a 
specialist in the relevant area. Further, if the source evidence is not 
accepted, the examiner must explain why.
In 1989 SSA initiated a congressionally mandated SSI outreach pro 
gram. Since 1989, more intensive efforts at outreach have been pursued 
at the local, regional, state, and national levels. More than twenty-five 
cooperative agreements have been awarded for SSI outreach demon 
stration projects, some of which target persons with mental illness and 
homeless persons (Committee on Ways and Means 1994).
Another supply change during the 1989 to 1993 period is the 
marked decrease in the frequency of CDRs. Agency downsizing during 
the 1980s combined with the increased claims workload in the early 
1990s resulted in a reduced allocation of resources to conduct CDRs. 
The proportion of DI beneficiaries leaving the rolls because of medical 
recovery dropped to an all time low of less than 0.5 percent in 1993.
There were very significant SSI supply shifts for children during this 
period, related to the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Sulli 
van v. Zebley and the adoption of new mental disorder listings for chil 
dren in 1991. Even though these supply changes pertain to child 
applications only, it has been suggested that the large impact of the 
decision on DDS and SSA determinations for children spilled over to 
decisions about adults. Because the most significant impacts of these
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changes were on allowances to children with mental disorders, it 
would not be surprising if spillover effects for adult applications were 
primarily in the mental disorder category.
Finally, changes in the adjudicative climate during the 1989 to 1993 
period likely contributed to application and award growth. "Adjudica 
tive climate" refers to the attitudes of state and federal government 
adjudicators. The outcome in a marginal case may hinge on the attitude 
of a state disability determination service adjudicator or an administra 
tive law judge toward the applicant, which may in turn be influenced 
by recent legislation, political and economic conditions, efforts by 
advocacy groups, an SSA commissioner's views, SSA's budgetary out 
look, court decisions, and changes in SSA regulations and policies. 
Some have also argued that adjudicators faced with heavy workloads 
during times of rapid application growth are likely to give questionably 
eligible applicants the benefit of the doubt rather spend additional time 
seeking additional evidence.
While changes in the adjudicative climate cannot be measured 
directly, there is agreement among those familiar with the determina 
tion process that they do occur and play a substantial role. Many 
experts we interviewed believed that there was a significant shift in the 
adjudicative climate in favor of making awards during the 1989 to 
1993 period (see Lewin-VHI 1995a).
In addition to changes that occurred after 1989, the many changes 
that were implemented prior to 1989 may have had a residual impact 
on growth. As noted in the discussion of the initial determination simu 
lations for 1980-1989, the decline in initial determinations from 1987 
to 1989 may have been due to the economic recovery rather than the 
end of the impact of changes surrounding the 1984 amendments. The 
changes created a group of "newly eligibles" who would not have pre 
viously satisfied the disability criteria, including some who had lost 
benefits in the preceding years. Many newly eligible individuals proba 
bly applied for benefits right away, but many others may not have 
applied for benefits because they were either employed, received 
income from some other source, or were not aware of their eligibility. 
Toward the end of the decade, and continuing into the next decade, the 
reasons why some newly eligibles did not apply earlier began to erode: 
the economy deteriorated; many state and local income support pro 
grams were cut; outreach efforts by SSA, state and local governments,
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and private organizations disseminated information about the new rules 
to potentially eligible persons; and state and local governments, advo 
cates, and lawyers learned how to identify potentially eligible individu 
als and help them obtain a favorable decision.
Effects of the Supply Changes
Evidence from Initial Determination and Allowance Simulations. 
The simulations of initial determinations for the period from 1989 to 
1993 show that much of the growth in initial determinations over this 
period is accounted for by unemployment and other state-level explan 
atory variables in the econometric model, but that much remains unac 
counted for. For SSI-only, a large share of the unaccounted for growth 
is clearly due to Zebley and the change in the mental impairment list 
ings for children. Even for DI, however, the growth not accounted for 
by the models is large. From 1989 to 1993 DI initial determinations 
increased by 21.6 percent, an increase that is 15.7 percentage points 
greater than predicted by the econometric models.
The growth in DI initial determinations not accounted for by the 
models' explanatory variables represents an implicit upper bound on 
the effects of supply changes on initial determinations. As discussed 
above, we think that growth not accounted for is partly due to impacts 
of some other factors (the growth in the share of women who are dis 
ability-insured, the business cycle, and state and local shifting efforts 
especially) that are not fully captured in our models. Hence, the unac 
counted for growth in initial determinations may substantially over 
state the impact of supply changes. Nonetheless, it is likely that state- 
level factors cannot account for all of the residual growth.
The initial allowance rate simulations for 1989-1993 provide stron 
ger indirect evidence on the importance of supply changes. The simu 
lations for DI show that the simulated series increased at a rate only 
somewhat lower than the increase in the actual series in 1989 and 
1990, but from 1990 to 1992 the two series moved in opposite direc 
tions—the actual rate for DI increased by 5.4 percentage points, while 
the simulated rate decreased by 0.9 percentage points. It seems likely 
that better measures of state-level factors in the model would increase, 
rather than reduce, the divergence in the actual and simulated series 
because, in general, we have found that such factors have a proportion 
ately smaller impact on allowances than on initial determinations.
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Hence, it is very difficult to explain these divergent paths by factors 
other than supply factors.
The initial allowance rate for DI fell by 5 percentage points from 
1992 to 1993, while the simulated rate fell by only 1 percentage point. 
While it could be that the simulated series understates the negative 
impact of the recession on the allowance rate, we would also expect to 
find a decline in allowance rates after the initial impact of an expansion 
in supply is realized—just as observed in 1986-1987 following the ini 
tial impact of expansions surrounding the 1984 amendments. It is also 
possible that some administrative tightening occurred in 1993 in 
response to concerns over rapid program growth, but we are aware of 
no explicit effort of this sort.
Evidence from Application and Award Simulations. The application 
and award simulations for 1988-1992 provide some additional indirect 
evidence on supply changes during this period. The analysis of appli 
cations, for instance, accounts for more than three quarters of Dl-only 
male application growth between 1988 to 1992, leaving only limited 
room for the net effect of either supply factors or other omitted factors 
on this group. 13 The models did less well in accounting for SSI applica 
tion growth, female application growth, growth in applications from 
those under age 50, and growth in applications in the mental and mus- 
culoskeletal disorder categories.
The fact that almost all of the application growth in the internal 
organs category is accounted for by factors in the model (Exhibit 2.8), 
while the other diagnostic groups show substantial unaccounted for 
growth, is consistent with the hypothesis that regulatory changes such 
as increasing the weight given to pain and other symptoms, increasing 
reliance on source evidence, and broadening the standards' for those 
with mental impairments resulted in substantial application growth 
during this period. One important caution in interpreting the analysis 
of growth not accounted for by impairment is that relatively rapid 
application growth in some categories may simply reflect switching of 
impairment classifications toward categories in which it has become 
easier to obtain an award rather than applications that would not have 
been filed in the absence of supply changes. Thus, for instance, excep 
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may significantly overstate the effects of supply expansions on total 
applications.
As mentioned previously, state and local efforts to shift the burden 
of welfare spending onto the federal government are a significant 
source of the exceptionally high growth in the mental impairment cate 
gory, and we suspect that a significant share of the category growth that 
is not accounted for by other variables is also due to these efforts. The 
effects of state and local efforts on application and award growth are, 
to some degree, inextricable from the effects of supply changes, how 
ever. As mentioned previously, many we have talked to argue that suc 
cessful state and local shifting efforts were in part made possible by 
eligibility changes for mental impairments.
The econometric models also account for much less award growth 
than application growth. In fact, although final allowance rates 
increased over the 1988-1992 period, the models predict that they 
should have declined, just as with our findings for initial allowance 
rates. As in the analysis of initial allowance rates, it is difficult to con 
ceive of an explanation other than a supply expansion for the growth in 
the final allowance rate. The econometric analysis shows that the 
effects on awards of most of the factors analyzed were proportionately 
no larger than their effects on applications, with some (especially the 
unemployment rate) being proportionately smaller. AIDS/HIV may be 
an exception, but this would only apply to the infectious disease cate 
gory.
CONCLUSION
A 1992 report from the Department of Health and Human Services, 
known as the 709 Report, found that the causes of DI program growth 
are many and complex. 14 The evidence we have examined confirms this 
conclusion, but also points to three major causes of the acceleration of 
application and award growth that began in 1989: the recession of 
1990-1991; new and intensified efforts by states and localities to shift 
the burden of welfare spending onto the federal government; and 
expansion in the "supply" of benefits. The relative importance of each 
factor varies by program and is different for applications and awards.
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The recession is apparently more important for DI than SSI, while 
shifting efforts and supply factors are more important for SSI than DI, 
and supply factors are substantially more important for awards than for 
applications. A fourth factor that clearly contributed to the acceleration 
of growth, but to a lesser degree, is the AIDS/HIV epidemic.
The findings imply that the steady economic growth experienced by 
the economy since 1992 is very good news for policymakers worried 
about rapid program growth, especially for DI. This is confirmed by 
the most recent data available on DI application growth (Exhibit 2.9): 
after the growth rate reached a peak of 13.2 percent in 1991, it dropped 
to 1.3 percent in 1994 and was a negative 6.9 percent through the first 
seven months of 1995. These rates compare to expected growth of 2.1 
percent based on changes in the size and age/gender composition of the 
disability insured population alone. We would not be surprised if the 
rate of growth continued to fall because application rates are still well 
above their 1988 level. The bad news is that DI caseloads will continue 
to grow in coming years because many of the large number of persons 
awarded benefits during the recent period are expected to remain on the 
roles for years to come (see Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4).
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SOURCE. SSA Office of Disability and Lewin-VHI calculations.
*The growth rate for 1995 is based on applications in the first seven months of 1995,
compared to the same seven months of 1994.
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The findings add to mounting evidence that economic incentives 
play a critical role in determining whether individuals with disabilities 
participate in the labor force or seek, and perhaps obtain, disability 
benefits. For many people with disabilities, it is not simply a matter of 
whether they can or cannot work because of their disabilities; rather it 
is a matter of whether the rewards to working are sufficient to make 
work more attractive than leaving the labor force and applying for dis 
ability benefits. While it must be recognized that this statement is not 
true for a large number of individuals with disabilities who have virtu 
ally no employment prospects even in a strong economy, the estimated 
magnitude of the impact of recessions on DI applications indicates that 
the statement is true for a large number.
Notes
1. The findings summarized here are compiled from three project reports: Lewin- 
VHI (1995a, 1995b, and 1995c).
2. See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) and Lewm-VHI (1995a) for discussion of earlier 
years.
3. The SSI-only category in the national data excludes SSI applications from indi 
viduals who were eligible for social security benefits in any category, including 
those eligible as DI workers.
4. There are advantages and disadvantages to analyzing awards by "application 
cohort." The primary advantage is that it allows us to examine the allowance rate 
(awards per application filed) for each application cohort within age/gender/pro 
gram groups Aggregate statistics typically compare applications filed in each 
year with awards made in that year. The lag between the filing of an application 
and a final decision may span one or more years. During periods of rapid applica 
tion growth, allowance rates calculated from aggregate data may be greatly dis 
torted. The primary disadvantage of using awards data for application cohorts is 
that events that occur between the time an application is filed and the time of the 
final decision cannot be modeled with aggregate data because the length of this 
period varies greatly across individuals in each application cohort.
5. For initial determinations, the definition of concurrent is based on the status of 
claims at the time the determination is made.
6. This variable is not included in the initial determination regressions reported in 
the appendix to this chapter because we did not have data for the full 1980-1993 
period. It was, however, included in models estimated using the subperiod for 
which it is available. See Lewin-VHI (1995c).
7. We are grateful to Charles Scott of the Office of Supplemental Security Income 
for providing this information.
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8. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1995). A total of 6,500 cases have been 
identified in the states of California and Washington, combined.
9. The decline in initial determinations may have, in part, been a result of improve 
ments in SSA's administrative computer system which were implemented in 
1981. As a result of these improvements, it was frequently unnecessary to process 
a formal application in cases where a person was found to lack insured status. 
While this certainly had a large impact on the formal applications filed, it is 
unclear as to its impact on initial determinations.
10. The /-statistic for the estimate is 7.7. The estimate using the 1980-1987 subpenod 
is 0.73, and the estimate using the 1988-1993 subperiod is 0.84.
11. The /-statistic is 4.3 using the full period. The estimate using the 1980-1987 sub 
penod is 0.8, while that using the 1988-1993 subperiod is 0.3.
12. See the National Academy of Social Insurance (1994) for a detailed description.
13. Note that this upper bound refers to net effects of unmeasured factors. It is 
entirely conceivable that even if the net residual is small, there is room for poten 
tially larger effects that work in opposite directions.
14. The report was mandated by Congress under Section 709 of the Social Security 
Act. Its full title is The Social Security Disability Insurance Program: An Analy-
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Appendix to Chapter 2
As discussed in the text, we estimated a series of pooled cross-section time- 
series models of applications and awards for the 1988-1992 period and of ini 
tial determinations and initial allowance rates for the 1980-1993 period, using 
annual data for states. In the first section of this appendix we provide a techni 
cal description of the methodology. Selected regression results appear in the 
next section, followed by results of simulations using the 1988-1992 estimates.
SPECIFICATION OF POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES 
MODELS
For the 1988-1992 analysis, state application data were disaggregated and 
analyzed by program, sex, age, and impairment: three program groups (DI- 
only, Dl-concurrent, and total SSI), the usual two sex categories, five age 
groups (under 30; 30 to 39; 40 to 49; 50 to 59; and 60 to 64), and four impair 
ment categories (mental illness and mental retardation; musculoskeletal; infec 
tious diseases, including AIDS/HIV, and impairments not otherwise 
classified; 1 and internal organ disorders—including cardiovascular, neo 
plasms, and other internal disorders, as well as impairments caused by acci 
dents. Thus, we estimated a total of 120 (3x2x5x4) application equations; each 
equation refers to applications in a specific program/sex/age/impairment 
group.
The 1988-1992 award analysis was performed at a higher level of aggrega 
tion—by program and sex only (six equations). While we initially obtained 
award data at the more disaggregated level, the 1992 award data were very in 
complete because many decisions were still pending. We subsequently ob 
tained updated data, but only at the higher level of aggregation.
The 1980-1993 initial determination and initial allowance rate analysis was 
performed at a still higher level of aggregation—by program only (Dl-only, 
concurrent, and SSI-only).
The models used in all of the analysis have the same structure. In each case 
the dependent variable is the (natural) logarithm of one of the following: an ap 
plication rate (applications per thousand population); an incidence rate (awards 
per thousand population); an initial determination rate (initial determinations 
per thousand population); or an initial allowance rate (initial allowances per 
initial determination). In the application analysis the population in the denom 
inator is for the relevant age/sex group; in the award analysis it is for those age 
18 to 64 of the relevant sex; and in the initial determination analysis it is for all 
those age 18 to 64.
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The dependent variable in each application equation is the logarithm of an 
application rate. For the higher level of aggregation, the rate is male or female 
applications for the program per one thousand adult males or females, respec 
tively. For the lower level of aggregation, it is an impairment-specific "appli 
cation rate" for the age/gender group — the number of applications in the 
relevant program category per thousand persons from the age/gender group in 
one of the four impairment categories. The dependent variable in the corre 
sponding award equation is the corresponding impairment-specific "incidence 
rate" — the number of awards in the impairment category per thousand persons 
in the age/gender group.
Each equation estimated had the following general form:
]n(Aa ) = p, + p ,*,„ + p^ + . . . + PA, + a, VI, + ... aTVT, + Est
where
Ast is an application, incidence, initial determination, or initial 
allowance rate, as specified above, in state s and year t.
p\5 is the intercept for state s (i.e., the equation intercept varies 
across states). The intercepts are sometimes referred to as fixed 
"state effects" because they capture the effects of all factors that 
vary across states but not over time.
X\sti ^2sf' • • •' Xkst are me explanatory variables. For the 1980- 
1993 analysis these include both current and prior year values of 
selected variables.
P! ... P^ are the coefficients of the X variables, to be estimated.
VI, ... VTt are dummy variables for each year of data except the 
first (base) year. VI equals 0 for the first year and 1 for all subse 
quent years, V2 equals 0 for the first and second year and 1 for all 
subsequent years, etc. VT equals 1 in the last year (T) only.
(Xgg . . . 092 are the coefficients of the year dummies. These are 
sometimes called "year" or "time" effects because each coefficient 
captures the effects of changes in all national factors in the corre 
sponding year that have the same impact on the dependent vari 
able in all states.
Est is the error term for state s and year t
As described in the text, the analysis relates within-state changes in the de 
pendent variable to changes in the explanatory variables. This is not immedi 
ately evident in the above specification, but is in fact correct because of the
82 Stapleton, Coleman, Dietrich, and Livermore
presence of a different intercept for each state. Since these control for all cross- 
state differences that are fixed over time, they in effect control for all of the 
base-year values of the explanatory variables as well as the base-year value of 
the dependent variable. Hence, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are 
determined by how the dependent variables change over time in relationship to 
how the explanatory variables change over time.
The models were estimated by weighted least squares, with weights equal 
to the size of the state's population in the relevant age/gender category. This 
method yields efficient estimates if the variances of the regression disturbances 
are inversely proportional to the size of the group population in the state and 
the disturbances are independent across states and over time. Weighted esti 
mates also provide better predictions of the national level of applications and 
awards relative to unweighted estimates. The reason for this is that they im 
prove the fit for large states relative to small states, and growth in large states 
determines a large share of national growth.2
We also looked for evidence of serial correlation in the disturbances. In the 
1988-92 analysis we assessed the importance of serial and correlation and oth 
er dynamic specification issues by comparing the results obtained from weight 
ed least squares using the full five years of data to results obtained using just 
the first (1988) and last (1992) year of data alone. The main findings were very 
robust in this comparison. The individual state intercepts wash out any autocor 
relation in the "two-year" estimates, which are the basis of the findings report 
ed here. In the 1980-93 analysis it was essential to use all years' observations 
in order to examine dynamic aspects of initial determinations and allowance 
rates. Hence, we specified a first-order autoregressive model for each state's 
weighted disturbance, with a common autocorrelation coefficient for all states. 
The estimated coefficient was always between zero and one and usually was 
significant. We also found some evidence of spatial correlation in pairs of ad 
jacent states, but the evidence was erratic and did not warrant the substantial 
effort required to correct for it. Ignoring spatial correlation does not bias pa 
rameter estimates but can result in estimated standard errors that are biased to 
ward zero. The models were estimated using the Statistical Analysis System 
(SAS); the REG procedure was used for the 1988-92 analysis and the MODEL 
procedure was used for the 1980-93 analysis. Standard errors for the 1980-93 
models were corrected for any cross-state heteroskedasticity in the weighted 
disturbances, but this was not done for the 1988-92 analysis.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Selected application and award regression results for the 1988-1992 period 
are reported in Exhibit 2A.1. These results were estimated using application
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and award data disaggregated by program and sex only; the voluminous appli 
cation results by program, sex, age, and impairment are reported in the appen 
dix to Lewin-VHI (1995b). Selected results from the 1980-1993 analysis of 
initial determinations and allowance rates appear in Exhibits 2A.2 and 2A.3.
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR 1988-1992
We report simulation results based on the 1988-1992 application and award 
models in Exhibit 2A.4. These show the percentage points of average annual 
growth in applications or awards during the period that are accounted for by 
each variable included in the final regression models, by program and sex. The 
application results were obtained by aggregating results simulated by program, 
sex, age, and impairment to the level of program and sex. Note that they do not 
correspond to the aggregate regression results reported in Exhibit 2A.I, but 
those regressions yield results that are very similar. Application simulations by 
age and by impairment are reported in the appendix to Lewin-VHI (1995b). 
The award simulations are based on the award regressions reported in Exhibit 
2 A.I.
Appendix Notes
1. AIDS/HIV cases first were included in the "other" impairment category before 
being recategorized in the infectious disease category.
2. To test for heteroscedasticity, we estimated White standard errors and found that 
they were not significantly different from the standard errors estimated by 
weighted least squares.
Exhibit 2A.1 Selected Regression Estimates for Application and Award Regressions, 1988-1992
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NOTE - Coefficients of variables specified in logarithms are elasticities by definition Except for the time effect, all other coefficients have been converted 
to elasticities "at the mean" by multiplying the coefficient itself by the mean of the variable. Elasticities in bold type have the expected sign and an abso 
lute ^-statistic of at least 2.0 Elasticities in normal type have absolute r-statistics of less than 2.0 Italicized elasticities have the sign opposite that expected 
and absolute f-statistics of at least 2 0. A separate intercept for each state was also included in each model (not reported) 
'The variable used is the log of the state's unemployment rate.
The GA variable is zero for every state in 1988; in 1992 it is the number of cuts in GA beneficiaries per capita between 1991 and 1992 in seven states and 
the District of Columbia and zero in all other states. 
3The AIDS/HIV variable is the logarithm of the incidence rate 
4The IRCA legalizations variable is zero in 1988 and is the number of legalizations per capita in 1992.
The percentage of children in single parent families is in logarithms.
This coefficient is an estimate of the percentage increase in the dependent variable from 1988 to 1992 that is not accounted for by the explanatory vari 
ables.
Exhibit 2A.2 Regression Estimates for Initial Determination Models, 1980-1993

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations, using data for all 50 states and the Distnct of Columbia. SSI-only esti 
mates include children. 
aVanable is in logarithms 
bVanable is age-adjusted. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Exhibit 2A.3 Regression Estimates for Allowance Rate Models, 1980-1993

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations, 
mates include children 
aVanable is in logarithms. 
Variable is age-adjusted 
*Sigmficant at the 0.05 level.
using data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia SSI-only esti-
Exhibit 2A.4 Decomposition of the Growth in Applications and Awards, 1988-1992






























































































































































SOURCE Simulations based on regression analysis of state data for 1988 and 1992
Comments on Chapter 2
Edward Yelin 
University of California, San Francisco
The econometric findings reported by Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) 
demonstrate a strong relationship between state unemployment rates 
and the growth in applications for Social Security Disability Insurance 
(DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. The analysis 
is more sophisticated than previous research demonstrating this rela 
tionship, principally because the researchers were able to incorporate 
effects due to changes in the demographic structure and in how 
national program rules were implemented in different states (Hambor 
1975; Levitan and Taggart 1977; and Lando, Coate, and Kraus 1979).
Given the strength of these findings and the consistency of these 
results with those of other researchers, policy makers concerned with 
DI and SSI would do well to evaluate the forces in the economy that 
give rise to increases in applications during periods of economic uncer 
tainty. In this commentary, I will outline some of the long-term trends 
that may account for the short-term problems in disability compensa 
tion programs. In suggesting a focus on long-term changes, my 
hypothesis is that persons with disabilities, like minorities and others 
facing difficulties in the labor market, have experienced a dispropor 
tionate amount of the shift in the kind and nature of employment. 
Cyclical downturns may exacerbate some of these changes, or they 
may legitimate applications for benefits that would not be approved 
during good times.
Table 1 lists a few of the changes in the labor market that have 
occurred during the last two decades or so. As men, especially older 
men, have exited the labor force, women have entered the labor force 
in record numbers, a trend especially pronounced among younger 
women. These changes are associated with the shift from a manufac 
turing to a service economy, with men disproportionately represented 
in the former and women in the latter (Yelin 1992). At the same time, 
the nature of work has changed. Smaller proportions of the labor force
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Table 1 Long-Cycle Complements to Short-Cycle Phenomena
• Declining employment rates of men, especially older men
• Rising employment rates of women, especially younger women
• Declining employment in manufacturing
• Rising employment in services
• Increase in part-time employment
• Increase in contingent employment, including self-employment 
temporary, leased, and contract workers
• Declining percentage with employer-provided health insurance 
and pensions
are in full-time, full-year jobs. Greater proportions are self-employed. 
In addition, greater proportions are not actually hired by the firms for 
whom they do the work. Instead, they may work on a contract basis or 
may be employed by a temporary firm. Increasing numbers are 
employed permanently by a contractor who then "leases" the workers 
to the firm for whom the work is done (Osterman 1988). Finally, 
smaller proportions of the labor force report receiving health insurance 
or pension coverage from their employer (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1993; Yelin 1992).
Employment data .do not cover all these phenomena, but the data 
that are available are consistent with the notion that persons with dis 
abilities experience these trends disproportionately. Table 2 compares 
overall rates of labor force participation for 1970-1972 and 1990- 
1992. Among all men, labor force participation rates declined slightly, 
by 2.6 percent. Among all men age 55 to 64, labor force participation 
declined more steeply, by 16.0 percent overall. Among all men with 
disabilities, labor force participation rates declined by more than 15 
percent, almost ten times the decline experienced by men without dis 
abilities. Similarly, among men age 55 to 64 with disabilities, labor 
force participation rates declined by more than twice as much as 
among men these ages without disabilities. In contrast, among women, 
those with disabilities shared in the growth in employment among all 
women. Indeed, young women with disabilities experienced larger rel 
ative growth than those without disabilities.
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Table 2 Change in Rate of Employment of Persons with and without 
Disabilities, 1970-1972 vs. 1990-1992





















SOURCE- Adapted from Yelm and Katz (1994, Table 1)
Aggregating across a small net decrease in labor force participation 
rates among all men and a large net increase among all women, overall 
labor force participation rates increased by 13.7 percent during the 
period covered. However, the net gain among persons with disabilities 
was small, while among those without disabilities, it was ten times as 
large.
Labor force trends among persons with disabilities would appear to 
be tied to the contraction of manufacturing and the expansion of ser 
vices (Table 3). In 1970, persons with disabilities held 9 percent of 
manufacturing jobs. This proportion declined in the ensuing period, so 
that by 1987 their share of manufacturing jobs fell to 8.3 percent. 
Meanwhile, the share of jobs in services held by persons with disabili 
ties increased, albeit not in a linear fashion, from 9.8 percent to 11.6 
percent, almost 20 percent in relative terms.
The foregoing data are broadly consistent with the notion that per 
sons with disabilities are prone to a last-hired, first-fired phenomenon, 
displaced in declining industries and at higher rates than men without 
disabilities, but hired in expanding ones and at similar rates to women 
without disabilities.
In addition, persons with disabilities would appear to experience 
short-term trends in employment disproportionately. Table 4 shows 
labor force participation rates for persons with and without disabilities 
for the period 1981-1983, a recession; 1983-1990, an expansionary 
era; and 1990-1992, the most recent recession. In the two recessions, 
persons with disabilities experienced much larger declines in employ-
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Table 3 Share of Employment among Persons with Disabilities, by Sector 
and Year
197019821987
Manufacturing 9.0 8.9 8.3 
Services__________9.8_________9.1_________11.6
SOURCE. Author's analysis of National Health Interview Survey.
Table 4 Cyclical Trends in Employment of Persons with and without 
Disabilities (%)
_____Years_____ With disabilities ___ Without disabilities
1981-83 ^5-LO 
1983-90 14.0 8.8 
____1990-92__________-4.1____________-0.8______
SOURCE Author's analysis of Annual March Supplement to Current Population Survey
ment than those without disabilities. In contrast, they experienced a 
larger relative increase in employment when overall employment rates 
were growing.
The long-term phenomenon of displacement of persons with dis 
abilities—particularly men—from industries shedding workers and the 
short-term downturns combine to generate a large pool of applicants 
for disability compensation programs. In addition, other changes in the 
nature of work, including the loss of security, the erosion of benefits, 
and stagnant wages exacerbate these pressures, as does the aging of the 
population and the growing prominence of conditions that begin earlier 
in life, including mental impairments and HIV-related illness.
Stapleton and colleagues have improved the confidence with which 
we can state that economic downturns increase the number of appli 
cants. However, the long-term trends in employment play an important 
role in creating the pressure that emerges in recessions. Thus, although 
we confidently can predict that some of the pressure on disability com 
pensation programs will relent with the end of a recession we also can 
predict that until the employment patterns of persons with disabilities 
match those of persons without, the pressure will return with the next 
recession.
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Comments on Chapter 2
Paul R. Cullinan 
Congressional Budget Office
There is an old saying that goes something like the following: "the 
more things change the more they stay the same." Perhaps nowhere is 
this more true in the public policy arena than for income support pro 
grams for the disabled. Despite significant changes in assistive technol 
ogy and in the legal status of persons with disabilities, many of the 
issues raised in Chapter 2 were addressed in a various forums during 
the 1970s. How do economic factors influence the demand and supply 
of income support for the disabled? How can enhanced work incen 
tives in disability benefit programs be implemented without making the 
programs more attractive to the millions of nonrecipients with signifi 
cant health problems? Can rehabilitation services be effective in 
enabling disabled persons to participate more fully in the workplace? 
How consistent is the administration of the programs across different 
levels of adjudication, among states, and across different types of med 
ical impairments?
My comments refer to the analysis of initial determinations and 
allowance rates for the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs over the 1976-1993 
period. Unlike most studies, this chapter analyses state-level data over 
the period rather than national data or microdata. The authors argue 
that this allows them to isolate state-specific effects from the impact of 
national trends or changes in law. Moreover, the authors analyze the 
effects for several subperiods in order to examine the stability of their 
estimates. As they had hypothesized, initial determinations and allow 
ances for disability benefits are strongly correlated with changes in the 
unemployment rate—i.e., higher unemployment rates lead to increased 
applications and to more allowances. These findings are similar to 
those of studies conducted in the 1970s.
NOTE: These comments represent the views of the author and do not reflect any offi 
cial position of the Congressional Budget Office.
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My comments focus on the adequacy of the economic modeling and 
on some programmatic factors that I think are critical which the 
authors have either ignored or have treated inadequately. While the 
authors have done a commendable job in employing state-level data in 
their modeling, I think they have relied too heavily on their state and 
time variables to capture the effects of changing program parameters.
The authors address the issues of applying for disability benefits 
from an economic perspective that individuals with severe health 
impairments will choose to apply for benefits when the expected 
returns are high compared with the rewards of market employment. 
Because this is most relevant for persons applying for DI, my com 
ments will focus on this group of applicants. In their analysis, returns 
from work are modeled indirectly through unemployment rates, labor 
force participation rates, and manufacturing's share of total employ 
ment. There are no social security-specific variables because the pro 
gram is not assumed to vary by state. Any differences among states are 
supposed to be captured within the state dummy variables, and any 
social security changes would be controlled for through the time vari 
ables.
The implications of this specification are that higher unemployment 
rates increase job search costs, increase worker uncertainty about job 
stability, and may lead to slower wage growth. Similarly, declining 
manufacturing employment is assumed to be associated with an 
increased scarcity of "good" jobs. Ceteris paribus, a worsening of any 
of these conditions would be expected to tilt the scales toward 
increased applications for DI.
The potential returns from applying for public benefits depend on 
the level of benefits (both cash and in-kind), the rate at which benefits 
will change over time, and the expense of applying for the benefits. But 
an overriding concern is likely to be the probability of actually being 
allowed to receive the benefits and to retain the benefits over the 
remainder of the person's working life. Given the relatively stringent 
eligibility standards for DI, the potential applicant must also weigh the 
loss of earnings capacity that might occur while the applicant is out of 
work waiting for a final disability determination. Only a minority of 
unsuccessful applicants are able to find market employment after they 
have been denied DI benefits.
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The authors use time variables to proxy programmatic changes, but 
interpreting the variables' coefficients is not straight-forward. The vari 
ables may be picking up the impact of macroeconomic or fiscal policy 
effects not captured by the other instruments in the regression equa 
tions. Moreover, even within the arena of social security policy, the 
coefficients may be influenced by a number of changing program 
parameters—sometimes operating in opposing directions. During the 
period, there were significant legislative changes affecting the generos 
ity of benefits and major changes in administrative factors as well. The 
1977 and 1980 social security amendments resulted in reduced benefits 
for a significant portion of the applicant pool, particularly younger 
adults with families. The phasing-out of student benefits in the Omni 
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 also lessened family benefits 
for applicants with older children. In addition, the administrative cli 
mate over the 1977-1982 period was one of much greater scrutiny of 
applications and allowances, with applications declining by more than 
17 percent and initial allowance rates falling from 47 percent in 1977 
to 29 percent by 1982. The fact that applications continued to decline 
amidst the worst recession in the postwar experience is very likely an 
indication that potential applicants recognized that it was much more 
difficult to be found disabled by the Social Security Administration 
than it had been in the previous decade.
As if these programmatic factors weren't enough, several other 
aspects of program administration also played a role. First, an increas 
ing number of denied applicants are appealing their denials to obtain a 
hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Moreover, the ALJs 
are reversing a larger and larger share of the determinations that they 
review, with the reversal rate climbing from around 60 percent in 1987 
to 75 percent in 1992. The result is that more than one-half of the 
growth in awards from 1986-1992 came from reversals by ALJs. 
Because the authors' analysis for the 1980-1993 period focuses on ini 
tial determinations, this large and critical contributor to program 
growth is ignored.
Although the quality control data of the Social Security Administra 
tion (SSA) have indicated little change in the accuracy of decisions 
made by state Disability Determination Services (DDSs), there are rea 
sons to suspect that the DDSs may not be as thorough as they were in 
the early 1980s, thereby leading to higher reversal rates upon appeal.
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Despite a 60 percent increase in the number of decisions made by 
DDSs over the 1986-1993 period, DOS staffing levels were virtually 
unchanged leading to decisions per staff year rising from 149 in 1986 
to 247 in 1993. Such a large increase in productivity over a relatively 
short period is remarkable, and it would be surprising—at least to cer 
tain observers—if none of this gain was in fact attributable to a less 
comprehensive review of applications by the DDSs.
Another and possibly related pattern is the increasing use of voca 
tional factors in disability determinations. In 1983, only 17.7 percent of 
awards at the initial determination level depended on vocational fac 
tors; the comparable figure for 1991 was 31.7 percent. This trend might 
be expected to increase the frequency with which the determinations 
are questioned, because decisions based on vocational considerations 
rather than solely medical evaluations tend to be more subjective.
Federal court decisions and the SSA's responses to them can also 
change the calculus facing the potential applicant. Since 1986, SSA 
has had a policy of acquiescing to circuit court decisions for all cases 
in that particular circuit. Consequently, instead of having a unified fed 
eral policy concerning disability determinations, the standards vary 
from state to state and from one judicial circuit to another. This raises 
questions about the interpretation of the coefficients of the state 
dummy variables as indicators of state-specific effects rather than of 
programmatic differences.
Despite these limitations, the authors' analysis is encouraging to 
researchers in the area. Given the aging of the baby-boom population 
into the stages of life with higher disability rates, it is important to 
understand better the factors that influence growth in public disability 
programs. This study and many others like it are necessary if we are to 
have enough information to adapt our nation's support system for the 
disabled in an ever-changing society.
Comments on Chapter 2
Richard G. Frank 
Harvard Medical School
The point of departure for the analysis reported in Chapter 2 is that 
there has been substantial growth in applications and awards under 
both the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Dis 
ability Insurance (DI) disability programs over the period 1988-1992. 
The chapter represents an effort to look behind the overall trends in 
program growth and to identify some basic forces that might be con 
tributing to the impressive rates of growth in awards. The authors pro 
ceed by gathering evidence from a variety of sources. They make use 
of econometric analysis, interviews with experts, and documentary 
materials on program changes. This is a very appealing approach to 
developing a complete view of the evolution of two complex programs.
In the comments below, I will attempt to accomplish three things. 
First, I will highlight several key observations made by the authors 
about the nature of growth during the period. Second, I will review 
their list of key forces that may be most important for understanding 
the exceptionally high growth in SSI and DI awards in the mental ill 
ness category. Finally, I will comment in some detail on three forces 
that may offer the most promising explanations and discuss what I 
found to be most persuasive in the authors' work and where more anal 
ysis may be needed.
BASICS
In assessing the growth in disability awards under SSI and SSDI, the 
authors decompose growth by two variables: 1) program status—DI- 
only, SSI-only, and DI/SSI concurrently; and 2) impairment class— 
i.e., disease class. When the data are stratified by these two factors, a 
number of important observations immediately emerge that serve to
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focus the rest of their work. The first observation is that even though 
changes in both application and allowance rates occurred during the 
1988 to 1992 period, it was the rise in application rates that made the 
largest contribution to the growth in awards for all three program 
classes (83 percent for Dl-only, 91.8 percent for DI/SSI, and 91.2 per 
cent for SSI-only). The second observation is that the growth in both 
applications and allowance rates for the mental illness class were well 
above the overall rates of growth for all impairments. For example, for 
the SSI-only program class, the growth in applications was 86 percent 
for mental illness, compared to 66.9 percent for all conditions. The 
third observation is that the growth in the application rate for the men 
tal illness class was above that for all other conditions, thereby driving 
up the growth in awards for this impairment group above that for all 
impairments.
EXPLANATIONS
Five basic explanations are offered in Chapter 2. Table 1 associates 
each type of explanation according to which component of the award 
rate it is most likely to affect. The likely impact of changes in the 
Social Security Administration criteria are clear and were relevant pri 
marily to mental illness, so I will not address that factor in any detail 
here. State outreach activities have also been well documented and dis 
cussed by the authors, so that I will not deal with that policy change.
Cost Shifting
This factor involves economic choices that differ from those typi 
cally discussed in the context of disability policy. The choices made in 
cost shifting behavior are generally not initially made by program ben 
eficiaries or potential beneficiaries. Issues related to cost shifting are 
among the most important discussed by the authors. They present some 
very suggestive econometric evidence showing that decisions about the 
structure of state income support programs made by state governments 
may have large impacts on federal disability programs and the federal 
budget. The primary policy analyzed by the authors is the impact of
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cuts in state General Assistance (GA) programs. They show that the 
impact on growth in awards for the mental illness category is espe 
cially large and significant.
It is important to note that there is more to the cost shifting story 
than GA cuts. A question implied by the line of research pursued by 
the authors is: What has changed for states to make cost shifting more 
attractive in the late 1980s and early 1990s? Part of the explanation 
offered by the authors relates to fiscal pressure on state budgets due to 
1) the economic slowdown of the early 1990s, and 2) limits placed on 
growth and taxation at the state level. Also growth in nonhealth and 
human service segments of state budgets, such as prisons, may have 
caused states to more aggressively pursue other ways to pay for income 
support and medical assistance for indigent people.
A second explanation is important in explaining the growth of 
awards for mental disability. During the late 1980s a number of states 
were decentralizing their public mental health systems. Decentraliza 
tion was usually accompanied by altered financial incentives for local 
government. Among the most important changes was abandoning defi 
cit funding of local mental health programs. The result is strong incen 
tives to enroll people in programs where federal dollars can be 
captured, since localities can keep the state dollars offset by the federal 
monies. This is an area where more probing would undoubtedly be 
valuable.
Recession
The authors advance two explanations about how the recession gen 
erates the observed pattern of awards by impairment class. The first
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argues that the recession hits "marginal" workers hardest. The second 
posits that the recession causes mental illness. The evidence on the first 
is reasonably strong. There is also other evidence suggesting that the 
marginal worker effect is not a transitory phenomenon. Recent papers 
by Cutler and Katz (1991) and Levy and Murname (1992) show that 
throughout the 1980s demand for labor shifted away from low-skill, 
low-education workers. The severely mentally ill disproportionately 
fall into this group.
The second explanation offered, that recessions cause mental ill 
ness, is not very persuasive. If one examines rates of major mental dis 
orders in the 1980-1983 and the 1990-1991 periods, one is struck by 
the stability in prevalence rates. Moreover, if one examines the 
research on mental health and work where there exists some opportu 
nity to sequence events, the impact of mental health on work is far 
stronger than the effect of work on mental illness.
The last point builds on the impact of mental illness on social out 
comes such as work. Virtually all the research in this area suggests that 
mental disorders lead to elevated rates of divorce, early marriage and 
child-bearing in women, and lower levels of household income. This 
accords well with the observations that 1) SSI mental illness awardees 
are more female than the overall SSI population; and 2) females in the 
mental illness impairment group tend to be older than other SSI 
females.
CONCLUSIONS
The authors have carefully examined available evidence and used 
good sense and solid statistical analysis to study SSI award growth by 
impairment class. They have offered some important empirical clues 
about what matters most. A particularly unsettling finding relates to 
cost shifting behavior. The result suggests that state welfare reforms 
may lead to shifting of responsibility to federal programs and new 
pressures on the federal budget. I believe they are pointing to key fac 
tors that need immediate analysis in order to understand the conse 
quences of our newest political currents as they become policy.
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3 The Impact of Health Care Costs 
and Medicaid on SSI Participation
Aaron S. Yelowitz 
University of California, Los Angeles
From 1984 to 1993, the disabled Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) population grew at an annual average rate of about 9.2 percent 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994). This chapter asks whether the 
availability of public health insurance through the Medicaid program 
contributed to the caseload growth. I specifically examine the effect of 
increasing Medicaid's value on SSI participation. I focus my analysis 
largely on the working-age population by examining the SSI participa 
tion behavior of adults between the ages of 18 and 64 using the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data spanning the years 1987 to 1992.
Unlike the dramatic Medicaid program reforms for pregnant women 
and children who might otherwise be eligible for Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), and for the elderly who might otherwise 
be eligible for SSI, the extensions of Medicaid for the disabled during 
the 1980s were relatively minor. 1 Although I cannot use the type of leg 
islative variation that has been used in other research to assess the 
importance of Medicaid for other populations, I will assess the impor-
NOTE: Work on this chapter was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
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tance of health insurance for the disabled using variation in Medicaid 
expenditure across states.
The primary estimation technique (instrumental variables) leads to 
the conclusion that the rising value of Medicaid contributed greatly to 
the increase in the SSI rolls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
instrumental variable estimates suggest that around one-quarter of the 
increase can be explained by this. In addition, the effects of Medicaid 
are much more important for the white population than the African- 
American population. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol 
lows. The next section provides some background on SSI and Medic- 
aid and reviews the economic importance of Medicaid for other 
populations, followed by presentation of some theoretical consider 
ations. Next, a descriptive analysis of the CPS data is presented. The 
regression results follow, and a final section explores policy implica 
tions.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Background on the SSI Adult Disabled and Medicaid Program
SSI was introduced in 1974, replacing state-run programs for the 
needy aged, blind, and disabled. In 1993, $23.5 billion was spent on 
SSI cash benefits for these groups. While the number of elderly and 
blind SSI participants remained stable, the number of disabled SSI par 
ticipants increased from 2.9 million recipients in 1988 to 4.0 million 
recipients in 1992.
In addition to having limited income and assets, an adult between 
the ages of 18 and 64 must be disabled to qualify for SSI. For purposes 
of eligibility, disabled individuals are those "unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determined physi 
cal or mental impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted, 
or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 
months." While this definition may appear to be quite objective, eligi 
bility standards, especially for mental impairments, have changed due 
to legislative, regulatory, and judicial action (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1995).
Growth in Disability Benefits 111
Besides receiving a monthly cash supplement, Medicaid provides 
the disabled adult with a second valuable benefit from SSI participa 
tion. Each state's Medicaid program offers its own package of covered 
medical services within broad federal guidelines. Federal law requires 
states to offer eight mandatory services and allows them of offer thirty- 
one optional services. 2 Although only 15 percent of all Medicaid bene 
ficiaries are disabled, they account for a much larger share of Medicaid 
costs. The average spending on disabled beneficiaries amounted to 
$7,717 per beneficiary in fiscal year 1993. 3 In contrast, average spend 
ing on nondisabled recipients was $2,233.
For disabled adults, there is little opportunity to receive public 
health insurance except by participating in SSI. A notable exception to 
this is section 1619 of the SSI law, which is intended to remove some 
of the work disincentives for the disabled. Section 1619(a) of the law 
provides continuation of cash benefits on the basis of disability even if 
earnings are at or above the "substantial gainful activity" level as long 
there is not a medical improvement in the disabling condition. Under 
section 1619(b), disabled individuals can continue to be eligible for 
Medicaid even if their earnings take them past the SSI breakeven point. 
These provisions turn out to be quite minor, however. In September 
1992, just 48,000 of the 2.6 million disabled adults between the ages of 
18 and 64 participated in either the 1619(a) or 1619(b) program (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1993).
Prior Studies of Medicaid and Welfare Participation
While the Medicaid program was introduced thirty years ago, and 
the program costs have been soaring, only recently has the program 
garnered much academic interest. The key obstacle in assessing Med 
icaid 's impact on outcomes such as welfare participation has been that 
eligibility for Medicaid and cash benefits had been highly correlated. 
The reason that most of the recent academic interest on Medicaid has 
focused on its interaction with AFDC and not SSI is due to the belief 
that the behavioral elasticities of the blind, elderly, and disabled are 
extremely small.
Several studies have examined the impact of Medicaid on AFDC 
participation and work effort. While some of the earlier studies found 
that Medicaid had a surprisingly small effect on the AFDC and labor
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market decisions of female-headed households, more recent work has 
found larger effects.
Blank (1989) exploits the fact that the average Medicaid expenditure 
differs tremendously across states. 4 She used data on 475 female- 
headed households from the 1980 National Medical Care Utilization 
and Expenditure Study (NMCUES). She finds that health problems 
significantly increased AFDC participation, but that program rules— 
such as the presence of the Medically Needy (MN) program or the 
value of Medicaid insurance coverage—had insignificant effects on 
AFDC usage. The effects on the MN program are not necessarily sur 
prising because eight of the thirty MN states in her sample had a pro 
tected income level below the maximum AFDC payment level. More 
surprising was the robustness of the finding that the mean state-specific 
Medicaid insurance value did not affect AFDC participation.
Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) construct an individual-specific valuation 
of health insurance to surmount Medicaid's collinearity with AFDC 
eligibility and benefits levels. They note that a Medicaid variable that is 
constructed from a state-specific average may not proxy for the valua 
tion of the Medicaid program by any particular family. They link 545 
female-headed households from the 1984 Survey of Income and Pro 
gram Participation to the 1980 NMCUES for health information to 
construct a "heterogeneity" index for Medicaid's value based on differ 
ent health characteristics of the woman and her family. This index 
yields enormous variation in Medicaid: the total actuarial values range 
from $2.18 to $2,740 per individual, which is then combined across 
family members to get a family-specific value. Using this approach, 
they find sizable effects of Medicaid on labor market outcomes: if all 
workers were covered by private health insurance, AFDC participation 
would fall by 7.3 percentage points and the employment rate would 
rise by 16.0 percentage points.
Yelowitz (1995) examines expansions in Medicaid eligibility tar 
geted toward young children between 1988 and 1991. These expan 
sions linked Medicaid eligibility to the federal poverty line rather than 
a state's AFDC income eligibility limit, thus offering an incentive to 
leave welfare. He finds that these reforms significantly decreased 
AFDC participation and increased labor force participation. Among 
female-headed households, the effects were largest for divorced and 
separated women, and negligible for never-married women. Yelowitz
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(1996b) examines recent changes in the Medicaid program on the SSI 
participation of the elderly. By using the implementation of a buy-in 
program for Medicare in the 1980s (which offered a substitute for the 
cost-sharing provisions of Medicaid), he finds that Medicaid has a big 
ger impact on exits from SSI for the elderly than the expansions tar 
geted towards children had on exits from AFDC for female heads.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section briefly explores how Medicaid may influence the SSI 
participation decision. The disabled individual maximizes a utility 
function, U(C, L), which is a function of consumption goods (C) and 
leisure (L). The price of consumption goods (Pc) is normalized to $1 
per unit, while the price of leisure is simply the wage rate (W). He is 
given a time endowment (T) which he can allocate between work and 
leisure. He may also receive nonlabor income (AT), for instance from 
the earnings of his spouse. Therefore his full budget constraint is 
defined as
(1) PcC + WL = WT + N.
In Figure 3.1, this is represented as the segment ABC. Given this bud 
get constraint, the consumer maximizes his utility.
By introducing the SSI system into the model, the government 
essentially changes the budget constraint. The program offers a grant 
(G), which was $669 per month for a married couple in 1994, and 
reduces this grant for earning income in the labor market. This reduc 
tion, known as the "benefit reduction rate" (T), is 50 percent of earned 
income. Therefore the net wage falls to (1 - T) W along the initial part 
of the budget constraint.
The final institutional feature to consider is incorporating Medicaid. 
Broadly speaking, Medicaid is received when the individual is on SSI 
and is lost in its entirety after leaving SSL This discrete drop in benefits 
is known as the "Medicaid notch"—the design of the program creates a 
portion of the budget constraint where we would predict that no utility- 
maximizing person would choose. Consider an individual who lives in
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a state where Medicaid is valued at some small amount, M1 —this can 
be thought of as the dollars the family would have to spend on medical 
expenses in the absence of insurance. His budget constraint now is rep 
resented by ADEFC in Figure 3.1. Consider a second individual who 
lives in a different state that has the same SSI grant but a more gener 
ous Medicaid program, so that M2>M1 . In this state, the budget con 
straint is represented by AGHFC. 5
Given these different budget constraints, we can predict that the 
more valuable the Medicaid package, the higher the SSI participation 
rate. This arises for two reasons. First, increasing the value of Medic- 
aid makes SSI more attractive to those who are ineligible based on 
their earnings. In this case, some people in this group may reduce their 
earnings in order to qualify. Second, increasing the value of Medicaid 
may encourage individuals who were previously eligible but not partic 
ipating to join the program. In this case, the net benefit may not ini 
tially outweigh the stigma cost of participating, but it could after the 
value of Medicaid increases.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
I use the 1988-1993 March Annual Demographic File, which pro 
vides retrospective information on family income, health insurance 
coverage, and program participation from 1987 to 1992 on the nonin- 
stitutionalized population. I choose to begin the analysis using the 
March 1988 CPS onward because several additional questions on 
health insurance coverage were added that make these later surveys 
less comparable to earlier ones. 6 1 end the analysis with the March 
1993 CPS because the last data on Medicaid average expenditure (the 
key independent variable) is for fiscal year 1992. 7
Table 3.1 shows sequential selection criteria and the number of 
observations eliminated from each screen for each CPS year. I use 
about one-third of the roughly 900,000 observations contained in the 
1988-1993 CPS years. The nine most important exclusions were being 
over the age of 64, being under the age of 18, living in Arizona, having 
imputed information on SSI or Medicaid receipt, having an imputed 
spouse number, being a woman under the age of 45, being a race other
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection Criteria, Current Population Survey: March 
Annual Demographic File


















Women under age 45
AFDC participants










Female head with 
child present
Male head with 
child present
Related children in 
family




































































































































































Growth in Disability Benefits 117
than African American or white, living in a single-parent household, 
and having more related children than own children in a family. 8 The 
CPS is, perhaps, more useful than other household data sets because 
only a small fraction of the adult population participates in SSI-dis- 
abled.
Table 3.2 presents some summary statistics for the variables used in 
the analysis for the entire population, SSI recipients and SSI nonrecipi- 
ents. Among the entire group, SSI participation is 1.15 percent over the 
time period, while Medicaid participation is nearly double that number, 
2.24 percent. Even with the exclusions of single-parent households 
above, it is still possible that some families have access to Medicaid 
from alternative sources rather than through the SSI disabled program. 
Part of the gap between the two participation rates could result from 
the existence of the Medically Needy program or the General Assis 
tance program. Among SSI recipients, more than 90 percent also 
receive Medicaid. There are at least two reasons why Medicaid partici 
pation may not be complete for SSI recipients. First, survey respon 
dents might only report that they received Medicaid if they actually 
went to the hospital. Second, because a number of states require a sec 
ond application for Medicaid, the respondent may not apply for bene 
fits until they become sick. This table also shows that Medicare 
participation averages 28.2 percent for SSI recipients and 2.2 percent 
for nonrecipients. Since an SSI recipient is much more likely to partic 
ipate in the disability insurance (DI) program than the average member 
of the population, a prolonged spell can result in Medicare coverage. A 
nonrecipient can also qualify for DI and thereby qualify for Medicare.
The next five variables in Table 3.2 represent state-level policy vari 
ables for the Medicaid and SSI program. 9 The average Medicaid 
expenditure for disabled SSI recipients is more than $2,000 higher than 
for elderly SSI recipients and more than $2,400 higher than for blind 
SSI recipients. The real Medicaid expenditure also exceeds the maxi 
mum annual SSI grant (which includes state supplements) by more 
than $800. There appear to be small differences in the average levels 
across SSI recipients and nonrecipients: nonrecipients appear to live in 
states with a higher Medicaid expenditure and substantially higher SSI 
grant. On the surface, these differences in average expenditure on Med 
icaid and average SSI benefits would suggest that higher benefits 
reduce participation. There are a variety of other factors, such as atti-
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NOTES: Author's tabulations of the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Annual Demo 
graphic File. Standard deviation in parentheses. Total number of observations is 297,930, of 
which 3,414 are SSI recipients.
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tudes toward welfare participation, that also vary across states and are 
correlated with benefit levels.
Finally, Table 3.2 presents several demographic characteristics that 
are included in the regression analysis. On average, SSI recipients are 
older and less educated. They are also more likely to be single, have 
fewer children, and be female. Finally, there are large differences in the 
take-up (and presumably availability) of private insurance coverage. 
While less than one-tenth of SSI recipients had coverage, more than 
three-quarters of the nonrecipient sample had private coverage.
Table 3.3 illustrates trends in SSI participation from 1987 to 1992 
for the entire sample and for several demographic groups. For the 
entire sample, the SSI participation rate increased steadily, from 0.98 
percent in 1987 to 1.27 percent in 1992. Perhaps the most striking fea 
ture of this table is that the level of participation for the African-Amer 
ican population is more than three times as high as for the white 
population. The trend in participation, however, shows no consistent 
pattern—the participation rate falls from 3.07 percent in 1987 to 2.81 
percent in 1989, and rises to 3.33 percent in 1992. The trend for whites 
is more clear: the SSI participation rate increased by more than one- 
third between 1987 and 1992, from 0.81 percent to 1.09 percent, 
despite varying economic conditions. The different trend foreshadow 
the different empirical findings for whites and African Americans in 
the regression analysis below. 10 Finally the table shows that SSI partic 
ipation rate for adult women was more than 1 percentage point higher 
than the rate for men, though both groups show a similar increased 
trend in participation.
It is important to note that program participation in the CPS, as with 
many other household surveys, appears to be underreported. The 
national SSI participation rate in the adult population was 1.75 percent 
in 1992, compared to 1.27 percent in the CPS (U.S. House of Repre 
sentatives 1993). While participation rates also appear to be consis 
tently under-reported in most states, the discrepancies vary. The 
participation rate is underreported by 0.07 percentage points in Florida, 
by between 0.32 to 0.48 percentage points in Illinois, New York, and 
Texas, and by 0.95 percentage points in California. If the stigma of 
reporting program participation to a survey taker varies across states, 
then the patterns we see across states would be likely to emerge.





























































































NOTE: Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.4 illustrates trends in the average real SSI benefit level and 
real Medicaid expenditure from 1987 to 1992. 11 The average benefit 
level is computed from the CPS, based on the respondent's state of res 
idence, time period, and marital status. Clearly, two different trends 
emerge here. Real SSI cash benefits remain largely unchanged. This 
may not be too surprising since the federal benefit level is indexed for 
inflation. Medicaid expenditure increased by more than $3,000 in real 
terms over this period. This pattern in Medicaid expenditure is similar 
to the pattern in overall SSI participation rates, and is at least sugges 
tive that a link between the two trends may exist.
Table 3.4 Trends in SSI Benefits and Medicaid Expenditures
Average Medicaid 



















NOTES; Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey All values are in 1990 
dollars. Medicaid expenditures is deflated by the medical CPI.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates Using Average Medicaid 
Expenditure of Disabled
For ease of interpretation, I present results from a linear probability 
model. The coefficients from the models below therefore may be inter 
preted as percentage point changes. The basic estimating equation is 
denoted by
(2) SSI.PARTj = Po + PjMEDICAID.BEN,, + (32SSI_BEN,r
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The subscript * refers to individuals, j to states, and t to time periods. 
The outcome, SSI participation (SSI_PART) is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the respondent participated in the program in the previous year. 
Two key policy variables that are expected to increase SSI participation 
are the average real Medicaid expenditure (MEDICAID_BEN) and the 
average real SSI benefit (SSI_BEN). I2 The vector X contains several 
individual-level variables that may also influence SSI participation, 
including the respondent's age and its square, race, residence in a cen 
tral city, education, marital status, number of children present, gender, 
and veteran status. 13 In addition, I amend this basic specification to 
allow for nationally uniform, time-varying shocks to SSI participation 
through the inclusion of five time dummies, as well as time-invariant, 
state-specific shocks to SSI participation through the inclusion of 
forty-nine state dummies. The coefficients P0, pj, p2 > Ps> 5/» and 5, are 
to be estimated, and et- is an error term.
By including state-fixed effects (SJ) and time-fixed effects (Tt\ the 
regression framework accounts for some of the other factors that may 
lead to an increase in SSI participation. I am able to control for the 
effects of the business cycle (at the national level) with the time dum 
mies. Since other studies have demonstrated that this influences dis 
ability insurance applications, it may be reasonable to expect it to 
influence SSI participation. If changing economic conditions are corre 
lated with Medicaid expenditure, the results will be biased by not 
accounting for this omitted variable.
Three other explanations for SSI growth, which essentially vary 
over time, are also controlled for. First, SSI spell lengths may have 
increased in duration because the Social Security Administration was 
performing fewer disability reviews. Second, some medical break 
throughs may have allowed disabled people to live longer than they 
otherwise would have (U.S. General Accounting Office 1995). Third, 
there has been growth over time in outreach efforts for SSI.
Several unmodeled or unobservable variables that differ across 
states could bias the results. As shown earlier, the SSI reporting behav 
ior in the CPS data varies by state. If admitting program participation 
represents permanent differences in attitudes that vary by state, includ 
ing state-fixed effects will account for this. In addition, the availability 
of Medicaid coverage varies across states, and this could affect SSI 
participation. For instance, a poor adult may be able to receive health
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insurance coverage through the Medically Needy program or the Gen 
eral Assistance program. It is possible that these variables are corre 
lated with Medicaid expenditure and affect SSI participation. For 
instance, more liberal states may have these optional programs, which 
would tend to discourage SSI participation, and have more generous 
Medicaid services, which would increase average Medicaid expendi 
ture. This type of modeled difference across states would likely lead to 
the conclusion that increased Medicaid expenditure reduces SSI partic 
ipation. To the extent that the MN and GA program remain fixed over 
the time period, this heterogeneity would be accounted for with state- 
fixed effects. It is plausible that the programs may have changed over 
time, however. Several states, including Michigan, eliminated their GA 
program in the early 1990s. If this program change is correlated with 
Medicaid expenditure, then even the model that includes state- and 
time-fixed effects will be biased. To account for these possibilities, I 
include four additional variables that vary over time at the state level: 
1) the Medically Needy protected income level for one person, 2) mea 
sures of the state unemployment rate, 3) labor force participation, and 
4) a measure of cuts in a state's General Assistance program. 14
The results in the first column of Table 3.5 show that the OLS esti 
mate of Pi is statistically insignificant and economically unimportant. 
The point estimate suggests that increasing Medicaid by $1,000 leads 
to an increase in SSI participation of 0.005 percentage points. Since 
Table 3.4 illustrates that average Medicaid expenditure for the entire 
sample rose in real terms from $6,700 in 1987 to $9,730 in 1992, this 
coefficient estimate implies that increased Medicaid expenditure raised 
the probability of SSI participation by 0.015 percentage points. Since 
SSI participation for the whole sample increased from 0.98 to 1.27 per 
cent (or 0.290 percentage points), the OLS estimate implies that rising 
health care costs can explain less than six percent (0.015 divided by 
0.290) of the rise in SSI participation.
On the other hand, this model shows that increasing the SSI benefit 
increases SSI participation, though it is only marginally significant. 
Raising the benefit by $1,000 results in an increase in SSI participation 
of 0.053 percentage points. While this estimate could be an explanation 
for the rise in participation, Table 3.4 shows little change in cash bene 
fits over time. The CPS estimates indicate that from 1987 to 1992, SSI 
benefits fell slightly in real terms from $7,211 to $7,133. While the
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Table 3.5 Linear Probability Model from Full Current Population 
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Table 3.5 (continued)_____________________________
(I) (2) 

















NOTES. Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey. Standard errors in 
parentheses All models also include state-fixed effects (49), time-fixed effects (5), and a constant 
term Instruments in column 2 are average Medicaid expenditures for the blind and elderly
cash benefits increase the probability of participation, they cannot 
explain the growth in participation. The table also shows the effect of a 
third policy variable, whether the respondent lived in a Section 209(b) 
state. Since very few states changed status from Section 209(b) to Sec 
tion 1634 during the period, the effect of 209(b) status is essentially 
subsumed in the state-fixed effect. The estimate in this column is not 
significantly different from zero and economically small.
The labor market variables enter the model with the expected signs: 
increases in the unemployment rate raise SSI participation (though it is 
imprecisely estimated), while increasing labor force participation low 
ers SSI participation. Not surprisingly, the MN variable is imprecisely 
estimated: after controlling for state-fixed effects, there is little inde 
pendent variation in the income limit. Contrary to expectations, the 
parameterization of the GA cut variable is "wrong-signed" and margin 
ally significant. While larger GA cuts (indicating a larger positive 
value) should presumably increase SSI participation (and therefore 
enter into the model with a positive sign), instead the sign is negative.
Education and family structure appear to play important roles in SSI 
participation. Relative to those with a college degree, individuals with 
less than nine years of education are 5.2 percentage points more likely 
to participate in SSI, while those with less than twelve years are 1.8 
percentage points more likely to participate. In addition, those who 
only completed high school are significantly more likely to participate
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in the SSI disabled program than those who entered college, but the 
economic impact is not as dramatic as for the other educational groups. 
Being married lowers SSI participation by 3 percentage points, while 
having an additional young child increases the probability of participa 
tion. The positive effect of young children may indicate a "spillover" 
effect on SSI participation resulting from the Supreme Court's Sullivan 
v. Zebley decision. It is well known that the number of children on SSI 
skyrocketed during this time frame, and once a household enrolled one 
member on SSI, its propensity to enroll other members may increase.
The signs of the other demographic and location-specific character 
istics enter into SSI participation largely as expected. SSI participation 
increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. Since many physical dis 
abilities may not occur until later ages, this finding makes sense. Rela 
tive to whites, being African American raises the probability of SSI 
participation by 1.64 percentage points. This is consistent with the con 
tinually higher levels of participation in Table 3.3. Living in a central 
city raises SSI participation. This may occur for two reasons. First, 
those in central cities may have more access to welfare and social secu 
rity offices or health care facilities, which lowers the transaction costs 
of SSI participation and raises the value of Medicaid, respectively. Sec 
ond, if living in a central city means that individuals have better infor 
mation about the programs, they would be more likely to participate. 
Finally, being male or being a veteran significantly lowers SSI partici 
pation.
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates Using Average Medicaid 
Expenditure of Elderly and Blind as Instruments
The prior estimates using variation in disabled expenditure may be 
biased if changes in the underlying health of the SSI population 
affected both Medicaid's value and SSI participation. If the eligibility 
criteria for disability becomes less strict, for example, so that people 
who were previously found to be ineligible are now deemed eligible 
for SSI, then the former estimates of Pj would be too small. In the 
Supreme Court's Sullivan v. Zebley decision, such a reevaluation 
occurred for children, and this may have had spillovers into the adult 
population. 15 In addition, if states attempted to shift their GA and MN 
beneficiaries onto the SSI rolls, and if these groups happened to be
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healthier, the OLS results would be biased. In this case, the marginal 
disabled SSI recipient will likely incur less health care expenditure 
than the average recipient, so that average expenditure falls while SSI 
participation increases. This would lead to a spurious negative correla 
tion (which in turn biases the coefficient downward). 16
To correct for this simultaneity bias, I instrument for average Medic- 
aid expenditure of the disabled in each state-year cell with the corre 
sponding average expenditure of the elderly and of the blind. These 
variables reflect different aspects of the state's Medicaid program that 
influence its value, such as variation in health care prices, access to 
care, and scope of services. Since the criteria to qualify as a blind or 
elderly recipient is more objective, these instruments are unlikely to be 
correlated with changing definitions of disability. 17
At this point, it is important to discuss the validity of the instrumen 
tal variables. Expenditure for neither the blind nor elderly fully cap 
tures the breadth of a state's Medicaid program—the blind tend to be 
healthy, and the differences in elderly expenditure may reflect differ 
ences in nursing home access. This does not invalidate the estimation 
technique, however. Two conditions must hold: the instruments must 
be correlated with the endogenous regressor and uncorrelated with the 
error term. While the expenditure on the elderly and blind is not per 
fectly correlated with expenditure on the disabled, they are extremely 
powerful instruments—the first stage F-statistic (predicting Medicaid 
expenditure for the disabled) is over 10,000. In any case, if the instru 
ments were weak predictors, the instrumental variable estimates would 
be biased toward the OLS estimates so I would be unlikely to find any 
effect of Medicaid.
By instrumenting, the coefficient estimate in the second column of 
Table 3.5 increases dramatically, consistent with changing the budget 
constraint in Figure 3.1. Increasing Medicaid expenditure by $1,000 is 
now associated with an increase in the probability of SSI participation 
by 0.024 percentage points. Again, taking the rise in Medicaid expen 
diture from Table 3.4, this estimate implies that rising health care costs 
from 1987 to 1992 raised the probability of participation by 0.070 per 
centage points. Since the total increase in SSI participation was 0.290 
percentage points, the point estimate indicates that rising health care 
costs can explain around one-quarter of the rise in SSI participation. 
The point estimates on the other explanatory variables remain largely
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unchanged, both in significance and in magnitude. By comparing the 
coefficient estimates on Medicaid expenditure and SSI benefit levels, a 
$1,000 increase in SSI leads to a similar rise in participation as a 
$2,170 increase in Medicaid expenditure.
Recall that Table 3.3 showed dramatic differences in SSI participa 
tion rates across racial lines. This may suggest that rising health care 
costs have different effects on the African-American and white popula 
tions. The two columns in Table 3.6 divide the sample into whites and 
African Americans, respectively. Again, I instrument for average dis 
abled Medicaid expenditure with average blind and average elderly 
Medicaid expenditure in each state-time cell.
The Medicaid coefficient estimates for the white population are 
slightly larger than the IV estimates from the second column of Table 
3.5. The effect of Medicaid expenditure increases slightly, and the 
coefficient is more precisely estimated than in the full sample. Cash 
benefits appear to play a less important role in SSI participation than 
for the full sample. In contrast, Medicaid appears to play little role in 
the SSI participation decision of African Americans, though the coeffi 
cient is imprecisely estimated. While the policy variables explain little 
of the SSI participation decision for African Americans, the demo 
graphic variables on education, family structure, gender, and veteran 
status are all significant predictors of participation.
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This chapter finds that rising health insurance costs are an important 
reason for participation in the SSI-disabled program. By using a large, 
nationally representative household data set, I find that around one- 
quarter of the rise in SSI participation may be due to increases in the 
value of Medicaid. The effects appear to be concentrated in the white 
population, not the African-American population.
I show that ordinary least squares estimates of Medicaid effect pro 
duce badly biased estimates, since the health status of the disabled 
population was changing. The estimates using instrumental variables 
produce much stronger positive effects of Medicaid on SSI participa 
tion. Is it reasonable to assume that the health status of the disabled
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NOTES: Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Standard errors in 
parentheses. In addition to the coefficients shown, all models also include state-fixed effects (49), 
time-fixed effects (5), and a constant term. Instruments in columns 1 and 2 are average Medicaid 
expenditures for the blind and elderly.
changed so dramatically while the health status of elderly and blind did 
not? Knowing the answer to this question is vital for assessing the 
validity of the instruments. It is difficult to believe that the health status 
of the blind changed dramatically from 1987 to 1992, and the instru 
mental variables results do not change markedly by only using the 
Medicaid expenditure for the blind as an instrument. On the other 
hand, it is possible the health status of the elderly on SSI may have 
changed because the Qualified Medicaid Beneficiary (QMB) program 
in the 1980s and 1990s offered an incentive for the elderly to leave SSI 
and still retain Medicaid. Around 1.4 million elderly were enrolled in 
this program in December 1992; however it is not known whether the 
health status of former SSI recipients who left and enrolled in the 
QMB program was better or worse than the average SSI recipient.
Are the estimated effects too large? At this point, it is important to 
remember about the recent empirical findings on other Medicaid popu 
lations. In other work, Yelowitz (1995,1996b) finds significant effects 
on AFDC participation for female household heads and on SSI partici 
pation for elderly households. In those studies, the policy experiment 
was somewhat different from this study, however. The policy changes 
for young children and for the elderly offered Medicaid benefits with 
out necessarily applying for AFDC or SSI, which therefore offered 
incentives to leave those welfare programs. In a closer comparison to 
this study, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) attempt to value Medicaid and find 
strong effects on AFDC participation for female-headed households. It 
is plausible to think that health insurance plays a more important role 
in the economic decision making of disabled adults than either female
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household heads or elderly households. Therefore, the stronger results 
here appear reasonable.
The findings have several policy implications for program design. 
Since Medicaid is an important determinant of SSI participation, offer 
ing health insurance without the need to participate in SSI may reduce 
total costs. This could occur because disabled adults may then forego 
the cash benefits from SSI—which amounts to more than $20 billion 
annually. On the other hand, some disabled adults who were not previ 
ously participating in SSI, because the program may be stigmatizing, 
may decide to participate in a Medicaid-only program, which could 
increase costs. In theory, this could occur through the Medically Needy 
program. The program typically has lower income limits than SSI and 
fewer covered services under Medicaid than for categorically needy 
recipients. Thus, Medically Needy may not offer enough of an incen 
tive for the disabled to leave. Therefore modifications of existing SSI 
program rules concerning Medicaid may have an impact on total costs.
Notes
1. See Yelowitz (1995, 1996b) for explanations of the Medicaid reforms for children 
and the elderly, respectively.
2. Required coverage includes inpatient and outpatient hospital services, rural health 
clinic services, federally qualified health center services, laboratory and x-ray ser 
vices, nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, family planning ser 
vices, physicians' services, home health services for any individual entitled to 
nursing facility care, nurse-midwife services, and services of certified nurse prac 
titioners.
3. These expenditure numbers include spending on intermediate care facilities and 
skilled nursing homes. I believe that it is important to include these numbers 
because access to these facilities is indeed part of Medicaid's value. While it is 
certainly true that only a small portion of the population will be institutionalized, 
it is also true that a small portion will use any particular Medicaid service. There 
fore excluding this expenditure seems ad hoc.
4. Winkler (1991) takes a similar approach.
5. It is not necessarily clear that an increase in Medicaid spending per beneficiary 
translates into an increase in the value to individuals, however. For example, as 
real payments to doctors or other service providers increase, the individual getting 
the same service at higher cost may not have greater value. It is much more diffi 
cult to obtain a family- or individual-level valuation, although other studies, such 
as Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) have tried.
132 Yelowitz
6. These questions specifically dealt with the health insurance status of children in 
the household. Survey respondents were effectively asked twice about the health 
insurance coverage of children in the household.
7. Furthermore, I restrict my attention to adults who would be unlikely to collect 
Medicaid from a program other than SSI. Thus, I exclude single-parent house 
holds with children under age 18 (who may be eligible for Medicaid under the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC, program). I also eliminate 
women between 18 and 44 from my sample. For this group, the primary health 
insurance expense would be due to pregnancy, and other reforms in the Medicaid 
program from 1984 onward could bias the results for SSI participation. To accu 
rately examine the impact of Medicaid for these groups, not only would the 
expansions need to be parameterized, but the joint AFDC, SSI, and labor force 
participation decisions would have to be modeled, which is beyond the scope of 
the current paper. See Cume and Gruber (1994) for an analysis of these Medicaid 
pregnancy expansions.
8. I follow Winkler (1991) in excluding Arizona from the analysis. Arizona had a 
Medicaid demonstration project for part of the time period I examine, and data on 
average Medicaid expenditure are not available.
9. All of these variables were obtained from various editions of U.S. House of Rep 
resentatives (1993).
10. Although the difference for African Americans is striking, it is not all that surpris 
ing for a means-tested program.
11. These are deflated using the CPI-U for the SSI benefit level and the medical ser 
vices CPI for Medicaid.
12. I include a third state-specific variable, whether or not the respondent lived in a 
section 209(b) state. Several states changed status between section 209(b) and 
section 1634 between 1987 and 1992, but in models with state-fixed effects, this 
effect is never reliably estimated. I would expect the coefficient to be negative— 
living in a state with extra application procedures for Medicaid increases transac 
tion costs and thus lowers SSI participation.
13. I include many of the same demographic variables that Winkler (1991) includes in 
her AFDC participation equation using the CPS. In addition, I tried restricting the 
sample to adults aged 22 to 64 since some rules which govern the SSI eligibility 
for a child who reaches the ages of 18 to 21 have changed over time. The results 
on the Medicaid and SSI variables are similar to the coefficients reported here.
14. These variables are carefully explained in Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2). It is possi 
ble that the inclusion of the labor market and General Assistance variables reflect 
outcomes of the same utility maximization process that lead to SSI participation, 
since these are constructed from participation rates rather than changes in the bud 
get constraint. However, it is more likely that they are instead driven by changes 
in the business cycle, so that they are not endogenous, at least at the person-level.
15. The Supreme Court ruled that disability standards for children may not be nar 
rower than those applied for adults. As a result, eligibility criteria for children are 
based on a child's developmental delay and limitations on the child's ability to 
engage in age-appropnate activities of daily living. This has increased the number
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of children classified as disabled. Prior to 1990, the same disability criteria that 
applied to adults were also applied to children.
16. This argument suggests growth in SSI-disabled expenditure should be slower than 
other groups who use similar Medicaid services, for whom the health mix was not 
changing. My calculations show average expenditure on the disabled grew 41 per 
cent in real terms from 1987 to 1993. The growth rates for the blind and elderly 
were much greater, 77 and 144 percent, respectively.
17. An aged person age 65 and over with limited income and resources can qualify 
under the aged SSI program, while blind individuals are defined as those with 
20/200 vision or less with the use of a correcting lens in their better eye, or 
those with tunnel vision of 20 degrees or less.
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Comments on Chapter 3
Barbara Wolfe 
University of Wisconsin-Madison
I like the paper by Aaron Yelowitz (Chapter 3) and believe its gen 
eral finding that Medicaid is a significant factor in explaining the 
recent growth in numbers of adult Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
recipients. We know that Medicaid has been growing—from 22.9 mil 
lion recipients ($48.7 billion expenditures) in 1988 to 35.1 million 
recipients ($107.9 billion expenditures) in 1994. Medical expenditures 
have increased tremendously over the period studied, and an existing 
body of literature on other population groups finds similar results: that 
publicly provided health insurance is an important determinant of indi 
vidual choices concerning both age of retirement and applications for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
The theoretical framework is one established in the literature and 
makes sense as applied here. It is a choice-based, utility-maximization 
model in which the provision of Medicaid (an either/or or a 0/1 choice, 
the so-called Medicaid notch) is incorporated into an individual's 
choice, selecting the option that maximizes well-being. Well-being is 
proxied by potential income (including the value of benefits in-kind) in 
each of the two options, SSI with Medicaid versus working. Health is 
not fully incorporated into the model; Yelowitz discusses the need to 
incorporate health into his model, but at the moment, well-being under 
the work option depends only on earnings for each individual. Health 
limitations are not incorporated, and although Yelowitz mentions this 
omission, he never discusses how it might influence the model. For 
consistency, he needs to incorporate the probability of being offered 
private insurance and a value for it if it is offered by an employer.
One further comment on the model is that most states have a spend- 
down provision that allows certain persons to obtain Medicaid without 
being on SSI, and many states offer medical care coverage through 
another program, General Assistance (GA). Hence, a number of per 
sons are potentially eligible for Medicaid or GA, and the probability of
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eligibility and the speed by which they could be found eligible are also 
factors to be considered. These factors are not incorporated into the 
model.
In regard to the data and empirical work, most of the exclusions 
seem reasonable, except perhaps for those eliminated because they 
have imputed information—but this is a problem that plagues all of us 
doing empirical research. In this case such exclusion seems quite 
minor and pertains to a very small proportion of the observations.
There are a few puzzles in the data.
1. The author reports Medicaid expenditures for disabled persons 
that are too high according to official figures in Health United 
States, 1995. In these official statistics, average spending in 1993 
was $7,706, compared to Yelowitz's reported value of $9,226. 
The author states that his figure includes nursing home expendi 
tures (see note 3 in Chapter 3), but so do the official statistics as 
reported in Table 139 in Health United States, 1995, which are- 
based on Health Care Financing Administration data. A similar 
issue arises with the data used for Medicaid in the study. Why 
these differences?
2. It would be meaningful to see a comparison of the insurance cov 
erage in a matched sample according to education, age, and mari 
tal status. I do not think that a comparison to the total U.S. 
population is very informative.
Many of the results seem plausible. A few raise questions about the 
reasonableness of the estimation. Perhaps the most puzzling involves 
the dummy variable included as an indicator of 209(b) states, which 
are more stringent with regard to Medicaid eligibility: not all persons 
eligible for SSI are eligible for Medicaid. This leads to an expected 
negative sign on the variable for a 209(b) state, yet the result is posi 
tive, though not significant. The other puzzle is why the number of 
children should be positive when there are no dependent benefits asso 
ciated with SSI and, hence, no additional benefit to families with chil 
dren. The author's explanation of a link to the Zebley case seems 
inadequate (unlikely) as an explanation.
Yelowitz appropriately raises the issue of endogeneity of the value 
of Medicaid. His argument is that if the benefits become more gener-
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ous, an increased number of marginal persons (i.e., those who tend to 
be healthier and use less medical care) will be attracted to SSI and 
Medicaid. This means that as more people join the ranks of those on 
these programs, the expected benefit, at least as measured in this study, 
will fall. This fall will not reflect decreases in program generosity, but 
rather increased generosity. Because of this potential problem, instru 
mental variables are used in the next set of estimates. But the choice of 
instruments is not compelling, in the following ways.
Expenditures on the blind and the elderly are used as instruments. 
According to the statistical test reported, they work well. Yet at least on 
an intuitive basis, neither of these groups seems able to fully measure 
the breadth of a state's Medicaid program. Blind persons tend to be 
healthy, so their medical expenditures will not reflect the scope of a 
state's Medicaid program. And differences in expenditures of the aged 
across states are likely to reflect differences in nursing home access 
rather than in breadth of acute and chronic coverage. Preferable instru 
ments would seem to be expenditures by disease category. This would 
require background information on the basis for a disability determina 
tion, which is not available in Current Population Survey data. One 
suggestion, drawing on an alternative data set, is to identify groups by 
expected expenditures—grouping, for example, into the following four 
categories: low cost, low technology, high technology, and experimen 
tal and related groups. This also suggests that using SIPP data may be 
preferable, although the time span would be shorter.
Finally, other factors that may or may not be fully taken into account 
may help explain the growth in SSI and Medicaid enrollment among 
adults.
• Reduced coverage of private insurance over this same time 
period, resulting in more co-payments and less coverage for other 
family members. This could explain some of the growth in SSI 
and Medicaid spending.
• Poor health, which reduces potential wages. This is also part of 
the utility-maximization framework and should be incorporated 
into the model.
• The increase in the number of AIDS cases. Many of these people 
are covered by SSI and Medicaid; $55 million was spent on AIDS 
in 1989, $280 million in 1992 and $500 million in 1994. The
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number of persons covered for AIDS differs substantially across 
states.
• There may also have been significant changes in the treatment 
and diagnosis of many illnesses over this period, which would 
also influence expenditures over time.
• Some drug addicts and alcoholics have become recipients of SSI 
and Medicaid during this period, and 75 percent of these persons 
are in two states—California and Illinois. If their use of medical 
care differs significantly from that of traditional recipients, the 
means of these states would be influenced by these persons in 
ways that would not represent true differences in the expected 
value of Medicaid across the states.
This type of research could be improved through the use of data 
sets, such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation, with 
more information on health conditions, as well as through the use of a 
new data set—the supplement to the National Health Interview Survey, 
which oversamples and resamples persons with disabilities. Use of 
such data may allow some additional work on how to create better 
groupings by diagnosis to predict the value of Medicaid, in particular 
to test whether those requiring greater expenditures are more likely to 
apply.
Given the available data, this author has done a good job of explor 
ing the role of Medicaid in explaining the recent growth of SSI. The 
chapter provides evidence to convince us that Medicaid is an important 
factor in accounting for that growth.
4 Determinants of Duration





Discussions of factors causing the increases in social security dis 
ability caseloads usually feature rises in the number of awards. 
Changes in the number of new awardees, however, do not directly 
translate into caseloads; duration is the essential link. Those who stay 
on the rolls for a long time contribute disproportionately to caseloads, 
and therefore to program cost. A better understanding of factors affect 
ing duration on the disability rolls should contribute to improvements 
in our ability to project future caseloads, to assess the effects of policy 
alternatives on caseloads, and to identify promising interventions 
designed to contain caseload growth. Duration on the rolls can be seen 
both as a function of factors affecting selection into the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) 
programs and as the result of factors directly affecting program exits 
and reentry. Selection into the SSI and DI disability programs is 
affected by the disability and economic criteria of eligibility. SSI and 
DI share the disability selection criteria. The severity of disability crite 
ria exerts two contrasting effects on duration: the relatively high mor 
tality risk reduces expected duration, while low recovery associated 
with severely disabling conditions increases it.
SSI and DI differ in terms of economic eligibility. DI requires that 
the person meet an insured status based on recent work activity. It is 
important that, while the Dl-insured status is a precondition of entry, it 
does not affect exits from the rolls. In contrast, SSI is means-tested, 
and therefore financial eligibility factors (changes in income and 
assets) form a potential source of exits and reentry. Some people qual 
ify for both SSI and DI benefits. Over the years, the disability and eco-
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nomic eligibility criteria of DI and SSI interact with largely exogenous 
demographic and economic factors to influence duration.
Programmatic variables also directly affect duration by influencing 
exits and reentry. Such variables include work incentive provisions, 
continuing disability reviews, vocational rehabilitation, and various 
rules concerning suspensions, terminations and return to the rolls. 
Some of these variables directly affect program eligibility (e.g., Con 
tinuous Disability Reviews [CDRs]), while others are expected to 
affect duration on the rolls through altering behavior (e.g., vocational 
rehabilitation). All of these variables affect the generosity of the bene 
fits and therefore may have indirect effects through altering application 
behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the factors 
affecting duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls based on previous 
studies and original research by the authors, and to analyze implica 
tions for caseload growth, projections, and policies. Several previous 
studies analyzed duration on the SSI and DI rolls on the basis of micro 
data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records 
systems. Most described the experiences of a single annual cohort of 
awardees using a fixed (e.g., two- or four-year) follow-up window 
(e.g., Treitel 1979; Bye, Riley, and Lubitz 1987; Scott 1989; Bye et al. 
1991). Hennessey and Dykacz (1992, 1993) compared two annual 
cohorts on the basis of a four-year follow-up window. With the single 
exception of Scott (1989) focusing on SSI disability stays, the above 
studies analyzed duration on the DI rolls among DI awardees, some of 
whom may have had concurrent unobserved SSI disability benefit 
receipt experience. Two studies (Hennessey and Dykacz 1989; Rupp 
and Scott 1995) utilized a much longer follow-up observation period 
(nine years and ten years, respectively), and used statistical methods to 
adjust for the lack of complete data on the completion of first DI spells 
(right censoring) and on first spell and total duration (including multi 
ple spells) data for the SSI disability program. These are the only two 
previous studies that presented mean duration statistics that are 
adjusted for censoring bias. Hennessey and Dykacz (1989) based their 
estimates on the experience of a single (1972) annual cohort of DI 
awardees, while Rupp and Scott (1995) utilized a data file containing 
multiple annual cohorts of SSI disability awardees and based their esti 
mates of mean duration on the experience of persons first awarded pay-
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ments during 1974-1982. They also conducted comparisons of 
duration patterns in DI, SSI, and Aid to Families with Dependent Chil 
dren. Other relevant previous studies looked at terminations (Schmu- 
lowitz 1973), analyzed the postrecovery experience of DI beneficiaries 
(Dykacz and Hennessey 1989), and compared the health and earnings 
of DI beneficiaries with the experience of rejected disability applicants 
(Bound 1989). Treitel (1979) analyzed the outcomes of appeals by ini 
tial DI denials and presented six-year follow-up data on death rates 
among rejected applicants. Only one previous study focused on the 
implications of trends in the composition of disability awardees on 
duration (Chirikos and Rupp 1992; Chirikos 1993). The study was 
based on aggregate data on awardees and a secondary analysis of micro 
data on duration, but was limited to DI.
AWARDEE CHARACTERISTICS AND DURATION
In this section we describe the effects of key awardee characteristic 
variables on duration and analyze the effect of the changing mix of 
awardees along these dimensions on trends in expected duration on the 
DI and SSI disability rolls. We will focus on the effects of age, gender, 
and diagnosis.
• Age is expected to affect duration because of its negative effect 
on the length of exposure to potential program participation, the 
positive relationship between age and mortality risk, and the neg 
ative relationship between age and the probability of return to 
work. The first two factors suggest a negative relationship 
between age at award and duration, while the third one is 
expected to affect duration in the opposite direction.
• Gender may affect duration because of the lower mortality risk of 
females in the general population, although this may be clouded 
by selectivity in the award process. Also, work-related suspen 
sions may be affected by gender differences, since men and 
women differ in work histories and work-related incomes.
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• Diagnosis fundamentally affects mortality risk, as well as the 
nature and severity of functional limitations and work disabilities 
affecting the opportunity costs of return to work.
We will analyze duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls separately 
due to the current lack of comprehensive event history data for both 
programs within a unified framework. In the first half of this section we 
will focus on DI awardees, some of whom received SSI benefits for 
many years, while others, particularly those applying for both pro 
grams, received them for a short period of time. According to our pre 
vious estimates (Rupp and Scott 1995), approximately 75 percent of 
awardees applying for both DI and SSI benefits complete their first SSI 
payment eligibility spell for reasons of excess income, presumably 
largely as a result of the start of DI payments. We can infer that the 
bulk of the disability payment experience of these concurrent awardees 
consists of duration on the DI rolls. Since concurrent awardees are 
implicitly reflected in the DI duration data, and because of the predom 
inance of early SSI exits for this group, the second half of this section 
focuses on nonconcurrent SSI awardees, i.e., persons initially eligible 
for SSI but not DI payments.
Duration on DI: Characteristics and Trends
There are three principal reasons for the suspension or termination 
of DI benefits: medical or work-related recovery, death, and retirement 
(conversion to the old-age component of social security at age 65). 
Overall, more than half of first DI disability spells end with retirement, 
more than a third are terminated due to death, and only 11 percent 
recover. Gender differences are dominated by the lower mortality risk 
of females. There is a strong negative relationship between age and the 
probability of recovery (Chart 4.1).
As age at award increases the probability of death increases, but the 
numbers also indicate that the competing outcome of conversion to the 
retirement program overtakes as the main reason for termination at the 
older age groups. Diagnostic differences are also marked, particularly 
among younger awardees. We note that changes in program rules, to be 
discussed later in more detail, play an important role in a beneficiary's 
recovery. In particular, changed work incentives, such as the introduc 
tion of the extended period of eligibility, changes in the number of
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CDRs, and the introduction of the medical improvement standards 
might have substantially altered the probability of recovery during the 
last two decades.
The net effect of age on expected duration is negative (Table 4.1). 
While overall expected length of first spells varies substantially by 
diagnosis—ranging from the low of 3.4 years for neoplasms to the high 
of 15.6 years for mental disorders, age differences are also important, 
especially for mental illness and nervous system disorders, where the 
expected duration of first spells is around 25 years in the youngest age 
group.
As expected, diagnostic differences are strongest in the youngest 
group and least pronounced among 50- to 61-year-olds (Chart 4.2). 
The lengths of stay shown in Table 4.1 represent the first uninterrupted
Table 4.1 Estimated Average Length of First DI Spells by Age and 














































































SOURCE Hennessey and Dykacz (1989, pp. 10, 12).
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stay on the DI rolls. We do not currently have good data on expected 
total duration on the DI disability rolls that would account for multiple 
spells. Accounting for multiple spells is potentially important, because 
some beneficiaries who leave the rolls may subsequently return. Based 
on data by Dykacz and Hennessey (1989), the authors estimated that 
accounting for multiple spells may result in an increase in mean dura 
tion of as little as a 0.4 years, from the 9.3 years average presented in 
Table 4.1 to 9.7 years in the aggregate (Rupp and Scott 1995).
Given the obvious importance of age and diagnosis in affecting 
duration, it is natural to ask whether changes in the mix of awardees 
along these characteristics through time resulted in marked changes in 
the expected duration of successive cohorts of DI awardees. The pro 
portion of younger awardees (aged 34 years or less) has increased from 
13.5 percent in 1975 to 19.3 percent in 1993. The data also show some 
marked shifts in the mix of awardees by diagnosis. The proportion of 
awardees with a primary diagnosis of mental disorders has increased 
from 11.5 percent in 1975 to 26.1 percent in 1993, while the proportion 
of awardees in the circulatory disorders category decreased from about 
30 percent in 1975 to 14 percent in 1993.
By combining information on the changing mix of awardees by age 
with disaggregated data on spell length for subgroups identified by age, 
it is possible to simulate mean spell length over time. Our estimates 
reflect the effect of changes in the age mix of new awardees on the 
expected mean length of first spells. Changes in the age mix of award 
ees produce a slow upward trend in expected duration from about 9 
years in 1960 to about 11 years in 1992; most of the estimated increase 
occurred since the early 1980s (Chart 4.3).
We did some additional work to see if the addition of diagnostic 
detail would change the results of the simulation substantially. We 
tested this hypothesis by conducting an alternative simulation using 
information on mean duration of first spells by age and diagnosis and 
data on the joint distribution of awardees by age and diagnosis for 1975 
and 1993. The results of the two simulations were virtually identical, 
suggesting that using age-specific information for the simulation pro 
duces robust results with respect to diagnosis. This is an important 
finding with respect to projection methodology highlighting the pri 
mary importance of the age distribution of new awardees for expected 
duration. We also compared our results with those of Chirikos (1993),
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who used a different methodology but arrived at results consistent with 
ours. This provides further evidence concerning the paramount impor 
tance of the age mix of new awardees.
Changes in the age mix of new awardees reflect a variety of forces, 
including changes in demographics (e.g., aging of the baby boom gen 
eration), epidemiological trends in the incidence of various disabling 
conditions with various age distributions of onset, and changes in the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations (e.g., mental impair 
ment regulations). Thus the results reflected in Chart 4.3 cannot simply 
be attributed to demographics alone. In order to better understand the 
role of demographics in explaining our results, we conducted an analy 
sis of the effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population 
on duration. Changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population 
between 1975 and 1993 reflects largely, though not exclusively, the 
aging of the baby boom generation and therefore are indicative of 
demographic shifts in the U.S. population. In order to estimate the 
effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population, we ana 
lyzed the effect of year-to-year changes in the age mix of the Dl- 
insured population on duration, assuming unchanged incidence rates 
between successive years and using the age-specific duration estimates 
used in the previous analysis that produced Chart 4.3. In our simulation 
we updated the incidence rate assumptions annually.
Actuarial data show that the proportion of younger (18 to 34 years 
old) Dl-insured workers peaked during the early 1980s, while the pro 
portion of older insured workers declined until fairly recently. Much of 
the overall decline in the average age of Dl-insured workers between 
1975 and 1993 is attributable to an increase in the proportion of mid 
dle-aged (35 to 49 years old) Dl-insured workers at the expense of 
older (50 to 61 years old) Dl-insured workers.
Our analysis shows that a substantial portion of the increase in the 
mean duration of first DI spells we attributed to changes in the age mix 
of DI awardees can be explained by demographics, but other factors 
contributed almost as much. We estimate that about half (0.8 years) of 
the 1975-1993 increase in expected duration (1.4 years) is attributable 
to changes in the mix of the Dl-insured population. The rest (0.6 years) 
is attributable to other factors contributing to the lowering of the age at 
entry among new awardees. For example, if the incidence of awards for 
conditions with a relatively early onset (e.g., mental retardation and
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psychiatric conditions) disproportionately increases, average age at 
award may decline, even if no demographic factors are at play.
The data also suggest that the trend of increasing duration of new 
awardees has magnified the implied effects of the rapid rise in the num 
ber of new awards during the last decade on eventual caseloads. While 
the number of DI awards (aged 62 or less) has increased from about 
250,000 in 1982 to about 580,000 in 1993, expected duration also 
increased by about 1 year (about 10 percent). Together, the influx of 
awardees and the increase in stay length substantially affect caseloads. 
This effect can be seen by multiplying the two factors (first two col 
umns in Table 4.2). Expected benefit years rose from 2.5 million for 
the 1982 entry cohort to about 6.3 million for the 1993 cohort. The 
1982-1993 increase in benefit years was primarily the result of 
increased awards; the increase in expected duration had a relatively 
small contribution to the overall change. However, if we take a longer 
view by looking at changes between 1975 and 1992, the previous and 
most recent peak in DI awards, duration becomes the key factor; an 
increase in expected duration from 9.5 to 11 years is a major contribu 
tor to the increase in simulated benefit years.
Finally, we note that our simulations reflect only the effect of 
changes in the mix of awardees (by age, and probably diagnosis as 
well) and do not capture changes affecting mean duration either for 
selected subgroups or across the board. For example, changes in work 
incentives, such as the introduction of the extended period of eligibil 
ity, might have increased mean duration, particularly for younger 
groups of awardees. In this case, due to such cohort effects, mean 
expected duration may have increased during recent decades more than 
our simulations seem to suggest.
Duration on the SSI Disability Rolls
In this section we focus on duration on the SSI disability rolls 
among nonconcurrent awardees prior to reaching their 65th birthday. 
In contrast to the discussion of DI, our analysis here also covers chil 
dren, who form an important, rapidly increasing, and controversial part 
of the SSI disability program. We will, however, present some informa 
tion for working-age SSI awardees separately that will be of use in 
comparisons with DI. The main difference between the DI and SSI dis-
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Table 4.2 Simulated Expected Mean Length of First DI Spells and
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ability programs affecting duration is the fact that DI is conditioned on 
prior work history, while SSI is means-tested. SSI recipients might lose 
payment eligibility as a result of changes in their family income or 
assets. It is to be noted, however, that DI beneficiaries are more at a 
risk of losing payment eligibility for work-related reasons, even after 
the liberalization of work incentive provisions during the 1980s. The 
differences in program design between the two programs need to be 
considered in comparing the SSI results, to be presented below, with 
the analysis of DI duration.
Overall, the SSI means test is the most important reason for first sus 
pensions during the first ten post-award years (Table 4.3). Death and 
reaching age 65 are clearly much less important reasons for first exits 
than in DI, even accounting for the fact that the eventual first suspen 
sion of many of the approximately one-quarter of awardees who did 
not exit during the first ten post-award years will be one of these two 
categories. The data show marked differences in the reason for first 
exits by age, diagnosis, and to a lesser extent by gender, generally in 
directions consistent with the DI findings.
The SSI stays of the 1974-1982 cohorts (Table 4.4) were corrected 
for the right-censoring of observations (Rupp and Scott 1995). Projec 
tions were made not only for first spells but also for total years 
expected on the rolls. Not surprisingly, the data show that the mean 
duration of first spells is substantially lower for working-age SSI 
awardees when compared to DI awardees. Moreover, subgroup differ 
ences are less marked in SSI, particularly by age group. These program 
differences appear to be driven by the effect of the SSI means test on 
the dynamics of first spells. Early suspensions due to the failure to con 
tinue to qualify for the means test affects SSI awardees largely inde 
pendently of age and diagnosis.
When multiple stays are accounted for (Chart 4.4), the overall pic 
ture dramatically changes, however. Overall, the mean SSI stay almost 
doubles from 6.9 years for first stays to 13.2 years for all spells for 
nonconcurrent adults and children combined. This brings the mean SSI 
stay to a level clearly higher than the mean DI duration, even account 
ing for the lack of precise data on DI total duration. The difference 
between the two programs appears largely attributable to the inclusion 
of children in the SSI disability program, although the data do not 
allow for a precise comparison. We note that the DI first spell and SSI
Table 4.3 Reason of Completion of First SSI Disability Spell during First 10 Post-award Years for Persons First 
Awarded SSI Disability Benefits during 1974-1982, Nonconcurrent Adults and Children
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SOURCE: Authors' longitudinal study file of 22,747 persons first awarded SSI benefits dunng 1974-1982
Table 4.4 Estimated Mean Duration of First SSI Disability Spells and Total Preretirement-Age Duration on the SSI 
















































































































































































































































SOURCE Authors' estimates based on longitudinal study file of 22,747 persons first awarded SSI benefits dunng 1974-1982.
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total stay estimates by age-group among prime-age adults are fairly 
close. Accounting for multiple stays in SSI highlights the age, and to a 
lesser extent, diagnostic differences in duration.
With duration patterns already described, we need to see how the 
demographic and diagnostic mix has changed over time. The most dra 
matic trend is the increasing proportion of children from 12.7 percent 
of new awardees in 1974 to 40.9 percent in 1993. Changes in the diag 
nostic mix of new awardees are also substantial, with the proportion 
with mental retardation and psychiatric conditions increasing dramati 
cally, from 5 percent to 22 percent (mental retardation) and from 6.8 
percent to 31.1 percent (psychiatric conditions) between 1974 and 
1993. A long-term decline of the proportion of females among new 
nonconcurrent SSI awardees from 56.8 percent in 1974 to 47.5 percent 
in 1993 reflects the increase in the proportion of women in the DI- 
insured population during this period of time.
Armed with both durations and demographic patterns, we were able 
to produce simulations that reflect changes in the joint distribution of 
new awardee cohorts by age, gender, and diagnosis. We also conducted 
simulations using information on changes in the age distribution alone 
and on changes in the age-gender mix. These latter, cruder methods, 
resulted in almost identical results. This robustness suggests that fac 
tors associated with the age mix of new awardees dominate the results. 
This is consistent with our findings for DI in this respect.
Changes in the age distribution of new awardees between 1974 and 
1993 are responsible for a substantial increase in expected duration 
from a mean of 12.3 years in 1974 to a mean of 17.8 years in 1993 
(Chart 4.5). This is a much more dramatic increase than was observed 
for DI. However, when children are excluded from the analysis, the 
trends for DI and SSI nonconcurrent adults appear much more similar. 
The combined effect of changes in the number of new awardees and 
the mix of awardees by the demographic variables considered in our 
analysis can be represented by the simulated benefit years associated 
with each entry cohort. As previously shown for DI, this is simply the 
product of the number of new awards and simulated mean total dura 
tion for each annual cohort of new awards (Table 4.5).
The combined effect of the dramatic drop of new awards between 
1974 and 1982 and the dramatic increase in childhood disability 
awards with long expected duration during subsequent years produces
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a dramatic pattern of changes and contrast between the early 1980s and 
recent years.
The analysis above is limited to the effects of awardee mix on 
expected duration and does not address the possibility that factors 
other than age, gender, and diagnosis might have also induced changes 
in duration on the rolls. Such other factors could include either 
awardee characteristics other than the three variables considered, or 
factors (such as programmatic variables) directly affecting duration 
events.
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Table 4.5 Simulated Expected Total Preretirement Age Duration on the 
SSI Disability Rolls among Children and Nonconcurrent 
Adults, 1974-1993














































































































NOTE- Number of awardees estimated from SSI 1-percent sample file Simulations based on joint 
distnbution of annual awardees by age, gender, and diagnosis and authors' estimates of total stay 
for subgroups.
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PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS DIRECTLY AFFECTING 
DURATION
In the previous section we have demonstrated that the mix of award- 
ees fundamentally shapes duration on the rolls. Nevertheless, these 
effects are conditional on programmatic rules concerning exit and 
reentry events. In this section we will focus on programmatic factors 
directly affecting duration, including suspensions and terminations for 
medical- and income-related reasons, work incentive provisions, and 
vocational rehabilitation.
CDRs form the primary vehicle for removing persons from the DI 
and SSI disability rolls for medical reasons. The number of CDRs per 
formed greatly varied over the years subject to swings in political deci 
sion making and SSA staffing constraints. During the early Reagan 
years, CDRs were perceived as important tools for containing the 
growth of the disability rolls. Following a political backlash and 
numerous court decisions, a moratorium was issued on CDRs during 
the mid 1980s, followed by the introduction of the medical improve 
ment standards making the removal of persons from the disability rolls 
for medical reasons more difficult. At the 1983 peak, 436,000 DI cases 
were reviewed, comprising 13.5 percent of the caseload (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1993, p. 64). More than 40 percent (182,000) were 
removed from the rolls. In contrast, during 1995 only 0.1 percent of the 
DI caseload was reviewed, and only 15 percent of these (475 cases) 
were removed from the rolls. Subsequently the number of CDRs per 
formed increased somewhat. The experience with CDRs in the SSI 
program also showed great variations, with a minimum level of activity 
during the last couple of years.
More recently, the role of CDRs as a policy tool has increased again, 
as exemplified by Section 212 of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 concerning SSI childhood dis 
ability cases, as well as other recent initiatives. Section 201 of P.L. 
103-296, the Social Security Independence and Program Improve 
ments Act of 1994, introduced time-limited benefits for persons dis 
abled based on a finding that drug addiction or alcoholism was a 
contributing factor material to the finding of disability. More recently, 
these provisions were replaced by stricter provisions of P.L. 104-121,
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the "Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996," providing for 
the outright termination of cash benefits and health coverage for all DI 
and SSI disability recipients who received disability benefits based on 
drug addiction and/or alcoholism at the time of the enactment of the 
law as of January 1, 1997, and prohibiting future DI and SSI disability 
benefit allowances (and associated Medicare and/or Medicaid eligibil 
ity) to any future disability applicant whose drug addiction and/or alco 
holism would be material to the determination of disability.
CDRs clearly affect duration on the rolls and may affect subsequent 
applications similar to the effect of denial rates, as was demonstrated 
by Parsons' work (1991). In this pioneering study, based on economic 
theory, Parsons hypothesized that high denial rates discourage subse 
quent disability applications as a result of their negative effect on the 
expected net benefits of DI application. His empirical analysis—based 
on data from the late 1970s—provided results consistent with this 
hypothesis. CDRs may have negative effects not only on duration 
among those on the rolls, but also on subsequent DI applications for 
similar reasons.
However, past experience suggests difficulties with relying on CDRs 
as a primary strategy of containing caseload growth both because of 
the legal and political problems embedded in the approach and for sub 
stantive reasons. Many persons on the disability rolls face serious med 
ical problems; identifying those whose medical condition sufficiently 
improves and is likely to improve in the future is inherently difficult. 
Moreover, time spent on the disability rolls -results in the depreciation 
of work skills and is expected to result in difficulties in returning to the 
labor force, especially without assistance. The General Accounting 
Office study of DI beneficiaries terminated during 1981-84 found that 
more than half returned to the rolls, and of those who did not, nearly 
half were not working (quoted in U.S. House of Representatives 1993, 
p. 70).
Administrative changes related to the SSI means test are also of 
potential importance in affecting duration. As we discussed previously, 
the data presented in Table 4.5 suggest that recent changes in the han 
dling of failure to respond to an agency request for information had a 
negative effect on suspensions, and hence a positive effect on length of 
stay. In general, procedures designed to tighten the monitoring of SSI 
means-test eligibility are expected to reduce duration, while loosening
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of procedures and/or reduction in the amount of resources devoted to 
monitor SSI income or asset eligibility are expected to increase dura 
tion.
In light of the difficulties of relying on the stick-only approach of 
CDRs, the interest in the carrots of work incentives is understandable. 
Both SSI (Section 1619 program) and DI (trial work period and 
extended period of eligibility) have gone through substantial liberaliza 
tions. Little is currently known about the effects of these changes on 
duration. The cohort-based comparison of DI exit rates during the 
1970s and 1980s (Hennessey and Dykacz 1993) suggests that the liber 
alization of DI work incentives during the early 1980s actually 
increased length of stay. Similarly, with the introduction of Section 
1619 provisions SSI suspensions directly resulting from work activities 
were eliminated, and data presented in Table 4.6 suggests no secular 
increase in income-related suspensions either. Thus, it appears that pre 
vious reforms of work incentive provisions might have increased dura 
tion in both programs. In addition, as Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) argue, 
such changes in work incentive provisions may induce additional 
applications thereby further adding to caseload size.
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) is another positive strategy to reduce 
duration in the disability rolls. The number of disability beneficiaries 
served by the state VR system has been historically small and has 
decreased further since SSA's placement-oriented reimbursement of 
VR agencies was introduced. Moreover, little is known about the effec 
tiveness of these interventions because of the difficulty in establishing 
a useful control group. The interest in vocational rehabilitation demon 
strations is rooted in the perceived failure of work incentives to move 
sizable numbers of beneficiaries to productive employment in an effi 
cient manner. Six-year experimental follow-up results from the Transi 
tional Employment Training Demonstration (Decker and Thornton 
1995) indicate that the employment services raised the average 
employment and earnings levels of the mentally retarded SSI recipients 
who were offered transitional employment services, and that the 
increases persisted relatively undiminished during the six-year period. 
However, the modest reduction in SSI payments offset only a fraction 
of the cost of transitional employment services. Moreover, only a small 
subset of eligible SSI recipients volunteered for the demonstration. A 
more recent SSA demonstration initiative, Project NetWork, targets a
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much broader group, including all DI beneficiaries and SSI recipients 
in the demonstration areas and uses a case-management approach to 
return-to-work (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). The net impact 
results of this large-scale experimental evaluation are not available yet, 
but preliminary analyses of demonstration participation suggest that— 
similar to the Transitional Employment and Training Demonstration— 
only a fraction of project eligibles volunteered for the demonstration 
(Rupp, Wood, and Bell 1996).
In view of the increases in the size of the caseload, policymakers 
continue to have an interest in these more direct methods of limiting 
duration on the rolls as evidenced by SSA's evolving employment 
strategy and the recent review of the disability program by the National 
Academy of Social Insurance (Mashaw et al. 1996). Whether such ini 
tiatives are going to have substantial effects on duration in the desired 
direction (reduction) is too early even to speculate on. Nevertheless, 
while much more research needs to be done on the effects of CDRs, 
work incentives, vocational rehabilitation, and other programmatic 
variables on duration, it appears safe to infer that none of these factors 
had a large overall effect on containing caseload growth over the last 
decade. If anything, the most consequential recent changes probably 
had effects in the opposite direction. By all likelihood the medical 
improvement standards, changes in the mental regulations, and the 
Zebley decision contributed to increased expected duration. Thus, the 
results of our simulations concerning expected length of stay in the 
previous section are likely to provide a conservative view of past trends 
in expected duration.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DURATION AND 
CASELOADS
In our analysis so far we have focused on past trends in awardee 
characteristics and expected duration. These factors do affect the future 
by virtue of the fact that the potential exposure to program participa 
tion of new awardees, especially among those young at first entry, is 
extremely long. Thus, as we have demonstrated, and assuming no 
major changes in program rules, the past trend toward younger entrants
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in both DI and SSI, most notably evidenced by the recent influx of a 
large number of children to the SSI disability rolls, is expected to put a 
strong upward pressure on caseloads for many years to come, unless a 
large number of the recent entrants are removed from the rolls through 
new policy initiatives. This implication of past trends for future case 
loads will affect SSA's disability programs even if the past trends 
toward younger entrants were to be reversed in the future.
This section addresses the next logical question. What can we say 
about the expected duration of future cohorts of new entrants? Can we 
assume that the past trends toward younger entrants and increasing 
expected duration will continue in the future? Or perhaps we should 
expect the reversal of these trends and shorter duration for future 
entrants? What are the expected effects of such future trends in dura 
tion on caseloads?
There are a large number of potential factors that might affect the 
duration of future entry cohorts, from demographic and economic fac 
tors to future policy and procedural changes. The purpose of this sec 
tion is not to provide crystal ball speculations about the net effect of all 
of these diverse forces, but rather to spell out the implications of some 
relatively tangible factors, notably demographic trends.
While we did not attempt to project future changes in age-specific 
incidence rates, we have used actuarial projections of the age distribu 
tion of the Dl-insured population to assess the likely future effects of 
the aging of the baby boom generation on expected future mean dura 
tion.
Our analysis shows that this factor alone is likely to result in a one- 
year decline in expected duration of first spells between 1993 (see 
Table 4.2) and 2006 (Chart 4.6). While this appears as good news, the 
same demographic forces also seem to imply future increases in inci 
dence rates.
The net effect may be an upward demographic pressure on case 
loads during the next ten to fifteen years as suggested by the relation 
ship between age, DI incidence rates, and duration in a cross-sectional 
framework (Table 4.7). The two factors (incidence and expected dura 
tion) work in the opposite direction: as age increases the incidence of 
disabling conditions serious enough to warrant the award of DI disabil 
ity benefits increases, while expected duration decreases. The product 
of these two factors represents the net effect on caseloads: expected DI
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Chart 4.6 Estimated Effect of Changes in Age-Mix of the DI Insured 
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Table 4.7 DI Incidence Rates, Expected Duration, and Benefit Years per 
1,000 Insured Workers
Awards per Expected DI benefit 

















SOURCE Incidence rates were calculated by the authors based on data on the number of DI- 
insured workers (1993) provided by SSA's Office of the Actuary and the number of 1993 awards 
by age group. Estimated first-spell duration data by age group are based on estimated by Hennes- 
sey and Dykacz (1989)
benefit years increase as we move toward the older cohorts of new 
entrants, because the positive effect of age on incidence rates is stron 
ger than the negative effect on duration.
We do not have actuarial projections for the population financially 
eligible for SSL Nevertheless, the population satisfying the SSI means 
test is conceptually akin to the notion of the Dl-insured population. 
While the SSI financial eligibility criteria are much more complex than 
the concept of the Dl-insured status, a microsimulation model devel 
oped by analysts at the Social Security Administration (Wixon and 
Vaughan 1989; Vaughan and Wixon 1989) based on the rich income 
and asset information available from the SIPP provides an opportunity 
for some analysis. Table 4.8 provides an estimate of the size and age- 
distribution of the population economically eligible for SSI. The esti 
mate, provided by Denton Vaughan to the authors, suggests that 
approximately 25.7 million persons aged 18-64 were financially eligi 
ble for SSI disability benefits in 1984. These estimates include (but do 
not identify) persons concurrently satisfying the economic eligibility 
criteria of both programs, as well as working-age persons eligible for 
SSI only. Our analysis shows that overall, the relationship between age, 
incidence, and expected duration of benefits is similar in the two pro 
grams. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences.
First of all, the SSI incidence rate is higher than the DI incidence 
rate. The comparison is affected by the exclusion of concurrents from
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Table 4.8 SSI Awards per 1,000 Persons Satisfying the SSI Means Test, 

















































NOTE 4 The estimated number of financially eligible persons was provided to the authors by Den- 
ton Vaughan based on the 1984 SIPP using the rmcrosimulation model developed by him and Ber 
nard Wixon (Wixon and Vaughan 1991; Vaughan and Wixon 1991). The SIPP estimates reflect the 
estimated number of persons satisfying the SSI income and assets means test, irrespective of eligi 
bility for DI The number of SSI awards estimated from the author's 1-percent SSI study file, 
however, is limited to persons receiving SSI benefits only, at least dunng the initial year following 
first award. Total duration estimates reflect all SSI disability spells and are based on age-specific 
means
our SSI incidence rate numerator and by the fact that the SSI incidence 
rates reflect the 1984 experience, while the DI incidence rates reflect 
1993 data. However, considering both of these factors would 
strengthen, rather than weaken the contrast. An important issue for 
future research is the reason for the higher SSI incidence rate. There 
are at least three competing hypotheses that might contribute to this 
finding. First, the average health and disability status of the financially 
eligible SSI population might be relatively low. Second, SSI benefits 
are more attractive relative to alternative sources of income for the SSI 
financially eligible population than the DI benefits are relative to the 
wages of Dl-insured workers. Third, because of differences in human 
capital and the lack of work experience, financially eligible SSI appli 
cants might have an easier time of qualifying under SSA's vocational 
criteria than might be the case with the average DI applicant. One fac 
tor that might work in the opposite direction is that a substantial por-
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tion of the financially eligible SSI population may meet the means test 
only marginally, and therefore face only relatively low levels of 
expected SSI payments reducing the economic incentive to apply. 
When both cash and noncash benefits are considered, however, the net 
incentives to apply for SSI may be very strong even for financially eli 
gible persons qualifying only for a small amount of SSI cash benefits 
because of the importance of Medicaid for many SSI applicants.
Table 4.8 shows that the relationship between age and expected ben 
efit years is somewhat different for SSI when compared to DI. In par 
ticular, the increase between the two younger age groups is reversed as 
age increases. The implication of this finding for the projection of the 
future effects of demographics on caseloads is that the aging of the 
baby boom generation might have a smaller net effect on SSI caseloads 
when compared to DI. However, because of the complex relationships 
between age, poverty status, family structures, disabilities, and other 
factors affecting the size of the SSI financially eligible population and 
incidence rates, much more work needs to be done before firm conclu 
sions can be reached about trends in future awards, duration, and case 
loads in the SSI disability program.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we assessed the relationship between age, gender, 
diagnosis, and duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls, and quanti 
fied the implications of past trends in awardee characteristics and 
future caseloads. We also looked at programmatic factors directly 
affecting duration, and the combined effect of incidence rates and 
expected duration on age-specific expected benefit years. We also 
made some inferences about the likely effects of the aging of the baby 
boom generation on expected duration and caseloads.
The data show that lifetime duration in both the DI and SSI disabil 
ity programs is long; thus long duration is an important determinant of 
caseloads, and hence of program cost. Between 1975 and 1993 the 
shift toward younger entrants resulted in substantial increases in the 
expected duration of new awardees in both DI and SSI. These past 
trends in expected duration create an upward pressure on future case-
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loads, especially in SSI where the recent influx of children is expected 
to have substantial future effects on caseloads, under the assumption 
that current program rules will stay in effect for persons already on the 
rolls in the future. An important issue for future research concerns the 
effects of Section 211 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor 
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 envisioning substantial tightening of 
SSI childhood disability eligibility provisions.
Our analysis suggests that the aging of the baby boom generation 
contributed to the 1975-1993 increase in the expected average duration 
of successive cohorts of new DI entrants, but that these trends will 
reverse during the 1993-2006 period as the baby boom generation 
ages. This will moderate, but not entirely eliminate, the likely upward 
pressures of the aging of the baby boom generation on future caseloads 
arising from rising incidence rates.
Our analysis suggests the usefulness of cohort-based studies of 
duration for understanding and quantifying the factors affecting future 
terminations and caseloads. In particular, such a perspective seems use 
ful in disentangling the effects of awardee characteristics, the size of 
successive awardee cohorts, programmatic variables and other factors. 
Several important issues remain for future research. We need to learn 
much more about the interaction of the SSI and DI programs as they 
affect the duration of disability benefits and future caseloads, and par 
ticularly about the duration experience of concurrent awardees. Much 
more work needs to be done, and is feasible to do, concerning trends in 
SSI financial eligibility and their effect on duration and caseloads. 
Finally, there is a clear need for creative and rigorous work on the 
likely consequences of various strategies to contain the growth of the 
disability rolls through affecting entry and exit events.
References
Bound, John. 1989. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insur 
ance Applicants." American Economic Review 79(June): 482-503.
Bye, Barry V., Gerald F. Riley, and James Lubitz. 1987. "Medicare Utilization 
by Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries: A Longitudinal Analysis." Social Secu 
rity Bulletin 50(12): 13-28.
Growth in Disability Benefits 173
Bye, Barry V., Janice M. Dykacz, John C. Hennessey, and Gerald F. Riley. 
1991. "Medicare Costs Prior to Retirement for Disabled-Worker Beneficia 
ries." Social Security Bulletin 54(4): 2-17.
Chirikos, Thomas. 1993. The Composition of Disability Beneficiary Popula 
tions: Trends and Policy Implications. Final report prepared for the Assis 
tant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, December.
Chirikos, Thomas, and Kalman Rupp. 1992. The Economics of Compositional 
Changes in Disability Beneficiary Populations. Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, New Orleans, 
Louisiana.
Decker, Paul and Craig Thornton. 1995. "The Long-term Effects of the Transi 
tional Employment Services." Social Security Bulletin 58(4): 71-81.
Dykacz, Janice M., and John C. Hennessey. 1989. "Postrecovery Experience 
of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries." Social Security Bulletin 52(9): 42-66.
Hennessey, John C., and Janice M. Dykacz. 1989. "Projected Outcomes and 
Length of Time in the Disability Insurance Program." Social Security Bul 
letin 52(9): 2-41.
————. 1992. "A Comparison of the Individual Characteristics and Death 
Rates of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries Entitled in 1972 and 1985." Social 
Security Bulletin 55(3): 24-^0.
-. 1993. "A Comparison of Recovery Termination Rates of Disabled-
Worker Beneficiaries Entitled in 1972 and 1985." Social Security Bulletin 
56(2): 58-69.
Hoynes, Hilary W., and Robert Moffitt. 1996. "The Effectiveness of Financial 
Work Incentives in Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental 
Security Income: Lessons from Other Transfer Programs." In Disability, 
Work and Cash Benefits, J.L. Mashaw et al., eds. Kalamazoo, Michigan: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Mashaw, J.L., V. Reno, R.V. Burkhauser and M. Berkowitz (eds.). 1996. Dis 
ability, Work and Cash Benefits. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Insti 
tute for Employment Research.
Office of Supplemental Security Income. 1994. 557 Annual Statistical Report, 
1993. Prepared by Office of Supplemental Security Income, Division of 
Program Management and Analysis, Social Security Administration, 
August.
Parsons, Donald O. 1991. "Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Pro 
grams." Journal of Political Economy 99(4): 859-876.
Rupp, Kalman, Stephen H. Bell, and Leo A. McManus. 1994. "Design of the 
Project NetWork Return-to-work Experiment for Persons with Disabili 
ties." Social Security Bulletin 57(2): 3-20.
174 Rupp and Scott
Rupp, Kalman, and Charles G. Scott. 1995. "Length of Stay in the Supple 
mental Security Income Disability Program." Social Security Bulletin, 
58(1): 29-47.
Rupp, Kalman, Michelle Wood, and Stephen H. Bell. 1996. "Targeting People 
with Severe Disabilities for Return-to-work: the Project NetWork Demon 
stration Experience." Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation 1: 63-91.
Schmulowitz, Jack. 1973. "Recovery and Benefit Termination: Program 
Experience of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries." Social Security Bulletin 36: 
3-15.
Scott, Charles G. 1989. "A Study of Supplemental Security Income Award- 
ees." Social Security Bulletin 52: 2-13.
Treitel, Ralph. 1979. "Recovery of Disabled Beneficiaries: A 1979 Follow-up 
Study of 1975 Allowances." Social Security Bulletin 42: 3-23.
U.S. House of Representatives. 1993. Overview of Entitlement Programs: 
1993 Green Book. Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Repre 
sentatives. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. July 7.
Vaughan, Denton R., and Bernard Wixon. 1991. "Implementing an SSI Model 
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation." Two Papers on a 
New SIPP-Based Microsimulation Model of SSI and OASDI. ORS Working 
Paper Series, No. 54, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security 
Administration, December.
Wixon, Bernard, and Denton R. Vaughan. 1991. "Rationale for A New SIPP- 
Based Microsimulation Model of SSI and OASDI." Two Papers on a New 
SIPP-Based Microsimulation Model of SSI and OASDI. ORS Working 
Paper Series, No. 54, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security 
Administration, December.
Comments on Chapter 4
Daniel Mont 
Congressional Budget Office
Kalman Rupp and Charles Scott (Chapter 4) provide an important 
extension to the work on award growth presented in this volume. As 
they correctly point out, the extent to which caseloads grow is depen 
dent not only on the inflow of recipients to the major disability pro 
grams, but how long those recipients remain on the rolls.
The aging of the baby boom generation, report Rupp and Scott, will 
increase caseloads. This increase, however, is the result of two oppos 
ing effects. On the one hand, an older population will have more occur 
rences of disability; that is, awards should increase as baby boomers 
age. On the other hand, older people typically have shorter spells of 
receiving disability benefits. Once they reach the normal retirement 
age they are no longer classified as disabled, and their benefits convert 
to retirement benefits.
Rupp and Scott examine factors other than age that influence the 
duration of spells on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), such as gender and diagnosis. 
What is lacking, as they point out, are analyses that isolate the impact 
of programmatic factors. Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs), 
vocational rehabilitation, the trial work period and extended period of 
eligibility, and the level of substantial gainful activity presumably all 
have an effect on the length of time someone receives benefits. The 
impacts of these program characteristics are not well understood.
The main reason concern has risen over growing caseloads in the DI 
program is the dwindling of the program's trust fund. Recently, the dis 
ability trust fund was bolstered, but this was by reallocating resources 
away from the retirement trust fund. The fundamental problem 
remains.
To understand the effects of age on total benefits paid (and thus on 
the trust fund), it is necessary to not only consider the effect of age on 
caseloads but on benefits paid. Since DI benefits are a function of past
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earnings, more awards to older applicants will generally mean higher 
average monthly checks. As shown in Table 1 (using demographic and 
program data reported in Rupp's and Scott's paper), the age distribu 
tion of awards in 2005 should be much higher than in 1993, the most 
recent year reported in the paper. Furthermore, older awardees get sig 
nificantly larger monthly checks; as shown in Table 1, the difference 
can be hundreds of dollars per month. Therefore, the impact of aging 
baby boomers on the disability trust fund will be larger than their 
impact on caseloads.












Average monthly benefit 
of new award in 1993______$521.6_____$681.6_____$809.5
SOURCE- Computed using data from the Social Security Administration. 
Projection
5 Characteristics of SSI and DI
Recipients in the Years Prior
to Receiving Benefits
Evidence from the PSID
Mary C. Daly 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
One of the most disturbing aspects of the recent growth in the Sup 
plemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insur 
ance (DI) rolls has been the increasing number of young people— 
individuals in their 20s, 30s, and 40s—who have moved onto the dis 
ability benefit system. Research on transitions off of the disability rolls 
suggests that many of these young recipients could remain on the sys 
tem for much of their adult lives (Rupp and Scott 1995). This potential 
change in program usage, from a bridge between work and retirement 
to a long-term income maintenance alternative, coupled with rising 
program expenditures and a growing commitment to supporting people 
with disabilities in the labor market, have renewed interest in the paths 
that individuals take to benefit receipt.
This chapter begins to characterize these paths by describing the cir 
cumstances and experiences of SSI and DI beneficiaries in the years 
before they receive benefits. Specifically, it examines the labor market 
effort, living arrangements, income sources, and economic well-being 
of a sample of SSI and DI recipients during the five years prior to ben 
efit receipt. This pre-award view of disability benefit recipients is 
important to the development of preventative policies designed to 
maintain individuals in the labor market and outside of the social safety 
net.
NOTE- Opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the 





Almost all of the research on SSI and DI recipients has focused on 
characteristics of current recipients and on their economic well-being 
and labor market behavior after benefits have been awarded. Scott 
(1989) described the characteristics of individuals who came onto the 
SSI rolls between January 1974 and December 1986. Kochhar and 
Scott (1995) examined the disability patterns among SSI and DI recip 
ients and related changes in the SSI caseload to specific changes in dis 
ability requirements and outreach initiatives. Rupp and Scott (1995) 
estimated the length of stay on SSI by age and diagnosis. Hennessey 
and Muller (1994) followed a group of DI recipients to determine the 
factors that influence their decisions to return to work. Scott (1992) 
examined the work efforts of individuals on SSI both before and after 
receiving benefits. Each of these studies began at the point of benefit 
receipt and focused on the factors that contribute to changes in the size 
and composition of the recipient population. Whereas such studies pro 
vide valuable information about the circumstances of individuals 
receiving benefits, they yield little information about these recipients' 
pre-award characteristics.
Several pre-award scenarios are plausible. One possibility is that 
individuals with average income, skills, and attachment to the labor 
market become so severely disabled that they are prohibited from 
working and must rely on transfer income for their economic well- 
being. In this situation, SSI and DI act as public insurance and protect 
the recipient from economic losses associated with the onset of a dis 
ability. In alternative scenarios, the onset of disability may not be the 
event that precipitates applying for and receiving benefits. Instead, 
individuals with disabilities may be capable of work, but unable to find 
employment because of insufficient or mismatched skills and educa 
tion or because of declining economic conditions that reduce labor 
market opportunities. In these cases, disability benefits represent 
"unemployment insurance" for people with disabilities who are unable 
to find jobs. 1
From the perspective of policymakers, the road that people take 
towards benefit receipt is important. Economic disparities that were 
present before the application for and receipt of benefits may not be 
eliminated by disability-based programs designed to offset the losses
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associated with working-age disability or to provide transitional 
income security during periods of health-related losses in economic 
well-being. Moreover, the extent to which work can be used to reduce 
the disability benefit rolls will depend largely on the path that people 
take to benefit receipt. Individuals with average work histories who 
become unable to work either because of an acute change in their 
health or because of a transitory shift in economic conditions will be 
more easily integrated back into the labor market than either individu 
als with a history of long-term transfer receipt or persons with an 
increasingly severe long-term health condition.
Finally, while income transfers represent one option for maintaining 
the economic well-being of all individuals with disabilities, their effec 
tiveness for all groups may not be equal. Examining this and similar 
issues requires that we look at individuals and their circumstances 
before they begin to receive benefits. It is this prebenefit picture that 
will provide the information necessary to make judgments about alter 
natives to moving onto the rolls.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The empirical results in this study come from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID data span more than two decades, 
from 1968 to 1991. Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed annually a 
sample of some 5,000 families, representing a disproportionate number 
of low-income individuals. At least one member of each family inter 
viewed has been either part of the original families interviewed in 1968 
or born to a member of one of these families. Partial information on 
individuals who ceased to be respondents prior to 1991 is included in 
the analysis whenever possible. The PSID currently contains data on 
over 42,000 persons, approximately 23,000 of whom are current 
respondents. This study uses the 1991 Family Individual Response- 
Nonresponse File, including data from 1970 to 1991. Sample weights 
are applied in the analyses to correct for the original oversampling of 




This study relies on longitudinal data that record information about 
income, benefit receipt, family composition, employment, and, to a 
lesser extent, health in each year for a set of individuals. Using this lon 
gitudinal information, the analysis selected a sample of individuals 
who began to receive benefits at some point during the data history. It 
then determines that information on these sample members for the pre 
vious five years is complete and organizes these individuals by the 
onset of their benefit receipt.
Capturing SSI and DI Awards
Unlike administrative data, the PSID does not provide a complete 
history of SSI and DI receipt. However, because the PSID began inter 
viewing families in 1968, there are now 22 years of data over which 
benefit receipt can be traced. Since 1975, the PSID has collected infor 
mation on the types of transfer benefits collected by each member of 
interviewed families. Respondents are asked to identify the program(s) 
that their benefits come from and to estimate the total amount of 
money transferred to each household member. Information from these 
questions is used to identify SSI and DI receipt for all members of the 
sample.
Individuals are included in the sample of SSI(DI) initial awardees 
when five consecutive periods of no SSI(DI) benefits are followed by 
one period of SSI(DI) receipt. 2 To further refine the sample of individu 
als with a beginning spell of SSI(DI), individuals living in households 
reporting SSI(DI) receipt during the period immediately preceding the 
individuals' award are excluded from the sample.
Sample Development
The sample includes all adults who experienced an observable spell 
of SSI or DI receipt, who were between the ages of 18 and 64 when 
receipt began, and who have at least five years of data recorded in the 
years immediately preceding the award year. Some members of the 
sample experienced multiple spells of benefit receipt over the periods 
covered. However, since the analysis is intended to capture experiences 
preceding the first award of benefits, subsequent spells are excluded 
from the analysis.
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Initial SSI awards are recorded beginning in 1979; DI awards are 
evaluated beginning in 1984. Although the PSID contains information 
on SSI receipt prior to 1979 and Old Age and Survivors Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) receipt prior to 1984, there are insufficient data to 
build a complete history during these periods. In the case of SSI receipt 
there are no data on a respondent's pre-SSI association with one of the 
state-based programs for Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Permanently 
and Totally Disabled, and Aid to the Blind. Since the analysis sets out 
to examine the pre-award circumstances of new SSI recipients, individ 
uals receiving'benefits between 1974 and 1979 are excluded from the 
analysis. For DI the problem is slightly different. Prior to 1984, the 
PSID data do not include an indicator for the type of OASDI benefit 
received. Thus, it is not possible to separate SSDI transfers from trans 
fers based on age or survivorship. 3
Applying these criteria, the final sample of new SSI recipients, 
which includes all those individuals who had five consecutive periods 
of no SSI receipt followed by at least one period of SSI benefits 
between 1979 and 1991, contains 211 individuals. The DI sample, 
which contains individuals who have five consecutive periods of no 
social security benefits followed by at least one period of DI receipt, 
has 199 members.4'5
Measuring Disability
Self-reported disability is recorded in order to observe the time 
between a self-reported health event and the beginning of disability 
benefits. There is continued discussion in the literature about the best 
way to ascertain disability status from self-reported measures, but 
since all members of the sample have already been classified as dis 
abled for the purpose of receiving benefits (by passing the substantial 
gainful activity screen), the most comprehensive set of measures is 
used (see Burkhauser and Daly [1996a, 1996b] for a brief summary of 
this debate). Four questions are combined to create the self-reported 
disability measure used here. The four PSID variables used are 1) dis 
abled or in need of care, 2) lists primary activity as permanently dis 
abled, 3) ranks health as fair or poor, 4) reports having a physical or 
nervous condition that limits the type or amount of work that can be 
performed. Any individual falling into one or more of these categories 
is considered to have a self-reported disability.
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Measuring Employment and Presence of Other Earners
Individuals are classified as employed in the previous year if they 
report that they worked 52 hours or more and had positive wage earn 
ings. Individuals are classified as living with other earners if anyone in 
the family unit reported both positive hours and positive earnings dur 
ing the year.
Measuring Social Assistance and Social Insurance
Social assistance includes all means-tested public transfers such as 
AFDC, food stamps, and General Assistance. The PSID data identify 
two welfare programs: AFDC and food stamps. All other social assis 
tance programs are classified as other welfare. Social insurance 
includes all public transfers made on the basis of employment contri 
butions; these include workers' compensation, unemployment insur 
ance, and social security.
Measuring Economic Well-Being
Since this analysis focuses on changes in an individual's access to 
resources, household economic status in the absence of government 
taxes and transfers (pregovernment income), and in their presence 
(postgovernment income), are measured. 6 To account for differences in 
family size, the equivalence scale weighting factor contained in the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty measures is applied to each individ 
ual household income.
The variables used in this analysis describe the economic and family 
characteristics of individuals who receive disability transfers. The vari 
ables are intended to capture the relative costs and benefits of applying 
for or receiving transfers. At the individual level, a person's marital sta 
tus, self-identification of disability, and labor force status are reported. 
Although individuals apply for and receive benefits, these decisions are 
often made within the context of family resources. Thus, the analysis 
reports on the presence of other earners, other transfer income, and the 
level of household size-adjusted income inclusive of taxes and trans 
fers. Finally, household composition is examined by comparing the 
two types of living arrangements in which a recipient has no other 
adult present: single-person households and single-parent households. 
To the extent that co-residing adults have two sources of income (either
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transfer income or earnings), these single adult families may be more 
vulnerable to economic losses associated with disability and thus more 
likely to apply for benefits.
RESULTS
The analyses presented here use multiperiod data to follow the path 
of adult SSI(DI) recipients in the five years prior to benefit receipt. The 
initial award is captured by requiring individuals to have five years of 
no SSI or DI benefits followed by at least one year of benefits. The lon 
gitudinal sample is used to examine the labor market activity, house 
hold economic well-being, and household composition of individuals 
prior to the beginning of SSI and DI payments, by examining these 
transitions, a clearer picture of who comes onto the disability benefit 
rolls, and what factors put individuals at risk for receiving benefits, can 
emerge.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the percentage of individuals who are in a 
particular circumstance—such as having a disability, falling below the 
poverty line, or living in a single-adult household—in each year prior to 
benefit receipt (?)• Table 5.1 describes the experiences of the sample of 
SSI recipients. The average age at award among SSI recipients is 42.0 
years. About one-third of the sample is married in each of the five years. 
The percentage of individuals reporting that they have a disability 
increases as the award year (f) draws nearer, moving from 42 percent to 
63 percent. 7 As the employment and transfer receipt percentages reveal, 
many of these individuals are unemployed or out of the labor force and 
relying on transfer income well before they receive SSI payments. Less 
than 30 percent were employed five years before receiving benefits, and 
less than one-quarter were employed three years before receiving bene 
fits. However, more than one-half were living with other earners and 
more than three-quarters were living in a household receiving some 
type of government transfer (social assistance or social insurance).
The stability of the percentage of other earners and the percentage 
of households receiving transfer income helps explain the very static 
pattern of pre- and postgovernment income over the evaluation period. 
Mean pregovernment income decreases modestly from five years prior
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of the Population of Adult SSI Recipients in the 
Years Prior to Benefit Receipt in Year t
Characteristics t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t
Individual3
Married (%) 32 34 34 32 30 29 
Self-reported
disability (%) 42 45 50 56 61 63 
Employed (%) 28 29 24 25 24 24 
Household
Other earners (%) 60 58 56 53 56 57 
Receiving social
assistance(%) 32 34 34 32 30 8 
Receiving any public
transfer (%) 73 72 77 82 82 100 
In poverty (%) 32 34 36 32 31 37 
Pregovernment
income ($) 9,151 9,170 9,416 8,459 8,413 8,253 
Postgovernment
income ($) 11,421 11,593 11,913 11,333 11,387 11,639 
Household composition
Mean family size 3.82 3.75 3.50 3.39 3.32 3.23 
Single-person
household (%) 7.5 7.9 7.7 10.5 11.0 16.5 
Single person with
children (%) 17.3 12.4 15.6 13.8 12.7 8.2 
All others (%) 75.2 79.7 76.7 75.7 76.3 75.3 
Head or partner in
household (%) 64.4 64.6 64.8 65.1 66.8 69.6
Child of head or
partner (%) 28.4 28.3 28.2 27.9 25.8 21.9
Other related or
unrelated adult (%) 7.2 6.1 7.0 7.0 7.4 8.5
SOURCE 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
NOTE Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive SSI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N - 211). Results are weighted to reflect population values.
Individuals' average age at award in year / is 42.0.
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Table 5.2 Characteristics of the Population of Adult DI Recipients in the 
Years Prior to Benefit Receipt in Year t
Characteristics t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t
Individual3
Married (%) 50 50 49 51 49 49 
Self-reported
disability (%) 42 44 49 55 66 75 
Employed (%) 51 49 42 39 33 18 
Household
Other earners (%) 66 58 58 59 59 59 
Receiving social
assistance (%) 11 9 15 10 11 4 
Receiving any public
transfer (%) 57 58 65 64 72 1.0 
In poverty (%) 14 12 18 16 23 20 
Pregovernment
income ($) 17,104 16,004 16,579 15,649 15,651 13,383 
Postgovernment
income ($) 17,238 16,676 17,211 16,670 17,472 17,350 
Household composition
Mean family size 3.33 3.25 3.13 3.07 3.05 2.92 
Single-person
household (%) 13.3 15.6 16.5 16.4 13.6 14.5 
Single person with
children (%) 7.3 6.9 5.6 5.7 9.0 8.5 
All others (%) 79.4 77.5 77.9 77.8 77.5 77.5 
Head or partner in
household (%) 77.9 79.4 79.4 80.9 80.9 83.2 
Child of head or
partner (%) 16.8 15.4 16.5 15.1 15.0 12.7 
Other related or
unrelated adult (%) 5.3 5.2 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1
SOURCE- 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
NOTE: Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive DI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N = 199) Results are weighted to reflect population values
Individuals' average age at award in year Ms 44 9
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to receipt (t - 5) to the award year (f), declining by 8 percent. After 
taxes and transfers have been included, this decline in household 
income disappears. Mean postgovernment income actually increases 
by 2 percent over the same period.
Although household income does not fluctuate very much over the 
period, the components of household income do change. The diver 
gence in pre- and postgovernment income over the five years indicates 
that as the award year draws near, an increasing portion of the average 
recipient's household income comes from public, rather than private, 
sources. Finally, the static pattern of average economic well-being 
comes with more than 30 percent of the eventual recipients in poverty 
each year. Thus, the income stability observed is at a relatively low 
level of economic well-being.
Apart from changes in individual characteristics and household eco 
nomic well-being, future awardees may experience changes in house 
hold composition that create the need for, or access to, benefits. For 
some individuals, disability benefits may be the mechanism by which 
they can live independently. The final portion of Table 5.1 describes the 
changes in household composition and living arrangements that occur 
prior to period t. As the year of benefit receipt draws closer, the number 
of eventual recipients living in single-person households increases. 
This rise is correlated with declines in both the number of single-parent 
families and the number of individuals living with their parents. The 
percentage of single-parent families falls from 17.3 percent in t - 5 to 
8.2 percent in t. Likewise, the percentage of individuals living in their 
parents' homes falls from 28.4 percent in t - 5 to just over 20 percent in 
t. The growth in the number of single-person households suggests that 
living in a single-person household and receiving SSI benefits may go 
together. Overall, these results show that a majority of eventual SSI 
recipients are heads or partners of their own households.
In Table 5.2 the focus shifts to DI recipients. Because of the mini 
mum quarters of coverage required of DI applicants, their prebenefit 
experiences are likely to include more work and higher levels of eco 
nomic well-being than the SSI recipients. The average age of recipients 
in the first year of benefits is 44.9 years. As with SSI recipients, the 
prevalence of disability among the sample members increases as the 
award date approaches. As the prevalence of self-reported disability 
increases, the percentage employed decreases, moving from 51 percent
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in year t - 5 to only 18 percent in year t. DI recipients were more likely 
than SSI recipients to be employed five years prior to receiving bene 
fits; one-half of the DI recipients were employed in t - 5 compared to 
less than one-third of the SSI recipients. Moreover, there is a discern 
ible process of transitioning out of the labor market among DI recipi 
ents. Over the five-year period the percentage of eventual DI recipients 
employed declined steadily, whereas among SSI recipients employ 
ment status remained relatively static.
In addition to their own work efforts, DI recipients have more 
household resources to draw on than did the SSI recipients in the years 
prior to receiving benefits. A larger fraction live with other earners, 
more are married, and fewer are living in single-adult households. Not 
surprisingly, a smaller percentage are in poverty or receiving transfers. 
As for SSI recipients, mean postgovernment income among future DI 
recipients remains stable throughout the five years preceding their DI 
receipt. And like SSI recipients, pregovernment and postgovernment 
income among future DI recipients remains stable throughout the five 
years preceding their DI receipt. And like SSI recipients, pregovern 
ment and postgovernment income among future DI recipients diverge 
as the benefit year approaches, implying a growing reliance on public 
transfers for income support.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 describe the prevalence of characteristics and cir 
cumstances in each year among the sample of eventual recipients, but 
do not provide information about individual transitions or patterns of 
behavior over the five years. The remaining analyses focus on individ 
ual patterns and transitions prior to benefit receipt. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
show the percentage of eventual recipients living in a particular cir 
cumstance by the number of years prior to receipt. Since this analysis 
encompasses a five-year span, an individual may be in a particular state 
from 0 to 5 years. These results provide some indication of the duration 
of circumstances among eventual recipients.
Table 5.3 reports findings for the sample of SSI recipients. The first 
row of Table 5.3 shows that more than one-third of the eventual recipi 
ents reported being disabled in each of the five years prior to receiving 
benefits. An additional one-third never report being disabled in the 
PSID data. The next row of Table 5.3 shows that about one-half of 
eventual SSI recipients did not work at any time during the five years 
prior to receiving benefits. The remaining 50 percent who did work
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over the five-year period were about equally dispersed over the distri 
bution of years 1-5, although a slightly larger number reported one 
year of market work than reported two, three, four, or five years of 
market work. Moving down the table reveals that a large fraction (40.3 
percent) of eventual recipients lived with other earners in each of the 
five years prior to receiving benefits. An even larger fraction (61.0 per 
cent) received some form of government transfer in each of the five 
year prior to receiving SSL Only about 10 percent of the future recipi 
ents received no government transfers prior to being awarded SSL 
Although a majority of eventual recipients lived with other earners and 
received government transfer income prior to receiving benefits, less 
than one-half maintained incomes above the poverty line in each of the 
five years. About 20 percent were in poverty over the entire five-year 
period, and about 25 percent were in poverty for one or two years over 
this period.
These results add to the picture of SSI recipients in the years just 
prior to benefit receipt. This view diverges slightly from the one cast in 
Table 5.1. Table 5.3 indicates that work is more important and transfer 
receipt less important that the percentages in Table 5.1 would imply. At 
the same time, the results in Table 5.3 show that the incidence of pov 
erty among eventual recipients is higher than implied by the yearly 
prevalence rates in Table 5.1.
In Table 5.4, the analysis is repeated for DI recipients. Like the SSI 
recipients, about one-third of the DI recipients reported being disabled 
in each of the five years prior to receiving benefits, and an additional 
one-third were never captured as disabled in the PSID data. Although 
the patterns of self-reported disability are similar among SSI and DI 
recipients, Table 5.4 shows that eventual DI recipients are more likely 
to work, less likely to receive benefits, and less likely to be in poverty 
than individuals who move onto SSI. Two-thirds of the eventual DI 
recipients (compared to one-half of SSI recipients) work at some time 
over the five-year period; about one-quarter work in each year up to the 
year prior to receiving benefits. Only 25 percent report receiving social 
assistance over this period, although about 80 percent received some 
form of public transfer. Consistent with a greater reliance on work, 
only one-third of the DI recipients are in poverty at any point during 
the five years prior to benefit receipt, compared to more than one-half 
of eventual SSI recipients.
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Tables 5.3 and 5.4 identify the fraction of eventual recipients who 
are either always or never in a particular circumstance. Tables 5.5 and 
5.6 shift the focus to the proportion of beneficiaries who experience 
transitions prior to receiving benefits. These results capture the paths of 
those who were not at either of the endpoints (0 or 5 years) in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4.
Table 5.5 reports results for SSI recipients. The first column records 
the percentage of individuals experiencing a transition at some time 
over the entire five-year period; the second column reports the rates of 
transition in the year prior to benefit receipt. Events for disability, 
divorce or separation, loss of employment, and move to a single-person 
household are recorded for the individual. 8 In addition, changes in an 
individual's household economic status are recorded as loss of other 
transfers, fall into poverty, and a change (positive or negative) in 
household income of more than 50 percent. Finally, increases and 
decreases in family size are recorded. These transitions describe the 
amount of movement into and out of circumstances that potentially 
change the need and eligibility for disability-related benefits.
Among SSI recipients the events of disability and job loss are the 
most common. About 30 percent of the sample of SSI recipients moved 
from reporting no disability to reporting a disability during the five- 
year preaward period. Only about 10 percent reported that the transi 
tion to disability occurred just two years prior to being awarded SSI. 
Loss of employment was slightly more common. Loss of employment 
is defined as moving from having earnings to not having earnings at 
some point between t - 5 and t - 1. Thirty-two percent of the sample 
reported such a transition. A little less than half that number, 12 per 
cent, report a loss of employment between t - 2 and t-l.
Based on the movements recorded in the previous tables, both the 
loss of employment and the transition into disability were expected. 
Less expected were the large number of individuals who experienced a 
change in one of the measures of household economic well-being. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.3 showed that the percentage of eventual benefit recip 
ients living in households with other earners and receiving transfer 
income was relatively stable over the five-year period. But Table 5.5 
reveals that the stability captured for the average is not representative 
of all individuals. More than one-quarter of eventual SSI recipients 
lose the support of other earners in their household prior to receiving
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Table 5.5 Changes in Family and Economic Circumstances Prior to 




Event of disability 29 10 
Divorce or separation 3 1 
Move to a single-person household 6 3 
Loss of employment 32 12
Household income
Loss of other household earners 26 4 
Loss of welfare income 24 10 
Loss of all transfer income 18 5 
Fall into poverty 28 9
50% or larger decline in 
postgovernment household income 20 7
50% or larger increase in 
postgovernment household income 42 10
Household composition
Decline in family size 52 17 
Increase in family size_____________34________14____
SOURCE: 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
NOTE" Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive SSI benefits between
1979 and 1991,(Af=211) Results are weighted to reflect population values
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Table 5.6 Changes in Family and Economic Circumstances Prior to 




Event of disability 32 14 
Divorce or separation 8 1 
Move to a single-person household 6 1 
Loss of employment 53 17
Household income
Loss of other household earners 22 3 
Loss of welfare income 17 4 
Loss of all transfer income 19 2 
Fall into poverty 29 12
50% or larger decline in 
postgovernment household income 23 5
50% or larger increase in 
postgovernment household income 44 14
Household composition
Decline in family size 38 13 
Increase in family size __ __ __ 30 __ ___11
SOURCE 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
NOTE: Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive DI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N = 199) Results are weighted to reflect population values
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benefits. Similarly, 24 percent stop receiving social assistance for at 
least one year prior to receiving benefits. Fewer individuals move 
entirely out of the transfer population. About 18 percent lose all trans 
fer income during the five years prior to receiving benefits.
Nearly 30 percent of the recipients transitioned from not poor to 
poor over the course of the period. One-fifth experienced a drop in 
their postgovernment household income of more than 50 percent. The 
frequency of these types of transitions point to a significant level of 
economic uncertainty during the years preceding movement onto the 
SSI rolls. This economic uncertainty is underscored by the finding that 
42 percent of eventual SSI recipients experience a 50 percent or larger 
increase in their postgovernment family income during the study 
period. Although increases in income are much more likely given the 
low base from which these individuals start, these fluctuations indicate 
that many future recipients experience substantial changes in their 
household income just prior to benefit receipt. Finally, both increases 
and decreases in family size are common in the years prior to an SSI 
award. About 50 percent of the future recipients experience a decline in 
family size at some time during the five years before receiving benefits. 
A smaller number—about 34 percent—have an increase in family size.
Taken together, these results point to a frequency of events that put 
individuals at risk for losses associated with their disability. The fact 
that changes in economic and household factors are as common as 
changes in health suggests that for many eventual SSI beneficiaries, 
becoming a recipient may often be a response to economic factors that 
interact with health.
Moving to changes among DI recipients, Table 5.6 reports similar 
patterns to the ones found for SSI recipients. Loss of employment is 
more common than changes in disability status. Loss of other earners 
and loss of public transfers occurs for about one-fifth of the sample. 
Approximately equal numbers of DI and SSI recipients experience a 
fall into poverty, or a positive or negative change in postgovernment 
household income. A smaller number of DI recipients, compared to 
SSI recipients, experience declines in family size, but about the same 
percentage report an increase in family size.
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CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has examined the characteristics of individuals in the 
years prior to receiving disability-related benefits. The picture that 
emerges is one in which changes in individual employment, household 
economic status, and household composition are as likely as changes in 
health. Moreover, for a large fraction of individuals, health status 
remains constant over the course of the five years prior to benefit 
receipt. However, since the PSID data include no measure of severity, 
no clear interpretation of this can be made.
Like other research, this analysis confirms that work is an important 
component in the lives of many future recipients, transitions out of 
employment in the five years prior to benefit receipt occur for about 30 
percent of the SSI recipients and for about 50 percent of the DI recipi 
ents. It is these groups who could potentially benefit—conditional on 
the severity of their impairment—from programs that encourage work 
and attempt to maintain people independently in the labor market. 
Despite some connection to the labor market, a large fraction of benefit 
recipients have been on public transfers for a number of years, particu 
larly among SSI recipients. For these individuals, interventions 
designed to avoid movement onto the transfer rolls must begin long 
before they apply for disability transfers.
While these data do not permit more elaborate determinations of the 
experiences of disability benefit recipients in the years prior to their 
awards, the results encourage this type of analysis. Further research in 
this area will help complete the picture of the transition of individuals 
onto the disability rolls and the types of assistance and support that 
would best serve to reduce long-term recipiency.
Notes
1. See Chapter 3 for an analysis of the relationship between economic conditions 
and the disability rolls.
2. The PSID data do not consistently permit the identification or concurrent SSI/DI 
recipients. To account for the possibility that SSI/DI concurrent recipients are dif 
ferent from SSI-only recipients, a two-year SSI receipt criterion is applied for sen 
sitivity analysis. This two-year restriction is based on the findings of Rupp and 
Scott (1995), which show that approximately 75 percent of concurrent SSI/DI
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recipients exit the SSI program within the first year. The results are not sensitive 
to this change.
3. The sample is a proxy for the first onset. In the case of SSI recipients who came 
into the panel after 1974, and those who were eligible for benefits under the previ 
ous programs for the aged, blind, and disabled, individuals may have had spells of 
benefit receipt that are not observed in the data. In the case of DI benefits, individ 
uals may have had benefits prior to the beginning of the panel in 1968 or prior to 
becoming part of the panel at some later period.
4. Using the stated criteria, there are 293 SSI recipients and 258 DI recipients. How 
ever, 82 of the SSI recipients and 59 of the DI recipients are not part of the PSID 
original sampling frame. These "out of sample" members of the PSID do not have 
sampling weights and therefore cannot be used in this analysis.
5. The robustness of the results to the small sample sizes was checked by shortening 
the in-sample requirement from five to three years. Although the sample sizes 
increased by approximately 50 cases the results were not changed. Therefore, the 
analysis reported refers only to the five-year requirement sample.
6. The tax routing developed by the staff of the PSID is used to compute the post- 
government income measure.
7. Given that each member of this sample has passed the substantial gainful activity 
test to receive benefits, it is somewhat surprising that only two-thirds report that 
they have a disability at the time they are awarded benefits. This discrepancy in 
self-identified disability and an official disability classification may be associated 
with the lack of specific questions about mental impairments in the PSID data.
8. Death of a spouse is not an option for SSI recipients due to the difficulty in iden 
tifying why benefits were received (i.e., for disability or survivorship).
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Comments on Chapter 5
Daniel Mont 
Congressional Budget Office
Mary Daly uncovers the instability that lurks beneath the seemingly 
stable behavior of aggregate measures of poverty and living arrange 
ments among people in the years prior to the receipt of disability bene 
fits. For example, the percentage of adult Supplemental security 
Income (SSI) recipients living with other earners in each of the five 
years prior to receiving benefits remains almost constant at just under 
60 percent. However, Daly shows that during those five years prior to 
receiving benefits, over 20 percent of recipients experienced the loss of 
an earner in their family.
These important results, however, can be easily misinterpreted if 
used to draw conclusions about the causes of Social Security Disability 
Insurance (DI) or SSI receipt. Take the above statistics. One should not 
conclude that the loss of an earner from one's household necessarily 
leads to a big increase in the chances of going on SSI. If the total num 
ber of future recipients in households with other earners stays constant 
at 60 percent, and 20 percent are losing household earners, then many 
future recipients, maybe as many as 20 percent, must be gaining house 
hold earners. One could equally conclude that gaining a household 
earner increases one's chances of receiving SSI! Of course, what could 
be happening are two separate types of events. Some people could lose 
the assistance of other earners and seek help through the SSI program, 
while others could be finding it harder to live on their own and so move 
in with others, but still end up receiving SSI.
The point is that there are a lot of transitions occurring among these 
people. It is unclear, however, how these factor in to the dynamics of 
SSI and DI recipiency.
The fact that instability exists among future SSI recipients is not sur 
prising. After all, in order to qualify for SSI benefits a person by defini 
tion has not had a stable work history.
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The finding that there is a reasonable amount of change in the fam 
ily and economic circumstances prior to the receipt of DI benefits is 
more interesting. Nevertheless, the impact of this finding is tempered 
by the fact that Daly makes no comparison with people not receiving 
benefits. How can- you judge if instability is associated with DI receipt 
unless you know if future DI recipients experience more or fewer tran 
sitions than their nondisabled counterparts?
The work Daly has done is an important first step at examining the 
path to receiving disability benefits and provides a much needed 
description of the lives of beneficiaries prior to their becoming benefi 
ciaries. Interesting extensions of this work would include
• comparing the rate of transitions reported in Chapter 5 to similar 
rates for people with similar levels of economic resources who do 
not end up receiving benefits
• investigating how circumstances surrounding transitions that lead 
to receipt of benefits differ from other transitions
• undertaking an event history analysis, or some other procedure, to 
determine how changes in living arrangements and economic cir 
cumstances affect the probability of beginning a spell of SSI or DI 
recipiency
• decomposing the disabled into categories of people who have had 
more similar experiences, for example by age or type of disability.
Comments on Chapter 5
Virginia Reno 
National Academy of Social Insurance
This is a very well-done paper. It is a thoughtful, clear, and concise 
descriptive analysis of what can be learned from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) about Social Security Disability Insurance 
(DI) and Social Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries in the years prior 
to benefit receipt. It leaves the reader wishing to know more, yet grate 
ful that the author did not stretch the analysis beyond what the data can 
show. I have two brief comments about the paper's conclusions and 
some more general observations about disability policy research.
The paper concludes that changes in employment and economic sta 
tus are as likely as changes in health in the five years before receipt of 
DI or SSI disability benefits. On one level, this should not be surpris 
ing. The purpose of DI and SSI is to provide benefits to people with 
severe work disabilities, not simply those with impairments. Conse 
quently, it is reasonable to expect changes in employment and eco 
nomic status along with changes in health status prior to benefit 
receipt.
This finding is consistent with what we heard in focus group inter 
views conducted for the Academy's Disability Policy Panel (Mashaw 
and Reno 1996a, p. 177-193). Those interviews included beneficiaries 
in three broad impairment categories: musculoskeletal, mental, and 
"other," which included circulatory, respiratory and other body-system 
diseases. In all three groups the onset of work disability was often 
gradual. Despite the onset of illness or injury, people often remained at 
their jobs months or even years after the onset of their conditions. 
They typically turned to DI only after they could no longer hold down 
their jobs. Often they had exhausted other remedies, such as rehabilita 
tion, and other avenues of support, such as unemployment insurance or 
workers' compensation. Those on SSI sometimes had relied on other 
assistance before they learned about and qualified for SSI. While focus 
groups are only anecdotal, they, like the PSID data, suggest that the
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transition onto the disability benefit rolls is a gradual process. Benefit 
recipients tend to be older workers with chronic, progressive condi 
tions. They do not fit a conventional image of "persons with disabili 
ties" that might be conveyed by the popular wheelchair logo. 
Wheelchair users are only a small proportion of DI beneficiaries, less 
than 5 percent some years ago (Lando, Cutler, and Gambler 1982). It 
appears that the nature of the person's impairment, and its interaction 
with the demands of work the person can reasonably be expected to do, 
are more important that the suddenness of impairment onset in under 
standing antecedents of benefit receipt.
Daly's paper goes on to conclude that "for a majority of individuals 
health status remains constant over the course of the five years preced 
ing benefit receipt," but adds a caveat that measures of severity of 
health conditions are lacking. I would suggest that the caveat makes 
the conclusion of dubious validity. Because health status is measured 
in such a rudimentary way, changes in health status are not fully cap 
tured. In this analysis, health status and disability status are used inter 
changeably. It is a binary variable made up of answers to four 
questions about 1) disability or need for care; 2) whether primary 
activity is permanently disabled; 3) whether health is fair or poor; and 
4) presence of a physical or nervous condition that limits the type or 
amount of work that can be performed. Presence of a disability is a 
positive response to at least one of the above. Absence of disability is 
none of them. By this construct, the only change captured is a transi 
tion from having none of these conditions to having at least one during 
the five years that end before benefit receipt. Changes in the severity of 
progressive health conditions after onset are not. measured, nor are 
onsets that occur in the year of benefit receipt. Without more refined 
measures of health and disability status, the conclusion that health sta 
tus remains constant does not seem to be supported.
The remaining points I want to make are not about the paper, but 
about what the author had to work with, or more important, what she 
did not have to work with. The paper highlights the serious dilemma 
researchers face in attempting to do policy research on the DI and SSI 
programs without adequate data. Investment in appropriate data bases 
has been sorely lacking over the last fifteen years. General household 
surveys designed for other purposes have two serious limitations for
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studying beneficiaries, problems of sample size and ambiguity in iden 
tifying the population of interest.
The PSID yielded 199 persons classified as having been newly 
awarded DI benefits from 1984 through 1991, an eight-year period 
when 3.4 million persons were awarded DI benefits (SSA 1995, p. 264). 
Similarly, it yielded 211 adults identified as new SSI awardees over the 
thirteen-year period from 1979 through 1991 when 4.1 million adults 
were awarded SSI benefits on the basis of disability or blindness (SSA 
1995, p. 302). The very sparse observations seriously constrain what 
can be reliably quantified with regard to the diversity of people's expe 
riences as they enter the disability benefit rolls.
General purpose surveys simply are not very cost-effective ways to 
sample disability beneficiaries, particularly new entrants. Despite con 
cern about the size of the disability benefit rolls, entry onto the rolls 
remains a rare event. DI incidence rates over the period under study 
ranged from about 3 to 5 per 1000 insured workers (Mashaw and Reno 
1996a, p. 16). If we take account of the fact that only about three- 
fourths of the working-age population are insured, the overall DI inci 
dence rate is about 2 to 4 per 1,000 Americans between 18 and 65 
years old. SSI incidence rates are no larger than these over the period 
under study. Because receipt of social security or SSI disability bene 
fits is rare, special surveys are needed to target and screen adequate 
samples of individuals who are at risk of entering the disability benefit 
rolls.
A second data limitation for the purpose of studying the characteris 
tics of DI and SSI beneficiaries is the lack of an exact match between 
administrative records and responses to household surveys. There are 
a number of reasons to worry about the validity of beneficiary status as 
reported in household surveys. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
beneficiaries often are unsure about what kind of benefits they are 
receiving. Distinctions among DI, SSI, workers' compensation, or 
other public or private benefits are not as clear to beneficiaries as they 
may be to policy analysts. Second, in many household surveys, one 
person in the household answers for everyone in the household. If we 
are worried about beneficiaries knowing the kinds of benefits they 
receive, we should be equally worried about proxy respondents know 
ing this information. Third, there are situations in which a working- 
age person may be correctly reported as the "recipient" of social secu-
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rity or SSI but is not the "beneficiary" whose health, disability, and 
employment status are of interest. This could occur if the recipient is a 
representative payee for a beneficiary who is too young, too disabled, 
or too impaired in old age to manage his or her own affairs. The payee 
is, technically, a recipient in that her or his name is on the check. Some 
4.2 million social security beneficiaries and 1.7 million SSI beneficia 
ries have representative payees (Mashaw and Reno 1996b, p. 56). The 
payees are very likely to be working-age adults who are not disabled. 
It remains a question how general household surveys distinguish bene 
fit "receipt" from disability beneficiary status among the working-age 
population.
For all of these reasons, our confidence in survey findings about the 
relationship between disability status and receipt of social security or 
SSI benefits among working-age adults would be greatly enhanced by 
an exact match with the Social Security Administration's administra 
tive records. This is true whether we are talking about the PSID, the 
Current Population Survey, the National Health Interview Survey or 
the new Health and Retirement Survey. Exact matches are not simple. 
They must comply with federal confidentiality requirements and are 
resource-intensive to construct well. But they are critically important 
for policy research on disability benefit programs and the cost is small 
in relation to the size of the programs for which policy evaluation is 
needed.
I recognize that researchers always want more and better data. But 
for purposes of research on the DI and SSI programs, data no better 
than that which existed nearly two decades ago would be a vast 
improvement. Between 1960 and 1978 the Social Security Adminis 
tration (SSA) sponsored special surveys of the disabled population 
every six years. The surveys were designed to capture the segment of 
the working-age population at risk of entering the disability rolls, as 
well as beneficiaries themselves, and some surveys included denied 
applicants. Each survey matched the reports by individuals in house 
holds with SSA's administrative records of the respondents' work and 
benefit histories. The period since 1978 has been a long dry spell in 
data base development.
This research conference is encouraging if it indeed barkens a 
revival of commitment within the federal government to investment in 
data bases that are needed to study the social security and SSI disabil-
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ity benefit programs. A promising new development is the first release 
of data files of the 1994-1996 Disability Survey sponsored by an inter- 
agency consortium led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation in the Department of Health and Human Ser 
vices (Adler 1996). In addition, the SSA's New Beneficiary Data Sys 
tem provides longitudinal data that follow a cohort of new DI 
beneficiaries for a decade after they entered the benefit rolls (Yeas 
1996). Finally, SSA's Disability Evaluation Study, which holds prom 
ise for study of the programs' eligibility criteria, continues to move 
through the planning, development and funding process (SSA 1996). 
All of these are promising new developments for disability research
Mary Daly's paper is a masterful job of gleaning from an existing 
data base new insights about the antecedents of entry to the DI and SSI 
disability rolls. If all of the new data bases under development are 
brought to fruition, researchers will have new opportunities over the 
next few years to refine our understanding of social security and SSI 
disability programs and the people who turn to them.
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Part II
A Closer Look 
at State and Local Experiences

6 The Growth in Disability
Programs as Seen by 




There are 1,300 persons in the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
who have witnessed firsthand the recent dramatic growth in the Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI disability programs: the 
managers of local social security offices. This group provides a truly 
unique source of information, and we knew, if asked, they would give 
us straightforward, thoughtful responses. So in March 1994 we sur 
veyed them for their perceptions as to what factors contributed to the 
increase in the number of persons applying for and receiving disability 
benefits.
The survey had both structured questions—to get the managers' 
thoughts on specific issues such as the impact of the local economy and 
the types of advisors and organized outreach efforts in their area—and 
open-ended questions—to enable the managers to provide any feed 
back they wanted. All 1,300 managers were surveyed, and 1,171 
responded, for a 90 percent response rate. About 38 percent of those 
responding (or 446 managers) took extra time and effort to write 
insightful, in-depth comments to the open-ended questions.
Before getting into the findings, though, it is important to mention 
three caveats to the survey. First, the managers were not anonymous in 
the survey. It was critical that we be able to recontact them for clarifi 
cation if needed. (Judging from the quoted material in this article, how 
ever, they certainly seemed to be indifferent to being identifiable.) 
Second, much of the information requested was subjective: the survey 
solicited their opinions, not quantifiable data. And third, the survey did 
not discriminate between factors that would affect social security (DI) 
versus SSI claims. (Note: A more detailed version of this paper—with
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additional information about the survey, its methodology, and find 
ings—is available from the authors.)
SURVEY FINDINGS
The field office managers identified a wide range of factors that they 
thought affected the recent (since 1989) growth in the number of per 
sons applying for and receiving disability benefits: local economic 
conditions, increased awareness of the availability of benefits, court 
cases, the decision process (that is, the way SSA determines if a person 
is disabled), changes in medical standards, the impact of state and local 
governments, the value of the disability benefit package, the lack of 
continuing disability reviews, other financial incentives (such as a pri 
vate insurance company's requiring a disability application as a condi 
tion to receive payment), and other miscellaneous factors.
Considering these factors led us to conclude that the growth in the 
disability programs was not simply a demand-side phenomenon (that 
is, the growth was not simply due to the fact that more persons were 
seeking benefits and/or more beneficiaries were staying on the rolls). 
There was a supply-side effect as well: for example, court rulings had 
made whole new classes of persons eligible for benefits, and outreach 
efforts had sought applications from persons who had heretofore not 
chosen to apply for benefits. Further, we found that the factors could be 
grouped by whether they were internal or external to the agency (Table 
6.1). The distinction is important because the external factors are out 
side SSA's control, but the internal factors can be more easily altered or 
influenced by policy makers.
Local Economic Conditions
High unemployment is often thought to cause an increase in the 
number of persons applying for disability. The field office managers 
were asked the extent to which they believed that local economic con 
ditions influenced the number of applications in their area. About a 
quarter of the managers said that local conditions had either no impact 
(9 percent) or had very little impact (14 percent); the remaining three-
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Table 6.1 Factors Identified by Field Office Managers as Influencing the 
Growth in SSA Disability Programs
Demand effects
External to SSA: Internal to SSA:
Economy, unemployment Outreach, program awareness 
Changing occupational structure Higher allowance rates 
State cutbacks, burden shifting Fewer continuing disability reviews 
Advisors, attorneys, etc. Attractiveness of benefits package 
HIV/AIDS Easier medical standards 
Incentives to apply Attorney fee policy 
Aging of the population
Change in attitudes, less stigma _____ ____
Supply effects
External to SSA: Internal to SSA: 
Court cases Outreach
Congressional mandates (includes Easing medical standards (includes 
outreach, medical improvement Zebley regulations, new mental 
standard, etc.) listing, drug addicts and
alcoholics)
Fewer continuing disability reviews 
Workload credits
quarters of the managers were about evenly divided between those who 
believed that local economic conditions had a modest impact (39 per 
cent) or a large impact (37 percent).
Managers were asked to cite some past events that had affected their 
particular office. Some listed event after event of specific plant closings 
and severe cutbacks, clearly demonstrating a sensitivity to events in 
their local economy and labor market. Others simply said "general eco 
nomic conditions" or "layoffs in construction industry." More than a 
third of the managers listed three or more events. Some said that 
growth during the recent recession was different from that of past 
recessions. Under-employment was cited as often as unemployment as
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the source of the problem. Some managers, however, said their area 
experienced growth in the number of disability applications and 
awards despite a healthy or improving economy. A few of the reasons 
they gave for this are discussed in the section on miscellaneous factors. 
Overall, the survey responses from the field office managers tended 
to support a link between poor local economic conditions, unemploy 
ment, and layoffs and increased applications for disability benefits. 
Among the comments offered were the following:
Economic conditions definitely have a major impact in the rise in 
disability claims. When factories have massive layoffs or close 
down, we receive DIB [disability insurance benefit] claims from 
workers with medical problems who had been working despite of 
their impairments.
The economy has taken a downturn. You cannot lay off thousands 
of people in their mid-forties and not think that they are not going 
to file for benefits.
Lack of retraining, lack of access to health insurance, and unavail 
ability of alternative employment that replaces lost earnings can 
lead to physical and/or emotional deterioration that gradually 
builds until SSA is the only option left.
Increased Awareness of the Availability of Benefits
Since the late 1980s, SSA has made a concerted effort to increase 
public knowledge and understanding of the disability program. Did the 
managers think that these efforts contributed to the growth in the dis 
ability programs? Clearly they did.
The managers were asked for some details about their own efforts in 
this area. For example, did their office provide information about the 
disability program to the local media? About 80 percent said yes. 
(Managers who responded negatively sometimes noted that these activ 
ities were handled by their area director's office, or that their office was 
in a major metropolitan area so that these activities were done by the 
offices in the city. Some managers said that they had tried to place 
materials in the local media, but were unsuccessful due to lack of inter 
est from the media—usually newspapers.) The survey listed eight pub 
lic information or outreach activities that might have been done: more 
than half of the managers did at least three.
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Nearly four out of five field offices maintained outside contacts for 
the purposes of providing information and advice. The contacts were 
usually with hospitals, advocacy groups, welfare and social service 
agencies, mental health clinics, doctors, employers, vocational rehabil 
itation providers, AIDS clinics, and penal institutions. More than half 
the managers said that their office had made special arrangements with 
these contacts for taking disability claims.
Obviously, the managers had put considerable time and effort into 
their public information and outreach work—which may explain why 
many of them were frustrated with our inquiries about outreach activi 
ties.
We were asked to do SSI outreach for many years. When we are 
asked to do something we do it and we do it quite successfully. 
Why do you now want to know why there was an increase in 
applications?
Question—if we've pushed outreach for years and awarded mil 
lions to grantee agencies [to help us reach all potential claimants], 
why are we now concerned that applications are on the rise?
It appears that our agency's own initiatives are responsible. Sev 
eral years ago we undertook massive outreach initiatives to spread 
the word and contact as many potential disability applicants as 
possible. We worked hard at this; we were successful; and, now 
we are reaping the benefits of our efforts. The increase in disabil 
ity claims is not a great mystery to us in the field offices. Rather it 
is a logical outcome of this agency's initiatives and goals over the 
past several years.
Some managers felt that SSA had gone overboard in its outreach 
efforts—and they said so:
I strongly believe that SSA is pushing outreach too much.
I personally believe SSA has taken outreach efforts to the extreme. 
In doing so I'm concerned that we have not always served the 
other half of those we represent—the taxpayer—properly.
In addition to SSA's outreach and public information activities, 
there are many other ways that a person could have become aware of 
the DI and SSI disability programs. Some of the ways mentioned by 
the managers include referrals from state or local agencies or advocacy
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groups; referrals by attorneys; the publicity generated by court cases; 
or word of mouth.
According to nearly 90 percent of the managers, claimants were 
often sent to their office by local welfare agencies. One-third said that 
the local legal aid society, advocacy groups for the disabled, or private 
social service agencies often referred claimants to them. The survey 
asked if any of these groups gave bad advice—that is, were they refer 
ring persons who were clearly not eligible for disability benefits? More 
than 20 percent of the managers could name one or more advisors who 
consistently did this: half of them cited local welfare agencies—those 
who administer the General Assistance, Aid to Families with Depen 
dent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and Medicaid programs. One 
manager stated:
Most of our applicants are referred to us by the state welfare 
offices. . . . Many physicians believe they are "helping" their 
patient to continue receiving welfare benefits if they were to check 
12 months or longer, not realizing that the patient is then required 
to file for SSA/SSI benefits. Claimants with broken leg(s), or 
pregnancy or some other mild ailment are unnecessarily being 
referred.
Nearly 60 percent of the managers said that attorneys in their area 
often advertised for disability claimants. Furthermore, about 90 per 
cent of the managers could list at least one person or organization in 
their area who actively promoted filings for disability benefits by pro 
viding either information or assistance to persons going through the 
application or appeals process. Nearly 25 percent of the managers 
could name nine or more such advisors! In all, the managers gave over 
3,500 names of persons or groups who provided advice and assistance. 
(Perhaps the most interesting of these were the third-party arrange 
ments whereby a state government contracts with a private company 
and pays a fee for each individual who is deemed eligible for a disabil 
ity benefit. For example, under one Maryland program, the private con 
tractor is paid a fee for each welfare recipient who is placed on the SSI 
rolls. Other states and localities have adopted similar strategies.)
More than 80 percent of the managers said that TV, radio, or news 
papers in their area usually or sometimes provided coverage of the dis 
ability programs.
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The press reports on people receiving SSI because of drug or alco 
hol addiction have resulted in an increase in people filing alleging 
these disabilities.
News articles on the substance abuse cases allowance rates have 
had some impact.
Word of mouth was cited as a source of information by nearly 20 
percent of the managers who offered comments. They said that new 
applicants often came to their office after talking with other applicants 
or because they were encouraged to apply after hearing stories about 
others being allowed benefits and getting large retroactive checks.
The impact of "word on the street" in connection with SSI for 
children and DA&A [benefits based on drug addiction and alco 
holism] cannot be ignored. Individuals file because neighbors and 
relatives have received benefits. It is not infrequent that a parent 
will make an appointment for a child who has been diagnosed by 
the schools with "special needs," but by the time of the appoint 
ment he/she will want to file applications for other children in the 
family.
Court Cases
Court decisions was the topic most frequently addressed in the field 
office managers' comments: fully half of them mentioned the courts as 
a factor in the growth of the disability program.
Nothing creates an incentive for filing a claim like a court case 
which results in adding a lot of people to the rolls. Nothing creates 
new claims like a neighbor getting a big retro check.
And among the court cases, none has had more impact than the Zeb- 
ley decision. In fact, the Zebley case (which dealt with benefits for dis 
abled children under the SSI program) was the single factor most cited 
as influencing the growth in the disability rolls: 43 percent of the man 
agers who offered comments said it was a major factor in the increase 
in workloads and growth in the disability program. The managers also 
thought that some teachers and school administrators either assisted 
parents to apply or actually pushed parents to apply because their 
school could then receive benefits (such as additional special education 
funding and access to medical and other tests). As one manager stated:
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These [SSI disabled children's benefits] are being pushed by local 
schools, physicians, and most of all economically disadvantaged 
parents. In addition to the cash received by the family, entitlement 
to our disability programs opens the door to other federal govern 
ment funding for agencies as well as individuals in assisting these 
children.
None of the managers indicated approval of SSA's Zebley policy; all 
indicated that this was an area in need of attention. Some of the manag 
ers had strong opinions.
We have observed some disability claims (mostly SSI disabled 
child's claims) where the medical evidence used to establish bene 
fit entitlement has seemed to us to be so "slim" that it would make 
one think that almost any adolescent and pre-adolescent child 
going through the typical socialization experiences and "growing 
pains" may qualify for SSI.
Rarely do we take a claim from a disabled child who has a physi 
cal disability. Almost all of them are mental. The decisions are 
based on subjective "evidence" and the claimants have learned 
how to act and answer the questions. I do not have the figures but 
it appears that generally there is more than one SSI applicant or 
recipient in the household. It is not unusual for an applicant to file 
for 2 to 5 children at the same time.
Once a parent gets one child on SSI they begin the process of 
qualifying others in the family, 5 or more siblings getting SSI is 
not unusual.
The Decision Process
The application and decision process has clearly changed in recent 
years. Allowance rates (particularly through reversals at the Adminis 
trative Law Judge [ALJ] level) are up. Attorney involvement is up, 
appeals rates are up, and denied applicants refile more than they did in 
the past. SSA's attorney fee arrangements guarantee payment will be 
received—and large backlogs and slow processing time, combined 
with high ALJ allowance rates, guarantees large retroactive payments 
and large fees for representatives. The managers had the following 
comments about recent changes in the decision process.
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Field office staff believe that there are too many levels of disabil 
ity appeal and find it difficult to accept SSA's disparities of allow 
ances at the different decisional levels: 30% at initial level, 12% at 
reconsideration, and 80-90% at hearings level.
We are seeing more non-attorney reps soliciting clients, even 
across state lines; some appear to have questionable motives, to 
the point of coaching prospective applicants on responses, impair 
ments, limitations, and conduct.
We continue to get disturbing allegations that the word is out and 
that anyone can get disability by "faking" their way through con 
sultative examinations. We are repeatedly getting disability appli 
cants who have never been treated for their alleged impairment 
and the sole medical source for the decision is a single consulta 
tive exam.
Disability applicants have expressed a belief that there is a differ 
ent set of criteria used at the hearings level. Applicants frequently 
ask if they can't go straight to filing a request for a hearing 
because they have had other applicants tell them they will be 
denied at the initial and reconsideration levels but will be allowed 
at the hearing level.
We believe the High allowance/Reversal rate by ALJs encourages 
both applicants and local firms to pursue disability no matter how 
slight the impairment might be. "The word" is out on the street— 
file for disability. You'll get denied but if you appeal to a judge 
you'll get approved. Unfortunately, the stats prove this theory . . .
... they will file and refile if denied. Many believe that if you keep 
trying, an approval will come sooner or later.
Changes in Medical Standards
More liberal standards—either because of court cases, legislation, or 
changes in regulations—have encouraged more individuals to apply 
for benefits. Comments about SSA's drug addiction and alcoholism 
(DA&A) policy were offered by nearly 20 percent of the field office 
managers who provided comments. As was the case with comments 
concerning the Zebley case and SSI childhood disability benefits, no 
manager indicated that SSA had made an improvement to the program 
with its current policy in this area.
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Drug and alcohol abusers are also finding easy benefits with SSL 
A couple of years ago, addicts needed a primary diagnosis relating 
to a mental or physical impairment before benefits could be paid. 
As I am writing this, I have an SSA-831 [disability determination 
form] in front of me showing a primary diagnosis of Cocaine 
Dependence, with a secondary diagnosis of Alcohol Abuse. This 
applicant has no physical or mental impairment alleged or diag 
nosed. Most addicts have responded positively to the promise of 
easy, free money from the government.
The most significant cause for the increase in our disability claims 
was because of the change in criteria for the mentally ill and 
DA&A cases. . . . We need a different approach to behavior con 
trolled illnesses. . . . Our present system only encourages people 
to continue their destructive behavior.
In 1984 Congress mandated that SSA review and update its listings 
of mental impairments. This was done, and allowances for mental 
impairments rose considerably before leveling off. Nearly 10 percent 
of the managers who offered comments mentioned mental impair 
ments.
The word is out in the legal profession that: (a) if you go to a hear 
ing and (b) show some mental involvement of disability in addi 
tion to the physical documentation, you will win.
If a comment by an applicant or observation by an interviewer 
shows any indication of a mental problem, we order a psychologi 
cal [exam]. This is done even though the claimant has never been 
previously treated for a mental problem and in all probability 
never will be. Thus, in numerous cases, a one time exam forms a 
significant piece,of evidence on which an allowance is made. We 
base allowances on such terrible impairments as attention deficit 
disorder, hyperactivity, personality and mood disorders.
About 7 percent of the managers who gave comments discussed the 
impact that easier standards and high or disparate allowance rates were 
having on the program. One manager noted how his own disability 
determination service responded to pressure to loosen standards:
After media coverage of the low allowance rate ... of individuals 
filing for disability benefits, we began to see our allowance rate 
increase from 24 percent to 48 percent. It is now averaging about 
40 percent.
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However, not all managers felt that easing the standards was an error 
on SSA's part. Some felt that these more liberal standards were more 
appropriate, particularly in light of the problems some workers have in 
finding jobs. One manager questioned the validity of the standards 
"when 80 percent of the initial claims are denied."
The Impact of State and Local Governments
Many states have tried to solve their budget problems by cutting 
back their social programs and shifting the financial burden to the fed 
eral government. Has this affected the DI or SSI disability programs? 
Of course: about 10 percent of the managers who offered comments 
mentioned state welfare offices and their referral policies as a factor in 
the growth SSA disability programs; more than 5 percent mentioned 
cutbacks in state welfare benefits and other programs; and about 5 per 
cent mentioned state efforts to shift the burden from state or local pro 
grams to federal programs.
We believe another major factor is increased referrals from public 
and private welfare agencies. The economic crunch facing states 
and localities has caused them to look to SSA programs as they 
have never done before.
Our local welfare office employs over 250 people, our office but 
21. The welfare office now has 4 disability advocates whose job it 
is to refer people to get them off welfare rolls and onto other pro 
grams like SSI and disability.
The Value of the Disability Benefit Package
Some managers felt that the benefit package (cash benefits as well 
as health coverage under Medicaid or Medicare—after a twenty-four- 
month waiting period) was becoming more generous than the work 
alternative, considering the paucity of good, high-paying jobs. Bene 
fits—especially SSI benefits to disabled children—were considerably 
more generous than welfare payments. Although only 3 percent of the 
managers who commented mentioned the value of the benefits pack 
age, some of their comments are worth noting.
The program is turning into an income subsidy for anyone who 
can get it, with very large financial rewards when you include
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medical assistance, cash tax free payments, and all the other 
related benefits. People can still earn a lot of wages or SE [self- 
employment income] each month plus the underground economy.
In many instances receipt of SSA and SSI benefits provide a stan 
dard of living comparable to that of those who work full time in 
'this area.
AFDC households are enticed by the possibility of receiving 
monthly check of $469.00 per child instead of the $115/month 
AFDC grant, with no limit for the number of children in the 
household. We have an unknown number of households in our ser 
vice area receiving SSI for 2, 3, and even 4 members. They tell 
others in the neighborhood who come in to file for their child who 
they say is "dumber" than the neighbor's child who is getting SSI.
The Lack of Continuing Disability Reviews
Over the past several years, SSA has opted to conduct fewer Con 
tinuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) in order to devote more staff to pro 
cessing the backlog of initial claims. In the past, CDRs were done 
regularly to make sure that a person continued to be eligible to receive 
disability benefits. About 20 percent of the managers who offered com 
ments felt that the reduction in CDRs contributed to program growth— 
not because there were fewer beneficiaries being found ineligible and 
thus removed from the rolls, but because fewer CDRs encouraged 
claimants to apply—it made benefits appear to be a lifetime promise of 
support. All the managers who commented in this area indicated that 
conducting more CDRs should be a priority; none thought that this was 
a workload that could be sacrificed without a detrimental effect on the 
programs. Some of them commented as follows.
Even the fact that Social Security has failed to perform a signifi 
cant number of medical CDRs in the last few years may contribute 
slightly in making disability-based benefits appear more attrac 
tive. Having a "permanent" source of income may increase one's 
motivation to contact Social Security and apply for benefits.
We believe the permanent nature of SSA disability benefits (usu 
ally paid for the rest of an individuals life) encourages filings as a 
means of a lifetime income.
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CDR's [continuing disability reviews] aren't being done, so the 
idea is becoming more wide spread that if you "get on" Social 
Security disability you are there forever, so it is worth the effort.
Other Financial Incentives
The survey asked the field office managers to list any sources of 
financial incentives offered to individuals to encourage them to apply 
for benefits. One-fourth of the managers listed one or more such incen 
tive. Among those mentioned were 1) some private insurance compa 
nies require an application for disability benefits as a condition for 
disability or long-term sickness benefits—and some reduce disability 
pay if the insured fails to apply; 2) some employers or unions require a 
disability filing as a condition for extended sick pay; 3) some welfare 
or general assistance programs provide a higher payment while a dis 
ability claim is pending or require a disability application as a condi 
tion for receiving benefits or continuing benefits; 4) some state general 
assistance or welfare programs do not have work requirement for per 
sons filing for disability benefits; 5) some local governments have a 
fund for health expenses for indigents that pays medical expenses only 
while a claim is pending; 6) some AFDC payments are terminated after 
a child reaches a certain age unless there is a disability claim pending; 
and 7) some states provide no access to the Medicaid program unless 
there is a disability application pending. Some of the managers pointed 
out:
We receive far more applications from persons who know they 
will be denied but are required by their insurance company to file. 
Insurance company can then get a copy of our file and not have to 
pay for a lot of medical reports.
We have numerous employers with sick pay plans which require 
participants to file for DIB [disability insurance benefits]. In many 
cases, there is no doubt that the claim will be denied. However, the 
individual must file as a requirement to continue to receive bene 
fits. In some cases, the individual says they know they will be 
denied and are filing only because they must.
The State, through Welfare and the school boards, as well as some 
private Agencies, quickly figured out by having children file for
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SSI, we would conduct needed medical tests at our cost. With a 
simple release form they then have access to those records.
Many of the people who file for disability are required to do so by 
the State or County in order to receive medical assistance. They 
only need medical help not disability benefits to get back on their 
feet. Universal medical coverage would reduce the number of 
applicants.
Some people file for SSI each year or so, even though they are 
regularly denied, because they want a visit to the doctor, and we 




Field office managers stated that they've noticed a real change in the 
public's attitude about receiving government benefits. There is a 
greater acceptability—with less stigma attached. Some of the manag 
ers said that they have found that disability is now viewed as an accept 
able alternative to work.
. . . there are available jobs in high enough numbers to rule out 
local economic conditions as the primary factor for any increase 
in disability claims. The fact is, however, when a potential job 
applicant or already employed person working for the Federal 
minimum wage or even $5.00 an hour sees their monthly take- 
home pay vs. what their friends are getting in monthly welfare or 
disability benefits, there is no incentive to work ... It is therefore 
our belief that IT IS THE WORK ETHIC that is missing from the 
population in our area, not the lack of available work.
Prior to the 1960's, there was great reluctance on the part of most 
citizens to ask for government assistance. The work ethic was 
strong and those who could work, even in spite of impairments, 
sought every opportunity to work as a matter of pride and self- 
esteem. This is not longer the case. The definition of disability has 
changed in the minds of the American public. Conditions that 
were once seen as impairments are now seen as totally disabling. 
Shrinking job markets and the growth of government programs 
are contributing factors. The stigma that was once attached to ask 
ing for public assistance is gone . . .
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A subtle change in how people view disability has occurred in 
recent years. It is no longer viewed (or even presented by SSA) as 
a severe long-term condition preventing you from doing anything. 
It is viewed today as an income supplement to unemployable or 
underemployed individuals.
The Aging of the Baby Boomers
More than 7 percent of the field office managers who offered com 
ments mentioned changing demographics and the aging of the baby 
boom generation as a factor in the growth of the disability rolls.
We've noticed an increase in disability claims in our area even 
though our economy has remained strong, and we're not in a hot 
bed of advocacy group activity. My spin on the increase in claims 
is due to: the babyboomers are getting into their 40's and 50's, 
which is prime DIB [disability insurance benefit] filing time.
.. . there are more people in their mid to late 40's, i.e., the age that 
the individual is more likely to become disabled. In other words, 
the "baby boomers" are getting older and their age is causing 
them to fall victim to the impairment related statistics.
Prisoners and Prison Newsletters
Just over 4 percent of the field office managers who offered com 
ments mentioned a growing trend among prisoners to seek benefits— 
which should not be surprising: SSA has been doing outreach efforts in 
penal institutions for several years. Two of the managers commented as 
follows.
Folsom Prison in our service area turns over 100 prisoners a week 
who believe they are SSI eligible and who will file claims as soon 
as they are on the street.
The prison system underground tells inmates they are eligible for 
DIB [disability insurance benefits] ... In the last 4 years we have 
seen a big increase of applicants recently released from prison. 
Parole Officers often refer claimants to file for disability.
Employer Disincentives to Hire the Disabled
Despite whether the economy is good or bad, there are certain disin 
centives to employers to hire the disabled: a disabled worker may 
cause an increase in the company's group insurance rates, or he or she
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may increase workers' compensation rates for the company or file 
workers' compensation claims. Several field office managers men 
tioned these disincentives as possibly influencing the growth in the DI 
and SSI disability programs.
Employers, because of workmen's comp, will not hire anyone 
with any type of physical problems.
Many people comment that they would work, but no one will hire 
them because:
1) Insurance/workers' compensation risk
2) Group insurance would be cancelled
3) Worried about workers' comp claims
4) Previous medical problems (e.g., back problems)
CONCLUSIONS
According to the field office managers, much of the increase in dis 
ability applications and awards was influenced by changes in the way 
SSA does business. Some of these changes were internal (for example, 
SSA's decision to do fewer continuing disability reviews in order to 
process more initial claims), and some of these changes were external 
(for example, the Zebley court case).
Overall, the field office managers strongly agreed in three areas: 
first, attention needs to be given to SSA's current policy regarding dis 
abled children's benefits under the SSI program; second, attention 
needs to be given to SSA's current policy regarding drug addicts and 
alcoholics; and third, reinstatement of continuing disability reviews 
needs to become an agency priority.
The survey responses make it difficult to ignore the potential impact 
SSA's own decisions have on program growth: the growth since the 
late 1980s cannot be solely attributed to outside influences beyond the 
agency's control.
7 The Ending of General Assistance






Applications for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability 
benefits have risen dramatically over the last several years. This growth 
in applications and in awards has occurred for both juveniles and 
adults. While the Sullivan v. Zebley decision has had an impact on the 
standards, applications, and awards for juveniles, no similar ruling or 
policy shift applied to adults. Even so, applications and awards have 
risen dramatically. In an effort to understand this rapid growth, the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the 
Department of Health and Human Services commissioned Lewin-VHI 
to conduct case studies of five states: California, New York, Florida, 
Texas, and Michigan. This paper presents our findings for Michigan.
There are a number of factors that make Michigan an interesting 
case study. The rate of growth of applications for SSI disability bene 
fits in Michigan has been among the most rapid in the country. Michi 
gan was an early pioneer in welfare restructuring, and the growth of 
applications coincided with the elimination of the state General Assis-
NOTE: Work on this chapter was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Data 
collection for the General Assistance termination project was supported by the Ford 
Foundation. The paper solely reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily 
represent the official positions of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Much of the authors' interpretations represented here are based on interviews con 
ducted with various individuals representing different organizations in the state of 
Michigan. We are grateful for the considerable time these individuals devoted to 
answering our questions. We also appreciate the assistance provided us by Alan Shafer 
and his staff at the Social Security Administration.
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tance (GA) program in 1991. Moreover, there appears to have been 
quite an active outreach program in the state, with coordination among 
the Social Security Administration in Michigan, state agencies, and 
advocacy groups.
We have interviewed individuals working for the Social Security 
Administration, the state of Michigan, and various advocacy agencies 
in an attempt to learn from their interpretations of this phenomenon. 
We have also made simple calculations using data from the Social 
Security Administration and the Michigan Department of Social Ser 
vices. Both our interviews and quantitative analysis present a fairly 
consistent picture of developments in Michigan.
In the remainder of this paper, we present data on the growth of SSI 
applications and awards in Michigan during the period from 1988 to 
1993. We also present some background material on developments in 
the state of Michigan, focusing on the ending in October 1991 of 
Michigan's General Assistance program. Following this background 
material, we review information derived from our interviews and quan 
titative analysis of the administrative data. We end with a short discus 
sion of what we think we have learned from the Michigan case study.
RECENT TRENDS IN APPLICATIONS AND AWARDS 
FOR SSI IN MICHIGAN
In Figure 7.1 we display annual adult applications for SSI disability 
benefits in Michigan from 1988 to 1993. Data for men and women are 
presented separately. These data are drawn from the Social Security 
Disability Research File (DRF) and are limited to adult disability 
applications and awards. They do not reflect growth encouraged by the 
Sullivan v. Zebley decision because that applied only to children. Over 
all, there were approximately 246,000 applications in the six-year 
period, at least some of which were reapplications after a denial of an 
initial disability claim. While nationwide adult applications rose by 54 
percent between 1989 and 1993, in Michigan they doubled, rising from 
28,000 applications in 1989 to 57,000 in 1993. Patterns for women and 
men were very similar. Over this same period of time, the non-elderly 
adult population in Michigan grew by less than 2 percent. Thus, very
Figure 7.1 Total Adult SSI Disability Applications
30,000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1 _ 1 Women ^1 Men
SOURCE: Social Secunty Administration Disability Research File
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little of the doubling of the SSI applications can be accounted for in 
terms of population growth.
The data also show the fraction of SSI applicants awarded benefits 
rising from 44 percent of 1988 applications to 51 percent of 1991 
applications. Award rates fell somewhat in 1992 and even more in 
1993, but much, if not all, of this drop probably reflects the fact that a 
substantial fraction of the 1993 cohort of applications was still pending 
on appeal. Data on initial determinations show the fraction of SSI 
applicants awarded benefits at the initial determination continued to 
rise through 1992. Given the fact that the fraction of denied applicants 
was also rising over this period of time, it seemed likely that, at least 
for 1992 and possibly even for 1993, award rates would eventually 
exceed those of preceding years. The fact that awards were rising more 
rapidly than applications would seem to belie any notion that what was 
going on was simply an increase in the number of frivolous or marginal 
applications.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 document applications for those with mental 
impairments and those with other impairments. 1 Applications for those 
with mental impairments tripled between 1989 and 1993, rising from 
6,000 in 1989 to 19,000 in 1993. In contrast, applications among those 
with other impairments rose by roughly 75 percent. As a result, appli 
cations for those with mental impairments accounted for roughly 45 
percent of the growth in total SSI applications in Michigan. Applica 
tions for those with mental impairments continue to rise after 1991, 
while applications for those with other kinds of impairment seem to 
have plateaued.
THE ENDING OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN MICHIGAN
Background
Between 1979 and September of 1991, Michigan funded a statewide 
GA program. GA was a cash-granting program for impoverished 
adults without dependent children. During the 1980s, the caseload var 
ied between a high of 142,000 in 1984 and a low of 93,000 in 1989 
(Michigan Department of Social Services 1991). Even though GA
Figure 7.2 Adult SSI Disability Applications for Mental Impairments
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Figure 7.3 Adult SSI Disability Applications for Other Impairments
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technically served an able-bodied population, it is now clear that it 
actually served older people, the chronically ill but not classified dis 
abled, and those who had some measure of disability. Kossoudji and 
Danziger (1993) found that 40 percent of the GA population was over 
age forty, that one-quarter had applied at some time for SSI, and that 
70 percent of respondents to a sample survey reported at least one 
chronic illness.
In September 1991, there were still 118,632 people receiving grants, 
although the enrollment had gone down since spring 1991 because of 
the termination threat. The decline in enrollment stemmed principally 
from a drop-off in applications to GA rather than from recipients leav 
ing the rolls. Eligibility criteria were simply based on income and 
assets. Most cases represented adult individuals, but some families 
with dependent children—families in which both parents were unem 
ployed or earning below the GA maximum income but who did not 
meet Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC-UP) employ 
ment history qualifications—were eligible for GA and represented a 
little more than 10 percent of the caseload (Kossoudji and Danziger 
1993).
The state of Michigan, along with other states, faced severe fiscal 
problems in the early 1990s. While the revenue the state received from 
both the federal government and from state sales tax were declining, 
the costs of incarcerations, health care, foster care, and public assis 
tance were all rising. A new, conservative republican governor, John 
Engler, was elected to office in November 1990 after running a cam 
paign in which he promised to both lower taxes and balance the bud 
get.
Although spending in other social programs was cut, Engler singled 
out General Assistance for virtual elimination. Engler first proposed 
this action in his fiscal year 1992 budget submitted to the Michigan 
legislature in January 1991. In May, Engler announced publicly that 
the GA program would be eliminated on June 1. Actual elimination of 
the program was held up in court, but finally went into effect October 
1, 1991. At the same time two supplemental programs, Emergency 
Needs and GA-Medical were cut. GA-Medical coverage provided pri 
mary ambulatory care everywhere except Wayne County, which had its 
own managed care program. Emergency Needs (which was later rein 
stated with reduced funding) provided for one-time application for
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funds to pay heating bills (for example), when the situation was an 
emergency and not part of an ongoing problem (Kossoudji and Dan- 
ziger 1993).
After GA was terminated, two much smaller programs were created 
for special populations: State Family Assistance (SFA) for families 
with children, and State Disability Assistance (SDA) for those deemed 
disabled, aged, or residents of substance abuse treatment facilities. The 
monthly grants are comparable to former GA stipends. SDA is easier 
to get on than SSI (processing of applications is quicker and work lim 
itations are expected to last 90 days, not the year required for SSI); 
however, unlike GA, health is central to the determination of eligibility 
for SDA. Moreover, those qualifying for SDA are required to apply for 
SSI as well. The state makes an effort to recover back payments from 
SSA if an individual is determined eligible for SSI.
In March of 1991, GA served 122,500 cases. Eleven and one-half 
percent of those were in families that would automatically qualify for 
SFA, while 1.3 percent were identified as disabled persons and would 
automatically qualify for SDA (Kossoudji and Danziger 1993). Those 
not automatically eligible for SDA could apply, but SDA continued to 
serve a much smaller population than did GA. State records indicate 
that within the first five months after GA was eliminated, only one-fifth 
of former GA recipients had applied for SDA benefits. Of those who 
processed applications, one-quarter were approved. In May 1992, a 
total of 8,898 individuals were on SDA. The average monthly caseload 
on SDA has been about 10,000 since then, with 3,000 to 4,000 thou 
sand annual transfers to SSI. They represent between 10 and 15 percent 
of SSI disability awards in Michigan.
The State Medical Program (SMP) replaced GA-Medical every 
where except Wayne County, which continued its own managed care 
medical program. However, SMP did not go into effect until December 
1, 1991, two months after GA was terminated. Furthermore, at that 
time only those who had been converted to SDA and SFA were 
enrolled in the new medical program. Others who met SDA/SFA 
income and asset requirements became eligible for and could apply for 
SMP. SMP is less comprehensive in coverage than Medicaid. It does 
not cover inpatient services and requires small co-payments for ser 
vices and prescriptions (Kossoudji and Danziger 1993).
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Implications
Most of the people we interviewed identified the ending of GA as 
the single most important impetus behind the growth in SSI applica 
tions. Even before Engler announced the ending of GA, many used the 
program as a transition or backup. Others on GA who were potentially 
eligible for SSI did not, however, apply. The paradox is that SSI bene 
fits were substantially more generous than GA benefits. For example, 
in 1990 an individual on GA would receive $266 per month in cash. On 
SSI, the same individual would have received $431. From the point of 
view of the state of Michigan, the person on GA would have cost $266 
while the same person on SSI would have cost the state only $45. Thus, 
both the GA recipient and the state of Michigan had considerable 
incentives to shift from GA to SSI.
Various explanations were offered for why more of those in GA had 
not applied for SSI benefits. Bureaucratic inertia was offered as one 
explanation for why program administration did not do a better job 
encouraging individuals to apply for SSI. Health status was not a 
requirement for eligibility for General Assistance. As a result, those 
potentially eligible were not identified. What might make this situation 
seem more reasonable is the fact that probably only a small minority of 
GA beneficiaries could pass the stringent medical screening required 
before receiving SSI benefits, and that this fraction would have been 
smaller in 1979, when GA was started, before the change in the mental 
health listings.
Another reason why people may not have applied is the more 
bureaucratic process and more numerous personal contacts associated 
with the SSI program. Applications required considerable effort and 
energy, and prospects for allowance were still uncertain. GA had a sim 
pler application and redetermination process, if for no other reason 
than because health was not a criterion for enrollment. Once GA was 
eliminated, however, people who were poor and in ill health basically 
had no other option besides SSI. Many of those on GA suffered mental 
impairments and/or had drug abuse or alcohol problems. These indi 
viduals may have been particularly reluctant to apply for SSI benefits. 
It was suggested to us that such individuals might find it less stressful 
to just get by on the low GA benefits than to be frequently reviewed, as 
would have been the case had they been on SSI. The simpler alternative
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may have been particularly attractive to the mentally ill who are para 
noid or socially isolated. GA helped them live marginally but relatively 
hassle free.
After GA was terminated, there were both federal and state outreach 
efforts targeted at former GA recipients who might have been eligible 
for SSL The Chicago Regional Office of the Social Security Adminis 
tration initiated one such campaign, sending letters to this population 
in December 1993. Returned letters were routed to the field offices. 
The individuals we talked to did not seem to think this effort had been 
terribly effective. The letter gave minimal information about the SSI 
program. For example, it did not clearly mention that one must be dis 
abled. The result was an increase in claims from people who wanted to 
get SSI but, by their own admission, were not disabled. Rather, they 
were unable to work due to the lack of job opportunities and inade 
quacy of their skills.
State-level efforts are thought to have been more effective. A series 
of computerized cross matches was conducted to see if the former GA 
recipients had applied for or already were on other social security pro 
grams. At least two mass mailings followed these cross matches. The 
mail included information about other available sources of disability 
funding as well as a preset initial appointment time at the local Michi 
gan Department of Social Services (MDSS) office. Field office staff we 
talked to thought these efforts had been somewhat effective.
OUTREACH AND ADVOCACY
Outreach
Whether we talked to social security field office staff, individuals 
from MDSS, or representatives of the advocacy community, there 
seemed to be general agreement that outreach efforts coordinated 
among the Social Security Administration, state agencies and advocacy 
groups had a strong impact on applications and awards for SSI and 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI).
Recent outreach efforts by field offices have expanded significantly 
for two main reasons. First, over the past several years, SSA has issued
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a series of mandates for field offices to conduct outreach to specific 
population groups which, among others, include low-birth-weight 
babies, children, and the homeless. Second, the Zebley decision led to a 
mandate from SSA that requires all field offices to increase the accessi 
bility of their staff to community residents.
The MDSS has conducted its own outreach efforts through meet 
ings with schools, probate court, nearly all social service agencies, and 
others who could make referrals. They provided an in-depth descrip 
tion of disability and instructions on how to file. In addition, MDSS 
hired temporary workers to screen files for possible leads for social 
security. The individuals we talked to thought that these efforts had 
resulted in a substantial increase in applications for SSL
Two state-specific outreach initiatives—the Michigan Inter-agency 
Task Force on Disability and the Client Services Task Force—are 
thought to have had a significant impact on rates of applications. Each 
task force includes representatives from a variety of state agencies, 
including the Departments of Health, Social Services, Labor, Educa 
tion, and Mental Health, with additional representatives on the Client 
Services Task Force from Legal Aid, and senate and congressional 
offices. These task forces focus on outreach through education and 
increasing awareness of the SSI and DI program changes. The outreach 
initiatives have been especially active since 1988 and target mostly 
potential SSI beneficiaries (the clientele of most groups represented on 
the task forces).
The education of workers in agencies participating in SSI outreach 
has had a major impact. There have been internal departmental alerts in 
SSA, and teachers and health care professionals have been trained to 
help identify possible cases. We were told that there is now close coop 
eration with local agencies and liaisons with shelters and community 
health agencies. -Better understanding of the process of applying for 
disability benefits and increased awareness of programs available for 
different populations have enabled the social service personnel to do a 
better job of informing and referring potential SSI applicants to the 
MDSS office. Hospitals and social workers as well as all the human 
services agencies, both local public and private, have been very asser 
tive in getting people to apply. Those we talked to felt that outreach 
works best when one goes to providers; direct appeals have not proven 
to be as effective.
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In addition, many health care providers have, over the last few years, 
become more in touch with MDSS and helped people apply for SSL 
Health care providers have an incentive for trying to get individuals 
onto SSI. Since those on SSI also have Medicaid, getting clients onto 
SSI implies that the health care providers will end up reimbursed for 
the services they provide. The Medicaid coverage is more extensive 
than SMP (for example) and also pays more under the DRG prevailing 
rate cap. MDSS has its own staff in the major hospitals collecting nec 
essary medical information on the clients. This facilitates their helping 
people to apply.
Substance abuse clinics and providers also represent significant 
referring agents. They refer a lot of people under rehabilitation to the 
MDSS office. Coupled with the GA cut, the state initiated outreach 
efforts targeted to alcoholics who were on GA and rehabilitation. For 
example, Harbor Light in Detroit was very active in searching for and 
finding drug addition and alcoholism (DA&A) people and helped them 
apply for SSL Legislation dating from 1972 as well as more recent leg 
islation mandates rehabilitation, monitoring, and facilitation of treat 
ment. In Michigan, the Drug Abuse and Alcohol Referral and 
Monitoring Agency (DARMA) refers clients to the proper rehabilita 
tion agencies. However, there is an insufficient number of resources 
available to which to refer these individuals can be referred. Since 
DARMA started in 1989 there has been an extensive outreach effort. A 
great deal of time has been spent in talking to different advocacy 
groups and social services providers, giving them accurate informa 
tion, organizing workshops and implementing panel discussions. In 
addition, DARMA monitors compliance and reports to MDSS. They 
have mental health therapists and substance abuse therapists as well as 
rehabilitation counselors working with them. They organize transporta 
tion and have contact with different agencies, like homeless shelters, to 
facilitate the process for the clientele. They assist in finding resources, 
cooperate with the rehabilitation council, and monitor progress.
DARMA works very closely with the Disability Determination Ser 
vices and has provided them with a good deal of information. In the 
opinion of the director, Ms. Rojas-Dedenback, DARMA has created a 
willingness by the MDSS to provide information about the available 
options to DA&A persons. The whole community has become more 
aware and has started to contact more people about applying for dis-
Growth in Disability Benefits 235
ability. Previously, there was a lack of awareness; people thought that 
GA was all there was for them, and it was not until they received better 
information that DA&A people have started to come forward. Primary 
referral sources for DARMA are the agencies they work with, i.e., ser 
vice providers, homeless shelters, advocacy groups, women's shelters, 
and treatment providers. The availability of benefits to those who are 
addicted has been spreading by word of mouth and has dramatically 
increased the number of claims being filed.
As evidence of the effectiveness of the outreach efforts to the 
DA&A population, field office representatives mentioned changes in 
the general knowledgeability of the population potentially eligible for 
SSL Others also thought that there had been a change in attitudes, most 
importantly a change in attitudes among potential applicants regarding 
the acceptability of identifying oneself as a substance abuser. While 
five years ago individuals would rarely identify themselves as sub 
stance abusers, currently it is not uncommon for individuals to enter an 
SSA office announcing that they were participating in some specific 
drug rehabilitation program and that they thought that doing so quali 
fied them for SSI payments. DA&A people "hang together," and SSI is 
discussed. Field office staff also mentioned that, largely as a result of 
the changes that had occurred in the applicant pool, the staff had 
become much more aware of the interrelation between substance abuse 
and mental health problems.
The general perception among the people we talked to was that the 
increased awareness of SSI could be attributed to a combination of var 
ious outreach efforts and word of mouth. Specifically, the growth of the 
shelter population, a group targeted for these outreach efforts, contrib 
uted to the rise in SSI applications. Many shelters in Michigan are now 
actively helping residents apply for disability benefits, including pro 
viding vans to help residents get to local MDSS offices, providing staff 
time to help individuals fill out paperwork, or having outside agencies 
come in to help. For example, in Detroit, at the request of a shelter, the 
Detroit Urban League will come out with SSI applications and help 
residents fill out forms.
Outreach efforts underway with the homeless shelter population 
illustrate the way in which outreach efforts may have interacted with 
the ending of GA to spur SSI application growth. The shelter popula 
tion in Michigan grew substantially after the ending of GA because the
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termination affected the population most at risk for homelessness. The 
state poured in funds for new shelters and additional beds, instigating a 
growth of shelters. In the Detroit area, emergency shelter providers 
think that over 75 percent of their adult clientele were former GA 
recipients (Park, Danziger, and Parrot 1994). Thus, the ending of GA 
indirectly increased the size of the population targeted for outreach 
efforts. Moreover, the state's increased investment in sheltering the 
homeless has added an extra incentive for getting those in the shelters 
onto SSI.
Advocacy
In recent years, advocacy groups that assist people in different levels 
of the application procedure and ensure that cases get through the 
bureaucracy have grown rapidly. Opinions differ as to what accounts 
for this growth. Some of the individuals we talked to thought the 
growth represented a response to a perceived need on the part of SSI 
and DI applicants. Others emphasized the fact that advocacy has 
become financially profitable. Various groups have begun to compete 
with each other for customers and funding. The advocacy and non- 
attorney groups can also increase their potential income by applying 
for federal and state funds (allocated for outreach effort, for example), 
and they can apply for grants from different foundations like the Mott 
Foundation and Robert J. Wood Foundation. Attorneys advertise on 
TV, in newspapers, and the yellow pages to handle disability claims. 
The fact that attorneys consider DI/SSI disability cases as almost 
always winnable is evidenced by their willingness to accept these cases 
on a contingency basis. The fraction of SSI and DI applications that 
have some form of representation has increased greatly in recent years 
and continues to do so.
The Medicaid Assistance-SSI advocacy program (MA-SSI) was 
started in the late 1970s and was funded at a higher rate starting in late 
1982. It was instituted to serve two populations, the primary population 
being the GA and Medicaid recipients (single adults who DDS deter 
mined to be disabled). The other group that the MA-SSI advocacy pro 
gram has under contract to service are clients from the Community 
Mental Health Agencies and the Department of Mental Health (people 
who were moved out of state hospitals).
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The MA-SSI advocacy program helps clients get through the appli 
cation process. The program had a 89 percent reversal rate on denials, 
once they got to the federal level. This kind of success rate was par 
tially a result of the fact that the advocacy program only sent people to 
apply whom they felt were probably eligible and whom they were will 
ing to back up by being present as paralegals.
QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF GA
While those we talked to emphasized both outreach and the ending 
of GA as important, the kind of qualitative information we derived 
from our interviews can never resolve questions regarding the relative 
importance of these two forces. Moreover, opinions varied somewhat 
as to the relative importance of the ending of GA.
There is a variety of quantitative information available that can shed 
some light on the potential impact of the ending of GA on SSI applica 
tions. Much of this information comes from the Michigan Department 
of Social Services administrative data on GA recipients collected by 
Sandra Danziger and Sherrie Kossoudji at the University of Michigan 
as part of a project evaluating the impact of the ending of GA. This 
data base includes information on three populations of GA recipients: 
those on GA in September 1990, in March 1991, and in September 
1991.
The MDSS data on these three populations were matched to data 
from the Social Security Administration's Disability Research File 
data. To maintain confidentiality, the information on the merged file 
was restricted to basic information on applications and awards for SSI, 
together with variables indicating which of the three GA populations 
the applicant belonged to. These merged data allow us to calculate the 
number of SSI applications per month made by individuals from each 
of the three GA populations.
The merged data show that of the 112,800 individuals receiving GA 
benefits as of September 1990, 43,700 (or close to 40 percent) had 
applied for SSI by the end of 1993. GA beneficiaries accounted for 46 
percent of total applications in 1991.
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This 46 percent could exaggerate the impact of the ending of GA on 
SSI applications. Many former GA recipients who applied for SSI ben 
efits might have done so even if GA hadn't been eliminated. At the 
same time, we cannot measure the impact of the termination on people 
who were not enrolled in GA but who, after 1991, might have applied 
to GA rather than SSI. One way to gain insight on the causal impact of 
ending GA on SSI applications is to look at data on monthly applica 
tions. There are quite distinct seasonal patterns in the monthly data 
with, for example, applications falling during December. For this rea 
son, we deseasonalized the application data. 2 The deseasonalized 
monthly applications are presented in Figure 7.4. They reveal a limited 
upward trend through 1990. There is a small spike in January 1991 
after Engler took office, a much larger spike in May, when Engler 
announced the ending of GA, and an even more dramatic spike in 
October 1991, when GA actually ended. Post-1991 applications, while 
more variable than those before the transition, never fall close to their 
pre-1991 levels. While many factors contribute to these changes, GA 
termination is almost certainly responsible for the transitional spikes.
Patterns are even more distinct when we focus on applications from 
the populations on GA. Figure 7.5 shows such data for the population 
on GA in September 1990. This figure makes clear that there had 
always been a flow of individuals between GA and SSI. Not surpris 
ingly, many appear to have used GA as a transitional or backup pro 
gram, applying for SSI benefits either before or immediately after 
beginning to receive GA benefits. 3 At the same time, this graph also 
indicates that the GA population responded both to the announcement 
that GA was ending and to the actual termination of benefits with an 
immediate heightened interest in SSI. The September 1990 GA recipi 
ent population continued to apply for SSI benefits at higher levels well 
past 1991. In 1990, they accounted for roughly 10 to 20 percent of 
monthly SSI applications. Even after being responsible for large num 
bers of applications through 1992, these same people still represented 
an average 20 percent of applications in 1993. The loss of the GA 
option, deteriorating health (perhaps associated with the loss of GA), 
and community outreach all stimulated the increased interest in SSI.
We wondered whether the increase in applications for the GA popu 
lation might have come primarily from the more marginally impaired. 
One might imagine that before the ending of GA such individuals
Figure 7.4 Adult SSI Disabled Applications, Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991
SOURCE" Social Secunty Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan Department of Social Services Data
Figure 7.5 Adult SSI Disabled Applications, Sept. 1990 GA Population—Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991
SOURCE 4 Social Secunty Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan Department of Social Services Data
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would not have bothered applying for SSI since the chance of succeed 
ing was low. We checked to see if the application peaks seem to have 
represented a more marginally impaired population by examining 
award rates by month of application. In fact, award rates for those 
applying in May, September, and October of 1991 were no lower than 
were award rates in the preceding months. What we did find is that a 
somewhat disproportionate share of applications in May, September, 
and October of 1991 represented first-time applicants.
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 reproduce Figure 7.5 but distinguish between 
those with and without mental impairments. These figures highlight the 
nature of these GA recipients' health impairments, contribute to the 
verification of expert opinion about the reluctance to apply for SSI for 
those with mental impairments, and reflect the intensified outreach 
efforts to the DA&A population. Mental impairment applications for 
September 1990 GA recipients virtually soar after January 1991, par 
ticularly for men. Applications for other impairments exhibit the now 
familiar three spikes but then retreat to lower levels. In September 
1990, when the population was measured, 29 percent of women's and 
33 percent of men's SSI applications were associated with mental 
impairment. Exactly two years later, and one year after GA termina 
tion, mental impairment represented 36 percent of GA women's and 47 
percent of GA men's applications.
We have also used the data we have to obtain crude estimates of the 
effect that the ending of GA had on applications for SSI. We use a 
number of different approaches to do this. Our first approach uses the 
overall number of applications for SSI benefits to project what applica 
tions would have been like had they followed the pre-1991 trend. To do 
this we regressed the log of applications on monthly dummies and a 
linear spline with kinks at January 1989 and January 1990. We then 
used these estimates to project applications for 1991 (Table 7.1). We 
attribute the gap between the actual and projected number of applicants 
to the ending of GA. The implicit assumption behind these calculations 
is the notion that, were it not for the ending of GA, applications would 
have continued increasing at the same rate they had been during 1990. 
These estimates suggest that the ending of GA can account for about 
two-thirds of the total increase in the number of applications between 
1990 and 1991.
Figure 7.6 Adult SSI Disabled Applications for Mental Impairments, 
Sept. 1990 GA Population—Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991
- - - - Men
SOURCE: Social Security Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan Department of Social Services Data.
Figure 7.7 Adult SSI Disabled Applications for Other Impairments, 
Sept. 1990 GA Population—Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991 
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SOURCE- Social Security Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan 
Department of Social Services Data.
aMethod 1: The log of monthly applications were regressed on a linear spline in time plus monthly 
dummies for the 1988-1990 time period Predictions based on this regression were calculated for 
1991. Method 1 estimates the impact of the ending of GA as the difference between the actual 
number of 1991 applications and the number predicted from the regression. 
Method 2. Using deseasonahzed data for the three GA populations combined, applications were 
predicted for 1991 assuming that applications continued at their Oct. 1990-Dec 1990 level Dif 
ference between actual and predicted represents estimated effect of ending GA. 
cMethod 3: Excess of deseasonahzed applications of May 1991 over April 1991 and of Sept and 
Oct. 1991 over Aug 1991 represents estimated impact of GA.
An alternative approach to trying to estimate the impact of the end 
ing of GA on 1991 applications is to estimate the number of individu 
als on GA who applied for SSI but would not have done so, were it not 
for the ending of GA. Since not all of those induced by the ending of 
GA to apply for SSI during 1991 will have received GA benefits, the 
question we are now asking is slightly different than asking about the 
impact of the ending of GA altogether.
To estimate the fraction of those on GA during the year prior to its 
termination who were induced to apply for SSI benefits, we took sim 
ple approaches meant to bound the total affects. First we assumed that 
applications from those who had been on GA some time during 1991 
would have continued at the (deseasonalized) rate they were appearing 
during the last three months of 1990. Results from such calculations 
are shown in the third row of Table 7.1. Method 2 suggests that the 
ending of GA could account for roughly 50 percent of the increase in
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overall applications and somewhat more of the increase for those with 
mental impairments.
Of course, it is possible that applications from those on GA might 
have risen even were it not for the ending of GA. A more conservative 
approach is to simply use the applications that occurred during the 
May, September, and October peaks to estimate the impact of GA. Fig 
ures 7.5-7.7 would clearly seem to indicate that this approach will 
underestimate the total impact of the ending of GA on applications. As 
such it represents a conservative lower bound estimate. The fourth row 
of Table 7.1 shows the spikes account for roughly 25 percent of the 
1990-1991 growth in applications for SSI. Even these conservative 
estimates suggest an important role for the ending of GA.
Similar methods can be used to calculate the longer term effects of 
the ending of GA. Obviously, the further out our projections go, the 
less confidence we have. Using pre-1991 data and method 1 to project 
applications into 1992 and 1993 suggests that while the ending of GA 
continued to have an effect, it accounted for a smaller and smaller frac 
tion of the overall growth in applications—45 percent of the growth in 
applications between 1990 and 1992 and 31 percent of the growth 
between 1990 and 1993.
Finally, cross-state variation can also shed light on the longer-term 
impact of GA's termination on SSI applications. Other states that 
recently restricted the availability of GA benefits have also experienced 
above-average growth in SSI applications. Estimates produced by 
Lewin-VHI personnel found a statistically significant association 
between the growth in SSI applications and the downsizing of GA. 
Simulations based on the Lewin model on Michigan show the ending 
of GA accounting for roughly 30 percent of the overall growth in SSI 
applications and 50 percent of the growth in applications involving 
mental impairments between 1988 and 1992 (Stapleton and Dietrich 
1995).
The September 1990 GA population is a convenient one for analyz 
ing GA termination's impact on SSI applications because it was mea 
sured before rumors of termination began to alter the GA population 
itself. It was only four months later, however, that Governor Engler set 
in motion the termination action. Earlier GA populations could be 
more informative about the stable transition to SSI over longer periods 
of time. We were unable to match data on earlier GA populations to the
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Table 7.2 Percentage of Various General Assistance Population 
Subsequently on SSI by Date
























SOURCE" Michigan Department of Social Services Data
Disability Research File. 4 However, the MDSS administrative data 
itself does indicate when individuals were enrolled in SSI. Table 7.2 
presents data for populations on GA during September of each year 
from 1988 through 1991. The columns give the number and fraction of 
the original GA populations receiving SSI benefits one, two, three, and 
four years later. Thus, for example, 2.9 percent of those on GA in Sep 
tember 1988 were on SSI in September 1989. Again, we see transition 
rates rising over time. After two years, 5.5 percent of the September 
1988 GA population was receiving SSI benefits. In contrast, after 
somewhat less than two years, 11.0 percent of the September 1991 GA 
population was on SSI.
DISCUSSION
A variety of factors in combination seem to have been responsible 
for the rapid rise in the number of adult SSI disability applications. The 
elimination of General Assistance removed one possible alternative 
option for potential SSI applicants. Along with this, extensive and 
well-coordinated outreach efforts seem to have increased awareness 
among both social service providers and potential applicants them 
selves. Finally, resources have been increasingly targeted at helping 
potential applicants with the application process. While we continue to
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have an interest in estimating the impact of the ending of GA on SSI 
applications, this change did not occur in isolation. The ending of GA 
might have had a very different impact on SSI applications had out 
reach or advocacy efforts been different. Similarly, outreach efforts 
were certainly motivated and facilitated by the ending of GA.
Our analysis of the rapid rise in SSI applications in Michigan quite 
clearly implicates the elimination of GA as an important factor in spur 
ring this rise. Other states in which similar case studies were conducted 
did not eliminate or drastically scale back welfare benefits. However, 
one can interpret the elimination of GA benefits as a dramatic attempt 
to cut state expenditures and to shift some welfare expenses from the 
state to the federal government. Results from the case studies done in 
California, Texas, and New York suggest that many states have 
responded to their fiscal problems by a similar shifting of individuals 
off state-funded onto federally funded programs (Stapleton et al., 
Chapter 2 in this volume).
Most economists modeling the decision to apply for disability bene 
fits (or, more generally, welfare benefits) have modeled the decision as 
a function of the potential gains for program beneficiaries. While we 
have no doubt that such gains play an important role in determining the 
choices individuals make, our results suggest that a number of other 
factors are also important. For SSI applicants, what Richard 
Burkhauser has referred to as "gate keepers" and Michael Lipsky 
(1980) has referred to as "street-level bureaucrats" would seem to play 
a central role. When GA existed, many people were satisfied enrolling 
in this less lucrative but also less bureaucratically onerous program.
Notes
1. We have not included mental retardation with other mental impairments.
2. To do so we regressed the log of the number of applications on a linear time trend 
together with monthly dummies. The coefficients on the monthly dummies were 
then used to adjust the raw data. To be precise, we estimated twelve monthly dum 
mies constraining the coefficients to average to 0. Letting (3, represent the coeffi 
cient of the ith month's dummy, and letting nlt represent the number of SSI 
applications in the /th month of the 1th year, then the adjusted number of applica 
tions is nlt = nlt I exp (J3, ).
3. Those enrolled in GA in September of 1990 could have entered the program at 
any time previously.
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4. Social security numbers were not available on existing files for populations of GA 
beneficiaries before September 1990.
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8 Lessons from Case Studies






In Chapter 2 of this volume we report on our empirical analysis of 
growth in applications and awards, focusing especially on the period 
from 1988 to 1992. That analysis pooled state-level time-series data 
from all states to empirically estimate the impacts of specific factors. In 
order to further investigate the reasons for the recent growth in the dis 
ability programs, and to better understand the findings from our empir 
ical analysis, we conducted case studies of application and award 
growth for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and for Supple 
mental Security Income (SSI) in five states. The states chosen for study 
experienced substantial application growth in either one or both dis 
ability programs and were believed to have had different experiences 
with regard to the factors hypothesized to have contributed to that 
growth. The states included in the study are California, Florida, Michi 
gan, New York, and Texas.
We visited each state to interview staff from the following types of 
agencies and organizations: state Aid to Families with Dependent Chil 
dren (AFDC) programs, state or local General Assistance (GA) pro 
grams, state Medicaid programs, local Social Security Administration 
(SSA) field offices, large county hospitals, state employment depart 
ments, public mental health agencies, state offices of immigration, and 
outreach programs in schools, prisons, hospitals, and homeless shel 
ters.
In this chapter, we summarize the qualitative evidence of the impact 
of various factors on growth obtained during the site visits and through 
follow-up phone interviews. More detailed discussion of the findings is
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contained in Lewin-VHI (1995a). We also present a statistical analysis 
of the experience of each state using the econometric models estimated 
from the pooled state-level data. Although the focus of the paper is on 
adults, some of the information collected is relevant to SSI child appli 
cations and awards.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the first sec 
tion, we discuss the reasons for selecting each of the five states 
included in this study, and we describe the trends in applications and 
awards in those states over the 1988 to 1992 period. In the next section, 
we first present the findings from the interviews conducted during the 
site visits to the five states. We then present the findings from the 
econometric analysis of state-level disability application data from 
1988 to 1992. The results of this analysis are combined with the char 
acteristics of each of the five case study states to assess the impact of 
specific factors on application growth in each state. In the final section, 
we summarize the lessons learned from conducting the five state case 
studies.
FEATURES OF APPLICATION GROWTH IN THE CASE 
STUDY STATES
All five of the case study states were large in terms of the total num 
ber of disability applications filed during the 1988 to 1992 period. 
Together, these states represented 35 percent of all disability applica 
tions filed in 1988, and include the four largest states in terms of total 
applications filed. The states were selected in part because of their size, 
in part because of diverse patterns in application growth, and in part 
because of interesting features that were identified through screening 
interviews with Disability Determination Service (DOS) administra 
tors in seventeen states and from a review of the findings from a survey 
of field office managers conducted by SSA. We summarize some of 
their interesting features below. 1
Growth in Disability Benefits 251
California
California was the largest state in terms of DI and adult SSI disabil 
ity applications in 1988, representing 12 percent of total claims filed. 
California is the only state of the five in which General Assistance ben 
efits, called General Relief (GR), are mandated by the state but are 
completely funded and administered by counties. Several factors 
believed to have contributed to application and award growth nation 
ally may have been particularly important. These include the recession 
(due to its relative severity in California compared to the nation), 
immigration, fraudulent applications, and growth in applications based 
on drug abuse and alcoholism (DA&A).
Florida
Florida had the fifth largest number of DI and adult SSI disability 
applications in 1988, representing 4.7 percent of total claims filed. 
Total applications grew 69 percent between 1988 and 1992, the second 
highest growth rate among all states. Interestingly, however, Dl-only 
application growth was only moderately high (ranked 14th), despite 
the fact that the increase in Florida's unemployment rate over the 
period was significantly higher than the nation's during the same time 
period. Factors believed to have contributed to application and award 
growth include the recession, immigration, and efforts by health care 
providers to assist clients with applications.
Michigan
Michigan had the eighth largest number of DI and adult SSI disabil 
ity applications in 1988, representing 4 percent of total claims filed. 
Between 1988 and 1992, Michigan experienced the second highest rate 
of SSI-only application growth in the nation. While SSI-only applica 
tions rose by 45 percent nationally, in Michigan they rose by 83 per 
cent. Awards rose even more rapidly than applications. Applications 
based on mental impairment rose substantially faster than applications 
based on other conditions and accounted for over 40 percent of the 
growth in total SSI applications. Increases in Dl-only and Dl-concur- 
rent applications were closer to the national median (ranked 22nd and 
16th, respectively) despite the fact that the growth in Michigan's unem-
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ployment rate was higher than the nation's during the same period. An 
important factor believed to have contributed to the high rate of SSI 
growth was the termination of the state's General Assistance program 
in 1991.
New York
New York had the second largest number of DI and adult SSI dis 
ability applications in 1988, representing 8.6 percent of total claims 
filed. While Dl-only application growth from 1988 to 1992 was very 
high (44 percent for New York vs. 27 percent for the entire country), 
Dl-concurrent and SSi-only application growth was relatively low (34 
and 25 percent for New York vs. 52 and 45 percent for the entire coun 
try). New York has a reputation for its past efforts to help low-income 
residents attain federal benefits, and we hypothesized that the success 
of past efforts was partly responsible for the comparatively slow 
growth in SSI applications. New York was also selected because we 
wanted to learn more about a New York City Board of Education 
project to help children in special education programs obtain SSI bene 
fits in the wake of Sullivan v. Zebley and the new child listings for men 
tal impairments.
Texas
Texas had the third largest number of DI and adult SSI disability 
applications in 1988, representing nearly 7 percent of total claims filed. 
Over the 1988 to 1992 period, growth in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent 
applications was lower than average (ranking 36th for Dl-only growth 
and 42nd for Dl-concurrent growth). During this period, however, 
Texas experienced higher than average growth in SSI-only applications 
(ranked 15th). This combination of higher than average SSI-only 
growth and lower than average Dl-only and Dl-concurrent growth 
made Texas a potentially interesting case study. Texas experienced 
very small changes in the overall unemployment rate during the reces 
sion. The relatively low growth in unemployment for the state, how 
ever, masks a great variation in changes in the unemployment rate 
across regions within the state.
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EXPLANATIONS FOR DISABILITY APPLICATION 
GROWTH IN THE CASE STUDY STATES
In this section, we first synthesize information obtained during inter 
views with representatives from a variety of state and local organiza 
tions in each of the five case study states. After discussing the 
qualitative information collected in these interviews, we present the 
results from a quantitative analysis of application growth in each state.
Findings from the Site Visit Interviews
We organize the discussion of the qualitative information obtained 
through interviews by the primary nondemographic factors believed to 
have contributed to disability application growth from 1988 to 1992. 
These include the 1990-91 recession, state program changes and out 
reach efforts, changes in SSA eligibility requirements, and other minor 
factors, including immigration and changes in the prevalence of spe 
cific health conditions.
The Recession
The recession of 1990-1991 was characterized by a recovery that 
was much slower than other post-war recoveries. This was particularly 
evident in the labor market (Council of Economic Advisors 1993). This 
recession affected states differently, due to variations in the length, 
severity (Table 8.1), and nature of the recession across states.
In California, the impact of the recession was apparently a signifi 
cant force behind recent DI application growth, and perhaps SSI appli 
cation growth as well. The recession in the state was more severe, on 
average, than in the rest of the nation (California experienced a 3.8 per 
centage point increase in unemployment, compared to a 1.9 percentage 
point increase nationally). Southern California was hardest hit, where 
job loss was concentrated in the defense and construction industries. 
Interviewees in California indicated that job loss was concentrated 
among older, more experienced workers, and among workers in low- 
skill jobs. The job loss experienced by older workers was often perma 
nent in nature, which may have contributed to DI application growth. 
Interviewees also reported that efforts by employers to assist laid-off 
employees in obtaining DI benefits increased during this period. The
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recession may have contributed significantly to SSI application growth 
from immigrants, as immigrants experienced particularly high rates of 
unemployment, but were often not disability-insured.
Florida's recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s also apparently 
had a significant impact on application and award growth, particularly 
in the Dl-concurrent application category. The recession in Florida was 
more severe, on average, than in the rest of the nation (Florida's unem 
ployment rate rose by 3.2 percentage points). Furthermore, while the 
nation's employment losses were largely concentrated in manufactur 
ing, Florida's losses were concentrated in construction. A significant 
loss of low-wage jobs may partially explain the high rate of Dl-concur- 
rent application growth, and only moderate Dl-only application growth 
in Florida since 1988.
The recession may have also been an important factor behind DI 
application growth during the 1988 to 1992 period in Michigan even 
though the increase in the unemployment rate for the period (1.2 per 
centage points) was less than the national average. The recession's 
early start in Michigan during the mid 1980s, and the auto industry's 
failure to recover, may account for some of the increase in Dl-concur- 
rent applications, as the income and resources of these DI recipients 
were reduced to SSI eligibility standards. One impact of the recession 
was that it led to strained state and local budgets and increased demand 
for public assistance. Reductions in state welfare programs due to the 
budgetary crisis had a clear impact on SSI application and award 
growth (discussed below).
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The severe recession in New York was characterized by large layoffs 
in major firms, many of which were expected to be permanent as man 
ufacturing companies accelerated the downsizing and restructuring of 
their operations. There was strong consensus among interviewees that 
the severity and nature of job losses during the recession contributed 
substantially to growth in DI applications, especially among workers 
with long-established jobs who were permanently laid off. Because 
many such workers would qualify only for DI, this may explain the 
rapid growth in Dl-only applications. The state's Office of Disability 
Determination and SSA field offices worked with employers and pri 
vate disability insurers to facilitate the application process for employ 
ees.
The recession that affected the nation in 1990 and 1991 had rela 
tively little impact on unemployment in Texas, but this is because 
Texas was experiencing a recovery from a severe recession that 
affected the state in 1985 and 1986. This may explain why Texas expe 
rienced lower than average growth in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent appli 
cations during the 1988 to 1992 period, both because overall 
unemployment did not increase by much and because individuals who 
might have been affected in the later period may have already applied 
for benefits during the earlier recession. As in California, we found 
anecdotal evidence that high unemployment among immigrant popula 
tions contributed to growth in SSI applications from immigrants.
State and Local Shifting and Outreach Efforts
In each of the five states, we found evidence of changes in policies 
or procedures that may have had the intended or unintended effect of 
shifting individuals from state and/or locally funded assistance pro 
grams to the federally funded SSI program. The nature, intensity, and 
apparent success of such policies is related to the financial incentives 
involved. Below, we discuss some of these policies and incentives and 
their potential impact on primarily SSI growth in the five case study 
states. We first discuss policy changes related to Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and GA programs. We then discuss pol 
icy changes associated with state Medicaid programs.
AFDC and General Assistance. In general, we found that efforts to 
shift welfare recipients onto SSI were focused on GA recipients; we 
found only very limited efforts targeted at recipients of AFDC. There
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are several reasons for this, financial incentives for state and local gov 
ernments being foremost among them.
State and local savings from shifting AFDC recipients onto SSI are 
fairly modest. The federal government already pays at least 50 percent 
of AFDC benefits in every state, so the savings to the state and/or local 
ity are at most 50 percent of the reduction in benefits. Some states also 
pay SSI supplements, so these must be deducted from any AFDC sav 
ings that would be realized. In contrast, the savings from shifting a GA 
recipient onto SSI can be very large, for two reasons. First, states and/ 
or localities pay for GA benefits in their entirety. Second, and often 
more important, states and localities usually pay for most of the health 
care provided to GA recipients, with no direct support from the federal 
government. Shifting a GA recipient to SSI in almost all cases means 
that the federal government will thereafter pay for at least half of the 
individual's health care through Medicaid. AFDC recipients are 
already Medicaid-eligible, so no such savings accrue when an AFDC 
recipient is shifted to SSI.
There are two other reasons that shifting efforts focus on GA recipi 
ents. First, a greater proportion of GA recipients may be likely to qual 
ify for SSI than of AFDC recipients. According to data from the 1984 
Survey of Income and Program Participation, 24 percent of persons 
receiving cash welfare assistance other than AFDC or SSI had a sub 
stantial disability compared to 17 percent of persons receiving AFDC 
(Mathematica Policy Research 1990). Second, in many ways, local 
governments are in a better position than state governments to imple 
ment shifting efforts effectively, and their share of the combined state 
and local financial responsibility for GA benefits is usually much 
higher than their corresponding share for AFDC. Local government 
familiarity with and proximity to local agencies and organizations— 
the local welfare department, hospitals and other health care providers, 
local advocacy organizations—gives them a distinct advantage over 
states in implementing shifting efforts. In some states, including Cali 
fornia, Texas, and Florida, local governments are responsible for 100 
percent of GA cash benefits, while the state is responsible for all 
AFDC payments not paid by the federal government.
Termination of Michigan's General Assistance program was the 
most dramatic change affecting SSI application and award growth in 
Michigan. GA served a substantial number of persons before its termi-
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nation. As of September 1991, the last month of GA existence, 118,632 
individuals were on the GA rolls, but only a fraction were enrolled in 
two successor programs: 11.5 percent in State Family Assistance 
(SFA) and 1.3 percent in State Disability Assistance (SDA). Those 
qualifying for SDA are required to file for SSI, a practice which was 
not enforced while the GA program was in operation. SDA caseloads 
are approximately 10,000 per month. About three to four thousand of 
these individuals transfer to SSI each year, representing about 13 per 
cent of SSI awards in Michigan in 1992.
Since 1988, aggressive outreach efforts in Michigan, coordinated 
between SSA, state and local agencies, and advocacy groups, have 
been an important factor behind increases in applications and awards. 
The outreach efforts have been effective in targeting specific popula 
tion groups and in identifying potentially eligible individuals. Special 
attention has been paid to children, low birth weight babies, and former 
GA recipients. The state of Michigan conducted its own outreach 
efforts through meetings with schools, probate court, nearly all social 
service agencies, and others who could make referrals. At the state 
level, a series of computerized cross-matches were conducted to see if 
former GA recipients had applied for, or already were on, other social 
service programs. At least two mass mailings of information followed 
these cross-matches resulting in an inflow of disability applications to 
SSA field offices. Of the various organizations engaged in outreach 
activities, health care providers have been particularly aggressive in 
referring individuals to the DSS offices.
In New York, the costs of health and welfare expenditures that are 
not paid for by the federal government are shared equally by the state 
and its counties. This cost-sharing arrangement creates a strong incen 
tive for the two levels of government to cooperate in shifting welfare 
beneficiaries onto SSI. The cost-sharing mechanism has been in place, 
however, since the 1960s, and many of the state shifting mechanisms 
were also in place before 1988. This may partly explain New York's 
lower than average SSI application growth since 1988. Shifting efforts 
aimed at AFDC and, especially, Home Relief (HR) recipients (HR is 
New York's GA program), have been in place for some time. An exam 
ple is the Disabled Client Advocacy Program (DCAP) implemented in 
1986, which identifies and assists disabled AFDC and HR recipients in
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the application process for SSL Such efforts were intensified more 
recently.
The incentive to shift HR recipients in New York is particularly 
strong because their health care is paid for by a "state-only" (state and 
county financed) Medicaid program. Shifting HR recipients to SSI 
results in especially large gains to state and county governments 
because the federal government assumes responsibility for half of an 
HR recipient's health care costs under Medicaid when the recipient 
obtains an SSI award. Medical cost savings in the typical case are sub 
stantially greater than cash benefit savings.
In addition to the outreach and SSI application assistance provided 
to AFDC and HR recipients, New York state and local agencies have 
implemented collaborative outreach efforts that target institutionalized 
adults prior to discharge, as part of an effort to keep discharged indi 
viduals from becoming HR recipients. Both the Department of Mental 
Health and the Department of Parole initiated statewide outreach activ 
ities to their target populations, individuals with severe mental illness 
and prisoners about to be released, in 1986. Individuals in these target 
populations are more likely to apply for SSI than DI. The impact of 
these efforts on application growth may have been strongest prior to 
1988, contributing to the relatively low SSI application and award 
growth after 1988. We also learned of local outreach efforts to specific 
hospitals that began in the early 1990s. Another important group that 
was identified by interviewees as a target of SSI outreach initiatives is 
homeless persons. Such initiatives were implemented by specific SSA 
field offices that target homeless shelters in their service areas; the SSA 
field office we visited implemented such an initiative in 1985. These 
initiatives were very aggressive in finding potential SSI applicants and 
assisting them in the application process.
One particularly notable outreach effort in New York City, albeit for 
children with disabilities, illustrates how the impact of outreach efforts 
on applications and awards may diminish over time. An intensive effort 
was initiated in 1992 to identify children potentially eligible for SSI, 
with an apparently substantial impact on child applications and awards. 
This is a joint effort by the New York City Board of Education, the 
state's Office of Disability Determination, and SSA. Since its inception 
in August 1992, the program has accounted for approximately 200 
awards per month. During the first few months of operation, approxi-
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mately 90 percent of cases were approved. At that time, the project 
referred only the most severely disabled children in the school system 
(those with IQs less than 59 or in need of physical assistance). The 
project's target population has expanded, however, and now that chil 
dren with a wide variety of impairments (including less severe mental 
retardation, emotional impairments, conduct disorder, and some physi 
cal impairments) are regularly referred through the project, the allow 
ance rate has decreased significantly. This example illustrates what has 
probably occurred with many of the shifting efforts initiated during the 
1988 to 1992 period. New efforts can result in large immediate 
increases in disability applications and awards as those most likely to 
qualify are targeted first. Subsequently, however, the flow of referrals 
and the allowance rate are likely to diminish.
In California, efforts to shift individuals onto SSI focused on Gen 
eral Relief (GR; California's general assistance program) applicants 
and beneficiaries. As in New York, Los Angeles County has an "SSI 
Advocacy Program" in place that provides SSI application assistance 
to GR beneficiaries, and, in some cases, assistance at the SSI hearings 
level. Los Angeles County's effort to shift GR recipients onto SSI is 
probably among the most aggressive in the state, due to the relative 
severity of the recession in the county as well as the relative size of 
their GR population (which accounts for 52 percent of all GR recipi 
ents in the state). The county's efforts began in 1982 and were signifi 
cantly increased in 1985, 1988, and 1992.
In Texas, we interviewed staff from the General Assistance program 
in Harris County (Houston area). No important policy changes in the 
Harris County GA program were identified. Texas does not, however, 
have a statewide GA program, and our findings for Harris County may 
not be generalizible to GA programs operated in other counties. In the 
state AFDC program, the implementation of an integrated eligibility 
screening process for AFDC clients may have had an impact on SSI 
applications. This process involves screening and assistance with 
application for other welfare programs for which the client may be eli 
gible. In 1989, SSI was added to the screen. Although explicit shifting 
was not the intended goal, the increased coordination among welfare 
agencies may have contributed to growth in SSI applications.
As in Texas, Florida does not have a statewide GA program. Find 
ings from our interviews with staff of the GA program in Dade County
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indicate that this program actively referred recipients to SSI prior to 
1988, and that changes in GA policies during the 1988 to 1992 period 
had little or no effect on SSI applications. As in Texas, Florida has a 
welfare eligibility screening system, which was implemented in 1992. 
The Florida system involved the training of AFDC caseworkers in SSI 
eligibility requirements. Though implemented late in the period of this 
study, the greater awareness of SSI eligibility combined with stream 
lining of the application process for welfare benefits may have contrib 
uted to SSI application growth in Florida.
SSA field office interviewees in Florida also indicated that SSI out 
reach activities in their state are among the most aggressive, sophisti 
cated, and targeted outreach efforts in the nation and have probably had 
a significant impact on application and award growth in Florida since 
1988. While the outreach activities of SSA field offices in the state 
have probably not increased significantly in intensity or aggressiveness 
since 1988, their continued efforts to identify and establish relation 
ships with potential sources of referrals may have led to outreach 
efforts that generate higher numbers of referrals, as well as higher 
allowance rates.
Medicaid Programs. Rising health care costs, continued deinstitu- 
tionalization of persons with mental disorders, and changes in the ben 
efits of state Medicaid programs may have affected applications to SSI. 
Some states, responding to budgetary pressures, have expanded Medic- 
aid coverage to services that were previously fully financed by state or 
local governments. Recent studies of state responses to the growth in 
Medicaid spending in nine states over the 1988 to 1992 period noted 
that six of these states (including Michigan, New York, and Texas) 
expanded coverage of mental health and mental retardation services 
under Medicaid in order to shift more of the cost of this care to the fed 
eral government (Coughlin et al. 1994). 2 Such changes in Medicaid 
coverage might induce providers and advocacy organizations to assist 
potentially eligible individuals to apply for SSI in order to obtain Med 
icaid coverage.
These incentives may have been further enhanced by changes in 
SSA policies that occurred in 1991. The changes increased the weight 
placed on "source evidence" (evidence from a claimant's own health 
care provider) in disability award decisions, giving a claimant's pro 
vider greater influence over the outcome of a claim. This may have
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intensified provider efforts to help patients obtain benefits, but we have 
not found any evidence on this point.
In Texas, the passage of legislation in 1985 requiring counties to 
take fiscal responsibility for their medically indigent population 
increased incentives for county-financed public hospitals to identify 
these individuals and help them to obtain Medicaid coverage. The Har 
ris County Hospital District, one of the largest county public hospital 
systems in Texas, recently implemented a computerized screening pro 
gram that identifies clients who are potentially eligible for Medicaid 
through any of a variety of programs, including SSL In addition, Texas 
expanded its Medicaid coverage of outpatient mental health services in 
1990-1991. This expansion increased incentives for community men 
tal health care providers to ensure that their patients apply for Medic- 
aid-associated programs for which they are potentially eligible. This is 
likely to have contributed to the above average growth in SSI applica 
tions based on mental impairment that Texas experienced during this 
period.
Several outreach efforts initiated in Texas during the 1988 to 1992 
time period apparently stemmed from the desire to enroll clients in SSI 
so they would then have the health insurance coverage of Medicaid. 
For example, in addition to its screening activities, the Harris County 
Hospital District operates an SSA-sponsored outreach program to hos 
pitals, clinics, and homeless shelters in the Houston area. Individuals 
potentially eligible for DI or SSI are assisted with the filing of an appli 
cation. A similar program was implemented in 1994 by the Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County. Outreach 
was also conducted by representatives from the SSA field office in 
Houston to patients of an area AIDS clinic.
In Florida, several interviewees indicated that efforts by health care 
providers have been particularly important in explaining DI and SSI 
application growth, and that these efforts were driven, in large part, by 
the potential to increase Medicaid enrollment and decrease the costs of 
charity care to providers. Since 1988, many large county hospitals have 
been working with SSA field office staff to identify individuals poten 
tially eligible for SSI. In addition, some hospitals have begun to hire 
contractors to recoup the funds lost in providing care for the uninsured. 
In exchange for assisting uninsured patients in applying for all benefits 
to which they may be entitled, hospitals pay these contractors a per-
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centage of the recouped funds. Finally, in 1992, providers of commu 
nity-based services for persons with developmental disabilities were 
permitted to bill Medicaid directly for their services. Prior to 1992, ser 
vice providers contracted with and were reimbursed by the Department 
of Developmental Services, who in turn billed Medicaid. This change 
in Medicaid reimbursement policy creates a strong incentive for pro 
viders to ensure that their clients are covered by Medicaid, and may 
explain some of Florida's exceptionally large Dl-concurrent and SSI 
application growth in the mental retardation impairment category.
Changes in Program Eligibility Requirements
Several revisions to the criteria SSA uses to evaluate disability 
implemented in the mid 1980s and early 1990s may have had a signifi 
cant impact on application growth. One of the most important changes 
was the revision of the criteria for determining disability based on 
mental impairment. These changes, implemented in 1985, increased 
the weight given to the functional ability of an applicant in determining 
eligibility relative to diagnostic criteria (see Chapter 2).
Other than state DDS administrators, interviewees had limited to no 
knowledge of changes in eligibility requirements except the changes 
for children brought about by Sullivan v. Zebley. We did not, however, 
interview individuals who might be the most knowledgeable about the 
changes in the disability eligibility criteria, such as advocates or dis 
ability attorneys.
In California and Florida, most interviewees indicated that changes 
in eligibility requirements did not have a significant impact on applica 
tion and award growth for adults. In Michigan, however, interviewees 
indicated that an increase in applications based on mental impairment 
followed the 1985 changes in the mental impairment listings. The 
impact of these changes may have been delayed as awareness of the 
changes, and the perception that these changes eased the strictness of 
eligibility criteria, spread among professionals and potential appli 
cants. Growth in claims based on mental impairment is closely associ 
ated with growth in drug addiction and alcoholism (DA&A) claims. It 
is believed that this was partly due to the increased training and clarifi 
cation of the rules on how to evaluate DA&A claims. Individuals inter 
viewed in New York also believed that heightened awareness of DA&A
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eligibility criteria may have contributed to application growth in that 
impairment category in New York.
In Texas, interviewees at the SSA field office in Houston believed 
that the changes in the mental impairment listings had caused denial 
rates to decline considerably and thus affected awards. They also indi 
cated that there has been a shift in the adjudicative climate, in that field 
office staff now provide more information to applicants regarding how 
to become eligible for the programs, rather than just taking information 
from the claimant, as was the case in the past.
Other Factors
Immigration. With the exception of Michigan, all of the case study 
states have relatively large immigrant populations. New immigrants are 
not eligible to apply for DI until, like others, they have satisfied the 
work requirements for disability-insured status. During the period 
under study, legal immigrants, however, could apply for SSI after three 
years of legal residency in the United States; the waiting period has 
since been increased to five years. In 1987, the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA) allowed certain classes of undocumented 
immigrants to become legal immigrants. Immigrants legalized under 
IRCA were not required to wait three years to apply for SSI. Prior to 
conducting the case studies, we had thought that IRCA immigrants 
may have contributed to SSI growth in the states with large immigrant 
populations, as IRCA created a larger pool of immigrants eligible to 
apply for SSI. Only a few individuals interviewed, however, com 
mented on the extent to which applications from immigrants may have 
contributed to growth. Empirical evidence, described later, also indi 
cates that IRCA legalizations had little impact on application growth 
(see also Chapter 2).
Interviewees in California indicated that applications from immi 
grants may have experienced above average growth since 1988 for sev 
eral reasons. First, anecdotal evidence provided by SSA field offices 
indicates that, in general, immigrant groups tend to be relatively well 
organized and aggressive in their pursuit of SSI benefits. Second, Cali 
fornia has recently experienced a surge in fraudulent applications, 
which has predominantly involved immigrant groups (see GAO 1995). 
Finally, the recession led to high unemployment in the immigrant pop 
ulation.
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In Florida, interviewees indicated that immigration probably did not 
have a large impact on application and award growth since 1988. Any 
impact that did occur was probably concentrated in certain areas of the 
state and among certain types of immigrants (i.e., entrants and refugees 
as opposed to legal immigrants).
In Texas, individuals from the Houston field office and state DDS 
office believed that applications from immigrants had increased in 
recent years. This may have been, in part, due to high unemployment 
among the immigrant population in Texas during the 1988-1992 
period. In addition, interviewees at the field office in Houston com 
mented on an increase in suspected fraudulent applications filed by 
Vietnamese immigrants.
Specific Impairments. A few interviewees in some states commented 
on the extent to which applications based on particular impairments 
had increased.
In New York, the very high concentration of HIV/AIDS cases in the 
service area of the Manhattan SSA field office accounted for rapid 
application growth in this area. This growth, and the high allowance 
rates for these applications, resulted in overall allowance rates that 
were temporarily very high—as high as 80 percent in 1992 for SSL 
The disparity between awards at this field office and other field offices 
caused the DDS to review all HIV/AIDS case determinations, resulting 
in a significant reduction in this field office's allowance rate in 1994.
Individuals at the Houston field office also indicated that applica 
tions from individuals with HIV/AIDS, especially women, were 
increasingly prevalent. They attributed this growth to recent outreach 
efforts to patients of an area AIDS clinic.
Interviewees in California indicated that the recent national surge in 
DA&A applications was concentrated in California. We found several 
factors in addition to high prevalence rates that may have contributed 
to DA&A application growth in the state, including cuts in state fund 
ing to counties for mental health and substance abuse services, the 
impact of "word of mouth" in prisons, and the effectiveness of out 
reach efforts targeted to the homeless.
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Findings from an Econometric Analysis of State Data
As part of a related study, a regression model of application growth 
from 1988 to 1992 was estimated using state-level data on disability 
applications disaggregated by age, impairment, program (Dl-only, DI- 
concurrent, and SSI) and gender (see Chapter 2). The specific factors 
analyzed in the model of application growth include the (log) unem 
ployment rate, GA program cuts (per capita reductions in the number 
of GA recipients), HIV/AIDS incidence (new cases per capita), per 
capita new legalizations under the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act, and the (log) percent of children living in single-parent families. 
The last variable, children in single-parent families, is used as a proxy 
for changes in family structure, including declines in marriage rates. 
Reductions in financial support from spouses is thought to have con 
tributed to disability application growth. Marriage rate data by state is 
not available, so the number of children in one-parent families is used 
as a proxy. 3
The amount of application growth accounted for by each factor for 
each state is reported in Table 8.2. The first factor, population growth 
and aging, was relatively more important in Florida, California, and 
Texas than in Michigan or New York. Population growth and aging 
accounted for as much as 2 percentage points of annual growth in the 
first three states.
Unemployment accounted for a substantial amount of Dl-only and 
Dl-concurrent application growth in California, Florida, and New 
York, especially for males. In these states, unemployment accounted 
for between 50 and 70 percent of annual Dl-only and Dl-concurrent 
application growth for males.
Michigan was the only state of the five studied that experienced 
reductions in its General Assistance program caseload. The results 
from the econometric analysis indicate that this had a substantial 
impact on growth in Michigan's SSI applications. Annual SSI applica 
tion growth accounted for by GA cuts in Michigan is estimated to be 
6.4 percentage points for males and 4.3 percentage points for females. 
This represents 40 percent and 27 percent of annual SSI application 
growth for males and females, respectively. There was also a substan 
tial impact on DI applications from men in the Dl-concurrent category. 
A separate analysis of application growth by impairment (not shown)
Table 8.2 Annual Growth in Applications Accounted for by Factors in the Regression Analysis, by Program and 



































































































































































































































































aGrowth due to specific factors expressed as percentage points. The results are based on application regressions estimated by age/impairment/gender/pro 
gram subgroups. Not all variables were included in each model.
bLarge growth accounted for by IRCA legalizations in California is the product of a very large growth in the variable and statistically insignificant coeffi 
cients. 
cTotal growth accounted for includes a small interaction among the factors above.
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indicates that the elimination of Michigan's GA program accounted for 
49 percent of all Michigan SSI application growth in the mental 
impairment category (Lewin-VHI 1995a).
New cases of HIV/AIDS accounted for the most application growth 
in Florida and Michigan for male Dl-concurrent applications (the vari 
able was not included in the regressions for females). Annual growth 
accounted for by HIV/AIDS was generally higher for Dl-concurrent 
applications than for Dl-only or SSI applications in all five states.
Growth in the number of IRCA legalizations accounted for the most 
SSI application growth in California, about 1 percentage point for both 
males and females. The coefficient for the IRCA variable, however, is 
statistically insignificant in the application regression. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, estimates of S.SI applications from IRCA immigrants calcu 
lated by SSA also indicate that this group had a very small impact on 
SSI application growth.
The final variable, children in single-parent families, accounted for a 
small amount of the Dl-concurrent and SSI application growth in all 
states except New York. This variable accounted for somewhat more 
growth in Michigan and California than in the other case study states.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The five case studies provide some important lessons concerning 
both the factors that contributed to the tremendous growth experienced 
from 1988 to 1992 and the determinants of application and award 
growth in general. These lessons confirm or enrich many of the find 
ings from our related research on caseload growth (see Chapter 2).
Lesson 1: The acceleration of growth in applications and awards dur 
ing the period from 1988 to 1992, above longer-term trends, 
was primarily due to three factors:
• the recession
• states and localities shifting the burden of welfare 
spending onto the federal government
• expansion in the "supply" of benefits
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The relative importance of each factor varies by program 
and is different for applications and awards.
There was a broad consensus among interviewees that the recession 
played an important role in high DI application and award growth in 
California, Florida, Michigan, and New York, and that the relatively 
mild downturn in Texas explains relatively low growth in that state. 
This consensus is strongly supported by the econometric evidence.
State and local policy and program changes had the effect of shifting 
many recipients of state and local welfare benefits onto SSI and, to a 
lesser extent, DI during this period. The apparent impact of the termi 
nation of Michigan's GA program and accompanying outreach efforts 
provides the strongest example, but aggressive efforts were found in 
other states as well. While in some states these efforts predated the 
period under consideration, many were initiated during the period and 
others were intensified. This factor can be viewed as an extension of 
the first because new and intensified shifting efforts were, to a signifi 
cant degree, responses to recession-induced budgetary shortfalls.
Supply changes refer to regulatory and policy changes, SSA out 
reach activities, court decisions, and the adjudicative climate. The evi 
dence on this factor comes primarily from the regression analysis and 
the interviews with experts, conducted for related studies. The regres 
sion analysis shows that much growth remains unaccounted for after 
taking into account the recession, GA cuts, and some other factors. 
While some of the residual growth is likely due to limitations on our 
ability to fully capture the impact of the recession, shifting, and other 
factors in the regression analysis, patterns of residual growth across 
impairment groups and across applications and awards are consistent 
with the hypothesis that a substantial fraction of the residual growth is 
due to supply changes. Anecdotal findings from the case studies are 
consistent with this conclusion.
The recession was a more important factor for DI growth than for 
SSI growth, while shifting of welfare beneficiaries and supply changes 
were more important for SSI. Supply changes were clearly much more 
important for awards than for applications. It is difficult to explain why 
allowance rates increased over this period in any other way; evidence 
from the regression analyses indicate that the other important factors 
had a negative impact on the allowance rate, if any.
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We have also found evidence that AIDS/HIV and changes in family 
structure contributed to the acceleration of application and award 
growth during this period, but their effects appear to have been small 
by comparison to the effects of the three factors cited above. Long- 
term growth in applications and awards is due to factors that we did not 
examine in the case studies—principally growth and aging of the popu 
lation and, for DI, growth in the share of women who are disability- 
insured (see Chapter 2).
Lesson 2: Regression estimates of the impact of the recession and of 
cuts in GA programs may significantly understate the full 
impact of the recession and efforts to shift the burden of 
welfare spending onto the federal government.
As we found in the case studies, the nature of job losses during the 
recession varied from state to state, and this variation apparently had 
an impact on applications: job losses among older, more experienced 
workers in California were believed to have had an impact on Dl-only 
applications; job losses in construction were thought to have affected 
Dl-concurrent growth in Florida and California; and low-wage job 
losses and high unemployment among immigrants were thought to 
have contributed to SSI growth in California, Florida, and Texas. The 
unemployment rate variable used in the regression fails to capture 
these subtleties of the business cycle that are important for application 
and awards. If the regression models were able to capture these more 
subtle changes in labor market conditions, they would almost certainly 
account for even more of the application and award growth during this 
period.
An analogous conclusion applies to the GA variable. The variable 
used in the regression analysis is an imperfect measure of state and 
local efforts to shift the burden of welfare spending onto the federal 
government. In the case studies, we found substantial new or intensi 
fied shifting efforts in California, Florida, New York, and Texas, many 
unrelated to GA programs in those states, or occurring in GA programs 
that were not cut during the 1988 to 1992 period.
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Lesson 3: Significant departures from long-term trends in application 
and award growth are generally self-limiting.
When we began this work, applications and awards were still grow 
ing very rapidly, and there were fears that they would continue to grow 
unless something changed. The major factors that we have identified as 
contributing to the acceleration of growth over this period—the reces 
sion, state and local shifting of welfare recipients onto SSI, and the 
expansion of the supply of benefit—were, however, one-time changes 
that temporarily increased application and award growth. Continued 
increases in unemployment, increases in efforts to shift the burden of 
welfare spending onto the federal government, and expansion of the 
supply of benefits would be necessary to sustain the rapid growth of 
this period. Instead, increases in unemployment are rarely sustained for 
long periods and are usually followed by declines during economic 
recoveries, opportunities to shift the burden of welfare spending onto 
the federal government diminish as the remaining pool of disabled wel 
fare recipients shrinks, and the effects of supply expansions also 
diminish as the number of nonrecipients in newly eligible groups gets 
smaller. While the impact of changes in specific factors on application 
and award growth may be self-limiting, the consequences of such 
growth for caseload and program expenditure growth may be experi 
enced for some time into the future (see Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4).
Lesson 4: The burden of health care spending on state and local gov 
ernments is a significant factor behind efforts to shift GA 
recipients and other indigent users of health care services 
onto SSI.
The burden of health care costs for indigent users of health care falls 
largely on state and local governments. Once such an individual 
receives an SSI award, the federal government pays for 50 to 80 per 
cent of his or her health care, via Medicaid. Savings to state and local 
governments from this change are often significantly greater than the 
reductions in cash payments. Reductions in direct state and local fund 
ing for indigent health care and for mental health services and simulta 
neous expansion of Medicaid mental health benefits may have 
substantially increased the intensity of provider outreach efforts in 
some states during this period, and outreach efforts undertaken by pub-
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lie hospitals and other health care providers appear to be among the 
most effective.
Lesson 5: Recent welfare and health reforms are likely to have a sub 
stantial impact on SSI applications and awards.
When we began examining growth in SSA's disability programs, we 
frequently encountered skepticism with the suggestion that reductions 
in general assistance and AFDC benefits would have an impact on SSI 
applications and, especially, awards. Since SSI benefits are more gen 
erous than GA or AFDC benefits, why wouldn't anyone likely to be 
eligible for SSI apply? The answer to this question was provided by 
many we interviewed. In brief, the intellectual and emotional invest 
ments required to successfully apply for SSI are a sufficient obstacle 
that many who are eligible will not apply when other sources of sup 
port, although lower, are more readily available. Thus, cuts in other 
support, or provision of intellectual and emotional support for applica 
tion, can induce the filing of SSI claims. This explanation is most 
apparent for individuals with severe mental disorders.
Many proposals to impose significant new limitations on AFDC 
benefits are currently under consideration by most states, and some 
states have already implemented major reforms. While disabilities are 
less prevalent among AFDC recipients than among GA recipients, a 
significant number of AFDC recipients—adults and children—have 
disabilities. Unless these recipients are exempt from work require 
ments, time limits, and other criteria, they can be expected to apply for 
SSI benefits. Furthermore, as a result of federal financing for AFDC 
being converted to block grants to the states, the financial incentives 
for states to shift AFDC recipients onto SSI have substantially 
increased, and, again, we should expect increased shifting to occur.
Notes
1. Throughout this chapter, we describe growth in adult applications and awards in 
three program groups: Dl-only, Dl-concurrent (low-income DI applicants who 
also file for SSI within six months of their DI filing), and SSI (blind and disabled 
categories only). In some instances, we examine growth in SSI applications from 
individuals who are not eligible for any type of social security benefit (S Si-only), 
but in general, SSI applications because of technical reasons that are related to 
differences in the time and place of filing for the two programs, and because SSI-
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only applications exclude SSI applicants who are eligible for social security bene 
fits other than DI disabled worker benefits.
2. Little or no shifting of mental health services was indicated for California and 
Florida in this study. While California did not expand Medicaid mental health ser 
vices, the state did reduce funding to counties for mental health and substance 
abuse treatment services.
3. Elasticities obtained from an econometric analysis where data are disaggregated 
by program and gender only are reported in the appendix to Chapter 2. Estimates 
from a more disaggregated analysis (report in Lewin-VHI 1995b) and data for 
each of the five case study states were used to obtain the results reported here.
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Comments on Chapters 6 and 7
Martha R. Burt 
Urban Institute
For someone like myself, who comes to this conference from the 
perspective of research on homelessness and on the severely and per 
sistently mentally ill, these papers by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6) 
and by Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7) contain some 
very interesting and provocative findings. I will focus most of my com 
ments on the latter chapter, since that was my primary assignment, and 
refer to the former as it augments the findings of Bound, Kossoudji, 
and Ricart-Moes.
A SUCCESSFUL POLICY
Both papers describe something we very rarely see documented in 
evaluation research—the successful administration of public policy. I 
strongly agree with the comments of several field managers (Chapter 6), 
who said, "What else did you expect?" as the consequence of greatly 
expanded and targeted outreach efforts to bring eligible nonparticipants 
onto the rolls. To that comment I might add, "What else did you expect?" 
as the consequence of Governor Engler's decision to end Michigan's 
General Assistance (GA) program for all but a very few individuals. 
Both appear to have been quite successful at achieving their goals. The 
latter action also appears to have had some results that its supporters 
denied would occur despite strong evidence to the contrary: the docu 
mented rise in the homeless sheltered population as reflected in Chapter 
7, and the rise in SSI applications and awards indicating significant lev 
els of long-term disabilities among the former GA population. It is par 
ticularly telling that the largest jump in SSI applications and awards 
related to the end of GA occurred among those with mental impair 
ments. I think it likely that the same is true for the jump in the number
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of sheltered homeless (and probably also the unsheltered homeless pop 
ulation).
Both of these chapters document the effectiveness of persistent and 
well-focused outreach efforts. Chapter 7 differentiates between out 
reach, seen as actions of local Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
offices, and advocacy, seen as actions of direct service providers and 
state agencies. I think the two go hand-in-hand, and it is quite likely 
that some of the SSI outreach efforts (and also the state agency activi 
ties) involved increasing the knowledge and program savvy of direct 
service providers so they could prescreen potential applicants and also 
help them to complete their applications. Thus I do not think one can 
separate the effects of outreach and advocacy; I see them as two arms 
of the same body, both intent on drawing people into the application 
process and assuring that they succeed at it.
THE ROLE OF STATE INTERESTS
However, what we can see as a success story from the point of view 
of SSI participation we can also see as illustrating some troubling 
trends in state-federal relations, which have potentially negative impli 
cations for the well-being of poor and disabled people. The role of state 
agencies in expanding the SSI rolls is instructive. For decades, states 
have sought ways to shift costs from their own coffers to those of the 
federal government. In the past decade or so they have gotten signifi 
cantly more sophisticated at this cost-shifting. In the case of SSI, 
Michigan had two major programs that were entirely state-funded— 
General Assistance (and its accompanying medical program) and state 
mental hospitals. By ending General Assistance, the state could elimi 
nate the cost of supporting the entire caseload and shift the burden of 
support for SSI-eligibles to the federal government. By furthering the 
efforts of state mental hospital patients' move into the community once 
they have the support of SSI, the state could shift to the federal govern 
ment a portion of its responsibility to provide both domiciliary and 
health care. The people who succeed in getting SSI are financially bet 
ter off than they were on GA or as state hospital residents, but those 
who cannot qualify or who never apply are certainly worse off. The
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fact that significant numbers of people in both the GA and mentally ill 
populations cannot and do not receive SSI, and therefore end up desti 
tute and sometimes homeless, is usually overlooked or downplayed by 
state officials as they try to reduce state outlays for services and assis 
tance to poor and disabled people.
It is important to recognize that all levels of government are divest 
ing themselves of responsibility for some categories of disability— 
chief among them mental disabilities—and that this has been going on 
for a long time. State efforts to shift costs will only increase in the 
coming years; their effects should not be overlooked, or masked by 
lumping federal, state, and nonprofit actions together into overall cate 
gories of "outreach" and "advocacy."
THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO REHABILITATION
It is also possible that there has been some overextension of SSI, or 
at least a failure to consider or require participation in rehabilitation 
efforts for those who might benefit from them. The most obvious 
newly expanded group of SSI recipients to whom this applies is those 
eligible by reason of drug abuse or alcoholism. Even among the long- 
term street homeless with drug or alcohol addictions, research evi 
dence now indicates that recovery is possible, along with a return to 
gainful employment. Both the National Institute on Drug Abuse and 
the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism have spon 
sored demonstrations showing significant success rates. Further, the 
efforts of many homeless service providers have helped at least some 
substance abusers recover, although formal evaluations are lacking. 
Rather than making the assumption of lifelong dependency for these 
conditions, the Social Security Administration (SSA) should be pro 
moting efforts to help SSI recipients move toward self-sufficiency to 
the extent possible.'
Let us assume that we can think of a four-part research agenda for 
SSI participation, including 1) who are the pool of eligibles; 2) what 
gets them to apply; 3) what affects awards (whether their applications 
are successful); and 4) what affects exits. I am suggesting that we need 
to pay somewhat more attention than we do at present to the last of
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these. We need to look at exit rates differentially by disabling condition 
and try to understand what SSA actions or policies could affect exit 
rates.
NEED FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY
My earlier caveat, "to the extent possible," brings me to the final 
point I want to make. My final comment does not really stem from 
either Chapter 6 or Chapter 7. However, I think it is important to use 
this forum to raise the issue of the stringency of SSI eligibility criteria, 
particularly with regard to capacity to work. We probably all recognize 
that our current ability to define "disability" with any precision leaves a 
good deal to be desired. For SSI purposes, we must deal not only with 
the presence of a physical or mental condition (diagnosis), but also 
with the extent to which the condition entails significant functional 
limitations (disability), and the extent to which it has lasted and can be 
expected to last a long time (duration). The biggest problems in deter 
mining eligibility come with identifying the level of functional limita 
tion and the expectation for duration.
To ease the burden on determining gradations of functional limita 
tion, the SSI eligibility criterion has been set quite high with respect to 
work—to be eligible for SSI, recipients must be completely unable to 
work. Yet the nature of some illnesses (particularly mental illnesses) 
that qualify a person for SSI may permit some work, in either a steady 
part-time capacity or episodically. The strong bent of current thinking 
about the severely and persistently mentally ill is that working, at 
whatever level is possible, is good for self-esteem, physical health, and 
mental health, even if it may not be enormously rewarding financially. 
The same is probably true for other disabilities.
But people also rely on the medical care available to them through 
Medicaid while they are on SSL They often feel they cannot risk losing 
their SSI, even if their work activity could compensate for the income, 
because they would also lose health benefits. Perhaps it is time for SSA 
to reexamine the nature of some of the disabilities that form the biggest 
categories of current recipients. It could give some consideration to 
rule changes that would allow recipients to do whatever level of paid
Growth in Disability Benefits 279
work they could, while still retaining their Medicaid coverage. Some 
fair reduction in cash grant levels might also be worked out. This 
would be in everybody's interest—clients, states, SSI, and providers.
To the extent that the opportunity already exists under current regu 
lations for significant levels of paid work while still retaining benefits, 
SSA should make greater efforts to assure that direct service providers 
and advocates know about this opportunity. From my experience with 
community-based providers of services to the severely mentally ill, I 
do not think anyone is clear about what clients can and cannot do and 
still retain their SSI. Participants at this conference have told me that 
there is considerable flexibility for paid work under current SSI rules. 
But ignorance of these opportunities among the people working most 
closely with SSI program beneficiaries seems to be widespread. There 
fore it is likely that fewer recipients work than might otherwise do so.
Note
1. This point may now be moot. The ability of these programs to continue serving 
clients whose primary diagnosis and reason for receiving SSI is alcohol or drug 
abuse will be challenged severely by new provisions for SSI eligibility contained 
in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. The loss of SSI 
income and Medicaid eligibility for this population reduces their ability to pay for 
housing and to receive needed medical care, both of which helped maintain them 
in the housing supplied by these demonstration programs.

Comments on Chapters 6, 7, and 8
Barbara Henry Bordelon 
U.S. General Accounting Office
As a discussant, I have focused on one of the explanations for SSI 
application growth discussed by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6); 
Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7).; and Livermore, Sta- 
pleton, and Zeuschner (Chapter 8): state outreach activities that shift 
individuals with disabilities from state-funded assistance to the feder 
ally funded SSI program. I compare their findings with those of the 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and elaborate on GAO's 
results. I conclude with some implications for public policy.
STATE OUTREACH EFFORTS SHIFT INDIVIDUALS TO SSI
Early in 1995, GAO profiled eight state-funded disability advocacy 
projects through telephone interviews with state welfare administra 
tors. Similar to findings reported by Livermore, Stapleton, and 
Zeuschner in Chapter 8, GAO found aggressive state outreach efforts 
that shifted individuals from state-funded assistance to Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI). GAO's findings also provide evidence to sup 
port the perceptions of financial burden shifting from state and local 
governments to the federal government reported in Muller and Wheeler 
(Chapter 6).
In testimony before the Congress, GAO reported that state efforts to 
enroll state welfare recipients in SSI were one of several factors that 
contributed to a tremendous growth in the number of disability recipi 
ents between 1985 and 1994 (GAO 1995a). GAO estimated that at 
least one-half of all states funded disability advocacy programs. These 
programs proactively assisted state welfare recipients with disabilities 
in negotiating the SSI application and appeals process. In so doing, the 
states hoped to accomplish three ends (Hardin 1992):
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• Increase recipients' income and often improve their access to 
medical care
• Enhance savings to the state government
• Bring more federal dollars into the state economy
GAO found that state disability advocacy projects primarily served 
General Assistance recipients. As noted by Livermore, Stapleton, and 
Zeuschner (Chapter 8), state and local governments paying 100 percent 
of General Assistance benefits had a financial incentive to transfer their 
qualifying General Assistance recipients with disabilities to a fully fed 
erally funded program such as SSL
Moreover, states avoided costs by moving individuals from state- 
funded medical assistance programs to Medicaid, which is partially 
federally funded. (In most cases, individuals qualifying for SSI are eli 
gible for Medicaid benefits.) Although some state disability advocacy 
projects served Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cli 
ents and foster care children, those caseloads generally were consider 
ably smaller than their General Assistance caseloads.
MODELS OF DISABILITY ADVOCACY SERVICES
GAO found that states generally used one of the following three 
models to deliver disability advocacy services.
• State contracts for advocacy services. Some states contracted 
with private-sector firms for disability advocacy services. For 
example, the state of Maryland contracted for the management of 
its Disability Entitlement Advocacy Program with Health Man 
agement Associates, Inc., for about $3 million annually. This 
amount covered the contractor's management fee and reimburse 
ment of basic costs, including legal services. Similarly, the Mas 
sachusetts Public Welfare Department contracted with ten 
community groups that helped public assistance recipients apply 
ing for SSI. The state also contracted with a legal services pro 
gram to represent SSI applicants during reconsideration and 
hearings. Massachusetts sent about 5,000 letters a year informing 
General Assistance recipients who had been denied SSI benefits
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about the state's legal services.
State advocacy units staffed by state employees. Some state 
advocacy programs were staffed by state employees. For 
instance, the state of Washington employed specialists—called 
SSI facilitators—to help with the SSI application process. Facili 
tators identified potential SSI candidates; assisted candidates with 
the application process; and helped the client file for reconsidera 
tion of the initial eligibility denial, administrative hearing, and 
appeals through the courts. With the assistance of facilitators, 80 
percent of the cases filed were approved, 60 percent at the initial 
level, reportedly due to thorough client screening and case devel 
opment, as well as attentiveness to timely filing of paperwork.
As another example, Oregon state employees—called SSI liai 
sons—were trained in the SSI application process by the local 
Disability Determination Service (DDS). The liaisons tracked the 
status of a case through an online hook-up to the DDS and pro 
vided needed information to help the DDS in its decision-making 
process. They also represented clients at hearings.
Combination of state employees with contracted legal ser 
vices. Finally, Pennsylvania illustrates a third model that com 
bined contracting with the use of state employees. Pennsylvania's 
Disability Advocacy Program had 139 advocates who were state 
employees in sixty-seven county offices. For legal services, the 
state contracted with the Pennsylvania Legal Services Center to 
support half the cases at the hearings level. The balance of the 
cases were supported by private attorneys.
DISABILITY ADVOCACY: FINANCIALLY BENEFICIAL TO 
STATES
As Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner note, strong financial 
incentives exist for state and local governments to shift general assis 
tance recipients to SSI. State officials with whom GAO talked found 
disability advocacy to be extremely cost-effective. The state could usu 
ally more than make up for its advocacy expenses, which were often
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less than the recouped General Assistance payments made by the state 
during the waiting period for SSI benefit approval, 1 while avoiding the 
costs associated with General Assistance and medical assistance.
In fact, GAO found that, together, five states reported using disabil 
ity advocacy programs to generate gross savings of about $90 million 
in a given year by helping enroll in SSI nearly 26,000 individuals 
receiving state benefits (GAO 1995a). Most of these reported gains 
came from one state. In fiscal year 1994, Pennsylvania reported net 
savings of $55 million by helping more than 15,000 public assistance 
recipients enroll in SSI instead of state General Assistance.
IMPLICATIONS OF OUTREACH FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Outreach is a legitimate activity for states to inform their citizens of 
their entitlement to SSI and its eligibility requirements. Consequences 
may result, however, that may have a potentially negative effect on the 
states' disability advocacy project.
1. Given the difficulty of predicting work capacity on the basis of 
medical impairment, to what extent do outreach efforts direct 
individuals who may have some capacity to work to a system that 
emphasizes work incapacity?
The literature shows that work capacity is a function of many factors 
and that accurately predicting work incapacity for most people with a 
physical or mental impairment is difficult (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 1988). Given the difficulty of accurately predict 
ing work capacity, beneficiaries may have a greater capacity to work 
than was previously believed. Therefore, to what extent do outreach 
efforts contribute to labeling someone as work disabled who in fact has 
the potential to work, inadvertently encouraging work incapacity?
2. Outreach is a front-end activity of the disability program that 
seems to receive much more attention than back-end activities 
that help individuals leave the rolls by returning to work. Can we 
afford to continue to overemphasize front-end activities to the 
detriment of activities that enhance independence through 
employment?
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State outreach efforts emphasize the front end of the process— 
increasing awareness of the disability program, identifying eligibles, 
and supporting the disability determination process—while, at the back 
end of the process, less than 1 percent of beneficiaries with disabilities 
leave the rolls to go to work.
Moreover, vocational rehabilitation (VR) plays a limited role in dis 
ability programs, with state VR agencies successfully rehabilitating 
only about 1 out of every 1,000 beneficiaries, on average, each year 
(GAO 1995b). Compare these dismal outcomes at the back end of the 
process to the success of the extensive outreach efforts at the front end 
that is documented in these papers. And then ask yourself whether we 
can afford NOT to pay attention to a) setting up an early expectation 
for maximizing work potential through various types of employment 
and rehabilitation services, and b) early intervention before contact is 
lost with the employer to maintain skills, prevent job loss, and enhance 
capacity.
Enduring solutions to these public policy issues will take time and 
resources to craft, but steps should be taken immediately to improve 
the direction of federal disability.
Note
1. The Social Security Administration requires that an interim assistance agreement 
must be in effect with the state if SSA is to repay the state for the amount of Gen 
eral Assistance it gave the individual during the waiting period for approval of SSI 
benefits. This is referred to as an "interim assistance agreement."
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This is a time of immense change in the world of disability: change 
in how we think about disability, change in the nature of work, change 
in the characteristics of persons applying for disability benefits, and 
change in our thinking about the role of the federal government in 
assisting some of our most vulnerable citizens.
The subject of this conference is causes and implications of growth 
in the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) disability programs. This presentation argues 
that it is not just change in the size of the programs that is, or should 
be, at issue. In addition, it is change in the needs and demands of per 
sons with disabilities and changes in the attitudes of society that must 
cause us to consider some of the fundamental underpinnings of the fed 
eral disability programs.
When we started this project in 1992, the Social Security Adminis 
tration (SSA) was faced with the need to understand largely unantici 
pated growth in the DI and SSI disability programs. Our focus on the 
determinants of program growth was essential for many reasons, 
including the need to effectively plan for adequate program financing, 
adequate staffing to process workloads, and policy changes to meet the 
needs of a changing beneficiary population. The primary concern was 
whether the rapid increase in the application rate—and to a somewhat 
lesser degree, in the award rate—would continue.
Thus, the research reported on in Part II of this volume was largely 
driven by the policy needs of the government, especially SSA. In this 
chapter we review the principal findings, then discuss their relevance to 
policy issues.
NOTE- Ms. Upp died in 1996.
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REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS
The principal findings of the research conducted by Lewin-VHI as 
well as by in-house staff at SSA and the Office of the Assistant Secre 
tary for Planning and Evaluation are as follows:
• Application and award rates have peaked and now are in decline.
• Changes in the characteristics of those applying for and being 
awarded benefits are leading to beneficiaries spending longer 
times on the benefit rolls.
• The resultant decline in the termination rate may well be the most 
important driver of program growth for the next two decades or 
so.
More specific aspects of these findings are discussed below. 
The Relationship between DI and SSI
This conference considers both the DI and SSI disability popula 
tions. Usually, we have considered the programs separately, believing 
that they serve quite different kinds of persons, one group insured for 
DI benefits on the basis of significant work experience and the other 
eligible for SSI because they do not have a significant attachment to the 
labor force. Increasingly, these lines are becoming blurred. Our study 
of growth in the DI program almost immediately became a study of 
growth in both the DI and SSI programs, as it became apparent that the 
major source of growth in the DI program was individuals applying 
concurrently for DI and SSI. These concurrent applicants are persons 
with enough work experience to become insured for DI benefits but 
whose economic status is so poor that their income and resources are 
below the means test limits for SSL Concurrent DI and SSI applicants 
are now more than half of all DI applicants. Generally, the research 
finds that factors influencing growth in one program are the same as 
those that influence growth in the other, although they may differ in the 
degree of influence that they exert.
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Applications and Awards
One fundamental question underlying the research effort was, are 
the increases in applications and awards short- or long-term phenom 
ena? The answer is both.
The research reported here, as well as actual experience, indicates 
that applications and awards in both the DI and SSI programs have lev 
eled off. There were fewer DI applications in 1995 than in 1994, and 
fewer SSI applications in 1994 than in 1993. Final awards (awards 
after all appeals are heard) have leveled off in both programs. Declines 
in awards at the initial level have somewhat offset continuing increases 
at the appeal/hearings level.
Short-Term Factors
One important cyclical source of growth—more so for the DI than 
the SSI program—was the poor economic conditions that prevailed in 
the early 1990s. In a bad job market, some who meet the programs' 
strict definition of disability and otherwise would have worked may 
apply for benefits. Lewin found that about one-fifth of the increase in 
DI applications and about a tenth of the increase in SSI applications 
from 1988 through 1992 seemed to have been influenced by increased 
unemployment.
Relatively short-term fluctuations in public awareness of the DI and 
SSI programs and perceptions about whether program rules are being 
strictly or less strictly enforced also influence program growth. It is 
generally believed that the programs were administered relatively 
strictly in the early 1980s. The administration, the courts, and the Con 
gress all responded in the mid 1980s by making it easier to get on the 
rolls and harder to put beneficiaries off the rolls. These attitudes seem 
to have prevailed until fairly recently.
Another factor at work has been state efforts to shift beneficiaries 
from state to federally financed programs. Lewin found that cuts in 
state welfare programs (general assistance) in seven states and the Dis 
trict of Columbia contributed significantly to the increase in both SSI 
applications, including Dl-concurrent applications. 1 The incentives for 
states to shift persons from their rolls to SSI so that the beneficiaries 
will become eligible for Medicaid would be significantly diminished 
by funding Medicaid through block grants to the states. However,
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funding other programs, such as AFDC, as block grants would increase 
incentives to shift beneficiaries to programs, such as SSI, that are more 
directly funded by the federal government.
Longer-Term Factors
Lewin found that the aging of the baby boomers was contributing 
significantly to long-term growth in application and awards for both 
programs. 2 This source of growth can be expected to continue for at 
least two decades for the DI program, until the boomers approach age 
65, and even longer for the SSI disability program. 3
Another long-term source of growth in the number of applications 
for DI is the increased work experience of women and the accompany 
ing increase in their likelihood of being insured for benefits. This factor 
has the opposite effect on the SSI program, however: as more women 
become insured for DI benefits, fewer apply only for SSI benefits.
New eligibility criteria for benefits on the basis of mental and pain- 
related impairments also appear to be a continuing source of applica 
tion and award rate growth.4
An increase seems to be continuing in applicants' appeals of denied 
applications and in award rates at the appeals level. Appeals and 
award rates clearly influence each other, and high appellate award rates 
encourage more applications.
Finally, Lewin found that a decline in family support contributed to 
application growth in both the DI and SSI programs. Lewin used a 
proxy measure to capture this effect—the increase in the number of 
single-parent families. Again, this trend does not appear to be turning 
around.
Terminations
The other main driver of program growth is duration on the rolls, or 
termination rates. Work done by our Office of Disability and by Rupp 
and Scott (Chapter 4) shows that duration is up and that termination 
rates are down. These changes, in turn, are being driven in large part by 
the changing characteristics of those who are now applying for and 
being newly awarded benefits.
First, they are younger. More than half of persons newly awarded DI 
benefits are younger than 50, and almost two-thirds of those awarded
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SSI benefits are younger than 50. Second, they are increasingly likely 
to suffer from lingering impairments, such as mental and musculoskel- 
etal disorders. Awards to persons with mental disorders increased by 
80 percent between the 1988 and 1992 DI applicant cohorts, compared 
with an overall increase of 48 percent in awards. The comparable 
increase in SSI awards was 81 percent, compared to an overall increase 
of 65 percent. Meanwhile, the share with heart disease and cancer 
declined dramatically in both programs.
These interrelated changes—in the age distribution and impairment 
mix of beneficiaries—mean beneficiaries are staying on the rolls 
longer because they are less likely to recover, and in the case of DI, 
they also are less likely to convert to old-age benefits. Thus, it is 
increasingly clear that fundamental, long-run program growth will be 
driven not by ever-increasing application and allowance rates, but 
rather by the changing characteristics of our beneficiaries. These 
changes in the characteristics of our beneficiaries are not news. But to 
some of us, at least, their importance is just beginning to be fully 
understood.
POLICY ISSUES
The questions raised in this section stem from concerns about the 
change in the characteristics of our beneficiaries, the effect of this 
change on program growth, and the effect of our program on the bene 
ficiaries.
Definition of Disability
What do we define as disability? For both the DI and SSI programs, 
the Social Security Act defines disability as inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment, that can be expected to result in death, 
or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than twelve months.
SSA is being challenged to rethink this definition of disability for 
several reasons. First, under the Americans with Disabilities Act
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(ADA), as Martynas Yeas (1995, p. 55) put it in a recent paper, people 
are not either disabled or not disabled. Rather, they are at different 
points along a continuum of needing accommodation and assistance in 
order to work.
Second, many with impairments that meet our definition neverthe 
less work, while others similarly impaired do not. So do our listings 
really distinguish between those who can and cannot work? Or do they 
distinguish between those who are expected to work and those who are 
not? Many blind persons work, for example, but blind persons are 
automatically presumed to be disabled under our rules. While in fact 
some blind persons can do some kinds of work, our rules are based on 
a presumption that a blind person should not have to work and that 
there is a public responsibility to that person.
Third, the creators of the disability program had in mind, for the 
most part, those with acute illnesses, such as heart disease or cancer. 
Especially when we think of the DI program, we think of older persons 
with a steady attachment to the labor force who are struck down with 
potentially terminal disorders. But, thanks to enormous strides in med 
ical technology, some diseases—many kinds of heart problems, for 
example—are survivable that used not to be. So even persons with 
these kinds of illnesses are living and receiving benefits longer. As we 
have said, the increases in our rolls are coming from those who are 
younger and/or those who suffer from mental disorders and back prob 
lems. Persons with these impairments are not expected to die as a 
result, but improvement often is either not expected or difficult to mea 
sure. So these beneficiaries are receiving benefits longer.
If we are going to revisit our definition of disability, what should be 
our new criteria? SSA has been exploring criteria that reflect ability to 
function in the workplace, but our experience so far suggests that this 
may be difficult to implement in a way that can be codified and admin 
istered as objective national standards and in a way that society will 
find acceptable.
The Federal Role
Having raised and not attempted to answer the difficult question of 
defining disability, we move to a second: What should be the federal 
role be in providing for persons with disabilities? Should we worry less
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about a one-size-fits-all definition and more about different types of 
interventions for different types of persons?
For a long time we have grappled with the belief that our programs 
should 1) provide income support until recovery or death for those who 
cannot work and 2) encourage return to work for those who have the 
potential to work. As more beneficiaries are young or suffer from 
chronic impairments, concerns mount about the role of DI and SSI dis 
ability benefits in encouraging a lifetime dependency on public income 
support.
• Is this fair to the person with a disability? Is it in their best inter 
est?
• Is this a desirable public policy outcome?
• With regard to the DI program, what is the appropriate role of a 
social insurance program?
Moreover, SSA is an agency with its roots in providing long-term 
income support for retirees. Its primary function has been to get the 
right check to the right person at the right time. We do not have much 
experience or expertise in facilitating self-sufficiency.
As we grapple with strategies to encourage employment, we have to 
consider a number of issues. One of the most difficult of these is how 
to develop standards that can be applied nationally to determine what 
type of intervention is best for whom. This is especially difficult when 
the differences among persons with a given kind of impairment are at 
least as great as the differences among persons with different kinds of 
impairments.
There is no question that many people with disabilities strongly 
want to work. And society expects those who can support themselves 
to do so. But in providing work opportunities, we must 1) not put any 
one at risk of losing life-sustaining support, such as medical benefits, 
and 2) take account of the fact that many of our beneficiaries are poorly 
educated, have few work skills, and have had, at best, a fragile attach 
ment to the workforce.
A number of options to change the federal role have been proposed. 
These include time-limited benefits; providing only services, but no 
cash; and offering partial benefits. Each of these approaches has some
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advantages over our present system, but each presents some issues, as 
well. For example,
• What happens when the time limits are up and the person is not 
self-sufficient? What are the criteria for deciding whether benefits 
should continue? And, what is the alternative to benefits for those 
for whom benefits are the last resort?
• Is it fair to limit any category of persons with a disability to ser 
vices only and no cash support? Being disabled costs money, not 
only in terms of forgone earnings, but also in terms of the need to 
buy ongoing support for daily life.
• What might be the criteria for partial benefits? How do we define 
partial? Could a change from the current definition toward some 
standard for partial benefits be equitably and uniformly adminis 
tered?
• What is the appropriate federal role, if any, for those who meet 
our definition of disability but who nevertheless work and have 
significant impairment-related work expenses?
Subsequent chapters in this volume address these and other issues. 
They are immensely challenging and complex issues.
It is tempting, on the one hand, to think that all is well and to resist 
change in the disability programs now that application and award 
growth have slowed, to think that the disability programs no longer 
present an issue. It is equally tempting to regard growth as bad, to 
assume that something is wrong if the programs are increasing in size 
and cost. Neither is the case.
As we consider the DI and SSI disability programs, we must keep in 
mind what it is that is driving fundamental, long-term growth: the 
changes in the nature of disability and of persons being awarded bene 
fits, and the resultant increases in duration on the rolls and declines in 
termination rates.
We must, of course, be certain that elements over which SSA has 
some influence are not driving application and award growth out of 
control. We must be certain that we have adequately financed the dis 
ability programs. We must make sure that we take appropriate adminis 
trative steps to ensure that only those who continue to be eligible stay 
on the rolls.
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But most important, we must be certain that our programs continue 
to serve the best interests of persons with disabilities and the best inter 
ests of society.
Notes
1. Research conducted under the Lewin-VHI contract has been summarized in 
Chapters 2 and 8.
2. Application rates are defined as the percent of applications based, in the case of 
DI, on those insured for disability benefits and, in the case of SSI, on those in the 
population covered by the SSI program Award rates have been variously defined; 
the term here is used to mean awards in any year as a percent of applications in a 
given year.
3. Technically, in the DI program, an applicant may be disabled before age 65, but 
becomes retired at age 65 or older. This is because benefits stop being paid from 
the DI trust fund and start being paid from the separate Old-Age and Survivors' 
Insurance trust fund for beneficiaries at age 65. No such distinction is made in the 
SSI program.
4. The same medical eligibility criteria are used for the DI and the SSI programs.
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The View from the Trenches





Although this chapter is entitled, "The View From the Trenches," I 
would challenge the premise that the authors of this chapter are really 
the ones working in the trenches. Whatever the case, each of us is a 
practitioner and is responsible for managing a portion of the disability 
process.
The commentaries we provide are a departure from the formal 
research papers that make up Chapters 2 through 8. The discussions 
here are more intuitive and more anecdotal, and perhaps more subjec 
tive and speculative than analytical; and I think it is safe to say that 
they are based less on hard objective data than on our impressions, 
observations, and opinions. We very much appreciate and are very 
much impressed by the work that is presented in the earlier chapters. 
The analyses have certainly added to our understanding of the causal 
relationships between those factors that most of us had assumed were 
generating the dramatic increase in our claims. By and large, the find 
ings reflect our own experience, particularly those findings that relate 
to application growth.
While the results are very useful in the aggregate, we do need to be 
cautious in applying generalized conclusions to specific sections of the 
country, and even in assuming that state-level findings are applicable to 
every area of a particular state. We have seen widely diverse patterns of 
application growth, and our experience suggests that the reasons for 
growth vary greatly, not only among states but among counties as well.
My comments are based on observations and experience in the five- 
state Philadelphia region. Application growth in the mid Atlantic states 
for the past seven years has generally been consistent with national pat 
terns. The overall rate of growth in this region was a few percentage 
points ahead of the national average in five of those seven years. We
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have seen very little, if any, increase in Social Security Disability 
Insurance (Dl)-only receipts. At the other extreme, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI)-only cases have increased by a full 102 percent 
and concurrent claims by 73 percent over that seven-year period.
As you would expect, application growth has been uneven across 
our five states, ranging from a 34 percent increase in West Virginia to a 
64 percent increase in Maryland. The most significant growth has been 
in Maryland and Virginia. Since 1988, concurrent and SSI-only claims 
in both of those states have increased by well over 100 percent. Our 
experience in the Philadelphia region so far in fiscal 1995 would sug 
gest that the rapid growth in initial claims is not yet over. During the 
first eight months of this fiscal year, our claims receipts were running 
13 percent higher than during the same period one year ago. That's five 
times greater than the national average and more than double the 
growth in any of the other nine regions. The sharp rise in initial deter 
minations this year is largely the result of a 22 percent increase in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. That increase is being driven by sig 
nificant cuts in the Commonwealth's general assistance program.
In describing the demographics of recent disability applicants, front 
line employees tell me that applicants today are more likely to be 
younger, even younger than the baby boom cohort. They are more 
likely to be women, and they are more likely to allege a mental or 
stress-related impairment than at any time in the past. Particularly in 
the large metropolitan areas in the region, applications for AIDS, HIV 
infection and Drug Addiction and Alcoholism (DA&A)-related impair 
ments are increasing. Employees are beginning to see the second and 
third generation of adults from the same household filing for SSI bene 
fits. As a growing number of applicants come to accept SSI as a legiti 
mate and permanent source of income—as a legitimate and permanent 
way of life—we fear that we may be creating a cycle of dependency 
that families are going to find more and more difficult to escape.
As in other parts of the country, the business cycle has clearly influ 
enced receipt patterns in this region. The impact of the 1990-1991 
recession was very apparent, particularly in highly industrialized areas 
of the region. However, we are beginning to wonder if longer-term 
structural changes in the economy have not had an equally significant 
impact on certain parts of this region. We also wonder whether the wid 
ening gap between low- and high-income families has had and will
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continue to have a significant effect on program growth. The general 
economic decline in some parts of this region as well as industrial 
restructuring have resulted in the elimination of many jobs that in the 
past have been held by unskilled workers. In our region, job loss has 
been concentrated in heavy manufacturing, in mining, and in the con 
struction industry. Increased automation and technology have reduced 
the demand for unskilled and semiskilled labor. Consequently, large 
numbers of people have simply removed themselves from the labor 
market because they don't have the education or the skills to compete.
Last week, a 65-year old coal miner filed a retirement application in 
our office in Clarksburg, West Virginia. He had made well over 
$50,000 per year, he had lived a good life, and he was now ready to 
retire. But according to the claims representative who took his applica 
tion, the man was probably functionally illiterate. He had a very diffi 
cult time understanding the most simple explanation or instruction. 
Similar situations are arising throughout the region. Today, with indus 
tries such as coal mining and glass manufacturing beginning to close, it 
is doubtful whether that same person entering the labor market today 
could earn more than minimum wage. These individuals might well 
end up poor, underemployed, perhaps being paid cash "under the 
table," and filing for SSI on the basis of a developmental disability. In 
many parts of the region, this is becoming a common applicant profile. 
These are people who, out of frustration, are dropping out of the labor 
market and are no longer seeking a job. Sadly, they have no alternative 
but to turn to us for financial support. These individuals, of course, are 
not reflected in any of our unemployment statistics.
In the Philadelphia region, cost-shifting actions by state and local 
governments have been, and I think will continue to be, a major con 
tributor to increased claims receipts. All of our states require, or cer 
tainly strongly encourage, applicants to their assistance programs to 
also file with us. Many local welfare offices continue to refer people to 
social security (SSA) who are obviously not disabled. Yet, these offices 
still insist that SSA provide a formal denial.
Two of our states, Pennsylvania and Maryland, operate well-orga 
nized and highly effective referral programs. They are aimed at shifting 
disabled persons from state-funded programs to SSI. For instance, 
Maryland began contracting with a private company back in the late 
1980s to carry out its referral function. The contractor screens, refers,
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and represents applicants in an effort to get them on the federal rolls. 
The contractor is also paid a fee for each welfare recipient who is ulti 
mately placed on SSI or DI rolls. The Maryland program, and a similar 
program in Pennsylvania, have been highly successful from our per 
spective in SSA, as well as from theirs. They have been successful 
because the states' and the contractors' employees are well trained, and 
they have a very solid understanding of our program. They are also 
plugged into SSA's service delivery network, which enhances the pro 
cessing of these referrals and subsequent shift to our rolls.
Our claims workloads, as you would expect, have surged following 
the introduction of state welfare reform initiatives. Those initiatives 
have, of course, all been aimed at reducing state expenditures. Both the 
Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia tightened up 
their General Assistance (GA) programs back in 1991, driving a large 
number of applicants into our offices. Since that time, the District has 
removed over 40 percent of their eligibles from their GA rolls. Penn 
sylvania, in 1994, introduced major changes in its GA program affect 
ing a significant number of chronically and transitionally needy 
persons. That action has had an enormous impact on new SSI applica 
tions in the State of Pennsylvania.
The state of Maryland eliminated its GA cash benefit program for 
disabled persons this month. Effective July 1995, they dropped 22,000 
disabled persons from their cash benefit rolls. That cash benefit will 
now be replaced by a much more modest provision for special services. 
Needless to say, we expect the action by Maryland to have a sizable 
effect on new SSI applications in that state. As several state workers 
have said in Maryland, SSI is now "the only game in town," and so we 
are expecting large numbers of applicants to come into our offices in 
the coming months.
We think it is likely that Virginia also may eliminate its General 
Assistance program, except for emergency assistance, during their next 
legislative session. They nearly did so this year. Considering our expe 
rience with the reduction of state GA programs and what has happened 
to claims intake in our offices, I can't help but believe that the welfare 
reform proposals that are currently being debated in the Congress will 
have an enormous impact on social security offices. If limits of any 
kind are imposed upon Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) benefits, I think we can expect many former recipients to
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begin filing for SSL I agree with the conclusions reached by the 
authors of Chapters 2 and 8 with respect to the welfare reform initia 
tives. I think, too, that their conclusions with respect to block granting, 
AFDC, or Medicaid are also right on target.
Finally, just a brief comment on our SSI outreach activities in the 
Philadelphia region. Our local field offices, like field offices across the 
country, conducted very aggressive outreach programs back in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. We worked in close cooperation with private 
agencies, community organizations, and service providers to increase 
program understanding, to train their employees, and to target potential 
eligibles. Despite a high level of commitment and an equally high level 
of activity, neither these internally managed initiatives nor the work of 
outreach grantees has, in my judgment, had an appreciable affect on 
application growth. While we would see sudden spurts of claims fol 
lowing major outreach events or outreach activities, our impression is 
that most of those new applicants would have eventually filed for SSI 
at some future stage anyway. So, at most, my suspicion is that our out 
reach efforts got people to file somewhat earlier than they would have 
otherwise. Frankly, I am inclined to believe, as are many of my staff, 
that the expanded involvement of advocates, the legal aid community, 
and even private attorneys has done more to influence program growth 
than our own agency-sponsored initiatives.

The View from SSA's Concord, 
New Hampshire, District Office
Celeste Hemingson 
Social Security Administration
The Concord, New Hampshire, field office certainly experienced the 
same expansion that is being reported elsewhere, but in our case, the 
growth continued into 1995. Although the increases tapered off in
1993. we had a 17 percent increase in disability claims receipts in
1994. and so far the intake in 1995 is as least as high as in 1994. The 
same thing has been happening throughout New Hampshire. The 1994 
phenomenon is puzzling to me. Although I could partially explain it by 
some changes in state welfare department policies that I will describe 
later, those changes would normally account for an increase in SSI 
claims. The biggest growth we experienced in fiscal year 1994 was 
actually in Title II claims.
I present only one other piece of quantifiable information in this 
chapter, and that is a description of a disability outreach project that I 
did. I think this example provides a useful illustration of outreach 
projects, and I'm particularly proud of this one because it was very cost 
effective.
In 1991,1 made a deal with the director of the State Department of 
Special Education to deliver fliers I had printed up to the parents of 
severely disabled children. The flier described basic entitlement 
requirements and included a tear-off coupon parents could mail in if 
they thought their child might qualify. We gave New Hampshire's 
Department of Special Education 8,000 flyers, which they distributed 
to teachers. We received thirty-eight replies, fourteen of which resulted 
in allowances.
The other types of outreach activities we do in district offices are not 
quantifiable. They are generally aimed at advocacy groups and others 
with whom disabled people come into contact and they're designed to 
enable the disabled to access our programs more easily. Several of the
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studies in this volume indicate that SSI and social security disability 
are difficult programs to access and that this might be why some poten 
tial beneficiaries would rather stay on General Assistance than apply 
for our benefits. If that's true, then perhaps our work with these groups 
may have broken down that barrier and paid off in additional claims.
We train workers in homeless shelters on who to refer to us; we set 
up telephone links for filing claims; we train veterans' service organi 
zations such as the VFW on who to refer to us and what types of evi 
dence we need. That's the type of outreach we do.
Outreach is always a form of publicity, but publicity, even if it's 
unwanted, will increase the application rate. I will describe the role of 
publicity in disability claims growth.
In 1968, my job was to place information about social security on 
nationwide radio and television networks. It was a tough sell. Public 
affairs directors believed that carrying information about elderly or dis 
abled people would undermine the young image stations were eager to 
project. My-biggest—in fact my only—success on that job was to place 
on a network radio feed a series of vignettes about sports figures who 
had obtained disability benefits. I used to think that if I could only 
make our program seem controversial, I could get some air time. Luck 
ily my bosses didn't go for the idea.
They didn't have to. Ever since the controversy hit the press about 
our payment of benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, we've been get 
ting calls from people identifying themselves as drug addicts or alco 
holics, asking for benefits.
Word of mouth is also an important factor that encourages applica 
tions for disability benefits. We have found that increasing the supply 
of awards increases the demand for awards. Many of those who apply 
for benefits say they're doing so because a relative or a neighbor was 
allowed, and they're sure they're just as disabled as he is. Many tell us 
they understand they'll have to apply three times before they're 
allowed.
I would like to turn to some changes in state and local welfare prac 
tice that have impacted us in New Hampshire. Here the changes have 
not been an instance of cost-shifting. I think for us cost-shifting is yet 
to come. In our case what happened is an indication of how Medicaid 
is a driver of SSI claims. Under a New Hampshire state law which 
went in to effect on December 1, 1993, the state was required to use the
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Social Security Administration's definition of disability in determining 
Medicaid and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (a state pro 
gram) entitlement. (New Hampshire is a 209B state, which means it 
makes its own determination about Medicaid entitlement). In the inter 
est of efficiency, the state decided to use our actual disability decision 
instead of making a separate decision on their own. As a result, we 
quickly heard from applicants who told us they had to apply with us 
before the state would take their Medicaid application. Others said they 
were required to file with us within twenty days of filing for Medicaid. 
Although the state had always required Medicaid applicants to file for 
social security or SSI, there was now more follow-through in making 
those applications happen.
Another change we've noticed is more applicants being referred 
from their town welfare directors. (General Assistance in New Hamp 
shire is paid for from town budgets and is administered by individuals 
elected to a post often titled "overseer of the poor.") We also see more 
towns requiring interim assistance agreements from applicants. We 
believe these increases are because town budgets are becoming 
increasingly stressed by the downturn in the economy.
We do notice that unemployment influences "demand for awards." 
We continue to see more people filing because they can't find work. 
Many tell us they can work but just can't get work. We also get more 
disability claims from 62-year-old workers who are also filing for 
retirement benefits. Our assumption is that the economy as much as 
disability is causing these workers to retire early.
These facts are surprising, because the unemployment rate in the 
Concord area is only 2.8 percent. However, this brings up a point we 
should all consider: most of the new jobs in New Hampshire are in 
retail sales and services, not jobs that pay enough to present a mean 
ingful alternative to disability benefits. Many of the available jobs are 
the type that Richard Frank described (see the discussion following 
Chapter 2), which are limited in hours just enough so that the employer 
will not have to provide benefits. These are not jobs that are a meaning 
ful alternative to disability benefits.
Another cause of disability applications is not directly related to 
current unemployment. It's what I categorize as economic deprivation. 
People contact us because they no longer have other resources to fall 
back on. Two signs of this are the increased inquiries we get from those
310 Hemingson
with short-term disabilities and those who are still working, but who 
have been advised by their doctors to stop working. These are workers 
who have no savings and no benefits to cover the period of time during 
which no social security or Supplementary Security Income (SSI) is 
available.
There have also been some changes in the world of work that cause 
people to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). This is 
the other side of the coin. More employers are requiring a disability 
claim before a company's private insurance policy will pay.
Recent trends to hire those with developmental disabilities have 
resulted in more and more SSI and disabled child beneficiaries becom 
ing insured on their own. Gina Livermore and her colleagues found 
that growth in the Mental Retardation category was greater than for 
any other category in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent applications (Chapter 
8). An advocate told me last week that she counsels disabled teens in 
school-to-work programs to apply for SSI in order to lock in Medicaid 
entitlement through the 1619 program. Once again, Medicaid drives 
SSI claims.
In summary, and this is particularly directed to those who don't 
work for social security, an article of faith for social security employ 
ees is that our programs provide a safety net. One of the things we say 
when we talk about retirement benefits is that you can depend on social 
security even when you can't depend on anything else. Our protection 
is portable, it's inflation-proof, and it's not vulnerable to stock market 
downturns. These facts also apply to the disability program, but in 
addition there are some other relevant facts: we're there when other 
income maintenance programs drop out of the picture. States, towns, 
and employers are relying on social security to pick up the slack when 
they can't do it. We are increasingly becoming the program of last 
resort.
The View from Michigan's Office 
of Disability Determination
Charles Jones 
Michigan Family Independence Agency
I am going to be wearing two hats since I come from one trench as a 
Disability Determination Service (DDS) administrator, and I am now 
in another trench with respect to the disability process redesign. So I 
am going to be talking with you from both of those perspectives. What 
I want to do, though, is to describe to you a cartoon that I saw in Los 
Angeles earlier this year because it really put a lot of things into per 
spective for me that I had sort of been thinking about relative to social 
policy and how we tend to approach it in this country. The cartoon was 
a scene from Washington, D.C., and there was a well-dressed man who 
was walking down the street. Behind him you could see the Capitol 
dome and the Washington Monument in the background and in front of 
this man was an open manhole and there was a hand sticking out of the 
manhole and a voice was saying, "Help me out!" Well, as the man 
approached the manhole he reached into his pocket and pulled out 
some money and stood as far away from the hand as he possibly could 
and gave this hand some money. In the next scene the man was walking 
on past the manhole and the person was still saying, "Help me out!" 
When the man was past the manhole, the hand and the person were still 
down in the manhole. I think that is very descriptive in terms of how 
we tend to approach social policy in this country. We tend to think that 
we are helping people out of the hole, but once we do whatever it is 
that we do with them in whatever arena, most people are still stuck in 
that hole.
Yesterday, I heard a lot of very good things in terms of reasons why 
there is program growth, and I agreed with most of what I heard. In 
terms of being from the trench in DDS in Michigan, I didn't hear any 
thing that was new. It was not surprising that when the economy gets 
bad, people file for disability. It was not surprising that when govern-
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ments become economically strapped, they cost-shift. It was not sur 
prising that when we change the program to make it more attractive for 
people to receive disability benefits, they apply in greater numbers. 
And it was no surprise that, as Celeste Hemingson indicated, when we 
advertise, there is a growth in the number of applications. What I was a 
little bit surprised about yesterday was that there was no discussion 
regarding what it is that we are going to do with all of this valuable 
research and all of this valuable information. Are we going to use it to 
anticipate future workloads? Hopefully, that would allow us to better 
react to them. Or, are we going to use it to prevent future work loads? 
Probably, the information is going to be used in both ways, but not in 
the context of any overall social policy.
In terms of the view from the trench, in the Michigan DDS trench 
we always had this picture of a giant pendulum out there and this pen 
dulum would swing from left to right, left to right, over the years. I 
don't mean that necessarily to signify any political spectrum, but it 
does swing, and we never seemed to get that pendulum right in the 
middle where it would do the most good. We saw the pendulum swing 
ing in the early 1980s with the Continuing Disability Review (CDR) 
debacle, where a decision was made that we need to get people off the 
roles because in fact there were, and still are, people on the disability 
rolls who should no longer be there. But there was no discussion, there 
was no thought of why they got there, who they were, and more impor 
tant, what we were going to do with them once we got them off the 
rolls. The result was a knee-jerk reaction where we kicked a lot of peo 
ple off the rolls and another knee-jerk reaction when we wound up put 
ting them back on at the hearing level. Now we just have all these 
people on the rolls and everybody is screaming that we've got to get 
them off. We also saw the Zebley decision, which I personally thought 
was a good decision, but which resulted in putting a lot of kids on the 
rolls. We didn't have any thought or discussion regarding that aspect of 
program growth and what we wanted to accomplish with these kids. 
What did we want them to do once they got on the rolls? Again, this 
knee-jerk reaction. Now we have another knee-jerk reaction that is 
going to swing the pendulum in the other direction, probably take a lot 
of kids off the rolls, or prevent them from getting on the rolls—kids 
who should be getting disability. And yet there is no discussion about
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what's the best thing for the kids or what objectives we want for the 
kids.
We saw in Michigan these knee-jerk reactions with respect to cost- 
shifting, and I was a part of that. We were very successful and very 
good at what we did. We saved a lot of money for the state, we got a lot 
of people onto SSI, and hopefully people benefited from the money 
that they got and from the medical care they received. But in Michigan, 
we had no discussions of return-to-work, we had no discussions of 
whether or not we were actually helping people with disabilities meet 
their needs on a daily basis to help them live, and we had no discus 
sions about what we expected in terms of educational outcomes for 
children. We just had a very successful cost-shifting effort. I am hope 
ful that we did help some people in the interim, but again all of this was 
done without any specific objectives for us to head toward. These knee- 
jerk reactions we have are temporary solutions that two or three or five 
years from now we spend millions of dollars trying to correct.
Now, the program growth discussion, in my opinion, has to be com 
bined with a larger discussion in our country on a comprehensive pub 
lic policy of what disability programs should achieve. We have a lot of 
excellent efforts that are going on right now that are looking at various 
aspects of the disability program or disability in general. We have the 
National Academy of Social Insurance Disability Panel, we have the 
Childhood Commission, there are a lot of congressional efforts going 
on, there is proposed legislation that will have even new committees 
and new groups looking at the area of disability, and of course we have 
internal efforts within Social Security Administration. I know that in 
the private sector, private insurers are also struggling with this issue. 
All of these efforts are very good, but all of them really need to be done 
after a national decision is made about what it is we want to achieve 
with disability policy. That way, all of our efforts, whether we are talk 
ing about disability redesign, whether we are talking about doing more 
CDRs, whether we are talking about program growth or childhood dis 
ability, will all be working toward the same end and for the same 
objective and hopefully for the betterment of everyone. Again, my 
view from the trench, if I were still in the Michigan DDS, is that the 
pendulum is still swinging and that five years from now we are going 
to be spending millions of dollars and hundreds of work-years trying to 
correct whatever problems we are correcting today.
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Now the people in the trenches don't have time to ponder why appli 
cations have grown. In Michigan, when our caseloads were going up, 
we didn't have time to think about what the reasons were. The issue 
was how were we going to handle it, and how were we going to do it 
with inadequate resources? The view from the trenches was also what 
mess am I going to get blamed for and how am I going to clean it up, 
because the policymakers were, once again, overreacting. One facet of 
addressing program growth is to improve the process, and the other 
trench that I am in is intended to try to do that. The disability process 
redesign is not a panacea for the disability program; we need to decide 
where we are headed with disability. But I think there are some fea 
tures in the redesign that will help in this area of program growth. One 
of them is our comprehensive public relations program, which is really 
focused not on a "come on down and file" kind of a message, but on a 
message that will give our customers better information and more real 
istic information about the process. It is also focused on providing third 
parties with information they need to get the information we need. We 
want to couple that comprehensive public relations campaign with 
working with and expanding the use of third parties.
Our experience in Michigan was very successful with this, and 
despite the fact that we doubled the number of SSI applications and the 
rolls increased because of a tremendous amount of advocacy and out 
reach, the fact of the matter is that our application growth could have 
been much greater had we not gone out and worked with other state 
departments, advocates, and others who were helping people to file. 
What we were able to do to was to prevent a lot of frivolous applica 
tions from being filed, because the initial reaction of the Michigan 
Department of Social Services to cutting off General Assistance was 
going to be to tell all 83,000 to go file for social security disability. So 
there are some benefits to having a very focused, a very tailored public 
relations process that would get you "good claims." When I say "good 
claims," I am not necessarily meaning to differentiate between good 
claims and bad claims, but we have a very high allowance rates on our 
SSI efforts in Michigan. There were a lot of reasons for that—prima 
rily because we did go out and work with other people to focus on 
those applicants who were most likely to be disabled—that saved 
everybody time and money, and we think it was beneficial to the cus 
tomers we were trying to serve.
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Another thing we are trying to do with the disability redesign is to 
unify the process so the cases that should be allowed will be allowed as 
early in the process as possible. We need to restore a sense of fairness 
to the program and to eliminate the tremendous growth at the hearing 
level. One observation that I do have about yesterday was that all the 
discussion of growth focused on initial applications and not on recons 
and hearings. I think this is also a very significant issue that needs to be 
dealt with.
There are some other features in the disability process redesign that 
I hope to be able to return and discuss with you in the future, but I 
really do want to leave you with this thought: what is needed is a com 
prehensive public policy debate and decisions regarding the goals that 
we as a society want to achieve in assisting persons with disabilities. 
Until that takes place, the vast majority of people who apply for dis 
ability benefits, no matter what we do, are going to continue to remain 
in that hole. And I am hopeful that through a lot of discussion and mak 
ing some decisions about where we want to go, the next time we 
approach a hole and someone is reaching out to us saying "Help me 
out," that when we are past that hole we leave with that person travel 






The Perspective of a Public Trustee
Stanford G. Ross 
Arnold & Porter 
Washington, D.C.
I begin by describing in a very brief fashion how the policymaking 
institutions are working today and, in particular, how this discussion 
fits into that setting. Focusing attention on institutional issues can help 
us to be more practical in our consideration of policy responses.
I served as a Public Trustee of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund 
from 1990 to 1995. As shown in Figure 11.1, the Public Trustees serve 
with the ex-officio Trustees (the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and 
Health and Human Services) on the governing board of the Social 
Security Trust Funds and have an important oversight role in the man 
agement of the system. In that regard, I have a certain sense of respon 
sibility for the Lewin-VHI work product that is being discussed at this 
conference. Also, from that vantage point, I offer some thoughts about 
what should be done with the important information produced by that 
study.
When the rapid expansion in applications and awards took place in 
the early 1990s, the Trustees were called upon to issue a "Section 709 
letter" to the Congress in April of 1992 informing them that the 
reserves were projected to fall below 20 percent. This was the first time 
that this alarm bell was set off since this provision was enacted in 1983 
in response to the concern that there should be some institutionalized 
early warning signals given to the Congress when trust funds were 
approaching insolvency.
Then, when the proposal for reallocation from the Old-Age and Sur 
vivors Insurance Trust Fund to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund was 
made in late 1992, my co-Public Trustee and I refused to approve 
unless a research agenda was pledged by the ex-officio Trustees, who 
were then members of the Bush administration. We felt strongly that 
the short-term palliative of a reallocation should not take place without 
providing for the Congress and the public to gain information that
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would permit a more fundamental look at the program and hopefully 
lead to some reform efforts.
In April of 1993, with new ex-officio Trustees from the Clinton 
administration, we again had the commitment to a research agenda 
renewed and took the position that the Section 709 letter should con 
tinue to be issued until the conditions that called for it were corrected 
by legislation. In other words, the Public Trustees provided continuity 
in seeking a solution to the problem of the impending insolvency and 
persisted in persuading the executive branch and the Congress to reach 
a position where a substantive policy discussion would take place.
Legislative action to do the reallocation took place in 1994, some 
what over two years after the Section 709 warning was issued. In fact, 
it was very close to the last possible legislative moment, since funds
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would have been unavailable to pay benefits sometime in mid 1995 
without that action. As in 1983, there was procrastination, even on a 
relatively noncontroversial way of acting to avert the crisis.
The combination of the 1994 reallocation and the delivery to Con 
gress in 1995 of the study we are discussing sets the stage for the pos 
sibility of a informed debate on the Social Security Disability 
Insurance program and the companion Supplemental Security Income 
program. I saw reallocation then, and I see it today, as providing time 
and opportunity to address the substance of a program that is funda 
mentally troubled and that clearly requires serious reconsideration. At 
the same time, we must not lose sight of the great importance of the 
social security programs to the social fabric of the nation and to the 
many deserving people who rely upon them. The considerable achieve 
ments of the Social Security Administration (SSA) over the years in 
carrying out its responsibilities for administering the program must 
also be acknowledged. As needed changes to the program are devel 
oped, it is important that such changes be done in a careful and consid 
ered manner.
A few basic points can provide perspective in considering the policy 
aspects of the new study.
1. Looking across the entire spectrum of OECD countries, all 
advanced industrialized countries have disability insurance pro 
grams and all are more or less troubled. The United States is not 
an isolated case and, indeed, its problems are not as severe as in 
some other countries. I say this not to lower enthusiasm for 
undertaking the necessary review and reform, but only to indicate 
that we must keep a sense of perspective as we go about this task.
2. The problems of the disability program to date seem to go in 
cycles, or, if not in cycles, at least in fits and starts. My first 
hands-on experience with the program was as Commissioner of 
Social Security in 1978 and 1979, when I worked on the legisla 
tion that resulted in the disability reforms of 1980. That policy 
reconsideration and legislative activity was produced as a result 
of the unexpected expansion of the rolls in the mid 1970s. Then 
as now, a rapid expansion was followed by a plateauing of the 
applications and awards.
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3.1 believe that at least part of the reason for the fits and starts, if not 
cycles, relates to administration of the program. This is not the 
time or place to go into this subject in detail, but my conclusion 
on this is that administration is as critical to the results of the pro 
gram as the legal provisions. Unfortunately, the institutional 
arrangements underlying the program are flawed and sometimes 
unable to accomplish what the law requires or what any reform 
laws are likely to require. This is not to say that all of the institu 
tional arrangements are flawed, because indeed some work well. 
But when the Disability Determination Services are allowing 
some 30 percent of claims and administrative law judges allow 75 
percent, basic issues of administration in both of these processes 
are suggested. In short, unless the administration of the program 
can be improved dramatically, no amount of informed policy 
debate and reform legislation will truly be effective to meet the 
challenges that this troubled program presents.
4. While the law is hard to change, the program in fact changes as 
the society changes, but its shape today is not consistent with cur 
rent thinking about such programs. When enacted in 1956, the 
legal concepts were more a product of the 1930s than of the con 
temporary society that then existed, much less the one we have 
now. The Americans With Disability Act of 1990, which empha 
sizes concepts of self-help and equal opportunity, is closer to cur 
rent thinking. I recognized that anachronisms were present at 
some level when I had hands-on responsibility in the late 1970s, 
but the shift in underlying premises was just beginning to take 
place at that time. A new paradigm is clearly present today and 
needs to inform the policy debate and any reform legislation. 
There are changes in the economy, new patterns of work, and 
changes in the society that must be taken account of more fully 
than has heretofore been the case.
5. Among the new directions that require greater consideration 
today are employment strategies by which applicants for disabil 
ity are given more help to return to work. Similarly, more effort 
might be given to considering privatizing aspects of the process. 
It is entirely possible that private contractors might do a better job 
than government agencies at providing rehabilitation, training,
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and assistance with employment strategies. Recent experiences in 
other areas such as workers' compensation, in which integrated 
approaches to providing medical treatment, long-term health 
care, rehabilitation, and return-to-work assistance, might well be 
instructive. The SSA programs for too long have tended to be iso 
lated from innovative changes that are taking place in the private 
sector, and the use of privatization techniques might be a way to 
better relate aspects of these governmental programs to those pri 
vate sector developments.
6. Underlying much of the current debate is the question of whether 
incremental changes can achieve a desired restructuring of the 
program or whether more fundamental or radical change is 
needed. I would submit that there is no reasonable alternative 
here but to provide for all changes to be incremental, with ade 
quate transition periods. It may be that far-reaching, "radical", 
change is appropriate, but the way to achieve that goal is not- 
through drastic, precipitous action, but by moving incrementally 
in a measured and orderly way. We must constantly be aware of 
the disruption that can be caused by sudden changes in policy for 
which the affected people are not adequately prepared. Also, 
administrative agencies such as SSA, even though well inten- 
tioned with many dedicated people, are inherently limited in their 
ability to implement change. Political realism suggests that prob 
lems of implementation be given careful consideration at the time 
legislation is enacted and that the constraints imposed by the need 
for effective and reasonable implementation be taken into 
account in any reforms. There is a tension between more radical 
proposals and the administrative capacity to make them feasible. 
While there must be a presumption that needed new policies can 
be effectively implemented, it also must be recognized that mak 
ing changes may require that additional resources and adequate 
time be provided to the agencies that are called upon to discharge 
these responsibilities.
7. Bipartisan approaches are needed. We need to overcome the iner 
tia of Washington lobbyists and others representing what they 
think benefits their constituents, which is generally for maintain 
ing as much of the status quo as possible. In our own limited area
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of responsibility, the two Public Trustees, by operating in a bipar 
tisan, nonpolitical, professional way to stimulate research and 
hopefully a substantive policy debate, show the benefits of this 
approach.
Thus, I would urge that an open and candid discussion of alterna 
tives is needed, and I hope we can all contribute to an atmosphere that 
permits that today and in the many difficult days ahead as the process 
towards reform continues.
Unsustainable Growth: Preserving
Disability Programs for 
Americans with Disabilities
Andrew I. Batavia 
Florida International University
The Social Security disability programs, which constitute the essen 
tial safety net for people with disabilities in our country, are growing at 
an unsustainable rate. If we are truly committed to meeting the needs 
of people with disabilities, we must make the changes necessary to 
ensure the long-term viability of these programs. I do not want my fol 
lowing remarks to be misconstrued; while I have no commitment to the 
status quo, I am deeply committed to developing well-designed dis 
ability programs that provide income security while encouraging inde 
pendence for people with disabilities.
I approach these issues from two different, but mutually reinforcing, 
perspectives. First, I view them as a policymaker on Capitol Hill who is 
responding to several national goals: to balance the budget and to get 
the economy back on track, to make government run more efficiently, 
and to assist people with disabilities to live productively and indepen 
dently. Second, I look at them as a person with a disability, who was 
once a recipient of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,
NOTE: This chapter is based on comments delivered when the author was serving as 
Legislative Assistant to Senator John McCain. Several significant program changes 
have occurred since the time of that presentation, particularly with respect to the eligi 
bility of legal aliens and proposals concerning treatment of children with disabilities. 
The chapter should therefore be read not for current program content, but for concep 
tual and historical insight into the programs from the perspective of a Senate aide who 
has a disability and significant experience with the programs. Andrew Batavia is cur 
rently associate professor at the School of Policy Management, College of Urban and 
Public Affairs, Florida International University. The views expressed are solely those 
of the author, and do not necessarily represent the positions of Senator McCain, or any 
organization with which Mr. Batavia is or has been affiliated.
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and who has some serious concerns about the disability programs and 
their effect on people with disabilities.
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
From the perspective of a policymaker, the rapid rate of growth of 
the disability programs in recent years is alarming. The number of 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries alone increased 
27 percent from 1989 to 1993, as compared with a 7 percent increase 
in retired worker social security beneficiaries (DHHS 1994). Disability 
benefit payments increased 51 percent over that period. Applications, 
eligibility awards, and payments for the SSI program are also growing 
dramatically.
Altogether, the federal government is currently spending about $70 
billion each year for the social security disability programs, almost 
twice as much as five years ago (Board of Trustees 1995; Committee 
on Ways and Means 1994). If this upward trend continues, the pro 
grams soon will be subject to increasing political scrutiny and criti 
cism. Eventually, public support for them will dissipate. Because these 
programs are so important, we must get them under control.
There has been a dramatic change over the past thirty years in the 
way our society perceives people with disabilities (see articles by Ross 
and by Weaver, this chapter). Previously, when an individual incurred a 
permanent and significant disability, the general expectation was that 
he or she would no longer be employable or even potentially employ 
able. In recent years, as a result of the independent living movement, 
improvements in assistive technology, and enhanced environmental 
accessibility, there is an increased expectation that even people with 
very substantial disabilities can work.
This social change is best evidenced by the enactment of the Ameri 
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the civil rights law that rep 
resents a national consensus on the goals of our nation's disability 
policy and the legitimate expectations for our citizens with disabilities. 
Many of our disability laws that were established prior to 1990 are 
inconsistent with the ADA's basic premise that people with disabilities 
can be employable and must be given the opportunity to live full and
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productive lives. It is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure that all 
disability policy is consistent with the premises and goals of the ADA 
(DeJong and Batavia 1990).
A PERSONAL DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE
From my perspective as a person with a disability, I am concerned 
about the "entitlement mentality" that the social security disability pro 
grams impose on their recipients, particularly on young people with 
disabilities. Beneficiaries, and even potential beneficiaries, are repeat 
edly given the message that they have a right to benefits as long as they 
can demonstrate an inability to work by virtue of a disability. Even 
those raised with a strong work ethic begin to think about how they can 
demonstrate their absolute inability to work. Once that mind set is 
internalized, it is very difficult to alter.
To avoid this counterproductive self-fulfilling prophecy, people with 
disabilities must be brought into the mainstream of the community as 
soon as possible. This is why antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA 
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) are so 
important. People with disabilities must obtain an expectation of 
employability before they receive and accept the societal message that 
they are "too disabled" ever to work.
In 1973, when my spinal cord was injured in an automobile accident 
at the age of 16,1 was confronted with conflicting messages from the 
people running our nation's disability programs. I was informed that, 
because of the "severity" of my disability (C2-3 quadriplegia), I would 
qualify for SSI and therefore be entitled to cash benefits and Medicaid 
for the rest of my life. However, if I demonstrated the ability to earn a 
small amount of money, I would be disqualified and all of these bene 
fits would no longer be available to me. (This was before the various 
work incentive provisions were enacted in the 1980s.)
I made a decision that was, in a sense, irrational. I decided to take a 
great risk—to go to college, law school, and graduate school with the 
support of vocational rehabilitation, and to thereby become employ 
able notwithstanding my disability. To most Americans, this decision 
may seem neither irrational nor risky. However, by doing so, I was
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potentially compromising tens of thousands of dollars of life-sustain 
ing support for the rest of my life. Moreover, I was doing so without 
any assurance that I would be able to earn comparable benefits through 
employment. The likelihood of regaining eligibility once I had demon 
strated the ability to work seemed remote.
I was fortunate. I have a supportive family and friends who encour 
aged me to take that risk. I also had a vocational rehabilitation counse 
lor named Joan Brown who believed in me and who provided advocacy 
in obtaining the educational benefits I needed. Many people with dis 
abilities do not have such supports. As evidenced by program statistics, 
most make the low-risk decision to stay on the programs permanently. 
Given the basic structure of the system, even with its current work 
incentive provisions, this is not an irrational economic decision. Many 
simply do not trust the government to allow them to regain their bene 
fits once they have lost them.
This has convinced me that we need to alter the programs' structures 
to create strong incentives for people with disabilities to seek gainful 
employment and ultimately to leave the programs. I come to this con 
clusion not because it will save the taxpayers money. In fact, it will 
probably cost somewhat more in the short run to provide the opportu 
nity for people with disabilities to work. I support structural reform of 
the programs because it will improve the lives of people with disabili 
ties by helping them to achieve their highest potentials.
THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
The 104th Congress recently enacted major welfare reform. Inter 
estingly, in a political climate in which almost all means-tested welfare 
programs were being considered to be block granted to the states, the 
disability programs have been largely exempt from the block-granting 
debate. There appears to be a general consensus that these programs 
are such an important part of the safety net that they should continue as 
entitlements. However, that does not mean that they should maintain 
their current structures and policies. The rapid growth of the disability 
programs ensures that we will soon be engaged in a debate over what 
changes should be made.
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The causes of the programs' growth is an extremely complex issue 
and is not well understood (GAO 1994). Among the factors that appear 
to affect the increase in program applications are economic conditions, 
the policies of other social programs, state efforts encouraging people 
to apply, and demographics (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2). However, all 
of these factors interact with the policy structures of the disability pro 
grams. There is a basic conflict between the fundamental premises of 
these programs and the ADA. I believe that this incongruity explains 
much of the reason that very few beneficiaries ever leave the disability 
rolls.
The disability programs are based on an outdated premise equating 
disability with unemployability. DI was initially structured as an early 
retirement program, with the foundational notion that if a person had a 
disability, he or she was basically unemployable; and there was there 
fore no reason to expend substantial resources in a futile effort to get 
the individual ready to work. In this stage of our history, we recognize 
that this is simply not the case. There have been attempts over the years 
to modify the programs' presumption of unemployability through the 
various work incentive provisions. However, the programs still main 
tain their self-defeating historical premise. Until we address this flaw, 
we are not going to get beneficiaries to work.
Adults with Disabilities
The recent growth in the number of adults in the programs appears 
to be largely a result of economic recessions and changes in state pub 
lic assistance programs (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2). In addition, the 
demographics of our aging population is expected to contribute signifi 
cantly to future growth, as the large baby boom population becomes 
more disabled and chronically ill.
While such factors have important implications and represent a 
challenge to finite federal and state budgets, they should not be the pri 
mary focus of program policy. Such growth could be constrained 
through more restrictive eligibility criteria. However, to the extent that 
this would disqualify individuals with significant disabilities that, at 
least temporarily, preclude employment, it would ultimately increase 
their vulnerability and interfere with their employment objectives. By 
far, the more important policy considerations for addressing the growth
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of the adult beneficiary population are appropriate vocational rehabili 
tation, education, and return to work.
Certainly, we should be developing better criteria and mechanisms 
(e.g., functional assessment measures) to determine who should be eli 
gible (Batavia 1992). The current eligibility system is based primarily 
on a medical model of disability that equates impairment with the 
inability to work. The Listing of Impairments used by the Social Secu 
rity Administration (SSA) is a poor proxy for determining functional 
deficits and inability to work. SSA's system of ongoing medical 
reviews in which beneficiaries are categorized and reviewed periodi 
cally according to expected medical improvement is also largely irrele 
vant. Capacity to work is not necessarily associated with medical 
condition or improvement in medical condition; the relationship is far 
more complex, with the more important variables being functional 
capacity and social (e.g., family) support.
Return to work is currently impeded by program policies that dis 
courage beneficiary efforts to become rehabilitated and employed and 
that do not encourage maintenance of any existing relationships with 
former employers (Mashaw et al. 1996; Burkhauser and Haveman 
1982). These policies range from the medical model definition of dis 
ability (assuming a causal relationship between an impairment and the 
ability to work), to a waiting period for eligibility that discourages 
early rehabilitation, to a benefit structure that creates an enormous dis 
incentive to work.
As suggested above, in response to a general consensus that these 
disability programs impose substantial disincentives to work, several 
laws were enacted by Congress in the 1980s to encourage SSI and DI 
beneficiaries to seek gainful employment and leave the disability rolls 
(NARF 1988). Yet, despite this legislation and indications that many 
disability beneficiaries wish to work, few ever leave the programs vol 
untarily (Muller 1989). In December 1993, only 35,299 of the 5.98 
million disabled SSI recipients participated in the Section 1619 work 
incentive program (DHHS 1994, Tables 7.F5 and 7.A3).
The unabated growth of the programs and the failure of the work 
incentive provisions to curtail such growth have demonstrated that 
incremental changes are not sufficient. We need substantial structural 
reform to ensure the long-term viability of the disability programs. In 
1991, when Susan Parker was Associate Commissioner for Disability
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of SSA and I was associate director of the White House Domestic Pol 
icy Council in the Bush administration, we and our staffs developed a 
proposal to fundamentally alter the premises of the disability pro 
grams. It would maintain the entitlement status of the programs but 
make them time-limited, thus creating a presumption and expectation 
of employability (Batavia and Parker 1995).
Our proposal would create four categories of disability:
1. A Permanent Disability Pension, which would apply to individu 
als with no capacity to work (e.g., people with severe brain 
injury)
2. A Temporary Disability Benefit, which would apply to the vast 
majority of beneficiaries, whose benefits would be limited to 
three years but would be potentially expandable for education, 
training, and other activities to become employable
3. An Early Retirement Benefit, which would allow people with dis 
abilities 55 years of age and over to opt out of the job market and 
accept early social security retirement
4. Provision Benefits, including personal assistance services, assis- 
tive technology, and training that would be provided to Tempo 
rary Disability beneficiaries to become employable
In addition, the proposal includes several other provisions that are 
geared to enhance administrative efficiency and encourage beneficia 
ries to work. These include elimination of the current five-month wait 
ing period for DI, expediting the paperwork, determining the 
appropriate course of action through increased beneficiary and physi 
cian responsibilities, using case management techniques to capitalize 
on the beneficiary's functional capacity and relationship with former 
employers, creating positive incentives to work, and establishing a con 
tract between the SSA and the beneficiary in which both would have 
responsibility to ensure that the beneficiary may become employed as 
soon as feasible.
The overarching goal of the proposal is to alter the culture of the 
programs by changing the expectations of all parties. However, the 
proposal will only work if there is adequate funding for rehabilitation, 
training and provision benefits, and if positive incentives to work are
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built in. Fear of losing health insurance and personal assistance ser 
vices creates among the greatest disincentives to work for people with 
disabilities (Friedland and Evans 1996; Batavia, DeJong, and Me Knew 
1993; Burns, Batavia, and DeJong 1991). An array of policy options, 
including reform of our in-kind benefit programs, are available to 
reduce these disincentives (Batavia 1993, 1996).
Children with Disabilities
Much attention has been focused on the rapid growth in the number 
of children in the disability programs after the Zebley Supreme Court 
decision. That decision dealt with the legal standard for children's eli 
gibility. At this time in the history of the programs, we should reexam- 
ine the policy rationale underlying that eligibility standard. With 
respect to adults with disabilities, a cash benefit is clearly justified as 
income replacement for individuals who, as a result of their disabili 
ties, cannot work. This rationale applies to adults, at least for the period 
of time that they are incapable of employment. It does not apply to 
children with disabilities, who are not breadwinners and who therefore 
have not forgone income as a result of their disabilities.
Consequently, some other rationale is needed for a cash payment to 
children. Typically, the justification offered is that the child's disability 
requires the parents to work less and earn less than they otherwise 
would or to hire outside help to assist in addressing the child's disabil 
ity-related needs. The needs of a child with a disability are often much 
greater than those of a nondisabled child, and the costs of meeting 
those needs are correspondingly higher for children with disabilities.
Because the policy rationale for a cash benefit is stronger with 
respect to adults than children with disabilities, further policy consider 
ation should be given as to which children justify a cash payment. It 
may be that the needs of many children with disabilities can be 
addressed entirely through in-kind benefits, including health care, assis- 
tive technology, and personal assistance services. Alternatively, a cash 
benefit may be warranted in certain cases to allow one of the parents to 
stay home and take care of the child. Analysis may reveal that some 
children warrant higher payments than they are currently receiving.
Assuming that it is determined that a cash payment continues to be 
justified for certain children, substantial research will be needed in
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assessing the appropriate eligibility criteria for identifying such chil 
dren and in determining the appropriate amount of the payment.
Legal Aliens
Another issue that has received increasing attention lately is the 
large increase in the number of individuals from other countries who 
have entered the United States legally and who have become recipients 
of the disability programs. It has been reported to Congress that 
approximately 738,000 legal aliens currently receive SSI, up from 
127,000 in 1982 (Rector and Lauber 1995; Matloff 1994). This consti 
tutes a growth rate of 580 percent in just twelve years. The vast major 
ity are elderly, and most apply for benefits within five years of entry 
into the United States. This disturbing trend should not be occurring 
under long-standing federal immigration policy, which precludes 
aliens who may become a "public charge" from entering our country.
There is a tendency to scapegoat noncitizens for the problems of our 
country. In fact, legal aliens have always played an important role in 
our economy and have contributed significantly to the growth of our 
nation. To the extent that they pay into social programs over an exten 
sive period of time, they should be entitled to benefits, proportionate to 
their contribution. However, there is evidence that many are attracted 
to our country primarily by its generous social programs (Rector and 
Lauber 1995). To the extent that this is occurring, policy changes are 
needed. One approach might be to preclude benefits for a stated period 
of time (e.g., three, five, or ten years) after the individual legally enters 
the country.
CONCLUSIONS
There are those committed to the status quo who would argue that 
the policy changes being suggested here, such as time-limiting disabil 
ity benefits, lack compassion. They are wrong. What lacks compassion 
is a system that convinces people with disabilities, and particularly 
children with disabilities, that they are too disabled ever to work. Our 
disability programs currently are fundamentally flawed. While incre-
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mental reforms have improved the programs, they have not corrected 
the basic problems. We must fix the programs to ensure that the people 
who rely on them will receive the benefits that they need, but in a man 
ner that encourages and empowers them to be more independent and 
productive.
Most important, for all people with disabilities, we must raise the 
expectations of our disability programs. As much as any other factor, 
including the work disincentives built into the current system, the pre 
sumption that an impairment necessarily limits the ability to work has 
handicapped generations of program beneficiaries. The experience of 
hundreds of thousands of people with disabilities who are now work 
ing, despite significant functional limitations, proves that this presump 
tion is false. People with disabilities can become gainfully employed if 
we expect them to become gainfully employed, and if they expect 
themselves to become gainfully employed.
Adults with disabilities must be given the expectations, opportuni 
ties, and incentives to seek and obtain gainful employment. Children 
with disabilities must receive the education and training that they need, 
alongside children without disabilities to the extent possible, to offer 
them full opportunities throughout their lives. The programs should be 
reformed to ensure that every dollar spent is invested efficiently in the 
future of their beneficiaries. People with disabilities in our country 
must be encouraged to seek employment to improve their personal sit 
uations and to remove themselves from the dependency of the disabil 
ity programs. Such dependency is neither in their interest nor that of 
our country.
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Policy Implications
of Recent Growth in Beneficiaries
with Mental Illness
Howard H. Goldman 
University of Maryland
I have taken as my task to comment on the analysis of the recent 
growth in the social security disability rolls, especially with respect to 
applications and awards due to mental impairments. I will review four 
questions: Is the analysis correct? Are the increases in applications and 
awards for mental impairments appropriate? Is this the correct set of 
questions from a policy perspective? Given a redefinition of the prob 
lem, what is the appropriate remedy?
1. Is the analysis by the Lewin-VHI team (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2) 
correct? Is there anything to add or modify in their analysis? Gen 
erally, the analysis seems both correct and consistent with the per 
spective of street-level bureaucrats and policy makers. The vast 
majority of the increase in awards is due to the tremendous 
increase in applications. Applications have increased in response 
to several factors, the most powerful of which appear to be eco 
nomic in nature, particularly downturns in the economy for Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) applicants and limitations in 
General Assistance welfare transfers. The latter is an especially 
important factor for applicants for Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) with a mental impairment as the basis for the application for 
disability benefits.
The analysis further speculates that the increases have some 
thing to do with changes in the mental impairment standards for 
disability introduced in 1985. It seems likely that the changes in 
regulations affected both applications and awards, as much by cre 
ating a change in the "adjudicative climate" as by the content and 
wording of the standards themselves. Although the new mental
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impairment regulations addressed a number of barriers to (appro 
priate) awards, they also signaled a policy change at the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), encouraging and facilitating 
application and clarifying previous (inappropriate) restrictions. In 
addition, the new standards reinforced the importance of data on 
work-related functioning in combination with signs and symp 
toms of mental disorders (rather than signs and symptoms alone). 
It is worth noting, however, that the previous standards also had 
functional criteria (similar in form and content to the newer stan 
dards), but they most often were ignored in the assessment of 
claims.
In addition, although there is little to suggest that rates of men 
tal disorders are increasing, there have been efforts in recent years 
to increase the recognition of mental disorders, especially in pri 
mary health care settings. This is particularly true for the most 
prevalent of the serious mental disorders, the affective disorders, 
applications and awards for which have increased most dramati 
cally. The same has occurred for substance use disorders, newly 
uncloseted by SSA policy, permitting substance abuse claims as a 
direct basis for award.
2. Are the increases in applications and awards appropriate? That is, 
do they represent good policy or bad? To the extent that these 
increases represent a correction of prior (misguided) policy, the 
increases in applications and awards are to have been expected 
and should be viewed as an improvement. Generally speaking, 
that accurately reflects my view. If these trends represent an over- 
correction, admitting individuals to the disability program inap 
propriately, that certainly is a problem. I believe some of the sto 
ries of occasional misrepresentation, fraud, and abuse by 
applicants, but I believe that these cases are exceptions rather 
than the rule. Furthermore, I have reason to believe that such mis 
behavior occurs with claims involving other body systems, as 
well. As for problems with discrepancies in decisions between 
various levels of review and appeal, I believe that these represent 
problems with policy implementation rather than with the poli 
cies themselves—and that there are administrative remedies that 
should be pursued before revising the standards.
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If the issue of the appropriateness of these trends actually 
addresses the question of whether these impairments (e.g., affec 
tive disorders) warrant such rates of applications and awards for 
disability benefits, an affirmative answer can be found in the epi 
demiology of mental disorders. Studies of the prevalence of 
depression indicate that approximately 16 million Americans 
each year meet the criteria for a depressive disorder, 2 million of 
whom are considered to have severe depression (National Advi 
sory Mental Health Council 1993). Furthermore, depressive dis 
orders are among the most disabling of common chronic 
conditions. Work-related disability is reported more commonly 
for depression than for arthritis or obstructive lung disease and is 
nearly as disabling as acute coronary artery disease. The work- 
related disability persists, as well, for longer than for the other 
conditions, even when it is symptomatically improved by treat 
ment (Wells et al. 1989; Hays et al. 1995).
3. Are these the correct questions to ask from a policy perspective? 
Is there a problem with the disability program with respect to 
mental disorders? We have become concerned because of the rate 
of growth in applications and awards without knowing what level 
to expect. We do not know what is the "right" rate for mental dis 
ability in the population, and we will not know until we conduct a 
careful study, such as that proposed by SSA in their Disability 
Examination Study. That investigation should begin to give us an 
estimate of what the appropriate demand for benefits due to men 
tal (and other) impairments ought to be, using several criteria 
(signs, symptoms, physical exam and laboratory findings, lay 
reports, and functional assessments). Our current alarm about rate 
increases is this year's reaction (in the context of fiscal concerns) 
to the same data praised last year as a correction of long-standing 
barriers to access for claimants with mental impairments and sub 
stance use disorders.
The Lewin-VHI analysis (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2) does not 
tell us precisely what to expect in the future. It does hint at a pos 
sible major problem with the SSI program in the wake of welfare 
reform: given the experience with limited welfare reform and the 
reactive cost shift of individuals with mental impairments from
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the general relief rolls to the SSI program, we should be prepared 
(and not be surprised) when applications and awards continue to 
rise (or increase at a faster rate).
Applications and awards, however, are not the only potential 
problem. Although I can offer an explanation for the appropriate 
ness of such increases, I am concerned about the duration of dis 
ability status for many individuals with mental disorders. This is 
especially true for the affective and anxiety disorders, which are 
very amenable to treatment. If SSA does not do more to encour 
age appropriate treatment and rehabilitation, then the large num 
bers of individuals entering the front door of the disability 
program will not be matched by a steady exit from the back door. 
This is how I would characterize the real problem associated with 
the mental disorders and the SSI and DI programs.
4. What are some potential remedies to a reformulation of the prob 
lem? What might be done to reduce the duration of receipt of dis 
ability benefits? Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not favor a 
"time-limited benefit" to solve this problem. Current policy sup 
ports the selective review of cases through the Continuing Dis 
ability Review (CDR) process. Although it has been misused in 
the past and is not very well implemented at present, the CDR 
process represents a rational policy. One could reexamine the 
issue of medical improvement and burden of proof. I prefer to 
retain the current policy rather than experiment with a new policy 
that threatens individuals who continue to be disabled with termi 
nation of benefits, subject to the (incredibly slow) process of 
reapplication at the end of a "time-limited" benefit period. If SSA 
cannot effectively implement a current policy requiring periodic 
case-by-case review, why should we introduce another new 
approach with what may prove to be at least as burdensome an 
administrative requirement? Some argue that people on a time 
limit will not reapply in great numbers. I believe that current ben 
eficiaries already believe they have a time limit and are afraid 
they will lose their benefits with any "false move" (such as even 
using a work incentive program to return to work). A time-limited 
benefit might actually stimulate applications and increase awards 
by adjudicators who may decide to just make an allowance,
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"since it is only for a short time, anyway."
If the goal is to change expectations about the disability pro 
gram, let SSA make clear its current policy regarding the dura 
tion of benefits. There is no current policy suggesting that 
benefits should be expected for life. The de facto policy may be 
one of limited exits from the rolls, but this is not because of stated 
policy. It is a problem of policy implementation and should be 
addressed administratively, not by wholesale change in de jure 
policy for which there is no better expectation of improved imple 
mentation of the essential case-by-case review.
Perhaps the most important potential change in policy would 
be to directly address the need for state-of-the-art treatment for 
beneficiaries. I am certain that this problem is not unique to indi 
viduals who are functionally limited because of mental impair 
ments. There are special barriers to treatment of mental illness, 
including stigma, lack of available treatment resources, and lack 
of individual financing for such care. The need to encourage 
treatment and rehabilitation, however, is a universal recommen 
dation for improving SSA's disability program.
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Rethinking the Social Security
Disability Programs: Causes
and Options
Jane L. Ross 
General Accounting Office
The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) programs have been experiencing substantial 
stress as a consequence of rapid growth in the number of program ben 
eficiaries. 1 Several operational problems have also contributed to pro 
gram stress. For example, the media have spotlighted several examples 
of program abuse and inadequate management action, and policy ana 
lysts have criticized the inefficiency of the disability eligibility deter 
mination process as well as the lack of attention to assisting 
beneficiaries in returning to gainful employment. Faced with this broad 
range of problems and the increased scrutiny focused on these pro 
grams, policymakers and the public seem to be open to considering 
program changes.
At the same time, changes have occurred in the way society views 
people with physical and mental impairments—changes that are lead 
ing to a rethinking of the relationship between cash benefit programs, 
such as DI and SSI, and the ability of people with significant impair 
ments to engage in productive work.
These comments address some of the operational problems within 
the DI and SSI programs and some of the societal changes that, in 
combination, are resulting in a receptiveness to rethinking the purpose 
and design of these programs. The comments also summarize some of 




Both DI and SSI currently have significant backlogs of cases await 
ing decisions on eligibility. In particular, waiting time for those who 
are appealing denials of their initial application now averages about a 
year.
As the Social Security Administration (SSA) has struggled to pro 
cess the tremendous number of applications for benefits, it has for 
many years reduced the number of reviews of the disability status of 
people already receiving benefits. Since the same workers are responsi 
ble for initial determinations and these periodic reviews, SSA has had 
to prioritize workloads and has done so by limiting its reviews of con 
tinuing disability status. 2
The net result of the eligibility determination backlogs and limited 
review of continuing eligibility is that SSA has been giving poor ser 
vice to its applicants and neglecting its responsibility for maintaining 
program integrity.
A second operational problem involves Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs), who hear the appeals of applications that have been denied. 
The ALJs are reversing decisions denied at the initial level in about 70 
percent of the cases that they hear. This reversal rate is much higher 
than it has been in years past and reflects the lack of a consistent sys- 
temwide process for determining eligibility. Adverse publicity about 
SSI program abuse by drug addicts and alcoholics, the parents of some 
disabled children, prisoners, and immigrants also signals that program 
managers have not been sufficiently vigilant in determining eligibility 
for benefits or monitoring people once they begin receiving benefits.
Finally, neither the DI nor the SSI program has a good record of 
returning beneficiaries to work. While no one is certain what propor 
tion of the beneficiary population can be expected to work, currently 
about 1 in 500 DI beneficiaries leaves the benefit rolls to return to 
work—a number that is generally agreed to be too low.
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SOCIETAL CHANGES
Society's view of the right of people with physical and mental 
impairments to be accommodated in the work place has changed sig 
nificantly. The public appears to believe that people with impairments 
ought to be assisted in a variety of ways to lead economically produc 
tive lives. More and more, we are coming to believe that categorizing 
people as either disabled or not disabled can't be done accurately. 
Rather, disabled people have a broad range of impairments with vary 
ing levels of severity. Many can be assisted to increase their involve 
ment with the workplace through adaptive technology and medical 
advancements.
There is also greater appreciation that the link between medical 
impairments and ability to work is a weak one. Several studies suggest 
that medical criteria by themselves are poor predictors of work poten 
tial, and many people who meet the DI and SSI eligibility criteria cur 
rently are working.
Society in general also seems to think that people ought to work. 
This view suggests not only that people ought to work if they are better 
off financially when working than when not working, but that most 
people have a responsibility to work. We have seen this view come to 
the fore in the new welfare legislation that limits the amount of time 
individuals can draw benefits. Such proposals are framed in terms of 
numbers of years of receiving benefits, not in terms of income avail 
able to the family. This same view is now being articulated with respect 
to disabled people in proposals that would limit the amount of time that 
they can receive DI and SSI benefits.
There is also a general concern about the overall size of the govern 
ment sector and whether programs such as DI and SSI are including 
larger numbers of people than is appropriate. In the case of the DI pro 
gram, some people are also concerned that taxes used to fund DI bene 
fits reduce the revenue that realistically can be raised for the retirement 
and survivors' insurance programs.
These shifts in the way decision makers and the public think about 
people with disabilities and about the size of the disability programs 
have generated a great deal of discussion about how to ensure that
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everyone who can work is assisted in doing so, while still ensuring 
income support for those who are unable to work.
POLICY OPTIONS
The policy options currently being discussed can be described as fit 
ting into one of three categories: incremental changes that modify spe 
cific provisions to encourage work, leaving the structure of the DI and 
SSI programs intact; changes that alter the current terms under which 
benefits are received, such as imposing time limits for certain benefi 
ciaries, but leave the current eligibility definitions in place; and 
changes that fundamentally redefine program eligibility and the benefit 
structure.
Regardless of whether incremental or more fundamental change 
might occur, most participants in discussions about DI and SSI policy 
changes agree that two actions currently under way at SSA must go 
forward. The first and most ambitious of these is the disability redesign 
project, the goal of which is to make the disability determination pro 
cess more timely, consistent, and cost-effective. This effort includes 
initiatives designed to reduce the time involved in making determina 
tions to standardize the ways in which disability is evaluated at all lev 
els of decision making, and to change the standards by which disability 
is evaluated toward measuring one's ability to function in the work 
place. Second, there also appears to be general agreement that SSA 
should increase the number of reviews of continuing eligibility that it 
performs, so that individuals with some likelihood of medical recovery 
will be reviewed on a regular basis.
INCREMENTAL CHANGES
The main thrust of most incremental reforms is to increase the total 
income and benefits of current beneficiaries who attempt to work. One 
such measure would increase the amount that a beneficiary could earn 
while still receiving benefits. Currently, most beneficiaries become
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ineligible to receive benefits when they earn more than $500 a month 
for nine months.
Another proposal suggests reducing cash benefits gradually as earn 
ings increase over time, rather than terminating benefits abruptly after 
a certain time at work or after a certain earnings level has been 
achieved, as is currently the case. (This proposal is targeted primarily 
at DI, since SSI already has this more gradual benefit offset.)
A third suggestion is that beneficiaries who return to work be 
allowed to retain their Medicare or Medicaid eligibility for much 
longer periods than provided in current law. The fear of losing medical 
coverage may be the most powerful barrier facing beneficiaries who 
consider attempting to work.
Others have suggested a different type of work incentive—a tax 
credit that functions as an earnings supplement for beneficiaries who 
work. A credit would be designed to ensure that an individual's com 
bined income from earnings and the tax credit would be sufficient to 
encourage him or her to try to work and then to stay at work.
A final example of incremental change is a proposal to allow SSA to 
use private rehabilitation firms to help beneficiaries develop skills that 
will facilitate their return to work. Currently, almost all vocational 
rehabilitation financed by SSA is conducted by state agencies. Many 
people believe that expanding the capacity of rehabilitation services 
and introducing competition among providers would be more effective 
in returning beneficiaries to productive activity.
INCREMENTAL PLUS
Some participants in the current policy discussions are concerned 
that the incremental options listed above will not provide enough 
encouragement for current beneficiaries to attempt to work. They 
believe that younger beneficiaries or those with certain impairments 
should receive benefits only for a limited number of years, so that they 
will have very strong incentives to try to work. Time-limited or tempo 
rary benefits could be proposed in conjunction with several of the 
incremental options.
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Another more substantial change to encourage more attempts to 
return to work would be to provide vocational rehabilitation services to 
people who have not yet been determined to be eligible for benefits. 
This approach has been suggested by those who believe that rehabilita 
tion would be much more successful if it were provided well before the 
time an individual is determined to be eligible for benefits.
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
This category of suggested policy changes involves a fundamental 
reorientation of the DI and SSI programs, with a shift in focus from 
proving an individual's inability to work to enhancing and supporting 
an individual's ability to work. The programs might run on two tracks. 
One track would be reserved for those whose disabilities represent 
much more profound functional limitations than the current DI and SSI 
definitions. These individuals would be evaluated as the most unlikely 
to return to work. The second track would be for those with some 
remaining capacity to function in the workplace, but a level roughly the 
same as the current DI and SSI definition of disability. The program 
rules for this group would be quite different from those that exist today 
and would allow for long-term receipt of both benefits and earnings. 
The idea would be to encourage as much work as possible and allow 
benefits to serve as a supplement. The underlying rationale for seg 
menting the program in this way would be to separate the conflicting 
goals in the current system, providing full benefits as long as an indi 
vidual couldn't work while providing significant encouragement and 
incentives to work.
CONCLUSION
The DI and SSI programs are being criticized because of operational 
failings and because they appear to undercut the beliefs that people 
with severe impairments ought to have more opportunity to work and 
that cash benefits should be viewed as a last option. Policymakers and
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the public appear willing to consider changes in the DI and SSI pro 
grams to address both of these types of problems. Many ideas for oper 
ational changes are incorporated in SSA's disability redesign initiative, 
but its focus does not extend to assisting and encouraging beneficiaries 
to return to work. Proposals to encourage return to work range from 
changes in the amounts that individuals can earn and still retain eligi 
bility for benefits to restructuring the programs so that some individu 
als receive both benefits and earnings while those who are unable to 
work continue to receive cash benefits.
Those who support more fundamental reforms acknowledge that 
they don't know what proportion of the DI and SSI populations can be 
expected to work. Even if there is a shift in attitude toward much 
greater emphasis on work, the DI and SSI definition of disability is 
very strict, and most people receiving benefits have severe mental and 
physical impairments. Supporters of these fundamental reforms point 
out, however, that those who apply for benefits under new program 
rules may be more open to the possibility of change than those who are 
currently receiving benefits and who may not be able to adjust to these 
new expectations.
Common to all of these proposals is the recognition that the charac 
teristics of people receiving benefits are changing as are the societal 
norms about the programs and their beneficiaries. In order to restore 
wide public support, DI and SSI will need to response to these new 
realities.
Notes
1. These comments were revised in September 1996 to reflect recent developments 
in legislative provisions and in program growth.
2. In 1996, the Contract with America Advancement Act authorized over $4 billion 
in separate funding for reviews of disability status in fiscal years 1996 through 
2002. In addition, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia 
tion Act authorized an additional $250 million total in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 
for SSI reviews. These additional funds, as appropriated, will allow SSA to do 
more disability status reviews without shifting resources away from competing 
priorities.

Policy Changes to Improve 
Market Outcomes
Carolyn L. Weaver 
American Enterprise Institute
I appreciate having the opportunity to participate in this conference 
and discuss the very important issues surrounding the rapid growth of 
the social security disability programs. This conference really is a first, 
as far as I know, in terms of bringing a significant analytical effort to 
bear on this problem and trying to bridge the gap between the research 
and the public policy worlds. This effort is important and long overdue. 
I hope it turns out to be the first of other such efforts that might 
broaden the base of our knowledge about disability and about the ways 
the government can and cannot reasonably be expected to improve the 
lives of people with disabilities.
Having said this, I will begin with a conclusion: The research pre 
sented by David Stapleton and others confirms what we have known 
for a very long time—disability is not an all-or-none condition, the 
presence or absence of which can be readily discerned in some system 
atic and reliable way. Disability is a complex and changing phenome 
non; it exists on a continuum; and its presence (or absence) and 
severity are extremely difficult to quantify or assess with precision. 
There is not only a problem of assessing the medical severity of indi 
viduals' physical or mental impairments, but also a problem of assess 
ing the impact of these impairments on work ability or on labor market 
or other outcomes. Moreover, the severity of work disabilities for peo 
ple with any particular impairment can be affected mightily by the eco 
nomic incentives and constraints they face.
Superimposed on these problems are all of the problems attendant to 
decentralized, public decision making. Disability determinations are 
made by literally tens of thousands of people in various bureaucratic, 
political, and judicial roles—as well as medical and vocational roles— 
who are subject to constantly changing rules and regulations and bud-
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getary and political pressures. Findings of disability, in other words, 
can be affected mightily by incentives and constraints—in this case, 
the ones facing decision makers (Weaver 1986).
One implication of all of this is that the federal government's largest 
cash benefit programs for people with disabilities, Social Security Dis 
ability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) can 
grow—and shrink—rapidly and serve populations whose compositions 
change dramatically, for reasons that are quite independent of underly 
ing trends in public health or in federal legislation. While this may not 
be news to program administrators or to researchers, it is nevertheless 
cause for deep concern. The federal government makes a very large 
commitment of tax dollars to the social security disability programs— 
close to $70 billion this year ($100 billion including Medicare and 
Medicaid), nearly double the level just five years ago (U.S. Govern 
ment 1995; Committee on Ways and Means 1994; Board of Trustees 
1995). Ensuring that these dollars flow to the people the programs were 
intended to serve would seem to be the first test of their effectiveness. 
Social policies cannot be deemed effective) and certainly not cost- 
effective, simply because a lot of money has been thrown at a problem 
and some of it seems to have stuck in the right place.
This brings me to a question: Who are the social security disability 
programs intended to serve? It is easy enough to give a definitional 
answer—the programs are intended to serve people so severely 
impaired that they cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity 
anywhere in the national economy (it says so right in the law!). But in a 
world with modern technologies, therapies, and medical and vocational 
interventions and techniques, this defines a small segment of the work 
ing-age population with mental or physical impairments. Indeed, a fun 
damental tenet of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is that 
even people with severe disabilities can, if provided the right environ 
ment, work and make lives for themselves and their families. One need 
only consider the example of a person who is, say, blind or deaf—and 
thus categorically "disabled" under social security law regardless of 
educational or professional attainment—to appreciate the fact that the 
social security programs provide ongoing cash support to a broader 
population than implied by the general definition of disability.
The research findings presented at this conference bring into sharp 
focus the extent to which the disability programs are not what they
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once were and do not serve who they once did. Gone are the days when 
DI, for example, served people with physical disabilities who found 
themselves out of work (or quitting work) late in life. Increasingly, DI 
serves prime-age men and women with mental illnesses of some sort, 
most of whom never leave the benefit rolls. Despite dramatic improve 
ments in science and medicine, in technology and information, and in 
the educational opportunities of young people with disabilities, which 
have improved the quality of life of people with disabilities as well as 
the job opportunities open to them, the number of people on the dis 
ability rolls has never been higher (Weaver 1992; Koitz, Kollman, and 
Neisner 1994).
This has many important public policy implications, not the least of 
which is that the idea that DI is an "early retirement" program may die 
hard, but die it must. The beneficiary population is getting younger and 
the opportunities for rehabilitation, recovery, and return to work are 
getting better. Work is the key determinant of economic well-being in 
our society and a widely shared goal of working-aged Americans, dis 
abled and nondisabled alike. Pursuit of this goal is undermined by the 
government only at great fiscal and social cost.
In the spirit of some of the welfare reform proposals now under dis 
cussion, there may be merit to reorienting the social security disability 
programs toward transitional aid for people whose conditions are not 
permanently disabling. The presumption underlying federal policy 
should, in the main, be that people who are disabled can gain the skills 
necessary to work; people who become disabled will recover and go 
back to work. A practical change in current policy that might help 
bring about such a reorientation would be to place a time limit on ben 
efits. For example, benefits might be granted for a period of three 
years. Individuals could reapply for benefits, and, if found unable to 
work, be granted benefits for another fixed period, but the presumption 
would be that work would follow. (This is not inconsistent with the 
suggestion made by Stapleton, Coleman, and Dietrich [1995; and 
Chapter 2, this volume] regarding the payment of temporary benefits 
during economic recessions.)
More direct "work incentive" provisions, which have been added to 
the programs over the years, have been largely ineffective (Muller 
1992; Hennessey and Muller 1994). While the reasons, no doubt, are 
many and varied, two stand out: first, work incentives and other poli-
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cies designed to promote work have typically been superimposed on 
the back end of the disability process—after the individual has left the 
labor force or made the transition from school to unemployment and 
has begun drawing cash benefits; second, they have built a more and 
more complex system atop the central (contradictory) policy—the def 
inition of disability—which requires that the individual be unable to 
work. Individuals who, in order to work, overcome the severe impair 
ments that qualify them for benefits and take advantage of the work 
incentive provisions ultimately find themselves ineligible for cash ben 
efits and without the security of Medicare coverage.
Clearly, reforms intended to improve labor market outcomes for 
people with disabilities must focus on the front end of the disability 
process, keeping people at work or on the path to work so that—to the 
extent possible—they never enter the system in the first place, a system 
described by some disabled people themselves as a "trap." Research 
suggests, for example, that employees who become disabled have bet 
ter labor market outcomes, in terms of duration of employment, when 
their employers work with them from the onset of the disability, main 
taining the continuity of the employee-employer relationship through- 
out the period of hospitalization and rehabilitation, and 
accommodating the workers' changing abilities and circumstances at 
the workplace (Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim 1995). The employer is 
critical to work recovery efforts.
The same message is echoed by rehabilitation counselors. Early 
intervention—ideally before the individual has ever lost his or her 
job—is critical to success.
More generally, reforms must address the employer side of the work 
equation, which is now largely ignored by policymakers. Consider the 
reasonable accommodation requirement in the Americans with Dis 
abilities Act. This amounts to a mandated benefits program, the cost of 
which is imposed on employers. Or consider the DI tax. Employers 
who make accommodations and go the extra mile to hire or retain peo 
ple with disabilities—thus sparing the social security system of at least 
a portion of the potentially large cost of supporting these people for 
life—must pay the same tax as all other employers. Or consider 
increases in minimum wage laws and other mandated benefits pro 
grams. These policies increase the cost of hiring low-skilled workers, 
discouraging the employment of precisely the kind of people who
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dominate the SSI rolls, people with poor educations and few job skills. 
Enhancing the employment of these people—aptly described by 
Burkhauser (1992) as the "doubly disabled"—will clearly require more 
than work incentives and civil rights; it will require basic measures to 
enhance the skills these people bring to the labor market, to reduce the 
barriers to part-time or low-wage work, or to subsidize employer's 
adjustment costs (Weaver 1991).
In the longer term, serious consideration should be given to privatiz 
ing the supply of disability insurance—not for all risks faced by all 
workers, but for the routine risks faced by workers who are not yet dis 
abled. While private insurers do not, by any means, have the answers to 
all or even most of the problems besetting the social security disability 
programs, they do have the ability to respond quickly to changes in 
knowledge and to new circumstances and opportunities—and the 
incentives to do so are strong (Weaver 1986, 1992).
If private insurers were to cover the routine risks faced by the typical 
worker, the federal government could turn to the question of how best 
to target resources on, and to provide more adequately for, people with 
special needs: people born with severe congenital abnormalities, 
unemployed people who become disabled, people with terminal ill 
nesses, people with catastrophic health expenses. DI provides the same 
coverage for everyone and, as a result, cannot meet the needs of any 
particular group particularly well. Some of the substantial resources 
being devoted to providing income support to prime-age men and 
women with substantial work histories could then be redirected to 
other worthy causes—including meeting the needs of children and 
adults with disabilities that leave them little hope of one day competing 
in the job market, with or without civil rights protections.
To date, Congress has managed to side-step the issue of the very 
rapid growth of the DI program—and obscure a very large (50 percent) 
increase in the DI tax rate—by a so-called "tax reallocation" between 
the social security retirement and disability programs (Board of Trust 
ees 1995). Since both programs are in long-range deficit, this was a 
stop-gap measure at best and, in my view, not well advised. The social 
security disability programs cannot retain broad public support without 
effective control over the beneficiary rolls, and effective control is 
unlikely to be achieved until policymakers confront directly the finan 
cial, economic, and social causes and consequences of rapid growth.
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Perhaps the next fiscal crisis will focus the attention of policymakers 
and provide the impetus for considering revamping two programs that 
provide much needed support to some and one-way tickets out of the 
labor market for many others.
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Advances in medical treatments, technology, and civil rights policy 
have created optimism that people with disabilities will increasingly 
become a part of the labor force. Yet that optimism has not yielded 
measurable outcomes in the employment rate of people with disabili 
ties, which has consistently ranged between 23 percent and 45 percent, 
depending on the definitions of "employment" and of "disability" used. 
In addition, the number of people entering the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) rolls has 
increased notably in the last decade, from 4.2 million in 1985 to 11 
million in 1996. The percentage of those leaving the rolls for the pur 
pose of returning to employment persistently remains less than 1 per 
cent.
Puzzled by this seeming contradiction between the improvements 
that should lead to increases in employment for people with disabilities 
and the steady increase on the SSI/DI rolls, the Social Security Admin 
istration (SSA) set about to examine why the return-to-work rate (or 
the rate of entering the workforce for the first time) is so low for bene 
ficiaries with disabilities. We reviewed the literature, talked to the 
experts, and dedicated ourselves to hearing from beneficiaries them 
selves about the obstacles they face when they consider returning to 
work. The following is a summary of what we learned.
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HIGH RISK OF LOSING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
When people with disabilities become SSI beneficiaries, they gener 
ally become Medicaid beneficiaries as well. After two years, DI benefi 
ciaries are eligible for Medicare. In general, loss of cash benefits may 
eventually lead to loss of health insurance as beneficiaries increase 
work earnings, even though they may not have improved medically. 
Between 1988 and 1992, the number of uninsured people grew by five 
million people in the United States. In addition, limits on employer- 
based health coverage for chronic conditions expanded. People with 
disabilities may find it difficult to access private health insurance 
because of preexisting condition exclusions and waiting periods 
imposed by carriers. Some people with disabilities need part-time 
employment due to limitations imposed by their disabilities. Part-time 
employment is rarely accompanied by health insurance benefits. Some 
people with disabilities need personal assistance services, which in 
many states are covered only by Medicaid. Thus, even if beneficiaries 
were to replace their public health insurance with private health insur 
ance, they would not likely receive coverage for all the services they 
need.
In a survey of more than 1,200 disability leaders from every state, 
the President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities 
(1994) found that loss of Medicare and Medicaid was perhaps the sin 
gle greatest barrier to employment. Another survey of disability pro 
gram applicants found that 75 percent of DI applicants and 79 percent 
of SSI applicants considered continued medical coverage as key to 
encouraging work.
Several work incentives address this problem. DI beneficiaries can 
continue Medicare coverage for at least 39 months following a trial 
work period and purchase Medicare after that time. SSI recipients can 
continue receiving Medicaid coverage up to a state-determined income 
ceiling after their earnings become too high for them to be eligible for 
cash payments. For example, in 1994 the cutoff point was $17,480 in 
Pennsylvania.
These work incentives do not appear to have a significant impact on 
the return-to-work rate of a large number of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries 
are generally unaware of the provisions. One survey found that 80 per-
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cent of beneficiaries who returned to work were unaware of the incen 
tives at the time they did so (Hennessey and Muller 1996). When 
beneficiaries are aware of the incentives provisions, they rarely under 
stand them fully; the incentives are complex, with different provisions 
applying to SSI and DI. Social security claims representatives have a 
difficult time explaining them and are generally focused on establish 
ing the applicant's eligibility and inability to work rather than pursing 
return-to-work goals.
WORK THAT PAYS THE BILLS
Some people with disabilities have enormous disability-related 
expenses, such as assistive technology or personal assistance services, 
for which there is rarely a subsidy, tax credit, or insurance reimburse 
ment. Some people with disabilities require extra time to accomplish 
daily activities, which means they may have less time and energy avail 
able for work. Others may have recurring or cyclical health problems, 
such as mental illness or multiple sclerosis, that require flexible work 
situations enabling them to meet their intermittent disability-related 
needs. Finding employment that is responsive to these needs and that 
offers a living wage can be difficult.
In addition, people with disabilities are often less educated than peo 
ple without disabilities and thus tend to have lower-paying jobs. While 
people with disabilities who work have an average income that is 
higher than people with disabilities who do not work, people with dis 
abilities earn less than people without disabilities. One analysis found 
the average earned income of workers with disabilities in 1995 to be 
$15,556, while it was $24,667 for workers without disabilities (Yelin 
1996).
In addition to receiving cash benefits and health care, people with 
disabilities who have low incomes may be receiving other types of 
public subsidies, such as food stamps, housing assistance, and energy 
assistance. Returning to work may jeopardize the cash benefits, the 
health insurance benefits, and all addition benefits. The loss of cash, 
medical, and other benefits may total an irreplaceable loss to a low- 
skilled worker who is likely to be compensated at minimum wage.
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CUSTOMER CHOICE AND PROVIDER INCENTIVES 
FOR RETURN TO WORK
While most recipients of disability benefits are unlikely candidates 
for return-to-work programs, a significant percentage are. Thirty-five 
percent of DI beneficiaries responding to a 1993 questionnaire indi 
cated an interest in receiving return to work services (cited in U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1996). Demonstration projects conducted 
by SSA, such as Project Network, have enabled beneficiaries with 
vastly different impairments to return to work. Yet the current system 
yields few beneficiaries who do return to work.
The Social Security Act requires referral of disability applicants to 
state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies. On average, state Dis 
ability Determination Services offices refer about 8 percent of appli 
cants who are awarded benefits. Less than 10 percent of those referred 
are accepted by the VR agencies as clients. State VR agencies success 
fully rehabilitate about 1 out of every 1,000 beneficiaries each year 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1996).
Because of the limited capacity and resources to serve all who may 
benefit from VR services, many state VR agencies limit the referrals 
they will accept to those they consider to be the best VR candidates. 
SSI or DI beneficiaries are often perceived as less appealing candidates 
because they may be seen as more difficult to rehabilitate. Although 
SSA pays VR agencies for rehabilitation costs of beneficiaries success 
fully employed for nine.months, the delay in payments and the risk 
accepted by the VR agency are often cited as disincentives to rehabili 
tate SSI/DI beneficiaries.
Customers assert that they know best which services would help 
them return to work. They dislike becoming involved with yet another 
government bureaucracy in order to access such services. Some need 
training that employers can best provide. Some need personal assis 
tance services or assistance with transportation. Customers want to 
choose the service provider that will enable them to design their own 
individualized rehabilitation services to meet their unique needs.
In 1996, SSA initiated a program to allow private rehabilitation pro 
viders to be reimbursed for serving SSI/DI beneficiaries when the state 
VR system does not serve them. SSA hopes that private providers will
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offer greater choice for beneficiaries who seek to return to work. They 
also invited state VR agencies to create performance partnerships. 
While only six agencies are participating, early results are promising.
YOUTH IN TRANSITION
The average age of SSI/DI recipients has decreased in recent years. 
As of 1994 about 4.2 percent of SSDI beneficiaries and 19.2 percent of 
SSI recipients were between the ages of 18 and 29. Today more than 
one million beneficiaries are younger than 22. Many who enter the 
rolls as children stay on the rolls through their adolescence and into 
adulthood. The proportion of beneficiaries with long-lasting impair 
ments, such as mental impairments, has increased in the last decade. 
Thus, many recipients are coming on the rolls earlier and staying 
longer.
DI, and to a lesser extent SSI, was originally constructed as an early 
retirement program. The programs are intended to replace cash income 
when a wage earner needs to retire before age 65. Therefore, in the eli 
gibility process, the focus is on the limitations of people needing to 
retire, not on their abilities. The programs were not designed for young 
people with significant impairments who nevertheless have ambitions 
and need to develop skills to achieve them. Too often they, and some 
times their families, may become dependent upon cash benefits that 
limit both their income and their potential. As the number of young 
people coming on the rolls increases and the length of stay increases, 
we must ask ourselves if a "retirement" model will best meet the needs, 
ambitions, and potential of so many of our nation's youth with disabil 
ities.
CONCLUSIONS
We believe the four key areas we have identified as obstacles to 
return to work for SSI/DI beneficiaries—access to health insurance 
(including personal assistance services), finding work that pays enough
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to live on, customer choice of return-to-work services, and the unique 
needs of youth—must be addressed if we are to improve our employ 
ment outcomes among beneficiaries. SSA is committed to supporting 
all beneficiaries who want to work. However, many of the obstacles 
people with disabilities encounter in seeking to work are beyond the 
scope of cash benefit policy and programs. Our nation's employment 
policy must accept and support people with disabilities as part of the 
American workforce, not as ancillary to it. SSA is working with other 
federal agencies to identify policy options that will remove employ 
ment obstacles encountered by our beneficiaries. Our customers have 
told us clearly that our federal return-to-work efforts need improve 
ment. We have heard them and we are moving forward with our federal 
partners seeking to address their concerns.
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Policies to Make Work Pay for 
People With Disabilities
Richard V. Burkhauser 
Syracuse University
The onset of a disability need not, and in the majority of cases does 
not, mean the end of work for people with disabilities (see Burkhauser 
and Daly 1996a, 1996b). The premise that most people with disabili 
ties can work contradicts the image of people with disabilities as "vic 
tims." Dedicated disability advocates have succeeded in getting an 
increasing share of young people with disabilities on the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) rolls. The question is, should this continue to be 
the primary policy goal of our disability system?
Previous chapters in this book have documented that changes in the 
business cycle and in policy variables account for more of the growth 
in Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI applications and 
awards over the past decade than does a nationwide decline in health. 
General economic conditions and the relative ease of access to and 
generosity of benefits encourage some people with disabilities to apply 
for benefits. Aarts, Burkhauser, and de long (1996) offer additional 
evidence that this is happening internationally. They compare disability 
transfer populations across countries and time periods and argue that 
these differences cannot be explained by differences in underlying 
health conditions alone. In 1994 the United States had about five work 
ing-age people on disability transfers for every one hundred workers, 
while in the Netherlands, which has an extremely generous and easily 
accessible disability transfer system, there were fifteen working-age 
people on disability transfers per one hundred workers. Policy matters.
But this does not imply that all persons with disabilities can work. 
There is great diversity within the population with disabilities both 
with respect to the severity of their disability and the skills they bring 
to the workforce. Those with disabilities who also have poor work 
skills are doubly disadvantaged in the labor market. Nevertheless,
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while severe disabilities or poor work skills limit market opportunities, 
the previous chapters are heartening because they suggest that changes 
in policy could result in more employment for people with disabilities.
To date, efforts to encourage disability transfer recipients off the 
rolls via extending Medicaid benefits or lowering the implicit tax on 
SSI benefits have not been successful. This is not surprising, given 
Moffitt's (1992) study of exits from AFDC and his more recent study 
(Hoynes and Moffitt 1996) of exits from disability transfer programs. 
Both papers suggest that people on government transfer rolls are not 
very sensitive to tax rate changes. In fact, Hoynes and Moffitt argue 
that making eligibility easier for those with disabilities who do work is 
likely to increase program participation rather than lower it, since a 
large share of people with disabilities who work might become eligible 
for benefits with a more relaxed work test. It appears doubtful that any 
of the back-to-work incentives now being tried will succeed.
Furthermore, Bound (1989) documents that the majority of those 
who go through the DI application process and are rejected do not 
return to work. Initially, these findings suggest that policy variables 
may not be important in the decision of people with disabilities to 
work, since few applicants to DI and SSI, rejected or successful, return 
to work.
But there is an alternative explanation. The timing of a work-based 
intervention may be as important as the intervention itself. By the time 
people with disabilities have gone through the long application and 
appeals process, in which not working is critical evidence of an 
"inability to perform substantial gainful activity," most of their links to 
the labor market have been severed. Hence, interventions to return 
them to work are much less likely to succeed than those applied imme 
diately following the onset of a disability to reduce the likelihood of 
their leaving work.
There is evidence that early intervention- helps to keep people with 
disabilities in the workforce. Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995) find 
that accommodation by employers extends tenure on the job following 
the onset of a disability. The average worker without accommodation 
stayed 2.2 years with his employer after onset. The average worker 
who was accommodated stayed 7.5 years with his employer after 
onset. To put this another way, 75 percent of those who were not 
accommodated were gone after three years. But it was nine years
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before 75 percent of workers who were accommodated left their 
employer.
If the timing of an intervention is critical to its success, then there 
may also be more effective strategies to reduce the disability rolls and 
further increase work among people with disabilities than are currently 
being tried. Below I suggest four such possibilities.
TAX-SUPPORTED SUBSIDIES TO KEEP EMPLOYEES 
WITH DISABILITIES ON THE JOB
Employers are much more likely to accommodate workers who 
become disabled on the job than to take on new workers with disabili 
ties. Most employers have made some investment in their employees 
and have better knowledge of their work capabilities than they do of 
potential employees. Hence, it is not surprising that they are more will 
ing to maintain such workers on the job after the onset of a disability 
than they are to hire new workers with disabilities. But it is not obvious 
that the stick of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 mandate is 
the appropriate mechanism for increasing accommodation. The carrot 
of tax-supported subsidies to pay for employer-provided accommoda 
tions would be more effective. Moreover, it would get us out of the 
habit of thinking that such accommodations, which we pay for in 
higher prices for the products we buy, are costless just because the 
costs do not show up on the federal budget.
TAX SUBSIDIES FOR RELATIVELY LOW-PRODUCTIVITY 
WORKERS
A larger share of people with disabilities work full time in Sweden 
and Germany than in the United States because Sweden, through direct 
job creation, and Germany, through explicit quotas, directly intervene 
in the labor market to make sure that people with disabilities are 
employed. Neither of these interventions into the labor market make 
political sense in the United States. But there is a uniquely American
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alternative to such direct market interventions: the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC).
The EITC, which currently uses the tax system to subsidize the 
work of low-income families with children, could substantially 
increase work by people with disabilities, especially those with low 
productivity. In 1993, the Clinton administration, with bipartisan sup 
port, dramatically increased the size and scope of this program. In 
1996, workers with two children received 40 cents in benefits for every 
dollar of their labor earnings up to a maximum of $8,900. For a mini 
mum-wage worker, for instance, this tax credit transforms a $5.15 per 
hour minimum wage into a wage of $7.21 per hour ($5.15 x 1.40 = 
$7.21).
A variation on this program would offer a Disabled Workers' Tax 
Credit (DWTC) to subsidize the labor earnings of people with disabili 
ties who live in low-income households. This would especially target 
the doubly disadvantaged, whose work skills yield them relatively low 
labor earnings in the private sector. For instance, a 40 percent tax 
credit on the wage earnings of those aged 18 to 25 with a disability 
would 1) encourage children with disabilities reaching the age of tran 
sition from school to work to choose work rather than SSI, and 2) off 
set, to a large degree, the effective tax rate on current SSI recipients 
who do work. The 1996 National Academy of Social Insurance's Dis 
ability Policy Panel recommends such a credit for a broad range of 
people with disabilities who have serious disabilities, whether or not 
they are eligible for disability transfer benefits (Mashaw and Reno 
1996). (For a broader discussion of the DWTC, see Burkhauser, 
Glenn, and Wittenburg 1997.)
A great public policy tragedy occurred in 1993 when the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy Evaluation, David Ellwood, convinced the admin 
istration to push for an extension of the EITC but no one in the admin 
istration or in the disability advocacy community seized that moment 
to extend the credit to people with disabilities. I understand why Ell- 
wood didn't do it. He, like most poverty policy experts, divides the 
population into two groups: those who are expected to work and those 
who are not expected to work. To him people with disabilities are not 
expected to work. But where were the disability advocates? Why didn't 
they push the message behind the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 to its logical conclusion and fight to extend the EITC as a means
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of further integrating the doubly disadvantaged into the labor market? I 
believe in 1993 there would have been a bipartisan majority ready to 
make that logical step if only someone had pointed the way. A biparti 
san majority continues to support the EITC's role as the major federal 
program aimed at making work pay. And I believe the passage of a 
DWTC is possible. But to achieve this goal, policymakers need to be 
convinced that most people with disabilities can work and should 
therefore be expected to work. And, therefore, that people with disabil 
ities should first be targeted for work-based programs, not transfer pro 
grams. But to win over policymakers, it is first necessary that the 
advocates of people with disabilities believe that work is possible.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Previous chapters have documented how the Social Security Admin 
istration's outreach efforts, together with state efforts to shift welfare 
costs, increased applications for SSL This is further evidence that the 
marching orders federal and state policymakers give to the frontline 
gatekeepers of our disability system influence the work versus transfer 
outcomes of people with disabilities. The Carter administration in 1978 
sent word to state administrators that DI and SSI rolls were rising too 
fast and that the eligibility process needed tightening. This moral, or 
immoral suasion, depending on your point of view, greatly reduced 
acceptance rates with no formal change in the law.
Aarts, Burkhauser, and de long (1996) compare work and transfer 
aspects in the disability programs of several western industrial coun 
tries. Those countries in which gatekeepers are given a clear signal that 
return-to-work is the primary goal of disability policy—e.g., Sweden 
and Germany—are the countries that best achieve this goal.
While the supply of disability applicants is influenced by the indi 
vidual incentives they perceive, the "demand" for applicants by gate 
keepers, which can be evidenced both by explicit procedures as well as 
by attitudes, also matters. If the gatekeepers of our disability system 
are signaled that successful placements into rehabilitation, training, 
and jobs are their measure of administrative success, it is likely we will 
see more such placements. But, unlike many European countries, our
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rehabilitation system is almost completely separate from our benefits 
transfer system, and it would be much harder to achieve coordination 
between the two.
TIME-LIMITED BENEFITS
To be eligible for permanent SSI or DI benefits, a person must be 
unable to perform "substantial gainful activity" for at least one year. I 
propose that those who meet this criterion but still may recover or be 
able to return to work after one year be given only a temporary SSI or 
DI benefit. After one year they would be fully reevaluated for perma 
nent benefits. During this temporary benefit period, recipients would 
have an opportunity to receive training and/or rehabilitation necessary 
to put them back to work. This proposal is much more important now 
that DI and SSI are shifting from bridges to early retirement toward 
lifelong programs for younger workers.
CONCLUSION
For the majority of people with disabilities, onset of a disability 
occurs after they have entered employment. Most people continue to 
work for some time after the onset of a disability. The timing of poli 
cies to prolong workforce participation may prove to be as important as 
the implementation itself, policymakers should begin to make work 
pay for people with disabilities through tax subsidies to employers, dis 
ability tax credits, the use of temporary benefits as a mechanism for 
trying rehabilitation before permanent transfers, and as a general signal 
to gatekeepers that return to work is the primary goal of social policy. 
The enactment of these pro-work reforms is likely to reduce the dis 
ability transfer population and increase the employment of people with 
disabilities.
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Private Sector Disability
Management Activities and the
Social Security Disability Program
Patricia M. Owens 
UNUM Life Insurance Company of America
Social security is a work disability construct, and work disability is 
a core concept for workplace disability managers as well. When a per 
son is unable to work because of an illness or injury, an alternative 
income stream may be made available from public and private sources 
during the period of disability. Private sector disability management is 
an increasingly important influence over how the various disability 
programs interact. Studies done by insurers and academic researchers 
reveal that employers spend up to 1 percent of payroll on disability 
management. This includes a variety of programs to prevent disability 
or minimize disability impact, such as wellness programs, employee 
assistance plans, medical clinics geared toward minimizing disability, 
employee safety programs, claims management activities, and return- 
to-work programs.
Thus, workplace disability management can be defined as services 
and programs that involve providers, employers, and employees in pro 
moting healthy workers and workplaces and that are believed to actu 
ally reduce the impact and cost of disability to all parties. The field is 
evolving in more sophisticated directions as its foundation becomes 
more grounded in the multifaceted and evolutionary nature of disabil 
ity and recognizes the various contributors to disability. Its activities 
focus on both the employer or organizational level and on the individ 
ual worker.
With its development, workplace disability management is helping 
discover a host of contributors that affect why an individual cannot and 
does not work. Medical factors are among many multidimensional 
contributors that develop over time on a work disability continuum.
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The demands of work, changes in work environment, economic condi 
tions, family issues, and education are just a partial sample of the 
potential contributors or forces in each case. Given this circumstance, 
determining disability status under any program designed to provide 
income in lieu of work is as much art as science. As others have noted, 
this complexity can cause various levels of functional loss to be com 
pensated, depending on definitions and decision-making approaches.
Workplace disability management often focuses on people who are 
unable to work because of a medical condition and, after a time, 
recover function. However, this field also concerns itself with worsen 
ing impairments and functional limitations that can be episodic. 
Accommodation or return to work for current employees in these situa 
tions, or hiring a person with this type of disability, raises a different 
set of issues.
Clearly, the framework for accommodation or return to work is dif 
ferent for a current employee (as distinguished from a job applicant). 
Employers have legal and moral obligations relating to the health, 
safety, and general welfare of employees. As a result, this is an area 
where we can more readily see the impact of workplace disability man 
agement and its relationship to Social Security Disability Income (DI).
The course of action for employees who become disabled is influ 
enced by whether an illness or injury arose from work. The employer 
has liability in workers' compensation, and the employee recourse to 
litigation is more common. This can impact employment policy, both 
positively and negatively.
Other issues will come into play when the injury or illness is not 
work-related. For example, whether the employer provides health and 
disability benefits and whether those benefits are insured or self- 
insured will affect employment policy toward persons who become 
disabled. Employers paying for health and disability benefits in lieu of 
wages can be more eager to get the person back to work in order to 
minimize these payouts. By contrast, if insurance pays and the 
employer feels no direct or indirect costs that cannot be cost-benefit 
rationalized, the employer's motivation might be to replace the dis 
abled person with a more productive employee or downsize and abol 
ish the job. Benefit programs are either seen as a bridge to return a 
person to work or as a humane way to assist the person out of the
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workplace and both techniques can improve productivity. Often it is 
the insurer advocating stay at work or return to work.
Disability management principles emphasize the costs of not man 
aging disability. Potential savings sources range from the fundamental 
benefit of prevention to savings produced by returns to work or integra 
tion of health and disability benefits. The fact that the disability man 
agement field has recognized and advanced these principles is having 
an effect on employment policies. At one time, disability programs 
focused on assisting a qualified person to secure social security bene 
fits to offset any private benefits. This still happens, but more often now 
as a last resort. The reason: disability managers have recognized that, 
absent a full recovery, return to work is much less likely once a person 
is receiving social security benefits. However, the last resort of secur 
ing social security benefits is still driven by employment policies, 
which do not focus on return to work. In this way, social security enti 
tlement becomes a focal point in the increasingly complex interaction 
of workplace disability management and employment policy.
Social security eligibility is linked to these dynamics in another 
unique way. With its strict definition, often stricter than private pro 
grams, social security payment becomes a benchmark that the person 
truly cannot work. In effect, this relieves the insurer and employer of 
return-to-work responsibility and of at least part of the liability, assum 
ing there is no recovery.
The wide expanse of the economic environment affects the employ 
ment of persons with disabilities. Employer cost-cutting caused by glo 
bal competition, economic downturns, or shareholder demands are 
among the issues that will act upon employment policies. Social secu 
rity disability experience is influenced by the range of business climate 
issues that affect employment policies.
Individual disability management outcomes are influenced by 
employee and employer motivations. The genesis, nature, and timing 
of the impairment will produce different outcomes, depending on 
where a person is in his or her work cycle. Issues such as how workers 
like their boss, their work environment, and whether they have worked 
with a disability or impairment before can all be relative to whether 
they seek disability payment. The employer's experience with the 
employee—past performance and whether that performance has been
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poor because of attitude—will influence how the employer deals with 
an employee.
The nature of the impairment is important too. For example, co- 
morbidity of untreated depression with other impairments can prevent 
a return to work. Work requirements may fit or accommodate well with 
some and not other disabilities.
Presuming an enlightened employer, employment policy with regard 
to persons with disabilities depends partly on persons wanting to work 
and having more incentive to work than to stay at home. It also 
depends on there being a job available that the person can do and wants 
to do. This is not meant to be uncomplimentary. Too often it makes 
more sense from the individual's perspective to stay home—there is 
too much to risk in even trying to go back to work, especially if health 
and cash benefits are at stake. Employers, for their part, may feel they 
have done their moral duty by paying social security and private bene 
fit premiums.
Private sector disability management works regularly with all of the 
aforementioned incentives and disincentives. The field is having an 
increasingly important impact on employment policies. These activi 
ties become important considerations when addressing social security 
disability policy.
The Promise and Limitations of
Employment Policies 
for Current SSI Recipients
Craig Thornton 
Mathematica Policy Research
I would like to use a specific example to illustrate some of the prom 
ise and limitations of using employment support programs to assist 
current Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients to obtain 
employment and reduce their dependence on SSI. This example comes 
from the Social Security Administration's Transitional Employment 
Training Demonstration, which tested time-limited employment and 
training services for SSI recipients with mental retardation.
THE TRANSITIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING 
DEMONSTRATION
The Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, which oper 
ated from 1985 to 1987, was designed to help SSI recipients with men 
tal retardation increase their economic and social self-sufficiency.' 
Specifically, it sought to overcome a number of barriers that appeared 
to prevent SSI recipients with mental retardation from obtaining and 
holding jobs. In this way, the program attempted to help the recipients 
by increasing their employment, earnings, level of community integra 
tion, and total income while at the same time reducing government 
expenditures for SSI payments.
Intensive Employment Support Services
Transitional employment as fielded in the demonstration consisted 
of five core services intended to assist SSI recipients with mental retar-
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dation obtain and hold competitive jobs—that is, economically produc 
tive jobs that are essentially undifferentiated from other jobs that exist 
in the economy. The five core services were
• Outreach to all mentally retarded SSI recipients between the ages 
of 18 and 40 to invite them to enter the demonstration programs
• Waivers to SSI regulations to ensure that any recipients who 
chose to enroll in the demonstration could maintain their eligibil 
ity for SSI benefits while they received training
• Placement in potentially permanent competitive jobs
• On-the-job training that was provided by program staff and was 
gradually faded out over time so as to promote independence on 
the job
• Post-placement support and follow-up as necessary for job reten 
tion
The other distinguishing feature of transitional employment in the 
demonstration was that services were time-limited. In the demonstra 
tion, the core services were to be provided within one year from the 
time the SSI recipient enrolled in the demonstration. However, there 
was an expectation that arrangements would be made during that year 
for any necessary job-retention services, although those services had to 
be funded by a source other than the demonstration.
This approach to training and employment support was based on the 
then-emerging literature on supported employment (Moss 1980; Rusch 
and Mithaug 1980; Wehman 1981; Kiernan and Stark 1986; Rusch 
1986). A key feature of this approach is the customization of services 
inherent in using program staff to provide on-the-job training. This 
training enables participants to learn their jobs in the actual work envi 
ronment in which they would continue to work after the training was 
completed. The training covers the production aspects of the job and 
the equally important nonproduction aspects such as travel to and from 
work, relations with supervisors and co-workers, and effectively man 
aging the money earned from the job.
In general, the outreach, waivers, job placement, on-the-job training, 
and job retention services called for in the demonstration model were 
provided (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988). SSI recipients who 
enrolled in the program stayed for an average of 10.5 months, during
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which staff provided each enrollee with an average of 114 hours of 
direct service (that is, staff time spent working directly with a client or 
on that client's behalf). It is estimated that it would cost approximately 
$5,600 (in 1986 dollars) to provide these services in an ongoing pro 
gram that was not part of a demonstration (this cost would be approxi 
mately $7,400 per enrollee in 1995 dollars). There was substantial 
variation across individuals, with some enrollees receiving services 
costing less that $500 and others costing more than $25,000.
Active Outreach to Eligible SSI Recipients
Eligibility for the demonstration was limited to SSI recipients who 
1) were between 18 and 40 years old, 2) had a diagnosis of mental 
retardation in their SSI files, and 3) lived in one of the thirteen commu 
nities served by the eight demonstration training organizations. The 
case folders of over 30,000 SSI recipients were screened to identify 
such recipients. Approximately 13,800 eligible recipients were identi 
fied and were sent invitation letters that described the demonstration. 
In addition, follow-up letters, telephone calls, and outreach to service 
providers in the communities were also used to recruit recipients into 
the demonstration. A total of 2,404 recipients expressed at least some 
interest in the demonstration. Intake workers in the training organiza 
tions described the available demonstration services to all interested 
applicants and explained that participation in the demonstration was 
strictly voluntary. If the applicant consented to participate and the 
intake worker decided that the applicant could be served, the applicant 
was formally enrolled in the demonstration. A total of 745 SSI recipi 
ents with mental retardation (approximately 5 percent of the eligible 
population) were enrolled in the demonstration: 375 of these recipients 
were assigned randomly to the treatment group and the remaining 370 
of the recipients were assigned to the control group.
Limitations of Demonstration Enrollees
The average IQ score for the mentally retarded SSI recipients who 
enrolled in the demonstration was 57: approximately 84 percent had IQ 
scores between 40 and 70, and 6 percent had scores below 40. 2 In addi 
tion, 83 percent of the enrollees also had physical, social, or emotional
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problems that could be expected to impair their ability to function in 
the labor market. Approximately a third of the persons who were 
enrolled had no vocational activity during the year prior to their appli 
cation, and another third had only worked in sheltered workshops dur 
ing that time. Only 10 percent of the enrollees had held a competitive 
job in the previous year.
Rigorous Evaluation Component
In order to assess the extent to which the demonstration accom 
plished its goals, the demonstration included a formal evaluation com 
ponent designed to produce accurate estimates of the impact of the 
demonstration services on the key outcomes. The key feature of the 
evaluation was the use of an experiment that randomly assigned eligi 
ble volunteers to either a treatment group, which was offered transi 
tional employment services, or a control group, which was precluded 
from receiving the demonstration services but was free to obtain any 
other available services. By comparing the post-randomization activi 
ties of these two groups, the evaluation estimated the impact of adding 
the demonstration services to the services and incentives characterizing 
the status quo. Data for the evaluation came mostly from the Social 
Security Administration's (SSA's) Supplemental Security Record files 
and from an Intake Data Collection Form that collected information 
about the characteristics of sample members at the time they enrolled. 
In addition, enrollees at nine of the thirteen sites were interviewed in 
the fall 1988 (approximately three years, on average, after they 
enrolled in the demonstration). This survey provides a point-in-time 
glimpse of the job characteristics, wages, and work hours of the sample 
members.
Increased Services and Earnings for Enrollees
A comparison of the treatment and control groups indicates that the 
demonstration was successful in delivering the transitional employ 
ment services. The demonstration projects placed two-thirds of the 
treatment-group members on jobs during the demonstration. Half of 
those persons (or one-third of all treatment-group members) were suc 
cessfully stabilized on a potentially permanent job, that is, they
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reached a point where project staff felt that the person was capable of 
performing the work without the active ongoing support of the training 
program. This placement rate is consistent with the rate observed for 
other large employment programs for persons with disabilities (see, for 
example, Kerachsky and Thornton 1987).
The evaluation also showed that the demonstration services had a 
clear and persistent impact on the treatment-group members who were 
offered the demonstration services (Decker and Thornton 1994, 1995). 
The most important findings include the following points (many of 
which are illustrated in Figure 12.1).
• The SSI recipients who enrolled in the demonstration differed 
substantially from the eligible nonparticipants. Enrollees were 
slightly younger, had been on SSI a shorter period, and were 
more likely to have had recent earnings.
• Prior to enrolling in the demonstration, members in the treatment 
and control groups were essentially identical.
• Average employment and earnings levels for the treatment-group 
members rose quickly after enrollment, continued on an upward 
trend for about four years, and then fell slightly over the next two 
years.
• Average employment and earnings levels for the control-group 
members also increased over time, but not nearly at the levels 
observed for the treatment-group members.
• The impact of the services on average employment and earnings 
levels (which is estimated by the treatment-control difference) is 
statistically significant, proportionally large, and relatively persis 
tent over the six-year follow-up period: average earnings for the 
treatment group were 73 percent greater than for the control- 
group over this period.
• Despite the proportionately large impact on earnings, the absolute 
change was small: average cumulative earnings rose $4,282 for 
the six years (roughly $714 per year). 3
• Many of the treatment-group members held part-time jobs with 
relatively low wages: at the time they left the program, those 
treatment-group members who had jobs worked an average of






Months pre- and post-randomization
Treatment - - - Control - - - - Elig. nonparticipant
Earnings expressed in 1986 dollars.
Growth in Disability Benefits 383
27 hours per week and earned an average wage of $3.95 per 
hour; approximately three years later, less than a quarter of the 
treatment group members earned more than $300 per month, 
and only 43 percent earned more than the minimum wage.
The impact on average SSI payments was statistically significant, 
but relatively small: over the six years, payments fell by an aver 
age of $870 or about 5 percent.
Participants in the demonstration generally benefited from the 
services, their total income rose and they increased their produc 
tive activity and integration into society at large.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATION
This demonstration by itself is an extremely small foundation for 
developing employment policy for all SSI recipients. Nevertheless, the 
demonstration findings are quite relevant for efforts to assist SSI recip 
ients obtain and hold jobs. Their relevance stems from the fact that per 
sons with mental retardation make up approximately 30 percent of 
current SSI recipients and 43 percent of the children receiving SSI 
(Kochhar and Scott 1995). The results are also relevant because the 
demonstration is one of the few rigorous evaluations of an employment 
program for SSI recipients. Finally, when the demonstration findings 
are combined with the available literature, several tentative conclusions 
emerge.
First, it seems likely that the services required to move SSI recipi 
ents into employment will be relatively expensive. In the demonstra 
tion, the services had three characteristics that tend to make for an 
expensive program: customization, intensity, and duration. The train 
ing services were individualized to meet the specific abilities and inter 
ests of each participant, and this included individualized placement and 
on-the-job training provided by program staff. Participants tended to 
need substantial supports, at least early in the training process. This led 
programs to provide intensive services: in some cases, program staff 
worked directly with a single client full time for several weeks to teach 
the client the job. Once clients learned the job, the program support
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was gradually withdrawn to promote independence. However, this pro 
cess might take several months. In addition, program staff worked to 
establish ongoing job retention services from formal or informal 
sources (parents, co-workers, supervisors, and friends). The need for 
this ongoing support meant that many participants received 12 months 
of demonstration services followed by less intense job-retention ser 
vices.
As noted, it would cost about $7,400 per enrollee (in 1995 dollars) 
to provide the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration ser 
vice package. This figure is comparable to the costs estimated for simi 
lar employment support programs serving persons with mental 
retardation or other severe disabilities. For example, costs for a state 
wide program in Illinois averaged $5,300 per person served, and costs 
for a similar program in New York averaged $7,700 per person served 
(both figures are expressed in 1995 dollars). While the costs for these 
types of programs may decline as the training methods improve, it 
seems likely that efforts to place, train, and maintain persons with men 
tal retardation or similar severe disability will be much more expensive 
than the average costs currently incurred by state vocational rehabilita 
tion agencies. For example, Dean and Dolan (1991) estimated that 
costs in the Virginia Vocational Rehabilitation program averaged 
approximately $2,300 per client (when converted to 1995 dollars).
Second, it appears that a relatively small percentage of current SSI 
recipients will enroll and obtain employment. The available evidence 
suggests that relatively few SSI recipients work or seek employment 
supports. In the demonstration, 5 percent of the eligible population 
enrolled. Of the recipients who enrolled, two-thirds were placed on a 
job and one-third were successfully training on a job where there was a 
clear expectation of future independent work. Thus, less than 2 percent 
of the eligibles made the program-assisted transition to work. The Dis 
ability Policy Panel (1996) reports that for the Social Security Disabil 
ity Insurance program, fewer than 2 in 21,000 beneficiaries leave the 
rolls because of a return to work. Finally, Scott (1992) reports that 
while 80 percent of working-age SSI recipients had worked prior to 
receiving SSI benefits, only 22 percent ever work after benefits begin.
These figures suggest that voluntary employment support programs 
are likely to attract a relatively small percentage of current recipients. 
Even if more recipients did apply, it is not clear that the system has the
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capacity to provide supported employment services. Braddock et al. 
(1994) report that after more than a decade of rapid growth in the avail 
ability of supported employment and the inclusion of supported 
employment as part of every state's vocational rehabilitation program, 
approximately 90,000 persons are now receiving supported employ 
ment services. While this is remarkable growth for a program that 
existed largely as university-based prototypes in 1980, it is neverthe 
less quite small when compared to the 4.8 million persons currently 
receiving SSI disability benefits.
Third, the available evidence suggests that services like those pro 
vided in the demonstration can increase earnings dramatically but still 
not reduce SSI payment substantially. The demonstration services had 
a huge proportional, but nevertheless a small absolute, impact on 
employment and earnings. While the participants are clearly better off 
in terms of income and work place integration, they generally remain 
poor and eligible for SSI payments. SSI payments were lower for the 
demonstration's treatment group, but the savings averaged only $870 
per enrollee over the six years following entrance into the program. 
This small impact seems to reflect a combination of factors, including 
the work incentive provisions of the SSI program (particularly the 
exclusion of half of earnings from countable income and the provisions 
of Section 1619), the relatively low wages and work hours of many the 
participants who entered the labor force, and the desire of participants 
to keep Medicaid coverage. While the demonstration evidence does not 
indicate whether the wage and hours patterns reflect the full ability of 
the participants or decisions by the participants to limit their earnings 
in order to retain SSI eligibility, the available evidence suggests that 
the earnings increases are likely to be too small for recipients to earn 
their way off SSI.
Fourth, a replication of the demonstration would generate better 
results, but might still not generate net benefits to the SSI program. 
Three of the eight demonstration programs produced better than aver 
age impacts in the demonstration. These three programs seemed to 
share some specific program elements that differed from those of the 
other five. In particular, they tended to put more emphasis on careful 
job matching and seemed to stick with their clients longer when initial 
job placements did not work out (Decker and Thoraton 1994). In addi 
tion, site-specific impact estimates indicated that one of the eight pro-
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grams reduced SSI payments sufficiently to offset more than a third of 
the costs of the transitional employment services. These findings sug 
gest that replication efforts might improve on the performance of the 
demonstration programs. At the same time, replication efforts might 
have worse performance. The demonstration programs were selected 
from the eighty training programs that submitted applications in a 
national competition. Efforts to implement transitional employment on 
a national scale might not be as selective in their choice of providers 
and therefore might have smaller impacts than those observed in the 
demonstration. This seems to have been the case in Illinois as sup 
ported employment programs expanded from small university-based 
prototypes to a statewide program (Tines et al. 1990).
While more study is required, the currently available evidence sug 
gests that employment support services can play an important role in 
making people with disabilities better off, but a limited role in helping 
SSI recipients earn their way off SSI. The demonstration tested one ser 
vice model with a small group of recipients with a specific disabling 
condition. As a result, it is a very slim reed for shaping rehabilitation 
policy for the 4.8 million SSI recipients (or the'4 million disabled 
workers receiving Old-Age and Survivors Disability Insurance bene 
fits). Nevertheless, until the Project Network results are available, the 
Transitional Employment Training Demonstration remains one of the 
clearest pieces of evidence (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). It sug 
gests that it will be very difficult to move a large number of recipients 
off the rolls: few current recipients may volunteer (and motivation to 
work is probably a key ingredient to success), only a fraction of the 
volunteers may make the transition to work, and many may still not 
earn enough to become economically independent. 4 Participants appear 
to benefit from the services, but SSI benefits are not reduced suffi 
ciently to pay for all of the program services.
The outlook may be better if replication efforts adopt the service 
approach of the best-performing demonstration programs. The outlook 
may also be better for employment-support programs that target other 
subgroups of the SSI population, such as children who have been 
allowed on the basis of an Individual Functional Assessment. By tar 
geting children before they have entered the labor market, programs 
may have success in shaping expectations and attitudes about work as 
well as transmitting the skills required for work. Efforts to help chil-
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dren think of work and independence as their future rather than ongo 
ing SSI receipt should help to reduce long-term SSI dependence. This 
point is suggested by Scott's (1992) finding that young recipients who 
began receiving SSI benefits before they were 18 years old were more 
that twice as likely to work while receiving benefits as were persons 
who entered the program at an older age. Similarly, the many school- 
to-work programs serving students with disabilities offer some promise 
(Wehman 1991). However, these programs are still emerging and a 
dominant model has yet to emerge. Furthermore, there have been no 
controlled studies that compare the success of participants with what 
they would have done in the absence of the services.
With regard to employment support programs like those fielded in 
the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, at least three 
possible funding plans deserve consideration: 1) to provide vocational 
rehabilitation agencies with grants based on the number of SSI recipi 
ents served in transitional or supported employment, 2) to provide 
funding for ongoing job-retention services to agencies that have placed 
and trained SSI recipients on jobs that are likely to enable them to earn 
their way off SSI, or 3) to encourage SSI recipients to purchase 
employment support services by expanding use of two current provi 
sions of the SSI program—Plans for Achieving Self-Support (PASS) 
and Impairment Related Work Expenses (IRWE). Grants to vocational 
rehabilitation agencies could be based on formulas like the ones used 
in SSA's Beneficiary Rehabilitation Program or the one suggested by 
Berkowitz (1996). In either case, the funding could be based on the 
estimated SSI savings attributable to the transitional employment ser 
vices, so that funding could be kept in line with the expected reduction 
in SSI payments. By allowing working SSI recipients to deduct work 
expenses from earnings used to calculate their countable income and 
SSI benefit amount, the PASS and IRWE provisions essentially enable 
recipients to shift at least some of the costs of job supports back to the 
SSI program without increasing costs to SSA (Prero 1993). Such sub 
sidies could encourage greater use of employment supports and ulti 
mately save money for the SSI program if the supports led to greater 
earnings or economic self-sufficiency.
The overall assessment of transitional employment, however, should 
not rest solely on the perspective of the SSI program. It seems likely 
that transitional employment services could save money for the gov-
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ernment as a whole, particularly if those services substituted for facil 
ity-based services now being provided to many people with mental 
retardation. In addition, the program seems likely to generate net bene 
fits to society as a whole. From this perspective the earnings gains of 
participants would be balanced against the costs of the services. During 
the six-year observation period, the average earnings gains of partici 
pants offset approximately 75 percent of the gross cost of the services. 
Savings from the shift in service use seem likely to offset the remain 
ing social costs. In addition, the SSI recipients who received the transi 
tional employment services not only gained income, but also gained 
from their increased integration in the labor force. It is essential that 
society keep track of these nonpecuniary benefits and the overall satis 
faction derived from helping individuals with severe impairments par 
ticipate more completely in society, because these aspects represent a 
major justification for transitional employment services.
Notes
1. Prero and Thornton (1991) and Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore (1988) describe 
demonstration operations and the evaluation design.
2. The IQ scale used here has a mean of 100 and standard deviation of approxi 
mately 15 points. Thus, many enrollees had scores that implied cognitive func 
tioning at a level that was at least three standard deviations below the general 
population mean.
3 These figures are in 1986 dollars.
4. The difference between the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration 
control-group members and the eligible nonparticipants suggests that the motiva 
tion implied by volunteering for an employment program is an important factor in 
predicting subsequent earnings and employment.
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13 Summing Up: Reflections
on the Past and Future
of Disability Policy
Richard V. Burkhauser 
Syracuse University
Readers of this book old enough to remember the rapid increase in 
the disability rolls in the 1970s and the political response and counter- 
response that followed have now witnessed a complete disability pol 
icy cycle. Hence, in that sense, much of what has occurred in the first 
years of the 1990s is not new. Further evidence ofdeja vu is provided 
by the introduction of a now out-of-print book Disability and Work: 
The Economics of American Policy Robert Haveman and I wrote in the 
midst of the last great disability policy crisis brought on by rising dis 
ability rolls.
Political currents during the early 1980s have challenged the role 
of the federal government in American society ... No set of pro 
grams offers a better microcosm of the political, moral, and eco 
nomic debates that will result from this general rethinking of the 
role of social policy than those comprising the United States dis 
ability system . . . Clearly, a strong moral commitment to provide 
some form of protection and compensation to the disabled exists 
in this country. However, increases in public spending on pro 
grams for the disabled and the network of regulations established 
in an attempt to integrate fully the handicapped into society have 
caused even the traditional supporters of government intervention 
to pause. Concern with the rising costs of disability programs has 
affected all recent administrations, irrespective of political party.
Any informed debate over the direction of United States disability 
policy must take into account the complex nature of the existing
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system—its size, structure, recent growth, economic status, and 
labor market effects. (Burkhauser and Haveman 1982, pp. 1-2).
It is a bit daunting to revisit work written over a decade and a half 
ago. Having done so, I believe the general principles of disability pol 
icy analysis described there are as valid today as they were in 1982. 
But in some important ways I was quite wrong about how disability 
policy would evolve.
While Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) has a chapter on the rise of 
policies to provide equal access to education, employment, and mobil 
ity, we did not expect accommodation to become as dominant a theme 
as it is in current disability policy. We certainly did not foresee the 
strength of the disability movement that helped pass the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, nor did we advocate as strongly as I 
would now for the goal of full integration of people with disabilities 
into the labor market. I was wrong about the future course of the debate 
because in 1982 I believed that while it was possible that more people 
with disabilities could work than were currently doing so, most people 
with disabilities could not be integrated into the labor market.
As my discussion in Chapter 12 makes clear, I am now convinced 
that not only are the majority of people able to work following the 
onset of a disability but that they, in fact, are already doing so. Hence, 
public policies that focus on encouraging work following the onset of a 
disability are not based on daydreams or good wishes. (See Burkhauser 
andDaly 1996a, 1996b.)
The following four propositions based on the research I have done 
since Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) will reflect my perspective on 
past and future disability policy and set the stage for the conclusions I 
draw from the previous chapters.
1. Every person reading this book will die.
This proposition requires no additional evidence and, unfortunately, 
will occur even if you don't turn another page.
2. Most of us will experience the onset of a disability before we die, 
and many of us will do so while we are of working age.
Based on data from the Health and Retirement Survey, Burkhauser 
and Daly (1996b) show that most people with disabilities aged 51 to 61 
in 1992 experienced the onset of their disability during their work life.
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3. The most effective way to observe the importance of disability on 
work and economic well-being is to track the labor earnings and 
economic well-being of people before and after onset of a disabil 
ity.
Most comparisons of those with and without disabilities use cross- 
sectional data. But simple comparisons of this nature can overstate the 
importance of disability in explaining the difference between the two 
groups. In Table 13.1, Burkhauser and Daly (1996b) use multiperiod 
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to track the 
work, labor earnings, and economic well-being of men and women fol 
lowing the onset of a disability. Our definition of disability is that the 
respondent reports that a physical or nervous condition limits the type 
of work or the amount of work he or she can do. Since this is multiyear 
data, the respondent must report this for two consecutive years to be 
counted as having a disability.
Using event history analysis and PSID waves of data for 1970 to 
1989, we first find all persons between the ages of 25 to 61 who experi 
ence a disability and then look at what happens in the years prior to and 
after this event. 1 As can be seen in Table 13.1 the median percentage 
change in the labor earnings of men (women) from one year prior to 
onset to one year after onset is a decline of 24 percent (41 percent); the 
median decline two years after is 31 percent (62 percent). Clearly, 
onset of a disability decreases labor earnings but does not end work, 
and as Table 13.1 also shows, on average it is even less devastating to 
the economic well-being of households.
We are able to look at the household size-adjusted income of people 
with disabilities that comes from private sources by excluding all gov 
ernment taxes and transfers. This "counterfactual," which assumes 
people would not change their behavior in the absence of taxes and 
transfers, is a crude measure of what would have happened, but it does 
provide an approximation of the importance of government in reducing 
the shock of disability.
What we find belies the notion that the onset of a disability is on 
average a devastating economic event. For men the median change in 
before-government household size-adjusted income is a drop of 10 per 
cent. After two years the median change is a drop of 12 percent. For 
women the median change is positive. Once government is taken into
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SOURCE: Burkhauser and Daly (1996b, Table 4, p. 71).
NOTE: The sample is based upon data from the 1970 to 1989 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample 
includes household heads and spouses who report two consecutive periods of no disability followed by two consecutive periods of dis 
ability, who were between the ages of 25 and 61 at onset. A period of disability is one in which the respondent reports that a physical or 
nervous condition limits the type of work or the amount of work that he/she can do. Sample size for men in the first four periods is 725. It 
is 677 in the fifth period (two years after). Sample size for women in the first four periods is 303. It is 236 in the fifth period (two years 
after). The sample size is smaller for women because the PSID did not ask about spouses' disability status until 1981. 
aMedian labor earnings includes zero earnings. Earnings are in 1991 dollars.
bBefore- and after-government incomes are adjusted for household size using the equivalence scale implied by the United States poverty 
lines. Income-to-needs ratios can be computed by dividing equivalent median income by the 1991 one-person poverty threshold of 
$6,932.
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account, the news is even better. After one year the median fall for men 
is less than 3 percent and after two years less than 4 percent. Table 13.1 
shows that our network of family and government does a reasonably 
good job of protecting people from dramatic drops in economic well- 
being following a disability. In making these assessments we do not 
simply look at the replacement rates of a given program to evaluate the 
change in economic well-being following the onset of a disability; we 
look instead at the change in overall household income. And we key on 
the transition into disability as the critical event, rather than the transi 
tion into a given program. While not perfect, on average our disability 
system works to prevent serious economic losses to the households of 
adults who experience the onset of a disability, at least in the short run. 
Hence, if forced to label persons with disabilities as either heroes who 
have coped with their disability and managed to offset its economic 
consequences or as victims who have been overwhelmed by their dis 
ability and suffered dramatic economic loss, the stereotype I would 
choose is hero.
4. Sophisticated social insurance and welfare networks were created 
in western industrial countries to offset the economic effects of a 
disability, as well as other economic events (e.g., recessions, 
depressions, plant closings, etc.) that threaten unemployment and 
economic well-being.
Figure 13.1 puts disability-based insurance and disability-based 
welfare programs in the context of overall social policy. In the next 
sections I will use it as a means of putting the findings of the volume 
into that same context. Figure 1 has its origins in Aarts, Burkhauser, 
and de long (1996), which focuses on differences in social programs 
across five western industrial countries—the United States, the Nether 
lands, Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain.
Figure 13.1 conceptualizes attempts by government policy to ame 
liorate job loss caused by economic or health factors in the context of a 
series of paths that workers may take as they move from full-time work 
to normal retirement. For workers who remain on the job over their 
work life the path to retirement is a straightforward one. It is not until 
they reach retirement age that they must choose between retirement 
and continued work. But for a significant number of workers, job sepa-







































ration before retirement is a reality for which social welfare policy 
must prepare.
No single figure can show all the possible paths that workers with a 
disability may take over their lifetime, especially one that is intended 
to show how labor market and social welfare institutions influence 
those paths across countries. But it is possible to show in a broad way 
how the incentive structure built into a country's institutions affect the 
average person in that country. In general one can imagine four paths 
that workers may take following the onset of such a disability. The 
first, which is defined as the work path, encompasses public programs 
that provide or encourage rehabilitation in order to overcome the work 
limitations caused by a disability. But it also includes more direct gov 
ernment intervention into the labor market through the creation of spe 
cific government jobs for people with disabilities, subsidies to those 
who employ such workers, job quotas, job protection legislation—dis 
missal rules, etc., or general antidiscrimination legislation requiring 
accommodation for workers with disabilities. The intent of these poli 
cies is to maintain those with disabilities on the job and in the labor 
market, either through the carrot of subsidies or the stick of mandates.
The second, which is defined as the disability insurance path, 
encompasses traditional disability insurance-based transfer programs. 
They may include short-term programs that mandate employers to pro 
vide replacement of lost wages during the first few weeks of sickness 
or directly provide such replacement through short-term social insur 
ance. In all European countries, they would include the provision of 
health care at no marginal expense to the worker. After some point, 
workers are then eligible to move to a long-term disability insurance 
program. Often acceptance into this program requires meeting both 
health and employment criteria. This path eventually merges with 
social security retirement programs.
The third, which is defined as the unemployment path, encompasses 
the short-term provision of unemployment benefits that to replace lost 
wage earnings due to cyclical economic downturns. At some point 
longer-term unemployment insurance is made available, often at a 
lower replacement rate. Finally, this also merges with the social secu 
rity retirement system at older ages. As we have seen, disentangling 
exits from a job because of a disability and exits from a job because of 
economic forces is in practice a difficult and often controversial task,
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especially since these exits can be influenced by the rules established 
by a country's social welfare system.
The final path is defined as the welfare path. These means-tested 
programs serve as a safety net for workers without jobs who are not eli 
gible for disability or unemployment-based social insurance programs. 
Such programs can be universal, subject only to a means test and/or 
linked to an inability to work either because of health, poor job skills, 
or child-rearing responsibilities. This track can continue past retire 
ment age for those not eligible for social security retirement benefits.
The extremely simplified social welfare system pictured in Figure 
13.1 provides some important insights for evaluating the disability 
transfer system in any country. And it can be used to explain the impor 
tant empirical facts uncovered in Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) and Liver- 
more, Stapleton, and Zeuschner (Chapter 8).
For persons who have a disability that begins to affect their ability to 
work, important decisions about work often must be made. When mak 
ing those decisions in conjunction with an employer, the social institu 
tions of the country in which those persons work may also be 
important influences. Such a worker is likely to look at the relative 
rewards of continued movement along the work path versus entry onto 
an alternative path. Similarly, a firm's willingness to accommodate 
workers may also be influenced by the social institutions it faces.
Not all workers can or will transform themselves into candidates for 
disability insurance benefits. But workers with a disability who are 
having difficulty with their current job or who are no longer working 
will be influenced by the relative rewards provided by the disability, 
unemployment, and welfare paths in their country when deciding 
whether to try to remain in the labor force or apply for transfer bene 
fits. Nor do all those with disabilities have the ability to continue to 
work. Some people's disabilities are so severe that continued employ 
ment is impossible and a movement onto the transfer rolls is inevitable. 
But for some portion of the population who suffer the onset of a dis 
ability that affects their ability to work, the length of time they con 
tinue on the job depends on the social institutions that are in place as 
well as their specific health problems. These workers add to the supply 
of candidates to disability transfer programs.
Countries with low or nonexistent welfare benefits, low unemploy 
ment benefits, and little available rehabilitation and job protection are
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likely to have a large supply of applicants for the disability insurance 
path. This supply increases as the replacement rate increases and the 
period of time over which benefits can be received increases. Examples 
of such countries are the United States and the Netherlands where 
increases in applications for disability benefits put tremendous pres 
sure on disability-based programs in times of serious economic down 
turns. Alternatively, when the protection offered by the unemployment 
path is similar to that offered in the disability insurance path, as in Ger 
many, the supply of disability applicants does not increase significantly 
during economic downturns.
In Sweden, where disability benefits are as generous as in the Neth 
erlands, application pressure on disability programs is far less severe 
because all persons with a serious disability who seek disability trans 
fer benefits are first required to receive rehabilitation. Following reha 
bilitation, it is government policy to provide jobs in the public sector if 
private sector jobs are unavailable. In Germany a combination of lower 
replacement rates and a quota system and nonactuarially reduced early 
retirement benefits deflect much of the pressure away from disability 
transfer programs.
Figure 13.1 shows how the incentive structure inherent in a coun 
try's social welfare system influences the supply of disability candi 
dates. But it can also be used to describe the demand for such 
candidates. To enter any of the four paths described in Figure 13.1, it is 
necessary to satisfy entry requirements. In a social security retirement 
insurance program, entry requirements are usually straightforward. A 
worker must have worked in covered employment for a given time or 
have performed other easily verified activities (e.g., attend school, rear 
children) and must be a given age. Such eligibility criteria are easy to 
administer. This makes the task of the front-line gatekeepers routine. 
They simply follow relatively objective criteria with little room for 
individual interpretation.
Of course, the overall size of the population on the retirement rolls 
will change if a higher benefit is paid or the age of eligibility is low 
ered, but gatekeeper discretion will not enter into this change. They 
will simply follow new criteria. Determining eligibility for the various 
paths open to those who have a disability that begins to affect their 
work but who are below early retirement age is not as clear-cut.
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Unlike age, which is relatively easy to verify, disability is a complex 
concept that has both health- and work-related components. One easy 
way to screen for benefits is to require a waiting period of around one 
year between the onset of the condition and eligibility, and to record 
how much the person is actually working. Then, either a private physi 
cian or a physician employed by the system determines the seriousness 
of the health condition with respect to the person's ability to work. 
While the first two pieces of evidence are easily measurable, the third 
is less so. Doctors can evaluate health conditions as they relate to a 
norm, but there is no unambiguous way to relate a health condition to 
one's ability to work. Hence, disability program gatekeepers' discre 
tion in carrying out established criteria is much greater than it is for 
retirement.
Access to the work path and the disability insurance path may be 
closely coordinated, as in Sweden, where a centralized group of gate 
keepers determines who can be rehabilitated and who goes directly 
onto disability transfer rolls. But these paths may also be administered 
in quite independent ways. In the United States, rehabilitation services 
are administered by an entirely different group of gatekeepers with lit 
tle or no coordination between them and the gatekeepers who adminis 
ter the disability transfer system.
All of these factors then enter into the way that front-line disability 
gatekeepers respond to changes in supply and to the voices of those at 
higher levels of administrative responsibility who are attempting to 
control the overall flow of people into the system. In periods of eco 
nomic downturn, the number of workers who leave their jobs rises and 
applications to transfer programs increase. In countries like the United 
States and the Netherlands, with generous disability benefits relative to 
other alternatives, tremendous pressure is put on the disability system 
to provide income to those workers. The pressure may lead to a spe 
cific easing of the rules or simply to a change in the interpretation of 
the rules. In this way "demand" may shift to accommodate supply.
What Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) have documented is that the busi 
ness downturn of 1989-1991 had an important role in the upsurge in 
disability applications, as Figure 13.1 would predict. But they also find 
that entrance into the program is not inevitable. The major recession of 
the early 1980s also had an important effect on applications but did not 
result in additions to the rolls since the gatekeepers were signaled by
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Congress and the administration to resist. None of these ebbs and flows 
in application and acceptance rates can be explained by changes in 
underlying health conditions in the United States.
As Figure 13.1 suggests, countries with generous and easily accessi 
ble unemployment and welfare paths are not as likely to see the impact 
of major business cycle shifts on applications to their disability insur 
ance path. But in the United States our unemployment system is not 
particularly generous and is short term. And, unlike most European 
countries, we have no universal income maintenance system. General 
Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are 
the primary nonhealth-related sources of income for low-income peo 
ple. As the eligibility criteria are tightened and the length of stay made 
more limited on these two programs, Figure 13.1 suggests that this will 
lead to increased pressure on SSI as an alternative to these two pro 
grams. Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7) suggest that 
this is exactly what happened in Michigan when their General Assis 
tance program was cut. Several other chapters on the topic of applica 
tion and growth (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2; Livermore, Stapleton, and 
Zeuschner, Chapter 8; and Bordelon's comments on Chapters 6-8) 
show that at the gatekeeper level there is a movement from General 
Assistance and to a lesser extent from AFDC onto the SSI rolls.
In addition to the supply story emphasized in Figure 13.1, there is 
the "cost-shifting" issue that is a generic problem of our multilevel 
approach to social welfare policy in the United States. An important 
message of this book is that there has been a systematic effort by state 
governments to shift their welfare costs to the federal government, 
which explains part of the upsurge in Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) applications. (See especially Livermore, Stapleton, and 
Zeuschner, Chapter 8.) The welfare reforms of 1996, which require 
states to pay 100 percent of the marginal cost of AFDC clients will 
make SSI an even more inviting program for state administrators anx 
ious to shift costs back to the federal government.
While Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner have concentrated on 
the importance of policy changes in General Assistance and AFDC on 
the SSI rolls, another policy change already adopted will also affect the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI rolls in the next 
decade. To reduce the financial burden of the aging baby boom popula 
tion on the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance system, the normal age of
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retirement is scheduled to increase from 65 to 67 in the next century. It 
is likely that further increases in both the early and normal retirement 
age will come. But Figure 13.1 shows that as we make the paths to 
retirement longer, the populations on DI and SSI will increase, because 
duration on the program will increase as will the incidence of new 
enrollment at older ages. This notion of the importance of duration on 
the size of the disability rolls is addressed by Rupp and Scott 
(Chapter 4) as well as by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6).
A final issue related to disability program growth discussed in this 
book is the shift in impairment trends among applicants and awardees 
over the last decade. Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) document that appli 
cations and awards based on mental disorders and musculoskeletal 
conditions have grown much more rapidly than applications and 
awards based on other impairments. To paraphrase their arguments in 
terms of Figure 13.1, they argue that this phenomenon is much more 
related to changes in the actions of disability gatekeepers than in 
underlying changes in conditions. Changes in the eligibility criteria 
and the greater emphasis on functional criteria rather than on medical 
evidence has led to more awards, not a change in underlying health 
conditions.
GROWTH IN THE DISABILITY TRANSFER POPULATION: A 
POLICY SUCCESS OR FAILURE
While Figure 13.1 is useful in providing a fuller policy context for 
the rapid increase in the disability rolls documented in this book, it is 
less useful in determining whether this increase was a policy success or 
a failure.
While I am confident a consensus exists on the importance of eco 
nomic and policy factors on recent disability program growth, I am 
much less confident consensus exists on the appropriateness of this 
policy outcome. This lack of consensus is best captured by the compet 
ing views of Goldman and Weaver in Chapter 11. While Goldman sees 
the growth in mental disorder awards as the expected consequence of a 
society finally reaching out to an underserved population in need, 
Weaver sees this as a substantial lowering of the gates with respect to
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our definition of disability. Likewise, the tremendous outreach 
"achievements" discussed by Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner 
(Chapter 8) and Bordelon (comments on Chapters 6-8) can either be 
seen as an appropriate attempt to provide deserved disability benefits to 
people unaware of their rights or as further evidence of a concentrated 
effort to shift the burden of general welfare assistance from the state to 
the federal government.
Ultimately, policy outcomes of the 1990s will be judged by one's 
overall view of the goals of social policy, and of disability insurance 
and welfare programs within it. It is at this point that I must confess 
that as a "poverty policy expert" of the 1970s, I and many of my col 
leagues advocated and laid the groundwork for the system we have 
today.
I was among the majority of academics who supported a Negative 
Income Tax in the 1970s. In fact, it was then common in policy circles 
to whisper that the passage of Supplemental Security Income effec 
tively gave us a Negative Income Tax (NIT) not only for all older peo 
ple but, with a broad enough definition of disability, most younger 
people as well. Today many policy experts and most advocates for the 
poor see the expansion of SSI as the best practical method of insuring a 
universal federal government-financed minimum income floor under 
all Americans.
Many things have changed about me in the last twenty years: first, 
the length of my hair, which was the defining characteristic of my gen 
eration, is shorter and has turned from brown to grey. Second, my faith 
in the NIT as the basis for assisting poor people has been critically 
affected by the very mixed results of thirty years of war on poverty pro 
grams. I now more fully recognize the dangers to the human spirit that 
permanent transfers bring. I am no longer a supporter of an NIT or any 
other universal guaranteed transfer program that requires no quid pro 
quo of its beneficiaries. I do not believe that residency or even citizen 
ship confers an entitlement to a minimum benefit, and I believe it is 
neither in the beneficiaries' interest nor in the interest of taxpayers to 
provide such benefits. Third, and more to the point, I am not alone. I 
doubt if even in the 1970s a majority of Americans supported universal 
guaranteed welfare minimums. Otherwise, then why did we have to 
hide the universal minimum in the guise of a disability program? But 
today the political mood is much less supportive of federally imposed
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minimums. The passage of welfare reform legislation that ended the 
open-ended guarantee of support payments for AFDC recipients by a 
Republican dominated Congress and signed by a Democratic president 
just before the presidential elections of 1996 is evidence of the political 
consequences of this mood. To the degree that SSI is seen as a mecha 
nism for supporting those who could work, its survival is also threat 
ened. This is the real danger that people with disabilities should 
recognize in their support of current DI and SSI eligibility criteria.
Fourth, what I believe is more in keeping with traditional American 
values and what a majority of Americans will support are government 
programs that subsidize work, not welfare, or, to borrow a phrase from 
a current political leader—programs that make work pay. As general 
transfer programs like General Assistance and AFDC are cut in an 
effort to shift people into the workforce, there will be increasing efforts 
to place these former beneficiaries on SSI as their benefits expire. Daly 
(Chapter 5) shows that this is already occurring, and the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation guarantees it will increase.
Finally, let me suggest why the defenders of our current system of 
transfer payments should pause. It is often said by veteran activists that 
while SSI is not a very generous program, at least it provides a safe 
haven against the uncertainty of the work path. And advocates of peo 
ple with disabilities have labored tirelessly in Congress and in the 
courts to ensure that most people on SSI will never have to leave that 
program. But there is evidence that the uncertainty of the work path 
may in the long run be preferable to what appears to be the safety of 
SSI and other welfare-based transfer programs.
In a series of papers (Burkhauser et al. 1996a, 1996b; Burkhauser, 
Crews, and Daly 1997) look at how income distribution in the United 
States changed over the 1980s and early 1990s. We then look at how 
subpopulations within these countries fared over this period. 2
Figure 13.2 shows the distribution of real pretax, postransfer individ 
ual household size-adjusted income in the United States in 1979, 1982, 
and 1989. Since much of the discussion in this book has centered around 
the importance of business cycles, it is important to recognize that 1979 
and 1989 are peak years in the business cycle of the 1980s while 1982 
is the trough year in that business cycle. Hence, one can see the powerful 
negative effect the recession of the early 1980s had on the economic 
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the left from 1979 to 1982. Over the next seven years, however, eco 
nomic growth shifted the entire distribution back to the right.
Much of the discussion of the 1980s ignores the importance of gen 
eral economic conditions on income distribution and simply compares 
income distributions between two arbitrary years. Figure 13.2 shows 
that the years chosen can greatly influence one's view of that decade. 
But in looking at the 1980s it is most appropriate to choose points at 
the same place in the business cycle. Figure 13.3, compares the two 
peak years—1979 and 1989. 3 It confirms conventional wisdom that 
inequality increased and the mass of people in the middle of the distri 
bution fell. Note the shaded area. This is the "vanishing middle class." 
Some of the mass fell to the left—the mass of people at the bottom of 
the distribution grew. But the important news is that the vast major 
ity—90 percent—of the mass in the middle shifted to the right. That is, 
the majority of the "disappearing middle class" became better off 
rather than worse off. Inequality grew, but it did so because people in 
the middle became better off at different rates.4
We then divided the population into three broad subsets: persons liv 
ing in younger households (all persons living in a household headed by 
an individual aged 61 or younger, in which some household labor earn 
ings but no social assistance benefits are reported; persons living in 
older households (all persons living in a household whose head was 
aged 62 and older); and persons living in younger social assistance 
households (persons living in a household whose head was aged 61 or 
younger in which some form of social assistance—SSI, AFDC or other 
welfare transfers—was received). When we do this for young working 
households the distribution mirrors Figure 13.3. Inequality grew, and 
the middle mass fell. While there was some small growth on the left, 
the majority of people in these households became richer. For older 
households the entire distribution moves to the right between 1979 and 
1989. There was an unambiguous improvement in the economic well- 
being of older people living in households in the 1980s, in large part 
because of increases in social security retirement benefits and in the 
prevalence and generosity of employer pensions over the period.
What I want to focus on is the third subgroup—persons living in 
younger social assistance households. Figure 13.4 shows that the dis 
tribution of household size-adjusted income of this population shifted 
to the left between 1979 and 1982. That is, like other Americans, those
t
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persons in social assistance households were worse off in the business 
cycle trough year of 1982 than in the peak year of 1979. But unlike 
other Americans, seven years of economic growth was not able to 
return them to their previous 1979 high, let alone shift the distribution 
to the right of its 1979 position. While on average, persons on social 
welfare assistance were slightly better off in 1989 than in 1983, they 
were less well-off than in 1979. The overall economic well-being of 
those on welfare actually declined.
In the 1990s the bipartisan groups that are "reinventing government" 
and "changing welfare as we know it" show precious little support for 
increasing the economic well-being of nonworking welfare recipients. 
Thus, for young people with disabilities who are on the verge of mov 
ing toward either the work or welfare paths, the future value of a life 
time of SSI benefits is quite uncertain. Perhaps it is time for the 
advocates of people with disabilities to shift their efforts from the lost 
cause of defending and enlarging support for programs that subsidize 
nonwork to programs that encourage work.
In fact, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, with its empha 
sis on accommodation and the view that the majority of people with 
disabilities can work, should be at the center of a set of policies that 
begin to shift our collective energies from nonwork to work subsidies. 
But this movement should recognize that with rights come responsibil 
ities. If people with disabilities are able to work, then our public poli 
cies should be built around this expectation and not around a 
guaranteed lifetime of welfare transfers.
As I discussed in Chapter 12, accommodation, disabled worker tax 
credits, rehabilitation, and training offer real alternatives for an impor 
tant segment of the population with disabilities who would otherwise 
be in the next wave of SSI or DI beneficiaries.
This book has established that economic and policy forces signifi 
cantly affect the DI and SSI rolls. While we will always need SSI and 
DI for some people with disabilities, for many others this is a poor sec 
ond-best alternative. It is time to stop using SSI as a back door route to 
universal welfare minimums. Rather, we should recognize that people 
with disabilities have more in common with other Americans than they 
have differences. Economic growth is the primary engine of growing 
economic well-being for most Americans, including those with disabil 
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to integrate themselves into the American workforce; those with dis 
abilities and poor work skills, the doubly disadvantaged, do need a 
hand up, but we should first try to improve their economic well-being 
through work programs before we push them onto the welfare path.
Notes
1. Burkhauser and Daly (1996b) also provide cross-sectional information on the 
labor force participation of people with and without disability. We find the major 
ity of men and women aged 25 to 61 who report a disability in 1989 (using the 
same two-period definition of disability) worked at least 52 hours in that year and 
about 40 percent of men worked full-time. As was discussed in Stapleton et al 
(Chapter 2), the business cycle plays a role in the work lives of people with disabil 
ities. The year 1988 was the sixth straight year of economic growth in the United 
States and hence reflects work outcomes near the peak of the 1980s business cycle. 
Using the same definition of disability and work, Burkhauser and Wittenburg 
(1996) look at labor force participation rates of people with disabilities between 
October 1990 and January 1992 using the Survey of Income and Program Partici 
pants. Labor force participation of people with disabilities is lower during this 
weaker economic period; yet, about one-half of men with disabilities worked.
2. The data used in these papers come from the Current Population Survey. As in 
Table 13.1, the unit of analysis is the person, but within a household context in 
which it is assumed that household income is equally shared using an equivalence 
scale with an elasticity of 0.5. For the United States, household income is pre-tax 
and post-transfer. In-kind transfers are not counted.
3. Burkhauser et al. (1996b) repeat this exercise using the trough-to-trough years 
1982 and 1992. The results are similar to the peak-to-peak comparisons. Both these 
results are quite different from those one would find by comparing a peak year— 
1979—with a trough year—1992 (see, for instance, Danziger and Gottschalk 
1995) Not surprisingly, comparisons of peak-to-trough years lead to a much worse 
outcome but one that mixes changes along a business cycle with changes across 
business cycles. For a fuller discussion of the sensitivity of across-year compari 
sons of economic well-being see Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly (1997).
4. The definition of middle class used here is basically a statistical one. It is the mid 
dle of the 1979 distribution, which is bounded by the upper and lower intersec 
tions of the 1989 distribution—the "middle mass" of the distribution. Of course, 
these "intersection points" do not reflect the political concept of the middle class. 
In 1989 dollars the lower minimum is $4,725 for a single person ($9,450 for a 
household of four), or 74.9 percent of the poverty line and the maximum of 
$30,615 for a single person ($61,230 for a household of four—48.5 times the pov 
erty line). Burkhauser, et al. (1996a) offer an alternative lower boundary of twice 
the poverty line $12,622 for a single person ($25,244 for a household of four), 
which more closely matches the lower boundary of the political middle class, and
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reach the same conclusion—that the overwhelming majority of the middle class 
became richer in the 1980s.
References
Aarts, Leo, Richard V. Burkhauser, and Philip de long, eds. 1996. Curing the 
Dutch Disease: An International Perspective on Disability Policy Reform. 
Aldershot, Great Britain: Avebury 1996.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Amy D. Crews, Mary C. Daly, and Stephen P. Jen- 
kins. 1996a. Where in the World is the Middle Class? A Cross-National 
Comparison of the Shrinking Middle Class Using Kernel Density Esti 
mates. Cross-National Studies in Aging Program Project Paper No. 26, 
Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School. Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Amy D. Crews, Mary C. Daly, and Stephen P. Jen- 
kins. 1996b. "Income Mobility and the Middle Class," AEI Studies on 
Understanding Economic Inequality. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Amy D. Crews, and Mary C. Daly. 1997. "Recounting 
Winners and Losers in the 1980s: A Critique of Income Distribution Mea 
surement Methodology," Economic Letters 54: 35—40.
Burkhauser, Richard V., and Mary C. Daly. 1996a. "The Potential Impact on 
the Employment of People with Disabilities." In Implementing The Ameri 
cans with Disabilities Act, Jane West, ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers, pp. 153-192.
Burkhauser, Richard V., and Mary C. Daly. 1996b. "Employment and Eco 
nomic Well-Being Following the Onset of a Disability: The Role for Public 
Policy." In Disability, Work, and Cash Benefits, Jerry Mashaw, Virginia 
Reno, Richard V. Burkhauser, and Monroe Berkowitz, eds. Kalamazoo, 
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Burkhauser, Richard V., and Robert H. Haveman. 1982 Disability and Work: 
The Economics of American Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Burkhauser, Richard V., and David C. Wittenburg. 1996. "How Current Dis 
ability Transfer Policies Discourage Work: Analysis from the 1990 SIPP," 
Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation 7(August): 9-27.
Daly, Mary C. 1994. "The Economic Well-Being of Men with Disabilities: A 
Dynamic Cross-National View." Ph.D. dissertation in Economics, Syracuse 
University, Syracuse, New York.
Danziger, Sheldon, and Peter Gottschalk. 1995. America Unequal. Cam 
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Author Index
Aarts, Leo, 365, 369, 371, 396, 412 




Bartel, A., 52, 77
Batavia, Andrew L, 23, 25, 325, 327,
330,331,332,334,335 
Bell, Stephen H., 22, 27, 166, 173, 174,
386,390 
Berkowitz, Monroe, 26, 78, 173, 335,
356,371,387,388,412 
Berry, S., 341 
Blank, Rebecca, 112, 133 
Bordelon, Barbara Henry, 18, 281, 402,
404 
Bound, John, 17, 25, 64, 77, 141, 172,
223, 275, 281, 366, 371, 402, xiv 
Braddock, D.R., 385, 389 
Brown, Joan, 328 
Burkhauser, Richard V., 23, 24, 25, 26,
173, 181, 195, 247, 330, 335, 354,
355, 356, 365, 366, 368, 369, 371,
388, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 405,
406,408,410,411nl,411n3,411n4,
412
Burnam, A., 341 
Burns, T.J., 332, 335 
Burt, Martha R , 275 
Butler, J.S., 354, 356, 366, 371 
Bye, Barry V., 140, 172, 173
Chiang, Kimberly, 109
Chirikos, Thomas, 141, 146, 173
Coate, M., 15, 26, 78, 93, 97
Coleman, Kevin A., 31, 133, 353, 356
Conley, R W., 390
Coughlm, T.A., 260, 274
Crews, Amy D., 405, 41 In3, 412
Cromwell, J., 16, 26, 77
Cullinan, Paul R., 99
Currie, Janet, 109, 132n7, 133
Cutler, D.M., 106, 107 
Cutler, Richard C., 200, 203
Daly, Mary C., 13, 22, 25, 177, 181, 
195, 197, 198, 365, 371, 392, 393, 
395,405,411nl,411n3,412
Daniels, M., 341
Daniels, Susan M., 23, 24, 25, 359
Danziger, Sandra, 229, 230, 236, 237, 
248
Danziger, Sheldon, 411n3, 412
Dean, D.H., 384, 389
Decker, Paul, 162, 173, 381, 385, 389
DeJong, G., 327, 332, 335
De Jong, Philip, 365, 369, 371, 396, 
412
Dietrich, Kimberly, 31, 133, 245, 248, 
353, 356
Dolan, R.C., 384, 389
Dunstan, S.M., 378, 388n2, 390
Dykacz, JamceM., 140, 141, 144, 146, 
162, 169, 173
Eismger, Richard, xii 
Ellwood, David T., 7, 26, 368, 371, xii 
Engler, John, 229, 231, 238, 245, 275 
Evans, A., 332, 335
Fisher, Gilbert, 22, 25, 289, xii 
Foster, Rick, xiv 
Frank, Richard G., 103, 309 
Fnedland, R.B, 332, 335 
Fujiura, G., 389
Gambler, Edward, 200, 203 
Gentry, Judy, xiv 
Glenn, Andrew J., 368, 371 
Goldman, Howard H., 23, 24, 25, 337,
403
Gottschalk, Peter, 411n3, 412 
Gradison, William, 371 




Gruber, Jonathan, 63, 65, 78, 132n7, 
133
Halpern, J.H., 15, 26, 78
Hambor, J.C., 3, 15, 16, 26, 78, 93, 97
Hardm, Jane, 281,285
Haveman, Robert H., 330, 335, 391,
392,412
Hays, R., 339, 341 
Hemingson, Celeste, 14, 18, 20, 25,
307,312 
Hemp, R., 389 
Hennessey, JohnC, 140, 141,144,146,
162, 169, 173, 178, 195, 353, 356,
361, 364 
Heslam, D., 274 
Hill, M.A., 78, 356 
Hill, M.L., 389 
Hill, M.S., 179, 195 
Holahan, J., 274 
Hoynes, Hilary Wilhamson, 162, 173,
366, 371
Hu, Wei-Ym, 109 
Hunt, Allan, xiv 
Hurdle, S., 16, 26, 77
Jenkins, Stephen P., 412 
Jones, Charles, 18, 20, 25, 311
Katz, L.F., 106, 107
Katz, P., 95, 97
Kerachsky, S., 381,389
Kiernan, W.E., 378, 389
Kirn, Yang Woo, 354, 356, 366, 371
Kochhar, S., 178, 196, 383, 389
Koitz, D., 353, 356
Kollman, G., 353, 356
Kossoudji, Sherrie, 17-18, 25, 223,
229, 230, 237, 248, 275, 281, 402 
Kraus, R., 15, 26, 78, 93, 97 
Kregel, J., 389 
Krute,A., 15, 16,26,78 
Ku, L., 274 
Kubik, J.D., 65, 78
Lahiri, Kajal, 13, 26
Lando, Mordechai E., 3, 15, 16, 26, 78,
93, 97, 200, 203 
Lauber, William R, 333, 336 
Leonard, J.S., 64, 78 
Levitan, S., 93, 97 
Levy, R, 106, 107 
Levy,J.M., 15, 16,26,78 
Lipsky, Michael, 247, 248 
Livermore, Gina, 14, 18, 20, 25, 31,
133, 249, 281, 282, 283, 399, 402,
404, xiv
Loprest, Pamela, 79, xiv 
Lubitz, James, 140, 172
Madrian, B.C., 63, 78
Mashaw, Jerry L., 2, 26, 166, 173, 199,
201, 202, 203, 204, 330, 334, 335,
368,371,388,412 
Massanari, Larry, 14, 18, 20, 25, 301 
Matloff, Norman, 333, 335 
McCain, John, 325n 
McCaughrin, W, 390 
McKnew, L., 332, 335 
McManus, Leo A., 166, 173, 386, 390 
Metzler, H.M.D., 389 
Mithaug, D., 378, 389 
Moffitt, Robert, 63, 79, 112, 130,
131n5, 133, 162, 173,366,371 
Mont, Daniel, 175, 197 
Moss, J.W., 378, 389 
Muller, L. Scott, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 25,
26,79, 178,195,207, 281, 330, 336,
353,356,361,364,403 
Murname, R., 106, 107
Neisner, J., 353, 356 
Nelson, W.J., 196 
Noble, J.H., Jr., 389
Osterman, P., 94, 97
Owens, Patricia M., 24, 25, 373
Park, Kathy, 236, 248 
Parker, Susan, 330, 331, 335
415
Parrott, Sharon, 236, 248
Parsons, Donald O., 20, 26, 64, 65, 79,
161, 173
Poterba, James, 109 
Prero, Aaron J., 2, 26, 387, 388nl, 389 
Primus, Wendell, xii
Rector, Robert, 333, 336
Reno, Virginia P., 26, 173, 199, 201,
202, 203, 334, 335, 368, 371, 388,
412 
Ricart-Moes, Gema, 18, 25, 223, 275,
281,402
Riley, Gerald K, 140, 172, 173 
Rogers, W., 341 
Rojas-Dedenback, 234 
Ross, Jane L., 22, 23, 24, 25, 343 
Ross, Stanford G., 5, 22, 24, 25, 319,
326 
Rupp, Kalman, 1, 7, 11, 21, 22, 24, 27,
33,75,76n2,79,139,140,141,142,
146, 151, 166, 173, 174, 175, 176,
177,178,194n2,196,272,292,386,
390,403, xii 
Rusch, F.R., 378, 389, 390
Sandell, Steven, 79, xiv
Schmidt-Bayne, Christy, xii
Schmulowitz, Jack, 141, 174
Schore, J., 378, 388n2, 390
Scott, Charles G., 7, 11, 21, 24, 27, 33, 
75, 76n7, 139, 140, 142, 146, 151, 
174,175,176, 177,178,194n2,196, 





Stapleton, David C., 1, 11, 13, 14, 15, 
16,17,18,20, 25, 31, 76n2, 79,109, 
133, 245, 247, 248, 249, 281, 282, 
283, 329, 337, 339, 351, 353, 356, 
399, 401, 402, 403, 404, 41 Inl, 
xn-xiii
Stark, J.A., 378, 389
Stewart, A., 341
Taggart, R., 93, 97
Taubman, P., 52, 77
Thomas, Duncan, 109
Thompson, Larry, xii
Thompson, L.H., 3, 16, 27, 79
Thornton, Craig, 22, 24, 25, 162, 173,
377, 378, 381, 385, 388nl, 389, 390 
Tines, J., 386, 390 
Treitel, Ralph, 140, 141, 174
Upp, Melinda, 22, 25, 289, xiii-xiv
Van de Water, P.N., 3, 16, 27, 79 
Vaughan, Denton R., 13, 26, 169, 170, 
174
Ware, J., 341
Weaver, Carolyn L., 22, 23, 25, 326,
351,352,353,355,356,403 
Wedig, G., 16, 26, 77 
Wehman, PH., 378, 387, 389, 390 
Wells, K., 339, 341 
West, Jane, 23, 24, 25, 359 
Wheeler, Peter M., 14, 18, 20, 25, 207,
281,403, xiv 
Wmkler, Anne, 131n4, 132n8, 132nl3,
133
Wmterbottom, C., 274 
Wittenburg, David C., 368, 371, 41 Inl,
412
Wixon, Bernard, 13, 26, 169, 170, 174 
Wolfe, Barbara, 63, 79, 109, 112, 130,
131n5, 133, 135 
Wood, Michelle, 22, 27, 166, 174
Yeas, Martynas, 203, 204, 294, 297 
Yelin, Edward, 93, 94, 95, 97, 361, 364 
Yelowitz, Aaron S., 17, 24, 63, 79, 109,
112-113,130, 131nl, 133, 135,
136-137





Accommodation. See Americans with
Disabilities Act (1990) 
ADA. See Americans with Disabilities
Act (1990)
Adjudicative climate, 337-338 
Administration process, 320, 369-370 
Administrative changes
SSI program means test and,
161-162
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) 
allowance rates and, 214-215 
operational problems and, 344 
Adult Disabled and Medicaid 
Program (SSI), 110-113 
Adults
with disabilities, 329-332 
SSI disability applications in 
Michigan, 227, 228, 239, 240, 
242, 243
See also Children; specific issues 
Advertising
for disability claimants, 212-213 
Advocacy programs, 282
financial benefits to states, 283-284 
in Michigan, 236-237 
state contracts for, 282-283 
AFDC. See Aid to Families with
Dependent Children 
African Americans
SSI and Medicaid participation and,
120, 128, 129 
Age
award distribution in future, 176 
changes in distribution of new
awardeesby, 157 
Dl-insured population and average
length of first SSDI spells, 168 
at disability onset, 392-393 
duration and, 141, 142-149,
166-167, 175
as growth factor, 51, 266, 292 
See also Baby boomers; Children; 
Elderly; Young people
AIDS/HIV, 12
as application growth factor, 267,
269
in Atlantic states, 302 
data and, 53 
impact on disability applications and
awards, 33, 271 
in New York and Texas, 264 
Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), 7, 109 
General Assistance interactions and,
60-62
Medicaid and, 111-112 
participation by female-headed
households, 130-131 
program reforms and, 304-305, 405 
shifting responsibility for, 255-257 
state program growth and, 249 
Aid to the Blind program
SSI and, 1-2 
Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled 
SSI and, 1-2 
Alcoholism. See Drug Abuse and
Alcohol Referral and Monitoring 
Agency (DARMA) program; 
Drug addiction and alcoholism
(DA&A) 
Aliens
SSI eligibility of, 8 
See also Legal aliens, Immigrants 
ALJs. See Administrative Law Judges 
Allowance rates, 40-44, 214-215 
changes in, by impairment, 43 
regression estimates for models
(1980-1993), 88-90 
See also Application and award 
growth; Initial allowance rates; 
Unemployment rate 
Amendments to Social Security Act
(1980, 1981, 1984) 
and benefit supply changes, 65-69
417
418
Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)
(ADA), 2, 22, 293-294, 322,
326-327, 352
accommodation emphasis in, 409 
Antidiscrimination laws, 327 
Application and award growth 
actual and simulated initial
determination (1980-1993), 57 
allowance rates (1988-1992), 40^4 
annual growth rate by program and
impairment, 73 
annual growth rate of applications
(1985-1994), 75
application growth, 40, 41, 42, 104 
in Atlantic states, 301-305 
business cycles and, 54-58 
case studies in five states, 249-279 
changes in final allowance rates by
impairment, 43
classification in DRF data, 39-40 
decomposition of growth
(1988-1992), 91 
disability research file data
(1988-1992), 37-40 
econometric analysis of state data,
31-91,265-269
economic conditions and, 208-210 
economic restructuring and, 54-58 
empirical analyses of, 31-91 
family structure affecting, 271 
future trends affecting, 165-171 




mental illness recipients, 337-341 
in Michigan, 223-247 
other support program interactions
and, 59-63
policy applications of, 289-297 
population changes and, 49-54 
program groups and, 50 
short-term factors in, 291-292 
state case studies of, 249-279
supply change evidence from
simulations for 1988-1992,
72-74
supply of benefits affecting, 63-74 
total adult SSI program disability
applications (Michigan), 225 
younger entrants affecting, 165-171 
Application and award regression
results 1988-1992, 82-83, 84-85 
Application cohort, 76n4 
ASPE. See Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation 
Awardees
age mix of, 148
characteristics of affecting benefit
duration, 141-159 
cohorts of DI, 146-149, 162 
cohorts of SSI, 151 
limitations of surveys of, 201-202 
lowering entry age of, 148-149 
pre-award characteristics of,
177-195
proportions, by age, 146 
SSI duration among nonconcurrent
awardees, 149-159 
See also Application and award
growth; Awards; Persons with
disabilities 
Awards
age distribution of, 176 
drop in new, 157-158 
proportions, by diagnosis, 146 
See also Application and award
growth
Baby boomers
aging of, 148, 172, 175, 221, 292
retirement age increase and, 403 





impact on DI applications, 64-65 
Parsons and, 161 
return to work and, 366 
Benefit duration 
age and, 142-149 
awardee characteristics and,
141-159
determinants of, 139-172 
DIand, 142-149 
DI and SSI differences and,
150-151
diagnosis, age, and, 144-146 
of first DI spells, 145, 147, 150 
of first SSI spells, 154, 156 
flexibility and, 278 
implications for caseloads and,
166-171 
lifetime, in DI and SSI programs,
171-172
for new awardees, 149 
policy changes in, 353 
prior studies of, 140-141 
programmatic factors directly
affecting, 160-166 
program usage and, 177 
reducing, 21-22 
SSIand, 149-159 
simulated total pre-65 SSI disability
stays (nonconcurrents), 158 
simulated total preretirement stays
on SSI disability rolls, 159 
time-limited benefits and, 370 
of transitional employment for
mentally retarded, 378-379 
vocational rehabilitation and, 162 
work incentives and, 162 
Benefit reduction rate, 113 
Benefits
as acceptable alternative to work,
220-221 
analysis of supply changes
(1980-1989), 65-69 
analysis of supply changes
(1989-1993), 69-74 
to baby boomers, 221
employment and, 327-328 
increased awareness of, 210-213 
to prisoners, 221 
program interaction effects on,
59-63 
retaining while receiving assistance,
279 
and Social Security Act
Amendments, 65-69 
SSA field office mangers on reasons
for disability benefits growth,
207-222 
substitute and complementary
programs and, 17 
supply effects on, 63-74 
time-limited, 370 
value of, 64, 217-218 
See also Michigan; State and local
programs; specific states 
Benefit years
increase by age, 168-169 
Blind persons
defined for SSI eligibility, 133nl7 
Medicaid expenditures on, 137 
Block grants 
TANF and, 8 
See also Grants 
Budget constraints
SSI and Medicaid incorporated into,
113-115
Business cycles, 14, 41 Inl, 41 In3 
Atlantic states and, 302-303 
impact of, 32, 398-399, 401^02,
405^07 
regression estimates of, effects on
applications and awards, 54-58 
relationship to application growth,
93-96
simulated effects of, 56-58 




program eligibility changes in, 262
420
program growth in, 251 
program shifts in, 259 
See also State and local programs 
Caseload growth. See Application and
award growth 
Cash benefits
Medicaid eligibility and, 111 
termination for drug addicts/
alcoholics, 161 
Cash grant levels, 279 
CDRs. See Continuing Disability
Reviews 
Children, 160, 332-333
as application growth factor, 166,
267
caseload increases and, 172 
disability review and, 312-313 
disability standards for, 132-133nl5 
eligibility of, 7-8, 213-214 
future duration of stay and, 167 
increased proportion receiving SSI
program awards, 157 
Medicaid eligibility and, 112, 126 
mental disorder allowances for,
69-70
in New York City, 258-259 
SSI supply shifts for, 69-70 
See also Age; State and local
programs; Sullivan v. Zebley 
Choice
of return-to-work services, 362-363 
of SSI, Medicaid, and health
insurance benefits, 135-138 
Choice-based utility-maximization
model 
Medicaid impact on adult SSI and,
135 
Complementary programs, 17
program interactions and, 60 
Concord, New Hampshire
perspective of SSA regional office 
in, 307-310
Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs),
8, 140, 344
duration and, 160-166 
lack of, 218-219 
in Michigan, 312 
as policy tools, 160-166 
"Contract with America Advancement
Act (1996)", 161 
Cost
of transitional employment services
for mentally retarded, 383-384 
Cost sharing
state-federal, 257-258 
Cost shifting, 74, 104-105, 247, 
255-257, 259-260, 272-273, 
282, 291-292, 308-309, 402 
in Michigan, 314 
Court decisions, 102,213-214
See also Supreme court; Sullivan v.
Zebley 
Cross-section time-series models. See
Pooled methodology 
Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
in research on public health 
insurance-caseload growth 
relationship, 109
DA&A. See Drug addiction and
alcoholism







for benefits awards, 214-215 
problems with, 351-352 
Demand for benefits
SSA field office managers on, 208,
209
Demographic factors, 11 
in Atlantic states, 302 
future duration and, 167
421
impact on disability applications and
awards, 32-33
increased proportion of children 
receiving SSI program awards, 
157 
Medicaid, SSI recipients, and,
119-128




age and, 144-146 
duration and, 142 
flexibility and, 278 
DI program. See Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI) program 
Disabilities
age of onset, 392-393 
categories of, and employability,
331
criteria for, 11-12,50 
definition of, 293-294, 309 
examining categories of SSI
recipients and, 278-279 
flexibility and, 278 
measuring for pre-award
character! sties study, 181-182 
self-reported, 12
See also Persons with disabilities 
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits
(Mashaw et al.), 2
Disability and Work: The Economics of 
American Policy (Burkhauser and 
Haveman), 391 
Disability Determination Services
(DDSs), 34, 101 
Disability Evaluation Study (SSA), 2,
12 
Disability insurance programs
in industrialized countries, 321 
Disability Insurance Trust Fund, 319 
reallocation of funds to Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, 
319-321
Disability management
in workplace, 373-376 
Disability programs
cash and in-kind program 
interactions with, 17, 59-63
cycles of problems in, 321-322
entry to, 148-149
exit from, 139-140, 143, 160, 
163-166, 366
features of, 19-22
field office manager perspective on 
growth of, 207-222
goals of, 313
market served by, 352-356
operational problems in, 344
policy implications of growth in, 
289-297
preserving, 325-336
reentry into, 139-140, 160
rethinking, 343-349
See also Application and Award
Growth; Benefit duration 
Disability research file (DRF)




for children, 132-133nl5 
Disability Survey (1994-1996)
data files of, 203
Disabled Client Advocacy Program 
(DCAP)
in New York, 257 
Disabled Workers' Tax Credit (DWTC),
368 
Disabling health conditions
data available on, 53 
"Discouraged worker" effect, 56 
Discrimination, 327 
Disincentives
to hiring disabled, 221-222
See also Work incentives and
disincentives 
Disorders




DRF. See Disability research file 
Drug Abuse and Alcohol Referral and 
Monitoring Agency (DARMA) 
program
in Michigan, 234-236 
Drug addiction and alcoholism 
(DA&A), 138, 215-216
in Atlantic states, 302
benefits losses and, 161, 279
benefit termination for, 161
in California, 264
Michigan program for, 234—236
SSI benefits and, 279 
Duration. See Benefit duration
Early retirement, 23




characteristics study, 182 
See also Employment; Work entries 
Earnings
of disabled workers, 361 
health and, 141
for transitional employment of the 
mentally retarded, 380-383, 385 
Econometric analysis, 31-91, 265-269 
Economic deprivation
in New Hampshire, 309-310 
Economic factors
applications increases and, 93-96,
311-312
Atlantic states and, 302-303 
disability applications and, 208-210 
in growth of disability applications
and awards, 32 
impact of disability on individual,
393-396 
See also Business cycles
Economic restructuring
impact on disability applications and
awards, 32 
regression estimates of effects on
applications and awards, 54-58 
Economic well-being
changes in, 190-193, 407^09 
measuring for pre-award
characteristics study, 182-183 
in pre-award recipients, 199 
Education
SSI participation and, 125-126 
EITC. See Earned Income Tax Credit 
Elderly
DI program and, 23 
Medicaid expenditures on, 137 
SSI participation and, 112, 130,
133nl7 
See also Age 
Eligibility issues




new criteria and, 292
reaching individuals and, 212-213
recessions and, 56
for SSI and Medicaid, 110, 136
state changes in criteria, 262-263
See also specific issues and
programs 
Employers
and disincentives to hiring disabled,
221-222
return to work and, 374—376 
Employment
benefits as acceptable alternative to,
220-221 
business cycles and disability
applications, 93-96 
as component in lives of future




denial of benefits and, 100 
of DI and SSI recipients, 359-364 
disability and, 329, 331 
after disability onset, 392 
economic growth and, 409—411 
enhancements for, 355 
income levels and, 361 
measuring for pre-award
characteristics study, 182 
Michigan and, 313 
number of mentally retarded in
transitional employment program,
384-385
path to retirement and, 396-398 
retaining benefits and, 278-279 
return to work and, 330-332, 344,
362-363
strategies for, 322-323 
subsidies to maintain disabled
employees, 367 
support services for mentally
retarded, 377-379 
See also Unemployment rate; Work
incentives and disincentives 
Employment services, 162 
Employment strategies, 23-24 
Employment support training programs
funding plans for, 387 
Entitlement mentality, 327 
Entitlement programs
attitudes toward, 6-7,220-221, 289,
326, 343, 345-346 
Evaluation
of mentally retarded for transitional
employment, 380 
Explanatory variables
for application and award
determination, 46-48
Family Individual Response-
Nonresponse File (1991), 179
Family structure, 52
award growth affected by, 271
decline in support and, 292
impact on states, 271
pre-award period, 183-189, 191, 
192
SSI participation and, 125-126 
Federal government
role of, 294-297
shift of welfare spending to, 74,247,
255 
Female-headed households, 52
AFDC participation and, 130-131
Medicaid expenditures and, 112 
Field offices
on disability program growth, 
207-222
See also Concord, New Hampshire;
Philadelphia
Financial incentives, 219-220 
Fiscal problems (state). See Michigan;
State and local programs 
Florida
eligibility changes in, 262
immigrants in, 264
Medicaid programs in, 261-262
program growth in, 251
program shifts in, 259-260 
Funding
reasons for changes in, 352
See also Cost shifting; specific 
programs
GA. See General Assistance
GAO. See General Accounting Office
Gender
duration and, 141, 142, 175 




application and award growth and,
51
in labor force, 93, 95-96 
See also Men; Women 
General Accounting Office (GAO) 
outreach activities and, 281-282 
Social Security Disability Insurance 
(DI) program beneficiaries study, 
161
state advocacy and, 283-284 
General Assistance (GA)
Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and, 60-62 
impact of cuts on mental impairment
applications and awards, 62 
medical care coverage through,
135-136
in Michigan, 223-247, 275-276 
program cuts and, 266-267 
program interactions and, 60 
reforms in, 304
shifting responsibility for, 255-256 
state and local governments and,
249,271 
General health care
impact of reform on SSI, 63 
General Relief (GR) 
in California, 251 
Goals
of disability programs, 313 
of social policy, 404 
Grants
cash as, 279
See also Benefit reduction rate; 
Block grants
Harris County. See Texas
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 12
Health care costs
impact on Medicaid and SSI 
participation, 109-133
shifts in responsibility and, 272-273
Health coverage
employment and loss of, 360-361 
Medicaid without SSI participation
and, 131 
termination for drug addicts/
alcoholics, 161 
Health factors
and benefits applied for, 100
data available on, 53
earnings and, 141
impact on disability applications and
awards, 32-33 
Heterogeneity index 
for Medicaid, 112 
Hiring. See Employment, Work
incentives and disincentives 
HIV. See AIDS/HIV 
Home Relief (HR) program
in New York, 257 
Households
changes among DI recipients and,
193-194 
changes among SSI recipients and,
190-193 
economic impact of disability on,
393-396
limitations of data on, 200-201 
in pre-award years, 182-189 
younger, 407^1-09
Immigrants
state populations of, 263-264
undocumented, 263
See also Legal aliens 
Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(1986) (IRCA), 53-54, 263
as application growth factor, 267 
Impairment







See also Work incentives and
disincentives
Income distribution, 405-407, 408, 410 
Income programs
impact on SSI applications, awards,
and, 61
Income tax. See Taxation 
Income transfers
pre-award characteristics and, 179 
Industrialized countries
disability insurance programs in,
321 
Infectious diseases
as DRF classification category, 39 
Initial allowance rates 
for 1980-1994, 37, 38 
supply change impact on, 71-73 
Initial determinations, 76n5, 77n9 
1980-1994 data on, 34-35 
regression estimates for models
(1980-1993), 86-87 
supply changes and, 68 
See also Unemployment rate 
In-kind transfer programs
impact on SSI applications, awards,
and, 61
See also Transfer programs 
Insurance
social policy and disability-based,
396-403
See also Disability insurance 
programs; Health coverage; 
specific programs 
Internal organ disorders
DI application growth change and,
51
as DRF classification category, 39 
Intervention
return to work and, 366-367 
IQ scores
for mentally retarded SSI recipients, 
379-380
IRCA. See Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (1986)
Job loss
SSI recipients and, 190 
Job separation, 396-398 
Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation, 2
Labor force
business cycles and disability 
applications, 93-96
wage replacement rates and, 64
See also Gender 
Labor market, 13-16
changes in, 303
SSI participation and, 125 
Lagged effects
business cycle effects and, 55 
Legal aliens, 333
IRCA and, 53-54
See also Immigrants 
Lewin-VHI, Inc., 6
on mental impairment category, 
339-340
principal findings of, 290
See also specific issues 
Lifetime duration
in disability programs, 171-172
See also Benefit duration 
Linear probability model
SSI participation, 124 
Local programs. See State and local
programs 
Location-specific characteristics
of SSI participation, 122-126 
Long-term growth factors, 292 
Long-term program beneficiaries, 7
See also Benefit duration 
Los Angeles County. See California 
Low-productivity workers
tax subsidies for, 367-369
426
Market
for social security disability
programs, 352-356 
Marriage
mental illness and, 52-53 
Maryland, 302
advocacy program in, 282 
referral program in, 303-304 




of SSI, 151-157, 161-162, 170, 171 
Medicaid, 17 
benefits of, 111 
descriptive analysis of participation
selection criteria, 115-121 
elderly participation in, 112 
eligibility for, 135-136 
expenditures and SSI participation,
123-125 
factors in growth of enrollment,
137-138 
health care costs, SSI participation
and, 109-133 
impact of benefits on SSI
applications and awards, 63 
in Michigan, 234 
percentage and impact of disabled
beneficiaries, 111 
prior studies of participation in,
111-113
program interactions and, 60 
shift of individuals to, 282 
and SSI benefits growth, 110 
state coverages and, 260-262 
state program growth and, 249 
theoretical considerations in




Medicaid notch, 113-115, 135
Medically Needy (MN) program, 112,
131
Medical standards, 144 
changes in, 215-217 
Medicare, 17
program interactions and, 60 
Men
application and award growth for, 51 
See also Gender 
Mental disorders
adult SSI disability applications for
(Michigan), 227 
allowance changes for, 216 
appropriateness of applications and
awards, 338-339 
change in allowance rate for
(1988-1991), 45 
disability recipients and, 353 
as DRF classification category, 39 
GA cuts and mental impairment
applications and awards, 62 
growth in awards for, 403^04 
impairment criteria (1984), 66-67 
legibility standards changes and,
110
marital status and, 52-53 
mental illness application category,
40,41,42 
mental retardation application
category, 40, 41,42 
policy implications of beneficiary
growth, 337-341 
proportion of SSI awardees having,
157
standards for, 216, 337-338 
supply shifts for children and, 69-70 
See also Transitional Employment
Training Demonstration 
Mental Health Association of
Minnesota v. Schweiker, 67 
Mental retardation
growth in category, 310
427
proportion of SSI awardees having,
157 
Transitional Employment Training
Demonstration and, 377-388 
See also Mental disorders 
Michigan
DARMA program in, 234-236 
ending of GA and SSI program
disability growth in, 223-247 
outreach and advocacy in, 232-237 
perspective of Office of Disability
Determination, 311-315 
program growth in, 251-252 
programs for special populations in,
230 
public policy administration in,
275-276 
quantitative evidence on importance
of GA in, 237-246 
recent trends in awards in, 224-226 
termination of GA program in,
256-257
See also State and local programs 
Michigan Department of Social
Services (MDSS), 232-235 
Middle class, 411^12n4 
Musculoskeletal disorders
application growth, 40, 41, 42 
DI application growth change and,
51 
as DRF classification category, 39
National Academy of Social Insurance
Disability Policy Panel of, 368 
disability program review by, 166 
National factors
in application and award
econometric analyses, 48 
National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS), 12 
National Medical Care Utilization and
Expenditure Study (NMCUES),
112 
Negative income tax. See Taxation
New Hampshire
cost shifting in, 308-309 
outreach efforts in, 307-308 
perspective of SSA regional office
in, 307-310 
New York (state) 
cost-sharing in, 257 
eligibility changes in, 262-263 
HIV/AIDS in, 264 
New York City outreach program,
258-259
program growth in, 252 
See also State and local programs 
(case studies of)
Office of Disability Determination
(Michigan), 311-315 
Office of Research, Evaluation, and
Statistics (SSA), 13 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), 
6
principal findings of, 290 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust
Fund
reallocation of funds to Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund, 319-321 
Older workers. See Elderly 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(1981), 101
Ordinary least squares approach 
to SSI participation, 125, 127 
Oregon advocacy program, 283 
Outreach efforts
increased awareness of benefits
availability and, 211-212 
locating eligible welfare recipients,
212-213 
for mentally retarded SSI recipients,
379
in Michigan, 224, 232-236 
in New Hampshire, 307-310 
in New York City, 258-259 
in Philadelphia region, 305
428
policy administration and, 276 
program shifting and, 255-262,
281-282 
public policy implications of,
284-285 
by SSI, 69
Paid work. See Employment 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), 199, 393 
pre-award characteristics study and,
179-180, 199, 201 
Pennsylvania, 302
advocacy program in, 283 
Philadelphia SSA regional office
perspective, 301-305 
referral program in, 303-304 
Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(1996), 2, 6-7, 8 
childhood disability eligibility
provisions and, 172 
drug and alcohol abuse and, 279 
impact of welfare program changes
and, 18
Section 212 of, 160 
Persons with disabilities
consideration of needs and demands
of, 289
labor force trends and, 95-96 
as market for disability programs,
352-356
perspective of, 327-328 
societal attitudes toward, 345-346 
Policy. See Public policy 
Policy changes, 346-348 
cost shifting and, 104-105 
recession and, 105-106 
Policy implications, 22-24 
health insurance without SSI





and estimates of business cycle
effects, 55 
specification of pooled cross-section
time-series models, 80-82 
and time-series analysis of state- 
level data, 33 
Population
changes in Dl-msured, 148 
Population growth, 11-13
as application growth factor, 266 
applications, awards, and, 49-54 
See also Demographic factors 
Poverty
pre-award transition to, 193 
Poverty rate
application and award growth and,
51-52
determinants of, 52
President's Committee on Employment 
of People with Disabilities 
(1994), 360 
Prisoners
benefits sought by, 221 
Program growth. See Application and 
award growth; specific programs 
Program interactions, 17-18
impact on disability applications and
awards, 32, 59-63 
Programmatic factors
directly affecting duration, 160-166 
Project NetWork, 22, 162-166 
PSID. See Panel Study of Income
Dynamics
Public information, 291 
as outreach effort, 212 




decision making problems and, 
351-352
429
defining disability and, 293-295
DI program and, 3
on employment of DI and SSI
recipients, 359-364 
federal role and, 294-297 
of goals of disability programs, 313 
implications of federal disability
program growth for, 289-297 
implications of outreach for,
284-285
to make work pay, 365-370 
mental disorders policy and,
339-340
options for changes in, 346-348 
past and future of, 391-411 
pre-award characteristics and,
178-179 
preserving disability programs and,
325-336
public trustee on, 319-324 
See also Policy changes; Social
policy
Public transfers 
loss of, 193 
Public trustee
perspective of, 319-324
Qualified Medicaid Beneficiary (QMB) 
program, 130
Race
Medicaid participation and, 120,
128, 129
SSI participation and, 128 
Reallocation
from Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund to Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund, 319-321 
tax, 355 
Recessions, 401-402
impact on program growth, 74, 75,
253-255
policy changes and, 105-106 
See also Business cycles
Referrals, 303-304
awareness of benefits and, 212 
from town welfare directors (New
Hampshire), 309 
Reforms, 323 
AFDC and, 405 
in Atlantic states, 304 
general health care, Medicaid, and,
63 
impact on applications and awards,
273 
to improve market outcomes,
351-356 
of mental impairment disability
benefits, 340-341 
of welfare programs, 328-333 
See also Public policy; specific
programs 
Regression
estimates of recession impact, 14 
results for 1988-1992 period,
82-83, 84-85 
Regulations
SSA changes in, 148 
Rehabilitation, 409 
need for, 277-278 
policy changes and, 354 
vocational, 285 
Retirement
decreasing age of benefit recipients
and, 363 
DI as, 329
increase in normal age of, 403 
path to, 396-398 
size of population in, 400-401 
use of disability funds and, 353 
Return to work. See Employment; Work
entries
Section 709 (Social Security Act), 5, 6 
Section 1619 provisions, 162 
Self-reported disabilities, 12, 181 
"709 Report," 5, 13,74
430
Shifting of funding responsibility. See
Cost shifting
Short-term growth factors, 291-292 
Simulations
for application and award
determination, 48 
SIPP. See Survey of Income and
Program Participation (1984) 
Skills. See Training; Vocational
rehabilitation
Social assistance and insurance 
measuring for pre-award




programs, and, 396-403 
goals of, 404 
See also Public policy 
Social Security Act
1980 and 1981 amendments to,
65-69
1984 amendments to, 35-36, 65-69 
Section 709 of, 5, 6
Social Security Administration (SSA), 1 
administration of, 320 
catena changes and, 104 
field office managers' viewpoints on 
growth in disability programs, 
207-222
perspective of Concord, New 
Hampshire, regional office, 
307-310 
perspective of Philadelphia regional
office, 301-305 
See also Disabilities; specific
programs 
Social Security Disability Insurance
(DI) program, 1-2 
characteristics of population of adult 
recipients in pre-award years, 185 
characteristics of recipients in years 
prior to receiving benefits, 
177-195
disability awards by, 4
duration characteristics, trends, and,
142-149
household characteristics in pre- 
award years, 183-189 
incidence rate compared with SSI,
169-171
incidence rates, expected duration, 
and benefit years per 1,000 
insured workers, 169 
and pre-award view of disability
benefits, 177-195 
reallocation and, 321 
relationship with SSI, 290 
trust fund of, 175 
See also Application and award 
growth; Benefit duration; Supply 
of benefits
Social Security Independence and 
Program Improvement Act 
(1994) Section 201 of, 160 
Social Security Trust Funds, 319 
Social welfare protection system, 397 
Source evidence
for health benefits, 66 
Special needs
providing for, 355 
Spend-down provision, 135 
SSA. See Social Security
Administration 
SSI program. See Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program 
Standards. See Medical standards;
specific standards 
State and local programs
advocacy services and, 282-283 
and application and award
econometric analyses, 48 
case studies of, 249-279 
econometric analysis of state data,
265-269 
financial benefits of advocacy
services, 283-284 
impact of SSI supplements, 62
431
impact on applications and awards,
32,59-62
impact on benefits growth, 217 
Medicaid coverage, SSI
participation, and, 122-126 
in Michigan, 223-247 
relationship with SSDI and SSI
application growth, 93-96 
shifts to federal programs by, 74,
247, 255, 281-282, 291-292 
spend-down provision and, 135 
state interests and, 276-277 
See also Medicaid; Michigan; 
specific states and programs 
State Disability Assistance (SDA)
in Michigan, 230, 257 
State Family Assistance (SFA)
in Michigan, 230, 257 
State-level pooled cross/section time- 
series methods
business cycle effects and, 14 
State Medical Program (SMP)
in Michigan, 230 
State variables
supply factors and, 33 
Subsidies
to employed employees with
disabilities, 367 
Substitute programs, 17
program interactions, DI and SSI
applications and awards, and, 60 
Sullivan v. Zebley, 20-21, 35, 69, 126,
213-214,312-313 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program, 1-2, 4
alcohol and drug abuse and, 279 
analysis variables for SSI
population, 117-119 
applications for benefits in
Michigan, 231-232 
average length of first disability
spell and total pre-65 stay, 156 
awards per 1,000 persons satisfying 
SSI means test, 170
background on adult disabled and
Medicaid program, 110-113 
characteristics of population of adult
recipients in pre-award years, 184 
characteristics of recipients in years




disabled population growth and, 109 
duration and, 149-159 
eligibility for and Medicaid
eligibility, 136 
estimated mean duration on rolls of,
154-155 
factors in growth of enrollment,
137-138
household characteristics in pre- 
award years, 183-189 
incidence rate compared with DI,
169-171
in Michigan, 223-246 
modeling participation in, 121-128 
participation rates, by race, 128 
reallocation and, 321 
reasons for completion of first
disability spell, 152-153 
relationship with Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI), 290 
state supplements to, 62 
See also Application and award
growth; Benefit duration; Supply
of benefits
Supply of benefits, 9-10, 32 
analysis of, 65-74 
field office managers on growth of,
208, 209 
historical, and initial determination
and allowance growth, 68-69 
impact on states, 270 
increased awareness of availability
and, 210-213 
SSA disability programs and, 19-22
432
Social Security Act Amendments
and, 65-69 
state variables and, 33 
See also Benefits 
Support
financial, m-kind, and emotional, 52 
impact of interactions on DI and SSI
applications and awards, 59-63 
Supported employment, 378 
Supreme Court
on disability standards for children,
132-133nl5 
Sullivan v Zebley and, 20-21, 35,
69, 126 
Survey of Income and Program
Participation (1984) (SIPP), 12, 
13,256 
Sweden, 400
TANK See Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families 
Target populations, 12 
Taxation
on DI, 354
negative income tax and, 404
subsidies for low-productivity 
workers, 367-369
subsidies to employees with 
disabilities, 367
worker credits and, 409 
Tax reallocation, 355 
Temporary assistance, 18 
Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), 8, 17 
Terminations, 292-293
duration and, 141 
Texas
eligibility changes in, 263
HIV/AIDS in, 264
immigrants in, 264
Medicaid programs in, 261
program growth in, 252
program shifts in, 259
See also State and local programs
(case studies of) 
Third-party arrangements
for reaching eligible individuals,
212-213 
Time limits, 370
for alcoholic and drug addicted
disabled, 7
See also Benefit duration 
Time-series models. See Pooled
methodology 
Title II See Social Security Disability
Insurance (DI) program 
Title XVI. See Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program 
Training, 409
See also Transitional Employment
Training Demonstration and 
Transfer programs, 366
disability insurance-based, 398 
growth in population for, 403—411 
impact on SSI applications, awards,
and, 61
Transitional Employment Training 
Demonstration, 22, 162, 166, 
377-388 
impact on recipients of services,
381-383
implications of, 383-388 
Trends
in SSI financial eligibility variables,
12-13
See also Business cycles 
Trust funds, 3, 319 
209(b) states, 132nl2
Unemployment
as application growth factor, 266 
in Atlantic region, 303 
disability benefits growth and, 210 
impact in New Hampshire, 309
433
Unemployment insurance
for cyclical economic downturns,
398-399 
Unemployment rate
and disability program growth, 15 
effect on DI and SSI applications,
56-58, 93-96
impact on benefits applications, 100 
initial determinations, allowances,
and, 99
SSI and DI determinations and, 55 
SSI participation and, 125 
See also Business cycles;
Employment
Value of benefits package, 64, 217-218 
Virginia, 302
reform in, 304 
Vocational factors
disability determinations and, 102 
Vocational rehabilitation, 21, 285, 362
duration and, 162
Wage replacement rates
effect on labor force and disability
program participation, 64 
Washington State advocacy program,
283
Welfare path, 399 
Welfare programs
impact of changes on disability
programs, 18 
prior studies of participation in,
111-113
reform of, 328-333 
social policy and disability-based,
396-^03 
See also State and local programs;
specific programs 
Welfare recipients
arrangements for locating, 212-213 
Welfare reform. See Reforms 
Welfare restructuring 
in Michigan, 223-224
West Virginia, 302, 303 
Women
application and award growth for,
50-51 
decline of proportion of among new
noncurrent SSI awardees, 157 
economic impact of disability on,
393-396 
See also Female-headed households;
Gender 
Work
can/cannot work dichotomy, 22 
capacity for, 330 
in New Hampshire, 310 
See also Employment 
Work disabilities
DI and SSI benefits and, 199-200 
Work history, 151 
Work incentives and disincentives, 21,
111, 162, 222, 328, 330-332, 334 
health care loss and, 360-361 
policies enhancing return to work,
365-371
policy changes and, 353-354 
from providers, 362-363 
in social welfare system, 400 
taxation for subsidies to workers,
367-369
See also Employment 
Workplace disability management, 
373-376
Young people
in benefit system, 177, 363, 407-409

About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit 
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to 
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an 
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was 
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, 
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of 
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of 
publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a 
research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social 
scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements 
the internal research program by providing financial support to researchers 
outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major 
vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other 
selected works in the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services 
division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and 
training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication 
programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of 
public and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make 
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit 
of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, 
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and 
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work 
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional 
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